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Abstract 
Best known for being a ‘rollercoaster’ and a ‘marriage of convenience’, various scholars have 
tried to reflect upon the true nature of Pak-U.S. relationship under this banner. However, no 
matter how one examines this relationship one thing is certain –– the experience for both 
countries has been harrowing. After India settled for non-alignment early in the Cold War, 
Pakistan seized the opportunity and aligned itself with the United States in the East-West 
struggle and pledged allegiance to fight communism in Asia. But that was not the only motive –– 
Pakistan secretly hoped that an alliance with the U.S. would provide it security against India with 
whom Pakistan had an antagonistic relationship over their outstanding territorial dispute of 
Kashmir. When the U.S. did not rescue Pakistan as it had hoped for during its war with India in 
1965 and sanctioned both countries with an arms embargo, Pakistan felt betrayed. From that 
period onwards, Pakistan’s list of grievances against the U.S. developed into a narrative of 
betrayal and abandonment fed by several episodes in their relationship during and after the Cold 
War –– a period in which Pakistan developed and tested its nuclear weapons –– duly exploited 
by Pakistani leaders as a tool for populist politics.  
This dissertation provides the first scholarly account of Pakistan’s narrative and tests its 
merit against the U.S. non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan under five administrations from 
Ford to Clinton and finds that Pakistan’s narrative of betrayal and abandonment is uneven and 
misleading with respect to the objectives and successes of U.S. non-proliferation policy. This 
dissertation uses multi-archival documents to offer a counter-narrative which argues that 
Pakistan, although a small state, was able to brilliantly maneuver its way through restricted 
spaces in its relationship with the U.S. in the past five decades to not only acquire a decent 
conventional capability through U.S. military assistance but also nuclear weapons due to the 
  
fickleness of U.S. non-proliferation policy. This research concludes that the compromises made 
by the U.S. to accommodate Pakistan and its inconsistency in enforcement of non-proliferation 
laws has implications for the efficacy and success of U.S. non-proliferation policy with 
prospective proliferants.  
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1 
Introduction 
I understand that Dr. Kissinger would fly to Vietnam; on his way back he would make 
stops at Bangkok, Delhi, and Islamabad. This is to act as a cover plan. From Islamabad he 
would like me to make him disappear to a holiday resort in North Pakistan. In actual fact 
he will be carried by P.I.A. to be delivered anywhere on Chinese soil, which you may like 
to suggest.1 
 
This handwritten text was given to the Chinese Ambassador in Pakistan, Zhang Tongon by the 
President of Pakistan General Yahya Khan on May 19, 1971 to be delivered to the Chinese 
premier, Zhou Enlai. Kissinger’s ‘double’ did appear in Nathiagali, Murree Hills, adjoining 
Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan, on the historic day Kissinger entered China aboard Pakistan 
International Airlines Boeing 707 on July 9, 1971. That was in all likelihood the highest point in 
Pakistan-U.S. relationship where Pakistan was bestowed with the trust to secretly open channels 
of communication between the United States and China. However, the high in their relationship 
did not last long. Just six months later during the thirteen-day Indo-Pak war in December 1971, 
which resulted in Pakistan’s dismemberment and creation of Bangladesh, Pakistan expected a 
show of support from the United States akin to the August 1971 Indo-Soviet treaty of mutual 
assistance. Too little came too late. U.S. assistance in arranging arms supplies to Pakistan and the 
                                                
1 F.S. Aijazuddin, From A Head, Through A Head, To A Head (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000), 71 
2 
presence of the USS Enterprise in the Bay of Bengal did not do much to deter the Indians or 
influence the outcome of the war.2  
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan’s deputy prime minister and foreign minister in 1971 
praised the United States for its support in the conflict during his speech before the UN Security 
Council on December 15, 1971 but he was bitter at the imminent loss of East Pakistan and lack 
of material support from its allies.3 When Yahya resigned on December 20, 1971 he transferred 
power to Bhutto making him the first civilian president and the first civilian martial law 
administrator of Pakistan. Bhutto’s bitterness, however, was not new. It had been simmering for 
several years and can be traced back to the first time the United States imposed arms embargo on 
Pakistan and India after their war in 1965 during Field Marshal Ayub Khan’s government when 
Bhutto was Pakistan’s foreign minister. After becoming Pakistan’s first civilian president (1971-
1973) and later as the prime minister of Pakistan (1973-1977), Bhutto effectively used the 1965 
sanctions and the dismemberment of Pakistan as a pretext to gain popularity from a dispirited 
                                                
2 Several declassified documents show that both Nixon and Kissinger were sympathetic to General Yahya Khan 
even after they had learnt of the massive killings carried out in East Pakistan as per the cables sent by the U.S. 
Ambassador to Dacca, Archer Blood, on 06 April 1971. The National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 
No. 79 is a compilation of declassified U.S. government documents on the Crisis of 1971. For Nixon and 
Kissinger’s sympathy for Yahya where Nixon wrote, “To all hands: Don’t squeeze Yahya at this time”, see 
Document 9, Memorandum for the President, Policy Options Towards Pakistan, April 28, 1971, Secret, 6pp. For 
movement of the USS Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal see Document 26, Memorandum for General Haig, 
Pakistan/India Contingency Planning, Secret/Eyes Only, November 15, 1971, 3pp. The electronic briefing book can 
be accessed at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/ Also see Gary J. Bass, The Blood Telegram: 
Nixon, Kissinger And A Forgotten Genocide (New York: Random House, 2013)  
3 On December 15, 1971 Bhutto attended the U.N Security Council session in NY, which was deadlocked on a 
ceasefire resolution vetoed by the Soviet Union to support the Indian position of no-troops-withdrawal.  After an 
emotionally charged speech, Bhutto stormed out of the UNSC meeting stating that he will not become party to 
legalizing aggression. A part of his speech available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rLSR9rWiBiU provides 
an insight into his personality admired by many Pakistanis who remember him as someone who took a stand against 
“the powers that be”.  
3 
nation through his non-alignment policy –– a theme he sold well to a demoralized, broken nation 
until his removal by General Zia ul Haq in 1977. General Zia’s eleven-year martial rule in 
Pakistan coincided with the invasion and defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan with 
American money and arms supply. It was also a robust period for Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear 
weapons development. After the retreat of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, America’s 
subsequent disengagement from Pakistan was not only abrupt but also unexpected for Pakistan 
since it had been hoping for continued U.S. engagement until the transitional set up in 
Afghanistan was completed. It also brought with it nuclear sanctions under which U.S. economic 
and military assistance to Pakistan –– which had been free flowing for the past decade –– came 
to a halt.  
Pakistan’s relationship with the United States in the last two decades of the Cold War 
under Bhutto and General Zia and the first decade after the Cold War is critical in understanding 
how Pakistan’s list of grievances against the United States –– that had begun to take shape in 
1965 –– gradually transformed into a popular narrative where America was viewed as an 
unreliable ally, a mere ‘seasonal’ friend which had ‘used’ Pakistan to serve its own national 
interests and ‘abandoned’ the latter after its interests were served. From 1972 to 1998 –– the 
period during which Pakistan pursued a nuclear weapons capability and then tested it in response 
to the Indian nuclear tests –– Pakistan had been under sanctions by various U.S. administrations 
under U.S. non-proliferation law. This is the period during which Pakistan’s abandonment 
narrative expanded to include its criticism of U.S. non-proliferation policy as selectively 
targeting Pakistan for nuclear proliferation in South Asia. Since 1965, Pakistan’s narrative of 
abandonment and the unreliability of the United States as an ally has unequivocally been 
embraced by its public. Yet, the fact remains that despite such negative narrative and its 
4 
attendant and widely prevalent anti-Americanism in Pakistani society coupled with a deep-rooted 
suspicion about U.S. intentions towards Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, the bludgeoned 
U.S.-Pak relationship still continues albeit like a bad marriage.  
Scholars of Pakistan-U.S. relations have struggled to understand the complexity of this 
relationship and all it has had to offer in the past sixty years. It has been variously characterized, 
amongst others, as ‘the marriage of convenience’ between two ‘Disenchanted Allies’4, the ill-
matched partnership and Pakistan’s ‘Magnificent Delusions’5 with the transactional nature of the 
relationship making Pakistan ‘America’s sullen mistress’.6 Scholars contend that despite the 
dangers of ‘Riding the Roller Coaster’7 and despite inherent incompatibilities between the two 
partners, the strategic dynamics in the region might keep America engaged enough in coming 
decades making it truly ‘No Exit from Pakistan’8.  
There are three sections in this chapter. The following section discusses Pakistan’s 
abandonment narrative in the light of its criticism of U.S. non-proliferation policy during the 
course of its nuclear weapons development followed by research questions and the argument, 
significance of the research, a note on methodology and chapter distribution. 
  
                                                
4 Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2001) 
5 Hussain Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, United States and an Epic History of Misunderstanding (New 
York: Public Affairs, 2013) 
6 Farzana Sheikh, Making Sense of Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009) 
7 Teresita Schaffer and Howard Schaffer, How Pakistan Negotiates With The United States: Riding The Roller 
Coaster (Washington DC: USIP, 2011) 
8 Daniel S. Markey, No Exit From Pakistan: America’s Tortured Relationship With Islamabad (New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013) 
5 
Pakistan’s Narrative And U.S. Non-proliferation Policy 
Pakistan’s narrative is a collection of perceptions shaped by various events in the history of its 
relationship with the United States, brought to life by political statements of necessity made by 
various Pakistani civilian and military leaders alike. Over the course of fifty years, these 
statements have made their way into the popular discourse in Pakistan about its relationship with 
the United States and latter’s treatment of Pakistan as the most sanctioned ally. From 1972 
onwards when the country embarked on its nuclear weapons development, Pakistan’s narrative 
expanded to include selective targeting of Pakistan’s peaceful nuclear program by the United 
States. This section attempts to present an overview of Pakistan’s narrative of abandonment, 
betrayal and discrimination by the United States in the context of U.S. non-proliferation policy 
towards Pakistan under five U.S. administrations from Ford to Clinton.  
Efforts to explore Pakistan’s nuclear weapons options had been underway since 1972, a 
year after Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto became the president of Pakistan, but U.S. concerns about Pakistan 
developing a nuclear weapons capability did not surface until after the Indian test in 1974.9 The 
Indian nuclear test was conducted using plutonium produced in the Canadian supplied research 
reactor, CIRUS, using heavy water imported from the U.S.10 The terms and conditions of the 
U.S. and Canadian technological assistance to India prohibited development of weapons-grade 
plutonium. India however violated its civilian-nuclear agreement with Canada and the United 
                                                
9 Literature on Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation places India at the center of all its strategic concerns. For an essential 
reading tracing Pakistan’s early nuclear motivations and developments see Zalmay Khalilzad, “Pakistan: The 
Making of a Nuclear Power,” Asian Survey, Vol.16, No.6 (June, 1976), pp.580-592; and Ashok Kapur, Pakistan’s 
Nuclear Development, New York: Croom Helm, 1987 
10 A declassified document, U.S. Aide Memoire to Indian Atomic Energy Commission in 1970, presents a very clear 
reading of U.S. position and expectations from its technological assistance to India, accessed on 15/09/12 
http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/19701116_US_Aide_Memoire_Indian_AEC.pdf   
6 
States and thereby was responsible for the turnaround in U.S. non-proliferation policy in South 
Asia. The Indian nuclear test also led to the establishment of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 
1974. Addressing a press conference the day after the Indian nuclear test, Bhutto resolutely 
stated  
The nuclear blast carried out by India yesterday is a development which will call forth a 
mature and vital response from Pakistan. The response cannot be vital if we become 
either complacent or nervous. To shrug it off is as dangerous as to get scared…Were we 
to become fearful or alarmed over India’s nuclear demonstration, it would indicate that 
we have already succumbed to the threat….Let me make it clear that we are determined 
not to be intimidated by this threat. I give a solemn pledge to my countrymen that we will 
never let Pakistan be a victim of nuclear blackmail.11 
 
U.S. attempts to delay Pakistan’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons technology started in the 
mid-1970s. The first blow to Pakistan’s nuclear efforts came during the Carter administration 
when its cooperation with France led the latter to cancel its 1976 agreement for the sale of 
plutonium reprocessing plant to Pakistan.12 Although cancellation of the French reprocessing 
plant delayed Pakistan’s plutonium route to the bomb, secret efforts to acquire the bomb through 
uranium enrichment program persisted. It was not until 1979 that U.S. intelligence confirmed the 
presence of Pakistan’s uranium enrichment program and the Carter administration terminated all 
military and economic assistance to Pakistan, invoking the Symington Amendment, a non-
proliferation law passed by Congress on 30 June 1976 which called for suspension of U.S. aid to 
                                                
11 “No yielding to any nuclear blackmail,” DAWN, May 20, 1974.   
12 French refusal to cancel its agreement with Pakistan during Ford administration is discussed in detail in Chapter 
Two on Ford’s Non-Proliferation Policy Towards Pakistan of this dissertation.   
7 
countries pursuing uranium enrichment programs.13 However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
in 1979 not only imperiled U.S. containment efforts but also endangered Pakistan’s own 
territorial integrity given its geographical proximity to Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, thus 
forcing the U.S. and Pakistan to resume their alliance commitments against a common enemy. 
Pakistan was relieved of the Symington sanctions in 1980 and was provided military and 
economic assistance in return for its commitment to equip and train Afghan freedom fighters to 
fight against the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan from 1980 to 1989.  
At its end, Pakistan continued to deny publically that it had either the desire or the means 
to develop a nuclear weapons capability. Based on U.S. intelligence reports on the presence of a 
nuclear weapons program in Pakistan, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in August 1985 
adopted an amendment sponsored by Senator Larry Pressler (R-SD) whereby the President had 
to certify every year that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device and that the aid offered was 
furthering U.S. non-proliferation goals. Despite the evidence on Pakistan’s nuclear program, 
President Ronald Reagan provided two certifications in 1986 and 1987 as per the Pressler 
                                                
13 In order to deal with regional proliferation challenges, U.S. Congress had amended the Foreign Assistance Act or 
FAA of 1961 in mid 1970s to include non-proliferation measures and arms export restrictions whereby any recipient 
of U.S. military and economic assistance involved in proliferation activities (transference or possession of uranium 
enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies) was to be penalized through sanctions and aid suspension. The 
Symington Amendment stipulated a waiver according to which aid could be resumed to the country in question, 
only if its continued suspension jeopardized U.S. national security interests. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
became a justification for the U.S. to resume aid to Pakistan to assist Afghan Mujahedeen against the Soviets.  
8 
Amendment to continue military and economic aid to Pakistan.14 However, the last Presidential 
certification came in 1989 (the Soviets had retreated from Afghanistan in February of the same 
year) with an explicit warning for Pakistan that it would face penalties if the nuclear program 
was not shut down. In 1990, President George H. W. Bush withheld his certification under the 
Pressler Amendment and imposed sanctions on Pakistan –– freezing $564m in economic and 
military assistance –– after it was confirmed that no steps had been taken by Pakistan to stop its 
nuclear weapons development. 
The termination of aid by the Bush administration under the Pressler sanctions soured 
Pakistan-U.S. relationship. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the abrupt U.S. military and 
economic disengagement with Pakistan in 1990 was understood by Pakistan as a signal that the 
alliance was over. This simultaneity of events in 1990 encouraged a burgeoning anti-American 
reset in Pakistan that damaged U.S. credibility as a reliable partner and strengthened Pakistan’s 
resolve to retain its nuclear option.15 During the Clinton administration efforts were made to 
                                                
14 Chapter Five, Reagan’s Non-proliferation Policy Towards Pakistan discusses the origins and implications of the 
Pressler amendment in detail. The law made all military and economic assistance to Pakistan contingent upon an 
annual presidential certification verifying that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear weapon and that any U.S. foreign 
aid to Pakistan would significantly reduce the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons. Hirsch provides a detailed 
account of the scope of waiver authority stipulated in Symington-Glenn and Pressler Amendments, see Theodore M. 
Hirsch, “Nonproliferation: Recent Legislative Developments,” Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American 
Society of International Law) Vol. 88, The Transformation of Sovereignty (April 6-9, 1994) pp. 556-561  
15 After Pressler sanctions, Pakistan was denied possession of 28 F-16s for which it had paid Lockheed Corp $658 
million. In addition, Pakistan was charged $50,000 per month in renting charges until the planes were delivered.  
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repair the damage done by the Pressler sanctions but without any success.16 Pakistan remained a 
threshold nuclear state during the 1990s and overtly nuclearized by testing its nuclear weapons 
on May 28 and 30, 1998 in response to the Indian nuclear tests of May 11 and 13, 1998.17 Both 
Pakistan and India were sanctioned by the United States for nuclear testing under the Nuclear 
Proliferation Prevention Act –– a law that revised the Glenn amendment in 1994 –– which 
threatened severe sanctions against any country trying to assist, develop or test nuclear 
weapons.18 President George W. Bush lifted these sanctions on Pakistan in 2001 when the U.S. 
commenced military operations in Afghanistan under the umbrella of its war on terrorism. The 
two countries resumed their alliance commitments once again and U.S. national security interests 
trumped its non-proliferation goals one more time.  
                                                
16 In order to avoid a lawsuit, Clinton administration returned Pakistan $470 million in cash and an additional $60 
million worth of wheat. This F-16 fiasco is often cited by Pakistan as a reason for considering U.S. an unreliable 
ally. For an extended reading of Pressler sanctions and its aftermath please see Richard W. Aldrich and Deborah C. 
Pollard, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Legal and Policy Implications of the Pressler Amendment,” United 
States Air Force Academy Journal of Legal Studies, (5 USAFA J.Leg.Stud. 103) 1994 accessed through LexisNexis 
on 22/10/12. For a Pakistani perspective on the issue of F-16s and the legal implications of sanctions on Pakistan see 
Ahmer Bilal Soofi, “Legal Aspects of the F-16 Contracts between Pakistan and General Dynamics,” Pakistan 
Horizon, Vol. 50, No. 4 (October 1997), pp. 51-73 
17 India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998 making the prospects of joining NPT nearly impossible. After 
the nuclear tests, the Government of Pakistan stated “we will accept obligations and commitment in the field of 
nuclear non-proliferation only if these are equitable and non-discriminatory. We will not accept unilateral 
obligations or commitment. We will not accept commitments which would permanently jeopardize the ability of 
Pakistan to deter the nuclear and conventional threats which India poses to our security” as quoted in a statement by 
Ambassador Munir Akram, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations Conference on 
Disarmament Geneva, 14 May 1998 at the Plenary of the Second Sessions of the CD available at 
http://cns.miis.edu/archive/country_india/statemnt.htm For Pakistan’s complete arms control and proliferation file 
see http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/pakistanprofile 
18 In an effort to deter India and Pakistan from nuclear testing, U.S. Congress passed the Nuclear Proliferation 
Prevention Act in 1994 threatening severe sanctions against any country trying to assist, develop or test nuclear 
weapons. For a detailed reading of the NPPA see Public Law 103- 236.  
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Pakistani policy and opinion-makers alike believe that Pakistan has been unduly 
presented as the scapegoat for nuclear proliferation whereas it was India that introduced nuclear 
weapons in the region in 1974.19 Pakistan’s narrative that has developed over the course of its 
relationship with the United States since the 1950s comprises of three broad inconsistencies of 
U.S. non-proliferation policies as seen by the Pakistanis: 
• The U.S. has repeatedly practiced ‘double standards’ on non-proliferation in South Asia 
by ‘punishing’ Pakistan and India differently for the same offense.  
• Pakistan’s attempts to acquire civilian nuclear technology to meet its energy needs have 
been thwarted since the 1970s whereas ‘India was rewarded for its proliferation 
behavior’ by several U.S. administrations.  
• Once a major Cold War objective was achieved in the 1990s (Soviet defeat in 
Afghanistan made possible due to Pakistan’s efforts), the United States brazenly 
                                                
19 Pakistan’s clandestine attempts to acquire uranium enrichment technology through A.Q. Khan network are often 
cited to differentiate between India’s and Pakistan’s proliferation record. For extensive and comprehensive accounts 
on AQ Khan’s network and its activities please see, Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney, The Islamic Bomb 
(Times Books, New York: 1981); Gordon, Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, 
and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Adrian Levy & Catherine 
Scott-Clark, Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons (New York: Walker 
& Company, 2007); Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins, The Nuclear Jihadist: The True Story of the Man Who 
Sold the World’s Most Dangerous Secrets and How We Could Have Stopped Him (New York: Twelve, 2007) and; 
David Armstrong and Joseph Trento, America and the Islamic Bomb: The Deadly Compromise (Hanover, NH: 
Steerforth Press, 2007) 
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‘sanctioned’ Pakistan for its nuclear proliferation activities and in the process ‘forsook 
the alliance’.20  
Former Pakistani ambassador Maleeha Lodhi in her 2009 essay ascribes the ‘mutually negative 
misperceptions’ between the two countries to the burden of history. She writes 
This after all, has been a rollercoaster relationship, characterized by an erratic stop-go 
pattern in which Pakistan has swung between being America’s most “allied ally” and 
“most sanctioned friend” to a “disenchanted partner.” Three things stand out about the 
troubled relationship from a historical perspective. First, relations have lurched between 
engagement and estrangement in almost predictable cycles. Second, these swings have 
occurred under both U.S. Republican and Democratic institutions, and on the Pakistani 
side, under democratic and military governments alike. Third, the episodic nature of ties 
has reflected Washington’s changing strategic priorities and shifts in global geopolitics, 
                                                
20 Pakistan’s growing nuclear weapons capability, Abdul Qadeer Khan’s illicit black market network and the safety 
and security of Pakistan’s nuclear assets to name a few, are some of the issues that have become part of standard 
literature on Pakistan’s nuclear history. It is not possible to cite here the quotes from Pakistani policymakers 
criticizing U.S. policies towards Pakistan for they are numerous but for a reading of Pakistani perspective on U.S. – 
Pakistan relations see Hamza Alvi, “Pakistan-US Military Alliance,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 33, 
No.25 (June 20-26, 1998): 1551-1557; Shahid Amin, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000); Najam Rafique, “Rethinking Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” Strategic Studies, Vol. XXXI, No. 3 
(Sep 30, 2011), 124-152; A.Z. Hilali, US-Pakistan Relationship: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (Aldershot, 
England: Asghgate, 2005). On Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and U.S. policy see Samina Ahmed, “Pakistan’s Nuclear 
Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices,” International Security, Vol. 23, No.4 (Spring 1999): 178-
204; Kamal Matinuddin, The Nuclearization of South Asia (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002); Farzana 
Sheikh, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Bomb: Beyond The Non-proliferation Regime,” International Affairs, Vol. 78, Issue. 
1(January, 2002): 29-48; Feroz Hassan Khan, “Nuclear Proliferation Motivations: Lessons from Pakistan,” The 
Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, Issue. 3 (2006): 501-517. On U.S. non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan see 
T.V. Paul, “Influence through Arms Transfers: Lessons from the U.S.-Pakistani relationship,” Asian Survey, Vol.32, 
No.12 (Dec 1992) pp.1078-1092; G. Andreani, “The Disarray of U.S. non-proliferation policy,” Survival: Global 
Politics and Strategy, Vol.41, Issue 4 (1999) pp. 42-61; Chaim Braun and Christopher F. Chyba, “Proliferation 
Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” International Security, Vol. 29, No.2 (Fall 2004) 
pp.5-49; David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “ The A.Q. Khan Illicit Nuclear Trade Network and Implications 
for Nonproliferation Efforts,” Strategic Insights, Vol. 5, Issue.6 (July, 2006); Richard. P. Cronin, K. Alan Kronstadt 
and Sharon Squassoni, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the Recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission: U.S. Policy Constraints and Options,” CRS Report for Congress, RL32745 (May 24, 2005) and; Feroz 
Hassan Khan, “Nuclear Proliferation Motivations,” The Nonproliferation Review, Vol.13, Issue.3 (2006) 
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which in turn have reinforced the popular perception in Pakistan that the country is seen 
from a tactical perspective, and not in terms of its intrinsic importance. When U.S. 
geostrategic interests so dictated, relations with Pakistan warmed, and aid and support 
followed. But when U.S. priorities shifted or when Pakistan pursued an independent 
stance, as, for example, on the nuclear issue, it led to long periods of discriminatory 
sanctions. This entrenched the view in Pakistan, at both the official and public levels, that 
Washington has pursued relations with Islamabad on a transactional and not a consistent 
or predictable basis.21 
 
In his recent work Eating Grass Feroz Hassan Khan, a Pakistani scholar examined the 
nuclearization of Pakistan’s narrative. He writes 
Today, there are three important strategic beliefs regarding nuclear weapons that were 
largely absent when Bhutto took power in 1971 but have since become dominant in 
Pakistani strategic thought. First, nuclear weapons are the only guarantee of Pakistan’s 
national survival in the face of both an inveterately hostile India that cannot be deterred 
conventionally and unreliable external allies that fail to deliver in extremis. Second, 
Pakistan’s nuclear program is unfairly singled out for international opposition because of 
its Muslim population. This feeling of victimization is accentuated by a belief that India 
consistently “gets away with” violating global nonproliferation norms. Third, is the belief 
that India, Israel, or the United States might use military force to stop Pakistan’s nuclear 
program. Today, these three beliefs –– nuclear necessity for survival, international 
discrimination against Pakistan, and danger of disarming attacks –– form the center of 
Pakistani strategic thinking about nuclear weapons. Collectively, these convictions have 
served to reinforce the determination of Pakistan’s military, bureaucratic, and scientific 
establishment to pay any political, economic, or technical cost to reach their objective of 
a nuclear-armed Pakistan. 22 
 
The narrative of the ‘unreliability’ of the United States as an ally has come full circle now that 
the U.S. is preparing to leave the region once again after fifteen years of Pak-U.S. counter-
terrorism engagement in Afghanistan. Ever since Pakistan’s overt nuclearization in 1998, the 
following U.S. actions have been feeding Pakistan’s narrative (a detailed discussion on these 
current sources of Pakistan’s narrative is beyond the scope of this research) 
                                                
21 Maleeha Lodhi, “The Future of Pakistan-U.S. Relations: Opportunities and Challenges,” Institute for National 
Strategic Studies, NDU, Washington DC, Special Report (April 2009) pp.1-6; 1 
22 Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2012), 6 
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• Sensationalized accounts of how the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons 
can be compromised given the rise of radical elements in the society since 9/1123 
• U.S. efforts to stop Pakistan from acquiring civilian nuclear technology while providing 
the same to India through the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal in 200524   
• U.S. support for Indian membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group25  
                                                
23 For some selected references that challenge Pakistan’s nuclear command and control amidst a Taliban threat, see 
Nigel Hawkes, “Pakistan Could Lose Control of its Arsenal,” The Times (London) (September 20, 2001); Peter 
Wonacott, “Inside Pakistan’s Drive to Guard It’s a-Bombs,” Wall Street Journal (November 29, 2007); David E. 
Sanger, “Trust Us: So, What About Those Nukes,” New York Times (November 11, 2007); Ben Arnoldy, “Could 
Taliban Get Keys to Pakistan’s A-Bomb? The Christian Science Monitor (May 15, 2009); Seymour M. Hersh, 
“Defending the Arsenal: In an Unstable Pakistan, Can Nuclear Warheads be Kept Safe?” The New Yorker 
(November 16, 2009); David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “Pakistani Nuclear Arms Pose Challenge to U.S. Policy,” 
New York Times (January 31, 2011); Jeffery Goldberg and March Ambinder, “The Pentagon’s Secret Plans to 
Secure Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal,” National Journal (November 9, 2011). For selected Pakistani responses see 
“Pakistan’s Evolution as a Nuclear Weapons State,” Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai’s address, Strategic Insights 
(November 1, 2006); Naeem Salik, “Building Confidence in Pakistan’s Nuclear Security,” Arms Control Today 
(December 2007); Feroz Hassan Khan, “Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Separating Myth From Reality, Arms Control 
Today (July/August 2009); Rabia Akhtar and Nazir Hussain, “Safety and Security of Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons,” 
in Usama Butt ed., Pakistan’s Quagmire: Security, Strategy and the Future of The Islamic Nuclear Nation (New 
York: Continuum International, 2010) and; Zahir Kazmi, “Normalizing Pakistan,” IISS Voices (May 2014)  
24 For some Pakistani references on Indo-U.S. nuclear deal and its implications for Pakistan, see Mushahid Hussain, 
“Pakistan’s Quest for Security and the Indo-U.S. Nuclear Deal,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 18, 
Issue.2 (2006) and; Tariq Fatemi, “ The Indo-US Nuclear Deal,” DAWN (December 16, 2006); Mooed Yusuf, “The 
Indo-US nuclear deal,” ISYP Journal of Science and World Affairs, Vol. 3, No.2 (2007): 47-56; Hasan Ehtisham, 
“The US Owes Pakistan a Nuclear Deal,” Eurasia Review (August 1, 2013) 
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• U.S. campaign to control Pakistan’s vertical proliferation by seeking consensus on Fissile 
Material Cut Off Treaty in the UN Conference of Disarmament26  
However, U.S. historians and analysts believe that the U.S.-Pakistan grievances are reciprocal –– 
three such accounts are noteworthy: 
Dennis Kux, retired diplomat and author of Dischanted Allies called the Pakistan-U.S. 
relationship a ‘marriage of convenience.’ Kux writes that  
…over the years U.S. and Pakistani interests and related security policies have been at 
odds almost as often as they have been in phase. The United States and Pakistan were 
broadly speaking, on the same wavelength during the Eisenhower, Nixon, and Reagan 
presidencies. During the Kennedy, Johnson, Carter, Bush and Clinton administrations, 
however, policy differences have been significant. Given these realities, the volatility of 
the relationship should not be surprising. Absent a greater and more continuous 
congruence of security goals, U.S.-Pakistan ties have lacked a solid underpinning of 
shared national interests. Major differences and consequent disputes were probably 
inevitable. The partnership was likely to prove a fragile structure. The tendency of 
Americans and Pakistanis to gloss over this basic problem has only served to sharpen the 
sense of frustration and disappointment about the actions of the other.27 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
25 The Nuclear Suppliers Group earlier referred to as the London Group was a multilateral nuclear export control 
body established in 1974 by a group of nuclear exporting countries led by the United States in response to Indian 
nuclear test in 1974. As of 2014, the NSG has 48 member countries and India has recently submitted its request to 
join this body encouraged by the U.S. Pakistan has voiced its reservations against Indian admission to the U.S. and 
also to other exporting countries. Pakistan maintains that India as a non-NPT state should not be accorded the right 
to enter NSG since it undermines the entire non-proliferation regime and if an exception is to be made for India then 
the same should be accorded to Pakistan. For a Pakistani perspective on the Indian quest for NSG membership see 
Saira Bano, “India’s Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) Membership and The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime,” Irish 
Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 25 (2014): 117-135.  
26 Pakistan is ‘estimated’ to have the world’s fastest growing nuclear weapons program. Pakistan is against a fissile 
materials cut off or FMCT and maintains that the treaty aims at perpetuating the discrepancy between Indian and 
Pakistani fissile material stockpiles since India had a head start. It argues that the treaty should address issues related 
to accounting of fissile material stocks and also cap reduction in existing stockpiles in addition to simultaneously 
holding discussions in CD on negative security assurances, preventing an arms race in outer space and nuclear 
disarmament commitment by the five NWS. For a Pakistani position on FMCT see Maleeha Lodhi, “Pakistan’s 
Nuclear Diplomacy,” The News International (July 08, 2014)       
27 Kux, Disenchanted Allies, xviii 
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According to former ambassadors Teresita and Howard Schaffer in How Pakistan Negotiates 
With The United States  
Pakistan and the United States agree on facts and chronology of their shared history, but 
they tell very different stories with those facts. For Americans, the narrative is one of 
willful disregard by Pakistanis for U.S. concerns about which they have been amply 
warned. In 1965, Pakistan ignored U.S. strictures against using in combat against India 
the arms Washington had supplied to confront potential Communist aggression. In 1990, 
the relationship came apart when Pakistan ignored U.S. warnings that developing a 
nuclear explosive device would lead to an aid cutoff. Pakistanis interpret both these 
events as betrayals of explicit or implicit U.S. commitments. For them, the dominant 
themes are disappointment and unreliability. Pakistan’s negotiators look on the United 
States as a country critical to Pakistan’s security, but one that Pakistan cannot count on in 
times of trouble…. Throughout the ups and downs of U.S.-Pakistani relations –– what 
one might call three marriages and two divorces –– Pakistanis have felt that the United 
States used Pakistan when it was convenient, and abandoned it when Pakistan was no 
longer needed.28  
 
American scholar Daniel S. Markey in his book No Exit From Pakistan sums up the Pak-U.S. 
relationship as follows 
…many young Pakistanis are taught to recite a litany of other low points in the 
relationship. These include several instances of what they call American 
“abandonments,” such as when the United States did not adequately rise to Pakistan’s 
defense in its wars with India in 1965 or 1971, or in 1990 when Washington slapped 
sanctions on Pakistan for pursuing a nuclear weapons program. American historians 
describe these events differently. They correctly observe that Pakistan’s own choices – to 
go to war and to build a nuclear arsenal – led to predictable American responses, not 
betrayals. Thus, Pakistanis and Americans tell conflicting versions of their shared history. 
There is at least a nugget of truth to the Pakistani lament that America has used their 
country when it suited the superpower’s agenda and then tossed it away when 
inconvenient. Yet, for all the Pakistani complaints about how the United States has never 
been a true friend, the fact is that Pakistan also used America. Pakistani leaders dipped 
into America’s deep pockets to serve their purposes, sometimes parochial or corrupt, 
oftentimes driven by persistent geopolitical conflict with neighboring India. In short, the 
United States has been a more fickle partner, its approach to Pakistan shifting 
dramatically across the decades. Pakistan, however, has been guilty of greater 
misrepresentation, claiming support for American purposes while turning the U.S. 
partnership to other ends. As a consequence, both sides failed repeatedly to build a 
relationship to serve beyond the immediate needs of the day.29  
                                                
28 Teresita Schaffer and Howard Schaffer, How Pakistan Negotiates With The United States, 360 
29 Markey, No Exit From Pakistan, 2-3 
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All these accounts provide insights about the complex relationship both Pakistan and the United 
States have had and continue to have. Even though, however, the list of grievances against each 
other is long, the divorce, it seems, is not yet final.  
Research Questions and The Argument  
This dissertation provides the first formal account of Pakistan’s abandonment narrative in the 
light of its criticism of U.S. non-proliferation policy and examines several questions. What are 
the origins of Pakistan’s abandonment narrative? Has the United States been an unreliable ally to 
Pakistan? Was the U.S. non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan a case of selective enforcement 
of U.S. non-proliferation laws? What did Pakistan get out of the alliance during the periods of 
engagement? How did Pakistan, a small state, survive this alliance with a superpower like the 
U.S.? How did Pakistan get away with the bomb? Is Pakistan’s abandonment narrative with 
respect to U.S. non-proliferation policy justified? 
After examining U.S. non-proliferation policy under five administrations: Ford, Carter, 
Reagan, Bush and Clinton, this dissertation concludes with offering a counter-narrative to 
Pakistan’s abandonment narrative and argues that though on some occasions Pakistan’s 
grievances about the deviations in U.S. foreign policy are justified, Pakistan’s popular narrative 
lacks fidelity with respect to the objectives and successes of U.S. non-proliferation policies 
towards Pakistan under these five administrations. Furthermore, Pakistan-U.S. alliance during 
the Cold War was a two-way street, a synergistic relationship, wherein both countries used the 
leverage they had towards each other to best serve their national interests. For the United States 
the leverage was Pakistan’s dependence on massive U.S. economic and military assistance and 
for Pakistan the leverage was U.S. dependence on Pakistan to defeat the Soviet Union in 
Afghanistan. This research finds that both countries used each other to get what they wanted –– 
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Pakistan more adeptly than the United States. While the United States used its leverage to keep 
the Pakistanis interested in fighting the Afghan war to defeat the Soviets with an unlimited 
budget for the war, Pakistan also used its leverage to gain maximum economic and military 
benefits from the U.S. In fact, Pakistan achieved more than it had bargained for –– it not only 
modernized its conventional military capability through U.S. military assistance but also 
developed a threshold nuclear weapons capability at the height of its engagement with the United 
States in the final decade of the Cold War made possible due to minimal interference from the 
administrations examined in this dissertation. And even after the Cold War ended, Pakistan’s 
nuclear weapons program continued unabated owing to the continuity in U.S. non-proliferation 
policy of ignoring Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development to pursue objectives other than non-
proliferation enabling it to overtly nuclearize in 1998.  
In tracing the historical roots of Pakistan’s narrative within the framework of U.S-
Pakistan alliance and U.S. non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan, this research adds to the 
historiography of American foreign relations with the Third World during the Cold War. Events 
explored in this dissertation reveal that Pakistan flirted openly with the idea of non-alignment off 
and on during its first decade of formal alliance with the United States in its bid to get the best 
from all the major powers during the Cold War. And in doing so, as the events related to its 
nuclear weapons development at the height of its Cold War engagement with the U.S. will reveal 
in subsequent chapters, Pakistan carved its own destiny as an ‘active agent’ instead of being 
manipulated by the major powers to serve their agenda.  
Pakistan’s behavior as a small state in alliance with a big power like the United States is 
also consistent with the theory of small states’ alliances with big powers as discussed in the next 
chapter. Given the structural constraints and the security dilemma Pakistan faced immediately 
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after its partition in 1947, it sought to seek alliances with states that could offer ‘security’ and 
‘money’ to help develop its economy. Although I argue that Pakistan may be a ‘small state’ 
given the size of its territory but its geo-strategic significance has made it enough of an important 
player in international relations and alliance politics to find a place in the foreign policies of 
major powers. As the discussion in this dissertation will reveal, after having understood its own 
‘strategic’ importance to major powers, Pakistan was able to successfully direct at different times 
the foreign policy of the United States to its own benefit.  
The examination of U.S. non-proliferation policy under three Republican administrations 
(Ford, Reagan and H.W. Bush) and two Democrat administrations (Carter and Clinton) reveals 
that the overall U.S. non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan was a bipartisan effort where the 
U.S. Congress not only instituted specific non-proliferation legislation to constrain Pakistan’s 
nuclear activities but also unanimously passed resolutions to relieve Pakistan from those 
sanctions as and when the need arose to engage Pakistan to serve U.S. national interests. This 
dissertation argues that the U.S. failure to prevent Pakistan from achieving and testing its nuclear 
weapons capability was not a policy failure per se but an enforcement failure where all five 
administrations irrespective of domestic politics tried to establish an imperfect quid pro quo with 
Pakistan pushing the latter to choose between aid and the bomb. In doing so, each administration 
shifted non-proliferation goalposts and red lines for Pakistan and prioritized foreign policy over 
non-proliferation policy. This research therefore suggests that in order for U.S. non-proliferation 
policy to be successful, the key is consistency in application and enforcement of non-
proliferation laws since the tools of foreign aid or sanctions alone cannot influence proliferation 
behavior of state with nuclear ambitions.  
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Significance of the Research 
The research conducted in this dissertation is important for two reasons.  
First, Pakistan-U.S. relations continue to be marred by stereotypical narratives that have 
polluted the psyche of both nations. It is time that changed. The United States will continue its 
engagement in South Asia sans physical troops deployment due to the strategic dynamics that 
have developed since 9/11 and they refuse to go away even after fifteen years of U.S. 
engagement in Afghanistan. Pakistan and the United States need each other for continued 
counter-terrorism operations in the region to eliminate terrorism.  Mistrusting each other’s 
motives (reinforced by their respective narratives) is highly counter-productive. This research 
brings out new knowledge and at times places old knowledge in a single volume that might help 
the two develop common ground for a common cause. 
Second, given its history of crises with India post-nuclearization, both countries have 
been reliant on the U.S. for crisis management. Until both countries develop bilateral crisis 
management mechanisms, America’s role in ensuring strategic stability in South Asia will 
remain critical in coming years. Therefore, Pakistan needs to rise above the anti-Americanism 
that its historical and current narrative propagates and revisit this relationship through a realist 
framework.  
This dissertation is a modest attempt at achieving a reset of Pak-U.S. relations by 
carefully examining U.S. non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan and arriving at a counter-
narrative that diverges from the existing one to suggest that the relationship delivered dividends 
for both countries in the period examined and that there is still hope for a mutually beneficial 
relationship based on mutual trust, reciprocal respect for each other’s intentions and shared 
sensitivity for each other’s insecurities.  
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Methodology 
This dissertation provides a historical account of the U.S. non-proliferation policy towards 
Pakistan from Ford to Clinton using primary source documentation from each of the five 
presidential archives: Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush and Clinton. Critical to this examination are 
the nuclear non-proliferation legislations: the Symington-Glenn, Pressler and Solarz amendments 
invoked against Pakistan to restrain its proliferation behavior. Primary documents to construct 
the legislative history of these amendments have been collected from the archives of the 
following Congressmen: Stuart Symington (D-MO), the State Historical Society of Missouri, 
Kansas City; John Glenn (D-OH), University of Ohio, OH and; Stephen Solarz (D-NY), 
Brandeis University, MA. Archival documents for Senator Larry Pressler (R-SD), the sponsor of 
the Pressler amendment, are not open to public but sufficient material on the amendment was 
available at the Glenn archives, OH, since Senator Glenn was the primary architect of what later 
came to be known as the Pressler amendment. Declassified governmental documents available 
through the Digital National Security Archive and the National Security Archive based at the 
George Washington University, Washington DC have also been used in this research. Where the 
archival documentation is sparse due to files still classified, secondary sources and interviews 
have been used to develop the arguments.  
 As mentioned in the previous section, Pakistan’s narrative vis-à-vis the U.S. is event 
based and is a collection of perceptions by Pakistani leaders and nation at large about Pakistan’s 
treatment by the United States. This narrative has not been documented before since a scholarly 
discourse in Pakistan on the subject is nonexistent. This dissertation attempts to document the 
narrative by using statements made by Pakistan’s military and civilian leadership through their 
own writings for example General Ayub Khan’s and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s published works used 
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extensively in the first two chapters, their popular statements documented in international 
newspapers used in all the chapters and relies heavily on recently published secondary sources to 
record Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development from 1972 to 1998. The counter argument that 
challenges Pakistan’s narrative and reveals its unevenness is developed using official 
correspondence between Pakistani leadership and their American counterparts collected through 
the U.S. presidential, national and congressional archives since Pakistan’s own official records 
still remain classified to date.   
Chapter Distribution 
Chapter One, Historiography of Pak-U.S. Alliance, discusses the asymmetric alliance 
relationship that developed between a small state like Pakistan and a big power like the United 
States at the beginning of the Cold War utilizing insights from the theory of small states’ 
alliances with big powers to understand Pakistan’s alliance behavior. A brief discussion on the 
successes and failures of aid and sanctions as two important tools of non-proliferation and its 
implications for U.S. non-proliferation policy is also discussed in this chapter in the context of 
U.S. policy towards Pakistan.  
A historical analysis of Pakistan’s narrative development is conducted in Chapter Two, 
Making Sense of Pakistan’s Narrative. As the title suggests, it discusses the events of 1965 and 
1971 as two turning points in Pakistan’s history that are important to understand its narrative 
about the seasonality of U.S. friendship.  
 Discussion on the Symington amendment, the issue of Pakistan’s attempts to acquire 
plutonium reprocessing plant and the narrative-building surrounding U.S. attempts to thwart 
Pakistan’s attempts to develop peaceful nuclear technology are discussed in detail in Chapter 
Three, Ford’s Non-Proliferation Policy Towards Pakistan.  
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General Zia ul Haq, Pakistan’s Chief of the Army Staff deposed Bhutto in a military coup 
in July 1977 and began another period of military rule in Pakistan that lasted for eleven years. 
During Zia’s regime, Pakistan-U.S. relations saw several ups and downs with an ‘unhappy’ 
period with the Carter administration from 1977 to 1981 and a relatively ‘happier’ one with his 
successor, Ronald Reagan from 1981 to 1988. Discussion on the Glenn amendment passed in 
1977, the Symington amendment imposed on Pakistan by the Carter administration in 1979, 
cancellation of the French reprocessing agreement in 1978 and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan resulting in the reversal of the Symington amendment are discussed in Chapter Four 
on Carter’s Non-Proliferation Policy Towards Pakistan.  
Pakistan’s robust but clandestine nuclear development continued during the Reagan 
administration but the passage of the Pressler and Solarz amendments by Congress in 1985 
apparently restricted Pakistani nuclear efforts, however, the amendments were not invoked 
during the Reagan administration. Discussions on how Pakistan helped the U.S. win the Cold 
War and the non-proliferation tradeoffs made in return during Reagan administration are part of 
Chapter Five, Reagan’s Non-Proliferation Policy Towards Pakistan.  
The period in the history of Pakistan-U.S. alliance at the end of the Cold War is crucial 
for deconstructing Pakistan’s abandonment narrative. Pakistan claims that the most damaging 
nuclear sanctions under the Pressler amendment were invoked against it during the Bush 
administration after Pakistan’s services were no longer required. Discussion on the Pressler 
amendment and how the Bush administration attempted to find ways to bypass the Pressler 
sanctions in order to accommodate Pakistan are discussed in Chapter Six, H.W. Bush’s Non-
Proliferation Policy Towards Pakistan.  
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Chapter Seven, Clinton’s Non-Proliferation Policy Towards Pakistan discusses the little 
known Brown and Harkin-Warner amendments allowing Pakistan get its fully paid-up military 
supplies worth $368 million back from the United States that were held up after the Pressler 
amendment. Discussion on Clinton’s efforts to stop Pakistan and India from conducting nuclear 
tests in 1998 and his efforts to engage them in discussions on the comprehensive test ban treaty 
are also part of this chapter.  
The Conclusion provides the counter-narrative on the U.S. non-proliferation policy 
towards Pakistan from Ford to Clinton. 
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Chapter 1 - The Historiography of Pak-U.S. Alliance  
This chapter provides a brief historiography of U.S. relations with Pakistan during the initial 
decades of the Cold War and utilizes the theory of small states and their alliances with big 
powers to understand the makings of their asymmetric relationship.  
 The Cold War in South Asia 
The period of history dominated by the Cold War from 1945 to 1991 was a struggle between two 
superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, for power, influence and resources around 
the globe. For the United States it was also a struggle to break out of isolation and forge new 
alliances beyond the Atlantic. The early historiography of the origins of the Cold War is 
comprised of three schools. The traditionalists or the orthodox school viewed American military 
and economic engagement in Western Europe primarily as a response to the Soviet aggression 
and its attempts to spread communism; the revisionists challenged the orthodox view and argued 
that it was America that initiated the Cold War and provoked Soviet responses through its ‘open 
door’ policies to pry open overseas markets and propagated democratic values around the globe 
to justify American economic imperialism; the post-revisionists however synthesized the 
traditionalists and revisionist schools of thought and argued that the breakdown of post-war 
peace could not be blamed on one country or the other, rather, both superpowers were equally 
responsible for mutual misperceptions and hostility in an overarching security dilemma.  
Some historians argued that post-war American expansionism was not merely forceful 
diplomacy devoid of morality; America, rather, was invited to forge security alliances by 
countries that were vulnerable to Soviet military expansion and were unable to protect their own 
territorial integrity. Some post-revisionist historians brought the concepts of ‘realism’ and 
‘national security’ into the mainstream debate and argued that America’s post-war expansion 
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was based on its national security considerations (domestic and external) as it sought to develop 
a strategic sphere of influence to safeguard its national interests, advance its power and 
influence, access overseas markets and resources, forge economic and military alliances with 
regional powers, provide conventional and nuclear security guarantees to its allies, and maintain 
its nuclear superiority –– all of which were the hallmark of a truly global empire.30  
                                                
30 ‘Origins of the Cold War’ remains the most controversial subject amongst historians of the Cold War. The 
historiography of the subject is rich – the list of historians and divisions within each school of thought, very 
complex; I have only selected a leading few to share here in no particular order or preference: In addition to the 
memoirs of Harry S. Truman, Dean Acheson or George Kennan, some of the leading orthodox historians who blame 
the Soviet Union for the breakdown of U.S.-Soviet relations include Herbert Feis, The Atomic Bomb end the End of 
World War II, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War they 
Waged and the Peace They Sought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., 
“Origins of the Cold War,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 46 (Oct, 1967);  John Lewis Gaddis Smith, American Diplomacy 
during the Second World War, 1941-1945, (New York: Wiley, 1965); Martin F. Herz, Beginnings of the Cold War 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969). Amongst the revisionists, the most controversial work that 
challenged the traditional view point of American innocence was by Williams Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of 
American Diplomacy (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1988); David Horowitz, The Free World Colossus: A 
Critique of the American Foreign Policy in the Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 1965); Gabriel Kolko, The 
Politics of War: The World and the United States Foreign Policy 1943-1945 (New York: Random House, 1968); 
Joyce and G. Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and The United States Foreign Policy 1945-1954 (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1972); Walter LaFeber, America, Russia and the Cold War 1945-1966 (New York: John Wiley, 
1967); Lloyd C. Gardner, Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949 (Chicago: 
Quadrangle Books, 1970) and D.F. Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960 (Garden City, N.Y: 
Doubleday & Company, 1961). For post-revisionists work, see, John Lewis Gaddis, “The Emerging Post-
Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Summer 1983); Martin J. 
Sherwin, A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and The Great Alliance (New York: Knopf, 1975); Thomas G. 
Patterson, Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press, 1973); Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the 
National Security State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977); John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold 
War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar 
American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), and; Michael Hunt, Ideology and 
U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987); Hunt, “The Long Crisis in U.S. Diplomatic History: 
Coming to Closure,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 16 (Winter 1992); Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: 
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South Asia as a region played an important role in enabling U.S. global supremacy by 
enabling the unipolar world order after the defeat of the Soviet Union in the final decade of the 
Cold War and its subsequent breakup. A post-revisionist explanation rooted firmly in realism and 
U.S. national security imperatives explains the advance of American foreign relations with 
countries in the region. The two newly decolonized, independent countries, Pakistan and India in 
1947, were caught in the superpower Cold War struggle for regional alliances within the first 
decade of their independence from the British Raj. Some scholarship on the origins and the 
impact of the Cold War on the “predominantly poor, nonwhite, and uncommitted areas of the 
globe” or the Third World31 argued that these countries, even though geographically critical as 
they were in providing the two superpowers a combination of military, economic and political 
resources, were manipulated by the two Cold War rivals and were not ‘active agents’ in shaping 
                                                                                                                                                       
National Security, The Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992) and; 
Leffler, “The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-1948,” 
American Historical Review, Vol. 89 (Apr 1984)  
31 Robert J McMahon ed., The Cold War in the Third World (New York: Oxford University Press), 2013: pg. 3. The 
etymology of the term “Third World” traces back to a French demographer, Alfred Sauvy who first used it in his 
article published in August 14, 1952. According to Mike Mason, Sauvy described the Cold War between the West 
and the Soviet Union as a struggle for “the possession of the Third World, that is, the collectivity of those that were 
called in the language of the United Nations ‘underdeveloped’” and that the “Third World was like the Third Estate 
at the time of the French Revolution: ignored, exploited, and misunderstood,” p.30, see Mike Mason, Development 
and Disorder: A History of the Third World since 1945 (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1997) 
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their own destiny. 32 The decision to align their foreign policies by joining one bloc or the other 
remained a challenge for many third world countries. For some the dilemma was acute. As 
American historian Robert McMahon suggested, “joining the Western power bloc, with its deep-
seated suspicions of those inclined to march to a socialist drumbeat, could constrict certain 
domestic political and development paths, compromising the freedom of choice that founding 
national elites invariably crave” whereas alignment with the Socialist bloc “… would almost 
surely minimize, if not preclude entirely, the option of coaxing dollars and support from the 
world’s richest and most powerful nation.”33 But countries in the developing world did make 
their choice in favor of one or the other bloc dictated by their domestic political environment and 
external constraints. While some aligned with the United States in the West and some with the 
Soviet Union in the East, some countries chose to remain non-aligned retaining the freedom to 
make independent foreign policy choices free of pressures from either bloc.  
                                                
32 McMahon suggests that early view of Third World relations with the United States was a narrow interpretation of 
a paradigm that “privileged the actions and motivations of policymakers in Washington and Moscow, treating Third 
World actors – at least by implication – more as objects of manipulations than as active agents shaping their own 
fate,” McMahon, Op.cit, pg. 4. For a selection of debates on the origins of Cold War in Asia see William Joseph 
Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers (New York: Praeger Publications, 1972); Bruce Kuniholm, The 
Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980); Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, 
India and Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); Michael J. Hogan ed., America in the World: The 
Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); S. 
Mahmud Ali, Cold War in the High Himalayas: The United States, China and the South Asia in the 1950s (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999); Andrew J. Rotter, Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947-1964 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000); Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions 
and the Making of our Times (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); David S. Painter, “Explaining U.S. 
Relations with the Third World,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 19 (Summer 1995) and; Paul M. McGarr, The Cold War 
in South Asia: Britain, The United States and the Indian Subcontinent, 1945-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013)  
33 McMahon, The Cold War in the Third World, 2013: Introduction, pg. 8 
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India and Pakistan chose opposite sides of the superpower divide during much of the 
Cold War even though they both actively continued their flirtation with non-alignment.34 
According to Stephen Cohen, Pakistan’s relevance to the regional security debate around 1947 
revolved around two questions, “how would an independent Pakistan stand between India and 
                                                
34 Non-alignment was Jawaharlal Nehru’s legacy, the first prime minister of India.  He articulated the concept of 
non-alignment in his 1963 Foreign Affairs article and stated: “The twin policies which have guided us since 
independence are, broadly, democratic planning for development at home and, externally, a policy which has come 
to be named, rather inadequately, “non-alignment”…(which) represents only one aspect of our policy; we have other 
positive aims also, such as the promotion of freedom from colonial rule, racial equality, peace and international 
cooperation, but “non-alignment” has become a summary description of this policy of friendship toward all nations, 
uncompromised by adherence to any military pacts” pg.456.  Nehru wrote this article in the aftermath of the Indo-
China war of 1962 and warned that Chinese behavior left little room for non-alignment: “If the world is viewed as 
divided essentially between imperialists and Communists, between whom war not only is inevitable in the end, but 
between whom tension in some form must be kept alive and even intensified as opportunity occurs, then there is no 
place in it for the non-aligned,” Nehru contended. “The non-aligned nations must, in this context, seem to be 
occupying an unstable, anomalous position from which, if they could be dislodged, either by cajolery or coercion, 
the result would be to accentuate the polarization of world forces” pg.460-461 see Jawaharlal Nehru, “Changing 
India,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Apr 1963), pp.453-465   
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Afghanistan, on the one hand, and between India and the Soviet Union, on the other?35 Could 
Pakistan maintain a viable army? Would it serve as a bulwark for India against Soviet pressure or 
radical Islamic movements?”36 Pakistan did not have much to offer to the Americans in its early 
                                                
35 After independence, Pakistan did not have good relations with either India or Afghanistan, its two immediate 
neighbors on the Eastern and Western side of the border respectively. Afghanistan raised the border issue with 
Pakistan, the Durand Line – drawn in 1893 by Sir Henry Mortimer Durand – that separated people belonging to the 
Pashtun tribes between Afghanistan and the then British India. After Pakistan’s independence from British India, 
Afghanistan raised the issue of ‘Pasthunistan,’ demanding Pashtun independence, demanding that areas in Pakistan’s 
North Western province with Pashtun majority population become part of Afghanistan or become independent – a 
demand that Pakistan denied. Afghanistan also became the only country that voted against Pakistan’s admission in 
the United Nations. Pakistan had several outstanding issues with India of which two major ones were the disputed 
territory of Kashmir and the Indus water dispute with the headworks of Punjab’s irrigation system being given to 
India by Sir Cyril Radcliffe in the Radcliffe Boundary Award at the time of the partition. As cited by Pervaiz Iqbal 
Cheema in his book The Armed Forces of Pakistan (New York: New York University Press, 2002), David E. 
Lilienthal, former chairman of the US Tennessee Valley Authority once wrote “No army with bombs and shellfire, 
could devastate a land so thoroughly as Pakistan could be devastated by the simple expedient of India’s permanently 
shutting off sources of water that keep the fields and people of Pakistan alive,” p.22. It was not until 1960 through 
the Indus Water Treaty that both countries found a permanent solution to their water crisis even though the last three 
decades have seen stability on this dimension seriously disturbed. Kashmir issue, on the other hand is still ongoing 
with both countries occupying parts of Jammu and Kashmir territory. 
36 Stephen Cohen, “ Pakistan and the Cold War,” in Chandra Chari ed., Superpower Rivalry and Conflict: The Long 
Shadow of the Cold War on The Twentieth Century (New York: Routledge, 2010): 75  
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days. Unlike India, Pakistan had neither inherited strong infrastructure nor a strong military.37 In 
early American calculations, Pakistan’s location could only have provided them with a possible 
“bomber base on the Soviet Union’s southern flank” and nothing more.38 Three years after their 
independence, a report submitted to the U.S. National Security Council on January 5, 1951 
proposed the idea of a strategic handshake of the U.S. with India and Pakistan. The report argued 
that the time was critical for the U.S. to reach out to these countries to enhance the security of the 
United States, stating that  
The loss of India to the Communist orbit would mean that for all practical purposes all of 
Asia will have been lost; this would constitute a most serious and threatening blow to the 
security of the United States. The loss of China, the immediate threat to Indochina and 
                                                
37 Born on midnight, August 14, 1947 when  British India was simultaneously partitioned and made independent of 
British rule amidst horrific violence and bloodshed, Pakistan, a nation of seventy million people, inherited many 
liabilities but not enough assets or infrastructure. With respect to the division of assets between India and Pakistan, 
perhaps the biggest task for the British managers of the partition was to divide the British Indian Army. According 
to Cheema, at the time of the partition, “the British Indian Army consisted of approximately 11,800 Indian officers 
and civilian officials and 450,000 other personnel.” The British Indian Army was divided firstly along the 
communal lines “enabling the two dominions to assume operation control of their respective forces.” The second 
stage included “redistribution of individuals and units, on voluntary basis, to the dominion they preferred, thus 
enabling the officers and their soldiers to opt for the country of their choice,” p.49.  Cheema records that “Pakistan’s 
share of the Army was much smaller. Whereas India got fourteen armoured corps regiments, 40 artillery regiments 
and 21 infantry regiments, Pakistan was allocated six armoured corps regiments, eight artillery regiments, and eight 
infantry regiments,” p.50. In the British Indian Armed forces, Muslim representation was 24 percent in comparison 
to 48 percent Hindu officers and “of the 461,800 Army personnel, Pakistan’s agreed total inheritance was around 
150,000 (including officers), in a little over 500 units of varying sizes,” p.51. Many British officials were retained to 
serve on various governmental positions due to lesser number of Pakistani civilian bureaucrats after independence. 
Pakistan did not have any military production facilities until 1950 when Pakistan Ordnance Factory was established. 
The only advantage Pakistan had was its strategic location – well recognized by the British and the Americans – but 
which it did not use to advance its own strategic interests until decades later. For historical overview of the origins 
of the Kashmir dispute see Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War (London: 
I.B. Tauris, 2010). For an excellent account of the Pashtunistan issue after Pakistan’s independence see James Spain, 
“Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier,” Middle East Journal Vol. 8, No.1 (1954): 27-40  
38 Cohen, “Pakistan and the Cold War,” 76  
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the balance of Southeast Asia, the invasion of Tibet, and the reverses in Korea have 
greatly increased the significance to the United States of the political, strategic and 
resource potential of the countries of South Asia. India, especially, and Pakistan as well, 
possess leaders having great prestige throughout the whole of Asia; the future support of 
these countries diplomatically and in the United Nations is of importance; India in 
particular has certain strategic materials of great but not strictly vital importance to our 
national defense; all these considerations emphasize the political and strategic necessity 
for continuation of free and non-communist governments in South Asia, especially in 
India and Pakistan, and of improved stability in the area.39 
 
Robert McMahon however has criticized this rationalization of U.S. policy of alliance-formation 
especially with Pakistan in the early years of the Cold War at the expense of losing India. 
Although he agrees with the post-revisionist argument for the “critical importance of strategic 
considerations to postwar American expansion” he argues that 
…the American policy to Pakistan was driven by a remarkably imprecise and inchoate 
formulation of the nation’s strategic needs. American planners came to view Pakistan as a 
key to the defense of the Middle East, but they were never sure exactly how it would 
contribute to that larger objective, nor were they certain about the exact nature of the 
threat Moscow posed to that troubled region.40 
 
                                                
39 “The Position of the United States with Respect to South Asia,” Top Secret, National Security Council Report 
submitted to the NSC by James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary of the NSC, January 5, 1951,Draft NSC 98, 
Presidential Directives, Digital National Security Archives retrieved from 
http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CPD00241 
accessed on Dec 3, 2014. John Foster Dulles, President Eisenhower’s Secretary of State was the architect of 
bringing Pakistan into the fold of formal U.S. alliance. He presented his idea of ‘community defense’ in his 1954 
article, “Policy for Security and Peace,” in Foreign Affairs.  Dulles proposed that in order to deal with the massive 
threat of communism, reliance needed to be placed on “creation of power on a community basis and the use of that 
power so as to deter aggression by making it costly to an aggressor.” Dulles believed that the “cornerstone of 
security for the free nations” was in the collective system of defense since no nation was capable of achieving 
security alone on its own, p.355. Dulles envisioned collective defense arrangement like NATO in other regions like 
the Middle East with Turkey and Pakistan at the heart of such an alliance.  
40 Robert J. McMahon, “United States Cold War Strategy in South Asia: Making a Military Commitment to 
Pakistan, 1947-1954,” The Journal of American History, Vol. 75, No. 3 (December 1988); 812-840: 815 
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McMahon suggests “a peripheral state like Pakistan could often exert substantial influence on the 
United States, pressing for military aid for its own purposes and virtually forcing an American 
response.”41  
Pakistan did come forth and align its own interests with those of the U.S. whereas Nehru 
chose non-alignment over major power alliances. Why was Pakistan enthusiastic about a pro-
Western foreign policy as a newly independent small state?42  
 Theoretical Interpretation of Pak-U.S. Alliance 
  Small States’ Alliances With Big Powers 
As per the conventional wisdom about small states and their foreign policy formation, neo-
realism or systemic and structural-level theories provide rich insight to predict small states 
foreign policy priorities given their focus on the dynamics between ‘power’ and ‘security’.43 
According to the neo-realists, small states are driven to form alliances with big powers due to 
their external constraints, more specifically motivated by their ‘security’ concerns rather than by 
their domestic or internal compulsions.  
                                                
41 ibid, 815 
42 This research uses the definition of ‘small’ or weak states in terms of their capabilities or power; having limited 
ineffectual capacity to influence security dynamics in its region or to defend itself against a larger more powerful 
neighbor.  As a newly independent country, Pakistan’s size was small, its resources limited and its military strength 
was 1:5 in comparison to India but it was not small in ‘influence’ given its geostrategic location.  
43 The literature on realism and foreign policy is rich in its explanations about states looking out for their own 
interests with weak states forming alliances with big states to maximize their security in an anarchic international 
system along with big powers having huge military capabilities seeking spheres of influence to balance against the 
threats to their capabilities. Three classic writings on the subject of realism, power, anarchy and their influences on 
foreign policy are Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Knopf, 1960); Kenneth Waltz, Theory 
of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979) and John Mearshimer, The Tragedy of Great Power 
Politics (New York: Norton, 2003). For balancing and bandwagoning policies see Stephen M. Walt, The Origin of 
Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987) 
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At first glance, Pakistan’s case appears to be a simple case of a small state seeking 
alliance with a big state like the United States to maximize its security through economic and 
military assistance during the duration of the alliance. But as a free actor in international 
relations, Pakistan, in addition to its alliance with the United States also developed an alliance 
relationship with China in 1963, containment of which until 1971 was the raison d'être of 
Pakistan-U.S. alliance. However, this dissertation argues that since the onset of the alliance, 
Pakistan’s pairing with the U.S. was asymmetrical –– the stated objective of the alliance initiated 
by the United States was different from the perceived objective of the alliance by Pakistan. In the 
first decade of the Cold War in South Asia, the United States engaged Pakistan to join the 
northern-tier states like Turkey, Iran and Iraq to counter potential communist influences and 
Soviet aggression in the Middle East.44 Pakistan joined the alliance naively hoping that the U.S. 
commitment would invariably extend to cover the ‘Indian threat’ along with the communist 
threat even when the U.S. had made no explicit commitment to Pakistan in this regard.  
There are two ways that Pakistan’s perception of U.S. support against the ‘Indian threat’ 
can be understood: a) different U.S. administrations made varied statements to Pakistani leaders 
time and again assuring them of their ‘support’ against an Indian attack. However, this ‘support’ 
was verbal at best and never inked in any agreement signed between the two countries, b) the 
military assistance provided to Pakistan through various defense agreements in support of its 
joining regional defense organizations, strengthened Pakistan’s military capabilities which irked 
                                                
44 The Mutual Assistance Agreement signed on February 25, 1954 provided Pakistan military assistance in exchange 
for  its commitment to join the Baghdad Pact initially known as the Middle East Treaty Organization established in 
1955. Even though the U.S. did not directly become part of this regional defense organization, its member states 
advanced a U.S.-dictated agenda. In 1954, Pakistan also became part of the Manila Pact aka the South East Asian 
Treaty Organization (SEATO) as the only South Asian state. However, the United States never explicitly made any 
commitment to defend Pakistan against Indian aggression. 
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India no end. In Pakistan’s policymakers’ thought processes, U.S.-supplied lethal weaponry 
would have deterred India from initiating any attack against Pakistan. Once again, the supply of 
U.S. arms to Pakistan was not an explicit U.S. commitment against India but it was perceived by 
Pakistan as an implicit assurance by the United States since the latter had supplied lethal 
weapons to Pakistan with full knowledge of its hostile relationship with India.  
 Discussion in the following chapter would reveal that this differing perception of 
objectives, the immutable difference between the stated and the perceived became clear to both 
parties when Pakistan and India fought their second war in 1965 and the United States refused to 
use force against India. As the state of Pakistan matured and the Cold War entered its second 
decade in South Asia, Pakistan sought additional relations with competing major powers in the 
region, the Communist China and the Soviet Union. Even though this was in direct violation of 
the terms of its alliance with the United States, both countries never formally ended the 
alliance.45 
What does the theory of small states and alliances tell us about Pakistan’s alliance 
behavior and foreign policy choices? Pakistan’s alliance formation can be analyzed through 
several variables at the three levels of analysis mentioned by Jeanne A. K. Hey in her research. 
In the introduction of her edited volume, Hey surveys the literature on small state foreign policy 
written after the Cold War and identifies two problems with the body of research. First, scholars 
writing on the subject provide little or inadequate evidence to discredit the conventional wisdom 
                                                
45 For a historical overview of the origins of the U.S. commitment in Asia and the Middle East see Stanley Wolpert, 
Roots of Confrontation in South Asia: Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and the Superpowers (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1982); Steven Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making of America’s Middle East Policy, 
from Truman to Reagan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985) and; Gary R. Hess, “Global Expansion and 
Regional Balances: The Emerging Scholarship on United States Relations with India and Pakistan,” Pacific 
Historical Review, Vol. 56, No.2 (May, 1987); 259-295 
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of the ‘security’ imperatives or ‘international determinants’ that add to the pre-eminence of the 
explanatory potential of the systemic factors. The second problem, Hey argues, is the ‘outdated’ 
focus of the literature on ‘state security.’ According to Hey, “foreign policy analysis has evolved 
significantly in its “second generation” [at the turn of the century and]…other factors at the 
individual, bureaucratic, and state levels very often have at least as much influence on foreign 
policy behavior as do international security concerns.”46  
In analyzing Pakistan’s alliance relationship with the U.S., these three levels of analysis 
provide considerable insight. At the individual level of analysis, the variable of leadership helps 
us understand Pakistan’s alliance behavior dictated by its leaders at different times in history. 
Pakistan’s foreign policy has been a product of personalism. Pakistan’s alliance formation with 
the U.S. from the first decade of its independence to date has largely been a product of 
personalized foreign policy decision-making dictated by the parochial interests of military and 
democratic leaders alike. According to Hey, “weak countries with limited foreign policy 
bureaucracies provide ample opportunities for individual leaders to leave their mark.”47 For a 
small state like Pakistan, individual leaders have always negotiated the terms of the alliance with 
the United States. Pakistan has had a long tradition of military rule. In its sixty-seven years of 
independence, there have been three decade-long governments run by three military rulers: 
General Ayub Khan (1958 – 1969) followed briefly by Yahya Khan (1969-1971); General Zia-
ul-Haq (1977-1988) and General Musharraf (1999-2008). Pakistan’s experimentation with 
democracy has been brief but even in the years Pakistan has enjoyed democratic regimes, its 
                                                
46 Jeanne A. K. Hey ed., Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 2003); 8 
47 Quoted in Frank O. Mora, “Paraguay: From the Stronato to the Democratic Transition,” in Jeanne A. K. Hey ed., 
Small States in World Politics (2003); 13  
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foreign policy decision-making has remained personalized. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1971-77), 
Benazir Bhutto (1988-1990 and 1993-1996), Mohammad Nawaz Sharif (1990-1993; 1997-1999 
and 2013 till date) and Asif Ali Zardari (2008-2013) are those democratic leaders that have 
interchangeably filled the years in between the military regimes. The lines between the stated and 
perceived objectives have been crossed by these individual leaders to strengthen domestic public 
opinion at home in favor of or against the alliance with the U.S. as and when it has suited the 
needs of their governance. 
At the state level of analysis, an explanation for Pakistan’s alliance formation behavior 
can be discerned from the regime type. According to J. David Singer, “at the sub-systemic or 
national level…. nations may be said to be goal-seeking organisms which exhibit purposive 
behavior” and that “[nations] do prefer and therefore select, particular outcomes and attempt to 
realize them by conscious formulation of strategies.48 Regime type has influenced Pakistan’s 
foreign policy. Pakistan and the United States have had relatively good relations during the 
military regimes in Pakistan. For example, during Ayub Khan (1958-1969), Zia-ul-Haq (1977-
1988) and Musharraf (2000-2008), both countries have enjoyed extended periods of military and 
economic alliance. Under military regimes, Pakistan’s alliance relationship with the United 
States has been military-oriented while under democratic regimes, the emphasis has been on 
economic assistance in addition to the military aid. In either case, Pakistan’s military has 
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benefited with a strong military and economic alliance with the United States in and out of 
power.49  
At the second level of analysis, the ideology of the state of Pakistan however does not 
provide adequate explanations for its foreign policy behavior or alliance formation as a small 
state. Andrew Jon Rotter in his book Comrades At Odds presents an interesting perspective about 
a state’s religious identity shaping its foreign policy. According to Rotter, the “religious-mythic 
basis for Indian statecraft” had direct implications for India’s foreign policy with other countries. 
Rotter argues, “While Indians and Westerners understood the implications of Hinduism 
differently, there is no question that Hinduism was increasingly associated with the state. 
Independence had affirmed Hinduism as a touchstone of authenticity for a struggling new nation 
seeking its identity.” Rotter contends that India’s neutrality during the early Cold War days in 
South Asia was seen by the British and the Americans as determined by Hinduism –– Hindus not 
being able to tell right from wrong. While this may be true for India, Roger maintains that 
Pakistan had no moral, ideological or religious dilemma in differentiating between good and evil. 
Roger explains, “During the Cold War, there could be no atheists, or polytheists, in foxholes. 
Leader after Pakistani leader gave assurances that he hated communism, that he would fight 
against communism, and that he admired the United State’s insistence on standing against 
evil.”50 It is hard to accept Rotter’s argument about religion being the unifying factor in binding 
Pakistan and the U.S. in a military alliance. For Pakistan, Islam neither interfered with its foreign 
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policy agendas nor did it dictate its alliances even though both Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the 
founder of Pakistan and Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan’s first Prime Minister made statements 
against communism and its incompatibility with Islam as discussed in the following chapter. But 
those statements were self-serving and cannot be seen through Rotter’s lens of religion shaping 
Pakistan’s foreign policy. Had that been the case, it would have stayed a constant but it did not. 
It varied, rather, with Pakistan’s national interests. For example, in its alliance relationship with 
China, the ‘communist-atheist’ ideology never interfered with Pakistan’s Islamic-monotheist 
orientation. And against the Soviets, the terms like ‘jihad’ and ‘holy-war’ were invoked only to 
justify Pakistan’s involvement in the war, as a U.S. proxy, to a domestic audience. 
The systemic level of analysis provides rich explanations for Pakistan’s alliance 
formation behavior given its chronic security dilemma vis-à-vis India. Stephen Walt explains 
alliance formation as either balancing or bandwagoning. Pakistan did the balancing. According 
to Walt, “Balancing is alignment against the threatening power to deter it from attacking or to 
defeat it if it does. Bandwagoning refers to alignment with the dominant power, either to appease 
it or to profit from its victory.”51 Walt argues that Pakistan did not adopt “a pro-India or pro-
Soviet policy, despite its obvious vulnerability to both”52 and the objective of Pakistan’s alliance 
with the U.S. during the Cold War and later with China was always to balance against its number 
one threat –– India.  
Born in an anarchic international system, Pakistan as a small nation-state was pitted 
against a huge adversary on its eastern border with whom it shared a bloody history of partition 
and a disputed territorial claim in Kashmir. On its western border, the state of Afghanistan 
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refused to vote in favor of its entry into the United Nations in 1947 and raised the issue of 
Pashtunistan, demanding freedom for the Pashtuns residing in the North West territory in 
Pakistan. With no military assets or capability and a weak bureaucracy, Pakistan sought to align 
itself with the biggest power and the richest country in the world at the time –– the United States. 
Pakistan’s threat perception of Indian aggression against Pakistan has justified Pakistan’s 
outreach to the U.S. for military alliances since 1954. It has also justified Pakistan’s alliance with 
China after the Sino-Indian border war in 1962. Military leaders in Pakistan have also used the 
Indian threat as a justification to depose civilian democratic governments in order to better 
safeguard Pakistan’s national interests they felt were not being served by the democratic forces 
in the country. Survival against the Indian threat therefore did not only justify Pakistan’s military 
alliance with the United States but also shaped Pakistan’s domestic and international destinies.  
The variables discussed above provide explanations for Pakistan’s foreign policy 
behavior with respect to its alliance formation with the United States in the first four decades of 
its independence, corresponding with the final four of the Cold War. These variables have also 
allowed Pakistan to invoke the stated versus the perceived objectives of the alliance time and 
again, blurring the lines between the two to augment its abandonment narrative. However, for 
Pakistan the appeal of these variables to predict the obvious is unsurprising.  
 Theoretical Interpretation of U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy 
 Non-proliferation Sanctions 
The U.S. non-proliferation policy utilizes economic, political and military sanctions enshrined in 
non-proliferation legislation to deter proliferation behavior in countries around the globe. Three 
laws –– the Symington and the Glenn amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
enacted in 1976 and 1977 respectively, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) and 
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the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act 1994 (NPPA) –– taken together, form the basis of U.S. 
nuclear sanctions regime.  
There is no consensus in sanctions literature in international relations scholarship on their 
‘efficacy’ in either deterring or changing a state’s behavior or even whether multilateral 
sanctions, as tools of coercive diplomacy, are more effective than unilateral sanctions in 
achieving their desired objectives.53 In their influential work on economic sanctions, Gary Clyde 
et al., reviewed 115 cases of economic sanctions between 1914 to 1990 and found that the 
sanctions worked in only 40 cases, making it ‘34 percent of the total’. Robert Pape credits this 
work for providing empirical support for a “significant shift in the scholarly consensus on the 
effectiveness of sanctions from marked pessimism in the 1960s and 1970s to qualified optimism 
in the 1980s and 1990s.” However, Pape’s own work challenged the ‘validity’ of Clyde’s 
research reducing their 40 successful cases to only 5 stating, “…sanctions have succeeded in 
                                                
53 The most widely used form of sanctions is economic sanctions to coerce a state into behaving according to the 
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only 5 of 115 attempts, and thus there is no sound basis for even qualified optimism about the 
effects of sanctions.”54  
In their book A Theory of Foreign Policy, Glenn Palmer and T. Clifton Morgan analyze 
U.S. foreign policy-making to understand how decision-makers select one policy over the other 
to maximize their utility given their objectives and the trade-offs made in the process. They 
argue that for a rational actor, each foreign policy decision made has a cost and no action is free. 
Decisions are made either to bring ‘change’ in some things that are undesirable or they are taken 
to reinforce an ‘existing outcome’. Moreover, all actions require ‘resources’ and states or leaders 
undertake a calculated cost-benefit analysis of their actions and given their constraints, then 
choose the best decision from a preference list or set of policies the authors introduce as ‘foreign 
policy portfolio’ that suit a particular need of the time.  Palmer and Morgan present a ‘two-good 
theory’ which maintains that “states pursue two things –– change and maintenance –– through 
their international behavior and component foreign policies and that they allocate foreign policy 
resources as efficiently as possible to maximize their utility.”55  Applied in the context of this 
dissertation, U.S. non-proliferation policy portfolio reveals a mixed bag of aid and sanctions as 
resources used by the U.S. to constrain Pakistan’s nuclear activities. Each administration under 
review in this research, chose a particular action for example the promise of aid to Pakistan in 
lieu of assurances of non-possession and non-development of nuclear weapons or the threat of 
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sanctions and aid cut-off to Pakistan in the absence of such assurances. Each time the goalposts 
on U.S. tolerance for proliferation were moved to accommodate Pakistan for one foreign policy 
objective or the other, a cost was inherited. The period that is examined in this research from 
1972 to 1998 reveals that the cost for the U.S. shifting its non-proliferation redlines –– lifting 
sanctions to enlist Pakistan’s support during the Cold War –– came in the shape of a nuclearized 
Pakistan.  
Recent research on U.S. non-proliferation sanctions policy and its efficacy to curb 
proliferation tendencies in states suggests that U.S. policy has been successful but largely 
‘hidden’ due to ‘selection effects’. Nicholas Miller argues that the U.S. non-proliferation policy 
of threatening economic and political sanctions has been successful against those states that were 
at the ‘onset’ of nuclear proliferation thereby deterring them from ‘starting’ their nuclear 
programs and has been ineffective against those with an ‘ongoing’ nuclear weapons program. 
Miller argues that “rational leaders assess the risk of sanctions before initiating a nuclear 
weapons program, which produces a selection effect whereby states highly vulnerable to 
sanctions are deterred from starting nuclear weapons programs in the first place, as long as the 
threat is credible.” And since “vulnerability is a function of a state’s level of economic and 
security dependence on the United States, states with greater dependence have more to lose from 
US sanctions and are more likely to be sensitive to US-sponsored norms.” Thereby those states, 
which were ‘inward-looking regimes with few ties’ to the U.S., started weapons program and 
were targeted with economic sanctions “rendering the observed success rate of nonproliferation 
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sanctions low.”56 The credibility of U.S. threat was established when the Congress passed its first 
non-proliferation related law, the Symington amendment in 1976. 
 In his unpublished dissertation, Nicholas Miller examines Pakistan’s case study and the 
efficacy of U.S. non-proliferation policy. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program started in 1972 
and consistent with the theoretical logic discussed above, Miller argues that the sanctions were 
not effective against Pakistan since a) it already had initiated a nuclear weapons program and b) 
‘initially’ its dependency on the U.S. was low thereby reducing the threat of incurred costs from 
U.S. sanctions. In the periods where Pakistan’s dependency on the U.S. was high, Miller argues 
the United States “undermined the credibility of its threats by waiving sanctions and continuing 
to provide massive amounts of aid despite Pakistan’s nuclear advances.”57  
Miller finds evidence for his theory by examining Pakistan’s case and its dependency on 
the U.S. at different periods in time. For example, “between 1974 and 1979, Pakistan was not 
highly dependent on the United States –– despite its status as an ally and aid recipient –– and so 
was not brought in line by US sanctions.” And from 1980 onwards, “Pakistan did become 
dependent on the United States due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and increased need for 
aid” however instead of making this “aid contingent on Pakistan verifiably giving up its nuclear 
weapons program” the United States “undermined its credibility by waiving sanctions and 
focusing solely on preventing Pakistan from testing, an effort which succeeded but which 
allowed Pakistan to advance to the point of acquiring to construct a nuclear device.”58 Miller 
states the counterfactual: “had the United States made aid explicitly contingent on stricter limits 
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on the Pakistani nuclear program in the 1980s, Pakistan likely would have restrained its nuclear 
program more substantially, at least for the duration of the Afghan war.”59 
 In examining the counter-narrative to Pakistan’s, this dissertation attempts to provide a 
comprehensive account of U.S. non-proliferation legislation, the Symington, Glenn, Pressler and 
Solarz amendments, and their application on Pakistan under different administrations. I argue 
that under all five administrations from Ford to Clinton (1974 to 2001) the U.S economic and 
military assistance to Pakistan was linked to non-proliferation assurances from Pakistan and not 
only in periods of high U.S. credibility and high dependency on U.S. aid by Pakistan. The U.S. 
not only undermined its ‘threat credibility’ (during the Afghan war when it provided aid to 
Pakistan, as Miller suggests), it ‘consistently’ compromised on its non-proliferation norms under 
all five administrations to achieve ‘other’ foreign policy objectives. Therefore, this dissertation 
suggests that it is not necessarily a non-proliferation policy failure but an enforcement problem 
reinforced by a behavior whereby this compulsive need to pursue goals other than non-
proliferation has exacted significant long-term costs on the overall U.S. foreign policy. And in 
this particular case, it enabled the creation of the seventh nuclear weapon state –– Pakistan.   
 Conclusion 
The historiography of Pak-U.S Cold War alliance relationship as discussed in this chapter reveals 
the highs and lows of U.S.-Pakistan relationship and shows how Pakistan, a small state, 
benefitted from the United States, a major power, whilst sometimes even dictating the direction 
of U.S. foreign policy. However, Pakistan’s behavior is consistent with the theory of small states 
alliances and their foreign policies under external constraints. With respect to the U.S. non-
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proliferation efforts, this dissertation builds on Nicholas Miller’s theory of non-proliferation and 
Pakistan’s ‘off-the-line’ case to suggest that ‘inconsistency’ in enforcement of non-proliferation 
norms has implications for the ‘threat credibility’ and efficacy and success of U.S. non-
proliferation policy with prospective proliferants. Implications for these two theoretical 
interpretations will be revisited in the final conclusion of this dissertation after examining each 
administration’s non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan  
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Chapter 2 - Making Sense Of Pakistan’s Narrative 
People in developing countries seek assistance, but on the basis of mutual respect; they want to 
have friends not masters.60 
Mohammad Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan, 1967 
 
Figure 2.1 Map of Pakistan61 
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the U.S. and other countries. 
61 Pakistan, Central Intelligence Agency available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/cia-maps-
publications/Pakistan.html  
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In order to understand Pakistan’s narrative about the seasonality of U.S. alliance with Pakistan, it 
is important to conduct a chronological analysis of Pakistan’s motivations for joining the alliance 
in the mid 1950s and its expectations from the United States at different time periods during the 
alliance. This chapter examines the beginning of Pakistan’s alliance with the United States and 
the rise and fall of that alliance.  
 From 1947 to 1959: Beginning of The Alliance 
When the Cold War arrived in South Asia, India steered clear of the superpower rivalry in its 
initial years while Pakistan showed enthusiasm for pro-Western alignment. Unfortunately for 
Pakistan, its founder Mohammad Ali Jinnah did not live long enough to lay strong foundations 
for Pakistan’s foreign policy, but he had visualized its direction. In his September 7, 1947 
cabinet meeting –– within the first month of Pakistan’s independence –– Jinnah shared his views 
and stated, “Pakistan [is] a democracy and communism [does] not flourish in the soil of Islam. It 
[is] clear therefore that our interests [lie] more with the two great democratic countries, namely 
the U.K. and the U.S.A., rather than with Russia.”62 Even though Pakistan’s pro-western leaning 
was discernible, it took some time to officially identify with the American camp. Three years 
later when Pakistan’s first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, an Oxford graduate of law, visited 
the United States on the invitation of the U.S. President Harry S. Truman on May 3, 1950 –– 
Pakistan was still a non-aligned country that had recognized communist China in 1949 much to 
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the dismay of the United States. Liaquat Ali Khan had also contemplated visiting Moscow but 
his visit never materialized.63  
In his speech before the U.S. Senate on May 4, 1950, Khan spoke directly and openly 
about Pakistan’s ideology. He assured the Americans that Islamic ideology was not in 
contradiction with the principles of democracy and freedom –– ideals that were valued and 
practiced by the western world  
We have pledged that the State shall exercise its powers and authority through the chosen 
representatives of the people. In this we have kept steadily before us the principles of 
democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam. There 
is no room here for theocracy, for Islam stands for freedom of conscience, condemns 
coercion, has no priesthood and abhors the caste system. It believes in the equality of all 
men and in the right of each individual to enjoy the fruit of his or her effort, enterprise, 
capacity and skill provided these be honestly employed. It firmly believes in the right of 
private ownership, although it frowns on large accumulations of unearned wealth and is 
greatly concerned over menacing inequalities. These are the articles of faith with us and 
by them we are irrevocably bound. They are our way of life; and no threat or persuasion, 
no material peril or ideological allurement can deflect us from the path we have chosen.64 
 
Liaquat Ali Khan was the short-lived architect of Pakistan’s non-alignment policy. According to 
Khan “Pakistan was not tied to the apron strings of the Anglo-American bloc, nor was she a 
camp-follower of the Communist bloc. Pakistan…had all along been uninfluenced by the inter-
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bloc struggle going on in the world and had supported the cause which it considered to be 
just….it was on this principle that Pakistan had voted in the United Nations sometimes with the 
Western bloc, at others with the communists.”65 Khan’s reference to Pakistan’s voting record in 
the UN caused much anxiety to the U.S. and the Soviets. At the time of Khan’s visit to the U.S., 
North Korean invasion of South Korea was underway marking the beginnings of the Korean 
War. Pakistan voted in favor of U.S. troops to fight the North Koreans, but when the U.S. 
dismissed Khan’s proposal for all-out-support for the Kashmir cause, Pakistan decided not to 
commit its troops to fight in Korea.66 Unfortunately Khan did not live long enough to pursue 
non-alignment and was assassinated on October 16, 1951 in Rawalpindi. Pakistan had already 
lost its founder Mohammad Ali Jinnah in 1948 and now with Khan’s assassination, Pakistan’s 
foreign policy needed direction and leadership. After Khan’s death, seven different prime 
ministers governed Pakistan until the first martial law was imposed in 1958.  
Within three years of Khan’s death, Pakistan had joined four defense organizations –– 
regional associations supported by the United States making it ‘America’s most allied ally’67 in 
Asia. Pakistan formally joined the pro-Western U.S. bloc after signing the Mutual Defense 
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Assistance Agreement on May 2, 1954.68 The same year, along with the United States, Britain, 
France, Thailand, Philippines, Australia and New Zealand it became a member of the South East 
Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). The purpose of SEATO was to block communist 
expansion in the region and to seek support for U.S. foreign assistance to Vietnam, Laos and 
Cambodia. India, Indonesia and Burma were invited to join but they refused to form alliance 
against communism and preferred to retain their non-alignment or ‘peaceful co-existence and 
non-aggression pacts’. Thailand and Philippines from the region joined the organization. Even 
though Pakistan did not belong to the region, its basic objective of joining the organization was 
to gain U.S. support against Indian ‘aggression’ and it did not want defensive action to confine 
only to communist aggression. Though the members of the organization agreed to Pakistan’s 
broader definition of aggression, U.S. clarified that military action will only be taken against 
communist entities and ‘promised to consult in the event of other aggression.’69  
In 1955, Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact, which included Britain, Turkey, Iran and Iraq 
–– the organization was renamed as Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) when Iraq left the 
Baghdad Pact after three years of membership. Although the United States was not a member of 
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CENTO –– just an observer –– it signed a bilateral agreement of cooperation with Pakistan in 
1959 as reiteration of its commitment of mutual defense with its regional alliance partners. Like 
SEATO, under the Baghdad Pact or CENTO, the objective also was to curtail communism and 
collective military action against communist aggression. The organization dissolved when Iran 
left the organization post-Islamic revolution in 1979.70  
In the initial decades of the Cold War, major U.S. foreign policy objectives in Asia were 
to gain influence in the region through forging economic and military alliances with free and 
friendly like-minded governments in the region; development of their individual and collective 
ability to resist communist influences in the region and to gain access to resources for U.S. 
markets in Asia. In the first decade of their alliance, Pakistan allowed the U.S. to realize most of 
its objectives in the region and became America’s bulwark in Asia against Sino-Soviet 
communist influences. But the cracks in the alliance became visible after the end of their first 
decade. Events from 1962 onwards reveal incompatibility in U.S. and Pakistani alliance 
objectives and expectations from each other leading to their first breakdown.  
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Pakistan’s president Iskander Mirza had appointed General Ayub Khan, Sandhurst 
graduate, as Pakistan’s first chief martial law administrator in 1958 after abrogating the 
constitution. Ayub Khan had joined the Pakistani Army in 1947 after independence as a 
brigadier and rose to become Pakistan’s first native Commander-in-Chief in 1951. Within two 
weeks of his appointment by Mirza, Ayub declared himself president of Pakistan and exiled 
Mirza to London.71 As a result of Pakistan’s participation in SEATO and CENTO, the United 
States signed an Agreement of Cooperation with Pakistan on March 5, 1959 which was a 
bilateral extension of U.S. commitment towards Pakistan which allowed Pakistan to receive 
military assistance from the U.S.72 The U.S. signed similar agreements with the other two 
CENTO countries, Turkey and Iran.  
 From 1959 to 1965: Fractures in the Alliance 
After Field Marshal Ayub Khan became the president of Pakistan, he reoriented the country’s 
foreign policy and decided to develop friendly ties with China and the Soviet Union. He 
articulated his rationale for this new policy later in his book Friends Not Masters and discussed 
at length Pakistan’s security imperatives demanding a change in foreign policy outlook. To 
understand how the Narrative took shape it is important to read through Ayub’s reasoning for 
‘the new outlook’ in toto. Addressing Pakistan’s geo-strategic imperatives, Ayub wrote  
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Take the geographical location first. Here is East Pakistan surrounded on three sides by 
India and the only approach is from the sea which is not difficult for an enemy to control.  
West Pakistan is wedged in between three enormous powers with the Soviet Union at the 
top, the People’s Republic of China in the north-east, and India in the south and east. I 
know of no other small country which has the somewhat dubious distinction of having 
three such mighty neighbours. Now, this location is a source of weakness in physical 
terms but it could be converted into a source of strength if we could establish normal and 
mutually acceptable relations with the countries hemming us in.73  
 
With India the prospects of good relations were not a possibility in the near-term given the 
dispute over Kashmir.74 By joining SEATO and CENTO, Ayub argued, Pakistan had already 
alienated the Soviet Union but was hopeful that it was “possible to come to an understanding 
with the Soviet Union by removing her doubts and misgivings” and that the design was never to 
harm the Soviet Union since Pakistan’s membership of the pacts was dictated by the 
requirements of Pakistan’s security.75 Change in Ayub’s thinking about accommodating the 
Soviets resulted from the U-2 incident and the subsequent Soviet threats to Pakistan. Ayub had 
leased the Americans a communications facility for ten years at the Badaber Air Base, Peshawar 
on July 17, 1959 that was not renewed beyond July 17, 1969.  CIA had used this facility as a 
listening post and to run a U-2 spy program to monitor Soviet nuclear and missile developments. 
On May 1, 1960, the KGB captured CIA pilot Francis Gary Powers after shooting down his U-2 
plane that had flown from Badaber on a reconnaissance mission. This exposed the U-2 spy-flight 
program and angered the Soviets.  It also brought to light Pakistan’s role in facilitating the 
Americans to spy on the Soviets. As Kux notes, Khrushchev threatened Pakistan that “if any 
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American plane is allowed to use Peshawar as a base of operations against the Soviet Union, we 
will retaliate immediately.”76 Although Ayub in a public announcement dismissed any 
knowledge of the U.S. U-2 program operating from Pakistan (his statement was corroborated by 
the U.S. State Department stating that the U.S. was running this program and using Pakistan’s 
airspace without Pakistan’s knowledge) he was nevertheless unnerved by the Soviet threat. On 
April 3, 1965 Ayub Khan met the Soviet prime minister, Alexei Kosygin for the first time and 
they discussed Pakistan’s membership in SEATO and CENTO and also the U-2 incident. In his 
defense, Ayub maintained that the U-2 incident “… had been as much of a shock to us as it was 
to the Soviet Union.”77 
Pakistan saw China as an ‘emerging power’ that wanted friendly neighbors and all 
Pakistan had to do to get on her side was to ‘convince her of our sincerity and friendly intent.’ 
Given that friendly relations with India were more problematic than building friendly relations 
with the two communist countries in Pakistan’s immediate neighborhood, Ayub felt that 
….if we could not establish normal relations with all our three big neighbours, the best 
thing was to have an understanding with two of them. They might have their internal 
differences but we did not need to get involved in that. This was a vital element in our 
new thinking: to keep clear of the internal disputes and conflicts of other countries; 
neither to philosophize about their problems nor to act as busybodies. It was on this basis 
that I set out to normalize our relations with the People’s Republic of China and the 
Soviet Union.78  
 
The problem however remained that in order to boost Pakistan’s economy, initial capital 
investments needed to be made and only one country was capable of making such incredible 
economic investments in Pakistan –– the United States. Ayub understood that given the Cold 
War ideological confrontations, establishing bilateral relations with all three powers –– China, 
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the Soviet Union and the United States –– would be an arduous task. However, Ayub believed 
that “because of the emergence of China, the earlier polarization between the Soviet Union and 
the United States is gradually disappearing” and for a long period of time to come they will be 
engaged to compete with one another for areas of influence and "none of them could afford to 
isolate and antagonize any of the developing countries completely.”79 The task for Pakistan, 
Ayub argued then, was to convince the United States that the former’s relations with China and 
the Soviet Union were not against U.S. interests and to inform the United States that Pakistan 
could not afford to take sides in major powers struggles, that we were not “in the market for 
becoming partisans in their struggle for power.”80 The choice, Ayub said, rested with the people 
of Pakistan.  
For the United States it was becoming increasingly difficult to find a balance between 
India and Pakistan especially when the policy was to arm them against China. Pakistan perhaps 
learned early on that entente with China would be beneficial in the long run and that ‘my 
enemy’s enemy is my friend’ had merit beyond proverbial and thus had made its choice. During 
the border conflict between India and China in October 1962, Pakistan rejected President 
Kennedy’s request of assuring India that Pakistan would not attack and open another front for 
India while it was under attack by China. Such an assurance would have allowed India to move 
some divisions from its border with Pakistan against the Chinese border in the Himalayas. 
Kennedy in his letter to Ayub on October 28, 1962 also assured Ayub that U.S. aid to India 
would only be used against the Chinese and not against Pakistan. To Kennedy’s disappointment, 
Ayub in his reply wrote that he believed the Sino-Indian war would be a short one since China 
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had limited objectives with respect to addressing the disputed border thereby not justifying 
American military assistance to India against the Chinese. On the assurances given by Kennedy, 
Ayub said 
I am very grateful for the assurance you have given that the arms you are now supplying 
India will not be used against us. This is very generous of you, but knowing the sort of 
people you are dealing with, whose history is a continuous tale of broken pledges, I 
would not ask a friend like you to place yourself in an embarrassing situation. India’s 
conduct over the question of Junagadh, Mangrol, Hyderabad, Kashmir and Goa81 should 
be well-known to you. Our belief is that the arms now being obtained by India from you 
for use against China will undoubtedly be used against us at the very first opportunity.82 
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Ayub was annoyed with the Kennedy administration since the decision “to give arms aid to India 
was arrived at without prior consultation with Pakistan; and it was communicated to India before 
it was communicated to Pakistan” despite the administration’s assurances to Pakistan on both 
counts.83 After the decision was made public, anti-American protests broke out in Pakistan 
marking the very beginning of the narrative that would be shaped by similar events 
overshadowing Pakistan-U.S. relations in the following decades. There was a realization in the 
Kennedy administration that assurances from Pakistan not to open another front for India in 
Kashmir while latter’s troops were away from the Line of Control were crucial. But even though 
Ayub had told Kennedy that Pakistan did not have any desire to take advantage of Indian 
predicament, there was an unease in Pakistan-U.S. relations after the U.S. decision to arm India 
against the ChiCom that led to Ayub’s reassessment of Pakistan’s alliance with the United 
States. To ease Ayub’s anxieties, Ambassador McConaughy during his meeting with Ayub Khan 
on November 5, 1962 handed him an aid memoire that reiterated U.S. assurances to Pakistan of 
U.S. assistance and stated, “the Government of the United States of America reaffirms its 
previous assurances to the Government of Pakistan that it will come to Pakistan’s assistance in 
the event of aggression from India against Pakistan.”84 A qualifier was added later to U.S. 
assurance to Pakistan against Indian aggression on November 17, 1962 through a press release 
issued by the Department of State, a copy of which was sent to President Ayub by Ambassador 
McConaughy on November 19, 1962. According to the press release, “the United States had 
assured Pakistan that if U.S. assistance to India were “misused and directed against another in 
                                                
83 ibid, 145 
84 Telegram from the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State on Ambassador McConaughy’s meeting with 
President Ayub Khan “footnote. 7: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Karachi Embassy Files, FRC 67 F 
74, 320 Pak/US Assurances,” FRUS, Kennedy Administration, Volume XIX, 1961-1963, South Asia 
 58 
aggression, the United States would undertake immediately, in accordance with constitutional 
authority, appropriate action both within and without the United Nations to thwart such 
aggression.”85 While this aid memoire and the U.S. commitment to Pakistan affirmed therein 
provided temporary relief from tensions in Pak-U.S. relations, Pakistan learned in its war with 
India two years later in 1965 and then five years later in 1971 that this assurance by the U.S. did 
not constitutionally obligate the United States to assist Pakistan in the event of Indian aggression. 
From 1962 to 1965, the United States provided India with $90 million worth of grant 
military assistance. Although both Pakistan and India had been receiving assistance from the 
United States under the Military Assistance Program (MAP) from 1954 to 1965 –– Pakistan 
received “over $630 million in grant military assistance for weapons, $619 million for defense 
support assistance, and some $55 million worth of equipment purchased on a cash or 
concessional basis” and India “purchased over $50 million in military equipment” from the 
U.S.86 –– the U.S. decision to grant military assistance to India after the Sino-Indian conflict 
pushed Pakistan towards China for additional military and economic assistance.87  
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 1965 Indo-Pak War and The U.S. Arms Embargo 
As already stressed, Pakistan-U.S. relations hit an all time low after the United States imposed an 
arms embargo on Pakistan and India following their second war over Kashmir.88 Pakistan and 
India had fought their first war over Kashmir within months of their independence starting from 
October 1947 until January 1, 1949. The war ended with a ceasefire line drawn between the 
occupied Pakistani and Indian territories in the disputed region of Kashmir. By 1965, they were 
ready to fight their second war. The 1965 episode is important in the history of Pakistan’s 
narrative development because it created rifts between Ayub Khan and his foreign minister 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto over the conduct of war and its aftermath leading to Bhutto’s dismissal from 
the foreign office. Bhutto would later solidify the narrative and champion the cause of non-
alignment, signs of which were already visible during Ayub’s term.  
Feroz Khan in Eating Grass documents the events leading to the 1965 war as follows 
In February 1965, India decided to evict Pakistani border troops from an old fort called 
Kanjarkot. Pakistan countered by deploying its forces. On March 6, 1965, the Pakistan 
Army’s 8th Division issued a crisp order to its 51st Brigade: maintain de facto control of 
Kanjarkot and do not allow violation of the territory. Earlier, Pakistan had captured 
Sardar Post in the area in a small skirmish. This move led to a small-scale operation 
involving Pakistan Army’s 6th Brigade, the “Battle of Bets” (bet being a local word for 
raised mound). In the third week of April the battle escalated slightly, and the Pakistani 
division contemplated an offensive maneuver to destroy a causeway, which would have 
cut off Indian forces. Ayub Khan disallowed this tactic in order to avoid further 
exacerbation of the clashes and instead ordered consolidation of Pakistani forces. 
Pakistan managed to defend the territory, hold its ground, and even at a tactical level, 
display better military leadership than its opponent. Unable to push the Pakistani troops 
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out of the disputed region, the Indians declared the skirmish to be ‘the wrong war with 
the right enemy at the wrong place.’89 
 
By the time the war broke out between Pakistan and India, both countries were recipients of 
MAP equipment from the United States and one of the greatest U.S. worries was their use of 
American supplied military equipment against each other during the war. In his cable to the State 
Department on April 27, 1965, U.S. Ambassador, Walter P. McConaughy stationed in Karachi, 
Pakistan apprised the State of the events related to the Rann of Kutch and the U.S. dilemma 
therein with respect to deterring Pakistan and India from using MAP equipment against each 
other. McConaughy stated 
US assistance is significant factor in enhanced military capabilities of both countries. In 
case of Pakistan five and one-half of its seven and one-half divisions are MAP supported. 
In the case of India, US military aid and US assistance in defense production area serve 
indirectly if not directly to upgrade appreciably India’s ability to sustain operations like 
Rann of Kutch engagements. This broadest context of issue posed by Rann of Kutch is 
how to avoid frustration of US efforts, undertaken in both countries at enormous cost, 
which would surely result from enlarged and prolonged hostilities. Regardless of merits 
India’s claim that Paks are employing MAP equipment in Rann of Kutch for aggression 
or Pakistani contention that its actions are justifiable defensive reactions to Indian 
encroachments disrupting long established equilibrium in upper half of Rann, present 
situation is not tolerable for us in terms of our essential interests in Subcontinent.  
 
McConaughy was aware of the consequences of U.S. decision to withdraw MAP especially from 
Pakistan and he almost prophetically enunciated Pakistan’s response to such an action. He wrote 
We are faced thus by a most crucial dilemma. To withdraw MAP support from Pakistan, 
however justifiable in the abstract would be to open here a Pandora’s box of outright 
neutralism and sweeping policy reorientation. MAP is lifeblood of Pak national security. 
If Paks are cut off from MAP because of its use in disputes with India, where facts (other 
than shared culpability both sides) have always been almost impossible to sort out and 
with Indians still benefitting from US military equipment while still not dependent on it, 
Paks will consider that they have no choice but to look elsewhere for military support and 
guarantees against aggression. In our view, it would be difficult to over-estimate the 
emotional impact of this issue in Pakistan, or the adverse effect on the American presence 
here, including without doubt status of our special facilities, that would flow from a 
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rupture of the Military Assistance Program. Yet, to decline control in some effective way, 
improper or questionable Pak employment of MAP equipment would be impossible to 
defend not only before Congress and in India, but in terms of our ability to exercise 
influence through MAP on Paks. We see no clear answer to this dilemma…At the same 
time, responsibility for concoction and vigorous stirring of Rann of Kutch witches’ brew 
rests equally on Pak and Indian shoulders.90 
 
The United States decided to warn both countries against the use of MAP equipment since one of 
the conditions of its supply to India and Pakistan was its use only against communist countries, 
namely China and not against each other. When Bhutto, Pakistan’s foreign minister in 1965 met 
McConaughy on April 30, 1965 he sought U.S. action on its assurances to defend Pakistan citing 
“December 23, 1957 Dulles-Noon assurances; November 29, 1956 assurances given to Baghdad 
Pact countries; Ambassador Langley reiteration to Ayub on April 15, 1959 of earlier Dulles 
assurances to Noon; 1961 Kennedy-Ayub communiqué reaffirming March 5, 1959 US-Pakistani 
agreement and other assurances given to Pakistan; and March 5, 1959 agreement.”91 
McConaughy told Bhutto that he would have to consult with Washington on the assurances 
Pakistan was seeking. He also warned Bhutto not to use MAP against India to which Bhutto 
replied that he was aware of U.S. concerns about the use of MAP equipment but he hoped the 
U.S. also realized that Pakistan’s territory was under attack.  
Several months after the Rann of Kutch episode, Pakistan planned an offensive 
‘Operational Gibraltar’ to ‘defreeze the stalemate in Kashmir’. As Khan documents, in the 
buildup to the Indo-Pak war in September 1965, Pakistan’s plans included “infiltration into 
Indian held Kashmir and formation of an uprising” in the valley. According to Khan, “three 
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fundamental assumptions lay behind these plans: (1) the action would remain confined to the 
disputed territory of Kashmir, (2) the subsequent uprising in Kashmir would be significant 
enough to tie down Indian forces, and (3) Pakistan’s international alliances would preclude an 
Indian attack across the international border.”92 If this plan was to be successful, Pakistan’s 
follow up plan ‘Grand Slam’ was to then allow Pakistan Army to “cross the cease-fire line in 
Kashmir and take control of a choke point called Akhnur, thus cutting off Indian forces in 
Kashmir from overland contact with Delhi.” According to Khan, Bhutto had assured Ayub that 
“India was not in a position to ‘risk a general war of unlimited duration.’” Unfortunately, Bhutto 
“convinced Ayub of the plan’s merits.”93  
Given how rapidly the situation between India and Pakistan was developing in September 
of 1965, Ambassador Chester B. Bowles, the U.S. ambassador to India (1963-69) wrote a 
memorandum to Secretary of State Dean Rusk proposing a change in U.S. military aid criteria to 
both India and Pakistan whereby the U.S. would continue to provide military and economic 
assistance to both countries only if they were committed in defending the subcontinent against 
Communist China where the equipment provided by the U.S. would only be used against the 
Chinese. But he also acknowledged that the way Pakistan’s relationship with China was 
evolving, U.S. military alliance with Pakistan was becoming irrelevant.  He stressed that the new 
criteria of giving military aid to India and Pakistan should aim at providing only those weapons 
that would meet the ‘logistical and tactical’ requirements to defeat the threat from China. 
Furthermore, he proposed that U.S. military aid “could be discreetly cautioned on India’s 
willingness to work toward a reconciliation with Pakistan” and U.S. economic assistance to both 
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India and Pakistan could be used as a “carrot to draw them into mutually beneficial cooperative 
economic ventures.” Bowles believed that if India’s confidence in the U.S. increased, “U.S. 
influence can effectively be used to moderate India’s relationship to Pakistan.”94  
The change in U.S. thinking about military and economic policy towards Pakistan and 
India was a result of U.S. realization that given Indo-Pak differences and tensions over Kashmir, 
they could not be used as a united front to fight Communist China, especially with Pakistan 
actively courting China. But even with this realization, the U.S. objective was to provide military 
and economic aid to both countries if it could be ascertained that there was a willingness 
amongst both parties to reconcile their differences. The objective was not to play favorites or to 
favor India over Pakistan as was misunderstood by Ayub and Bhutto in Pakistan in 1965 but to 
push both countries towards amicable settlement of their disputes –– hoping that their links with 
the West could still be preserved. Bowles was not alone in thinking on these lines, Dean Rusk, 
the secretary of state also enunciated the same to President Johnson.   
The dilemma for the United States was much greater than potential loss of Pakistan to 
Communist China if there was inaction on the U.S. part and if the Chinese came to assist 
Pakistan. In his memorandum for President Lyndon B. Johnson on September 9, 1965, Secretary 
Dean Rusk articulated the difficult position U.S. was in with respect to its decade-old strategy in 
South Asia of developing counterweights to China in the region. “If Kashmir were the only 
issue” Rusk wrote, “the US could reasonably hope to stand aside. However the whole Western 
power position in Asia may shortly be at stake.” Recounting U.S. investment in the region, Rusk 
remarked 
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So far, with an investment of nearly $12 billion, we have helped move the 600 million 
people of India and Pakistan along a line that has frustrated Communist ambitions. India 
along with Japan is the only power potential in Asia comparable to China. Were it now to 
go down the drain, we would face a new situation in many ways as serious as the loss of 
China. And as India goes, so eventually will Pakistan. 
 
Rusk questioned if given what was at risk for the U.S., whether non-involvement was even an 
option. He proposed to Johnson that the administration should help both countries stop hostilities 
if there was a genuine U.S. desire to fully support efforts towards negotiations on Kashmir. He 
argued that doing so “would improve the chances of keeping both India and Pakistan reasonably 
linked to the West and reasonably firm against Chinese Communist encroachment into the 
subcontinent.” Rusk also feared that if China got involved “Pakistan will wind up deeply 
committed to the Chinese Communists while India, feeling let down by the West and its national 
prestige at stake, would almost certainly go for the nuclear bomb.”95  
Pakistan’s Operation Gibraltar to stir an offensive in Kashmir was a failure. India decided 
to cross the international boundary and Pakistan’s ‘assumption’ that the international community 
would not allow India to attack Pakistan across the international border, proved wrong. On Sep 6 
and 7, 1965 when three Indian divisions, out of which two were U.S. supplied mountain 
divisions, crossed the international boundary to attack towards Lahore, the heart of Punjab, 
Pakistan, Pakistan’s offensive strategy had transformed into a defensive one. In a desperate 
attempt, Ayub Khan once again invoked U.S. alliance commitments to Pakistan demanding U.S. 
action to protect Pakistan against Indian aggression (which was in retaliation to Pakistan’s 
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offensive) and reminded Ambassador McConaughy of his earlier warning that any arms given to 
India to fight China by the U.S. would eventually be used against Pakistan.96 But the United 
States referred Pakistan to the UN. As Feroz Khan writes, on September 6, 1965 when Ayub 
Khan was preparing to address the nation, the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan told him 
‘Mr. President, the Indians have got you by the throat.’ Ayub assured him, as he did the 
nation in his speech, ‘Any hands on Pakistan’s throat will be cut off.’ For two subsequent 
weeks, war spread in West Pakistan, and the entire nation united behind Ayub as never 
before. The 1965 war ended with Pakistan’s having successfully defended Lahore and 
countered a major Indian offensive north of the region in the Sialkot sector north of 
Lahore.97 
 
Khan maintains that “though this outcome gave Pakistan an ‘illusion of victory,’ in reality the 
Pakistani objective of liberating Kashmir by use of proxy followed by a military invasion had 
failed.”98  
Despite Rusk and McConaughy’s pro-Pakistan positions, the Johnson administration 
decided to suspend military aid shipments to Pakistan and India after the 1965 war. Ambassador 
McConaughy delivered the U.S. decision to Bhutto with a word that the decision was not 
punitive and that the Secretary General of the U.N. had appealed the U.S. to suspend arms 
shipment to both countries in order to bring an end to the fighting.  Bhutto was furious over the 
U.S. decision to suspend arms supply ‘in the hour of need’ stating that it was ‘no way to respect 
an ally.’ Bhutto registered his anguish over the U.S. decision by telling the Ambassador that 
since the U.S. was Pakistan’s sole arms supplier while India had multiple arms suppliers, the 
decision to suspend military aid would comfort India but devastate Pakistan. Bhutto told 
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McConaughy that “Pak, cornered, deserted, bitched, had no alternative but interpret US action as 
punitive one assisting India, a non-aligned and treacherous country aggressing against US 
ally.”99  
For Pakistan, the war of 1965 was the first emotional episode since its bloody partition 
from British India in 1947.  Pakistan lost the war due to Bhutto’s arrogance and Ayub’s 
miscalculations about Indian responses. In Pakistan’s Narrative, the United States did not abide 
by its alliance commitments when Pakistan needed it the most whereas China did show support 
even though Pakistan-China entente was barely two years old at the time. Although Khan accepts 
that China was not “as helpful as Pakistan had expected or hoped” but the manner in which it 
condemned India’s ‘criminal aggression’ on September 7, 1965 was important for Pakistan. In 
addition to the condemnation, “referring to other incursions on the Tibetan border, [China] 
warned [India] that it should end its frenzied provocation activities or bear the responsibility for 
all consequences.” In another ultimatum, five days later, China told India to “dismantle all 
military works on the Chinese side of the border within three days.” Khan also documents Ayub 
and Bhutto’s secret visit to China during the war where they were advised by China to prepare to 
fight an all out, prolonged ‘people’s war.’100 However, according to Altaf Gauhar, Ayub’s 
information minister, “the whole Foreign Office strategy was designed as a quick-fix to force the 
Indians to the negotiating table. Ayub had never foreseen the possibility of the Indians surviving 
a couple of hard blows, and Bhutto had never envisaged a long drawn out people’s war. Above 
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all, the Army and the Air Force were totally against any further prolongation of the conflict.”101 
Pakistan was ready for the ceasefire. 
The war ended when the UN Security Council passed a Resolution 211 on September 20, 
1965 calling both countries to accept the ceasefire and start negotiations on the Kashmir issue. 
Ayub Khan had earlier vetoed Bhutto’s trip to NY to attend the Security Council session because 
“he felt Bhutto would not show sufficient balance.” According to a private assessment shared by 
Ayub’s close aide, Ayub was also “disenchanted with Bhutto’s reckless adventurism, grieved at 
Pak losses, strongly averse to entering any Chicom association and open to sensible 
compromise…[above all] was wary of Bhutto’s extremism.”102 But later on he agreed to send 
Bhutto to the UNSC deliberations where after his fiery speech, “just before the ceasefire 
deadline, he dramatically pulled out a cable from his pocket to announce Pakistan’s 
acceptance.”103 Indian prime minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri accepted the ceasefire on Sep 21st and 
Ayub accepted the ceasefire, against Bhutto’s advice on Sep 22, 1965. Both countries accepted 
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the Soviet Union as a third party mediator for the resolution of Kashmir’s status.104 The 
subsequent Tashkent Declaration was signed on January 10, 1966 where both sides agreed to 
restore normal relations and withdraw their forces to positions prior to August 5, 1965. A month 
before signing the Tashkent Declaration, Ayub Khan visited the United States in December 1965 
(a trip that had been cancelled by President Johnson earlier in April 1965) to seek U.S. support 
for the issue of Kashmir and repair the damage done to Pak-U.S. relations in the wake of 1965 
war. Johnson categorically told Ayub that if Pakistan-U.S. alliance had any chance of survival in 
future, Pakistan would need to stay away from China. In private, however, Johnson told Ayub 
that he “understood certain relationships just as a wife could understand a Saturday night fling by 
her husband so long as she was the wife.”105  
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McGarr in The Cold War in South Asia rightly concludes his commentary on the Anglo-
American interventions in South Asia from 1945 to 1965 by observing that the policies adopted 
towards India and Pakistan were “misguided, ineffectual and counterproductive” in their 
objectives to control Soviet or Chinese communist influences in South Asia. His primary 
reasoning for the failure of the British-American alliance against communism in South Asia 
points to their ‘contradictory assumptions’ that “India and Pakistan could be cajoled into settling 
their differences; that the spectre of Communist Chinese power would persuade India to abandon 
its policy of non-alignment; and that the dependence of India and Pakistan on Western economic 
and military aid would deter those countries from turning to the Soviet Union and PRC for 
support.”106 
The United States reminded Pakistan time and again that the treaty commitments only 
allowed for a U.S. response to a communist aggression against Pakistan, not Indian aggression. 
But Ayub and Bhutto remained dismissive of the treaty stipulations. The 1962 aid memoire 
discussed in the previous section which reiterated U.S. commitment to assist Pakistan against 
Indian aggression had a stipulated condition under which such an assistance were to be provided 
and the condition was ‘misuse’ of U.S. supplied MAP equipment by India in waging aggression 
towards another country other than China. Since Pakistan and India both violated the conditions 
of MAP and both used it against the other in 1965 war, technically Pakistan could not have held 
the U.S. to its commitment to penalize India alone and coming to Pakistan’s assistance to stop 
Indian aggression. In the short-term the Tashkent Declaration achieved its objectives, but the 
essence of Bhutto’s statement to McConaughy about U.S. desertion of its ally became a 
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permanent part of Pakistan’s abandonment narrative and along with the U.S. arms embargo on 
Pakistan after the 1965 war was seen as the first betrayal.  
From 1965 to 1972: Bhutto’s Nuclearization of The Pakistani Narrative 
No other commentary on Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto captures the essence of his personality better than 
American historian Stanley Wolpert’s biography Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan. Wolpert calls Bhutto a 
‘schizoid’ and writes “Zulfi Bhutto roused such diametrically opposed passions and has left such 
divergent images among his disciples and adversaries that it remains virtually impossible to 
reconcile them as reflections of any single personality.”107 Ambitious, mercurial, vindictive, a 
flawed genius, larger than life, a West Pakistani nationalist –– Bhutto was many things to many 
people in Pakistan and abroad.108 He was the architect of the 1965 war with India but after Ayub 
Khan’s acceptance of the ceasefire and the public backlash that ensued after losing to India, 
Bhutto distanced himself from his role in the war and so did other military generals under 
Ayub’s command. He maintained that Pakistan’s military victory would have been a reality had 
Ayub listened to his advice and not succumbed to Western pressure. In order to discredit Ayub, 
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“Bhutto spread the rumour that there were certain secret clauses in the Tashkent Declaration 
which he would expose at the appropriate time.”109 It was believable since Bhutto was Ayub’s 
foreign minister and he ought to have known what was unknown to a larger audience.110 Bhutto 
addressed the national assembly on March 16, 1966 on the insistence of Ayub Khan to hail the 
Tashkent Declaration and improve his public image. Undesirably though, Bhutto addressed the 
assembly and won public hearts by his oratorial tributes to the armed forces of Pakistan for 
standing up against the mighty enemy forces. As Wolpert rightly pointed out, “few things are 
more important to Pakistanis than military prowess, and Zulfi Bhutto’s tributes to the armed 
forces would soon help him to wean them from their top generals, first Ayub Khan, and later his 
successor, Yahya Khan.”111 When Bhutto talked about Tashkent Declaration his tone was 
mordantly sarcastic and he ended his long speech by saying that “…India will have to abandon 
its colony in Jammu and Kashmir…our cause can only succeed if we pursue our struggle 
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because ours is an honourable struggle sanctified by law and protected by Allah.”112  Suffice it to 
say that after listening to Bhutto’s speech, Ayub knew that he had not only lost the war but also 
his people to this ‘young populist politician.’ Bhutto was forced to resign and leave the country 
on a forced vacation. Wolpert quotes Salman Taseer (a slain former Governor of Lahore) 
reminiscing the time when he was a student present amongst thousands of people in Lahore 
gathered to receive Bhutto (who was on his way out of Pakistan) after his resignation shouting 
“Bhutto zindabad (Long live Bhutto), United States murda-W (Down with the United States), 
and…tears poured down his face as he was carried out of the station…the handkerchief which he 
used to wipe his eyes was sold later for Rs. 10,000. Pakistan’s redeemer seemed to be at 
hand.”113 Such was the power of Bhutto’s charisma that overtook Pakistanis by storm and 
enabled him to establish his narrative. Bhutto’s forced resignation from the ministry of foreign 
affairs in June 1966, six months after Tashkent, had left an impression on the people of Pakistan 
that he was the only true nationalist and that he had parted ways with Ayub due to his refusal to 
abase the country before the Indians and the Americans. These were the two cards Bhutto knew 
how to play well –– India and the United States –– which he used to keep the Kashmir issue 
alive and to generate support from the masses throughout his years as Pakistan’s president and 
prime minister from 1971 to 1977. Adding to the strength of his narrative was his desire to 
provide Pakistan with nuclear weapons to safeguard its territorial sovereignty and regain his 
country’s lost pride.  
On April 12, 1967, the United States announced that it would not resume military aid to 
Pakistan and India that had been suspended in the wake of their 1965 war. The United States 
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maintained that the decision was taken in the interest of maintaining security in the region, 
preventing another war between India and Pakistan and reducing the threat of arms race between 
the countries.114 Although the U.S. decision in April 1967 was an extension of its arms 
suspension policy of 1965 with only a ban on direct sale of lethal weapons, the arms policy was 
relaxed to permit “case-by-case cash sales of spare parts to both countries for previously supplied 
lethal weapons; continue to provide for the sale of non-lethal US equipment for cash or credit on 
a case-by-case basis; provide for case-by-case consideration by the US of purchases of US-
controlled lethal weapons held by third countries; and provide for small grant military training 
programs.”115 Bhutto viewed this U.S. decision to stop military assistance to Pakistan as a 
deliberate U.S. policy to pressure Pakistan over India. The chapter with the title “American 
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policy to bring Pakistan under Indian hegemony” in Bhutto’s book The Myth of Independence 
opens as  
Force enters when diplomacy is exhausted. If all attempts to bring about co-operation 
between India and Pakistan fail, it would be imprudent to rule out coercive measures. 
This does not necessarily mean that the United States, whose objectives are not quite 
identical with those of India, would, in desperation, create conditions that would enable 
India to dismember or destroy Pakistan. However, if the lessons of September 1965 are 
not forgotten, it would be rash to discount this possibility altogether in the calculations of 
Pakistan’s foreign and defense policies.116  
 
Bhutto was skeptical of the stated objectives of the American arms policy in South Asia on the 
suspension of aid to both countries. He believed that the objective of U.S. military aid suspension 
policy was a) not to stop an arms race between the two countries since an ‘arms balance’ 
between India and Pakistan would have reduced the risk of war –– just as it had led to détente 
between the U.S. and the Soviets and; b) was also not to prevent a war between India and 
Pakistan given that ever since the two countries concluded defense agreements with the United 
States –– Pakistan in 1959 and India in 1962 –– it had been the biggest contributor to the arms 
race in the region, even though there was awareness that unresolved disputes between the two 
countries would have hindered normal relations between them.117 Bhutto acknowledged that the 
U.S.-supplied military weapons in Pakistan’s possession and their effective use acted as a 
deterrent for India until the U.S. decided to stop military supplies. He questioned how Pakistan 
could maintain a deterrent in the absence of U.S. military assistance.118 The answer had been 
with him all along –– through Pakistan’s own nuclear deterrent.   
 Pakistan’s civilian nuclear program benefited from President Eisenhower’s Atoms for 
Peace program through which many Pakistani nuclear scientists, physicists and engineers 
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received training in the United States from 1955 onwards.119 Feroz Hassan Khan credits Ayub 
Khan and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto as two leaders whose “national-level decisions on domestic 
political dispensation and national security policy created new strategic alliances, military crises, 
and wars –– and laid the foundation of nuclear discourse in Pakistan.” Amongst the scientists, 
Khan credits the role of Dr. Abdus Salam, Pakistan’s first Nobel laureate, and Dr. Ishrat Hussain 
Usmani that “charted the course of science and technology advancement for peaceful and 
military applications.” Khan argues 
The historic rise of two distinctly opposite personalities –– General Mohammad Ayub 
Khan and his protégé Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto –– is a story of how personal idiosyncrasies and 
political decisions amid cross-cutting domestic politics, regional security dynamics, and 
global geopolitical tensions affected the nuclear discourse. Two opposing camps would 
emerge, one pragmatically advocating caution and slow gradual process, the other 
enthusiastically pushing for nuclear acquisition and development.120 
 
But it is not only a story of how Ayub and Bhutto’s differences affected Pakistan’s nuclear 
discourse; it is also a story of how expertly Bhutto used those differences to develop a narrative 
which worked in his favor allowing him to provide Pakistan a nuclear option. Bhutto had 
approached Ayub with the idea of Pakistan developing nuclear weapons but was snubbed by 
Ayub. Feroz Khan in Eating Grass details a meeting that took place in October 1965 between 
Bhutto and Munir Ahmed Khan who was working in the IAEA at the time and would later 
become Chairman of Pakistan Atom Energy Commission under Bhutto’s government. Munir 
Ahmed Khan had visited the Indian nuclear facility at Trombay in 1964 and informed Bhutto 
about India’s nuclear ambitions. Bhutto wanted Munir to meet Ayub and convince him about the 
‘urgency’ and the need for Pakistan’s weapons program. Munir during a meeting with Ayub in 
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December 1965 informed him about the nuclear technology, which was available restriction free, 
and that India and Israel were both taking advantage of it. Munir also told Ayub that if Pakistan 
were to get it, the cost would be no more than $150 million. Ayub was not impressed and 
maintained that Pakistan was “too poor to spend that much money. Moreover, if we ever need 
the bomb, we will buy it off the shelf.” When Munir told Bhutto that Ayub did not agree, Bhutto 
replied, “ Don’t worry, our turn will come!”121  
Bhutto’s turn did come but at the cost Pakistan’s dismemberment. In November 1968, 
massive demonstrations took place in Pakistan against Ayub led by two populist movements, 
Sheikh Mujub-ur-Rehman in East Pakistan and Bhutto in West Pakistan, which led to political 
breakdown in the country.122 Sheikh Mujib was more popular than Bhutto since his political 
party, the Awami League, had representation in both East and West Pakistan whereas Bhutto had 
not bothered to open an office for his political party Pakistan Peoples Party or PPP, in East 
Pakistan. The generals also feared that if Mujib scored a sweeping victory in general elections (if 
held according to schedule in 1969-70), the structure of the armed forces would be changed and 
they would be “consigned to subordination for ever.”123 Ayub handed over the power to General 
Yahya Khan on March 25, 1969 who, on the basis of adult franchise, created a constituent 
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assembly through general elections. The One-Unit scheme that was in place since 1955 whereby 
the four provinces of West Pakistan were administered as one single province was abolished and 
Yahya granted East Pakistan’s request for representation in the assembly on the basis of 
population. But he refused to convene the assembly when Mujib’s Awami League won with a 
landslide. Yahya used massive force to suppress the revolt in East Pakistan demanding secession 
following his decision. It took Indian intervention to separate East Pakistan from West Pakistan 
and the liberation of Bangladesh was completed on December 16, 1971 after a massive loss of 
life.124 Yahya recalled Bhutto from New York  (where he was representing Pakistan in the UN 
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Security Council deliberations on the 1971 war and whose PPP had won the majority seats in 
West Pakistan) to become the President of Pakistan and its first civilian Chief Martial Law 
Administrator on December 20, 1971.  
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto started a new chapter with the United States once the 1971 crisis was 
over. In his conversation with the U.S, secretary of state, William Rogers, Bhutto had accepted 
that his “Yankee-baiting Former Foreign Minister” days were over and that he was looking for a 
fresh start in Pakistan-U.S. relations. Bhutto had also praised the Nixon administration “for 
standing by basic principles of international law and civilized society” (during the Indo-Pak 1971 
war) and told the secretary that he was ready for reconciliation with India.125 His efforts towards 
normalization of relations with India resulted in the signing of the Simla Agreement between the 
two countries in 1972.  
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 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the origins of Pakistan’s abandonment and betrayal narrative, which 
began with the U.S. arms embargo on Pakistan after the 1965 war with India and strengthened 
with the 1971 breakup of Pakistan when the U.S. did not meet Pakistan’s expectations as an ally 
during that time period. Given its dependency on the United States for economic and military 
assistance, Pakistan had no choice but to reconcile its differences with the U.S. In addition to 
Bhutto’s friendly overtures, two U.S. policies helped smooth previous anxieties in Pakistan-U.S. 
relations: a) Nixon’s rapprochement with China and Pakistan’s role in facilitating the opening 
between the two countries and b) Nixon’s resumption of military sales to Pakistan and India.126 
Bhutto positively welcomed both these policies and his personal affinity with Kissinger allowed 
him to suppress his venom against previous U.S. policies towards Pakistan only to conveniently 
have them re-surface to legitimize his political position at home when he faced a popular revolt 
in 1977 (which is discussed at length in Chapter 4) resulting in his dismissal from power after a 
military coup.  
From 1974 to 1998 Pakistan relentlessly pursued nuclear weapons development 
ultimately testing its nuclear weapons in response to the Indian nuclear tests in May 1998. The 
United States non-proliferation legislation constrained U.S. foreign policy choices towards 
Pakistan from 1976 onwards –– after the first non-proliferation law, the Symington amendment 
was enacted –– and Pakistan was sanctioned for its proliferation behavior under different 
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administrations. Pakistan’s narrative that developed during this time period maintained that a) 
the U.S policy selectively targeted Pakistan for nuclear proliferation in South Asia b) the U.S. 
policy was uneven in its approach and sanctioned Pakistan only when the country was no longer 
needed to achieve other U.S. foreign policy objectives. The following chapters (3-7) in this 
dissertation will examine non-proliferation policies pursued by the Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush 
and Clinton administrations to understand how and if U.S. non-proliferation policies reinforced 
Pakistan’s abandonment narrative between 1974 and 2001. 
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Chapter 3 - Ford Administration’s Non-proliferation Policy 
Towards Pakistan 
After Nixon’s resignation as a result of the Watergate Scandal, Gerald Rudolph Ford assumed 
office, unelected, as the 38th President of the United States. With Nelson Rockefeller as his Vice 
President and Henry Kissinger as the Secretary of State, providing continuity in foreign affairs 
throughout his term, President Ford began his short two-and-a-half year term in office on August 
9, 1974.127 Confronted with an angry Congress that was keen on Nixon’s prosecution after the 
Watergate scandal, Ford was heavily challenged by domestic politics at home. On the foreign 
policy front, Ford was confronted with continued U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, détente 
with the Soviet Union and an altered regional security environment in South Asia.  
Three months before Ford took office, India had conducted its first nuclear explosive test 
on May 18, 1974 by separating plutonium from the spent fuel from its Canadian-supplied nuclear 
reactor CIRUS (Canada-India-Reactor-United States) for which heavy water was supplied by the 
United States. The Indian nuclear test (dubbed as a peaceful nuclear explosion or PNE) was 
criticized worldwide for violating the integrity of bilateral nuclear agreements with Canada and 
the United States. It also highlighted the dangers of nuclear proliferation in a world where many 
countries had signed similar multilateral agreements for nuclear facilities to pursue peaceful 
nuclear energy programs. Pakistan also joined other countries in criticizing India for its decision 
but the latter’s nuclear test hardly came as a surprise for the former’s government or scientific 
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Secretary of Defense on Nov 20, 1975, Brent Scowcroft succeeded Kissinger as National Security Advisor on Nov 
3, 1975, George H.W. Bush succeeded William Colby as Director of CIA on January 30, 1976 and Dick Cheney 
succeeded Donald Rumsfeld as the White House Chief of Staff on Nov 21, 1975.  
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community.128 Even though the test was conducted during Ford’s Vice Presidency in the Nixon 
administration, the Indian nuclear test single-handedly defined the contours of Ford’s non-
proliferation policy towards Pakistan during his presidency.  
The Indian nuclear test in 1974 had a direct bearing on Pakistan’s national security given 
their bitter history since partition and became a point of reference for Pakistan to seek 
resumption of U.S. military supplies by the United States to counter the Indian threat.129 
Pakistan’s strategy to deal with the altered strategic dynamics in South Asia after the Indian 
nuclear test consisted of the following: a) maintain nuclear ambiguity while seeking conventional 
military arms from the United States to modernize its military to counter the Indian conventional 
and nuclear threat; b) seek nuclear guarantees from major powers; c) stay out of the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) while internationalizing the issues of both regional nuclear 
proliferation and disarmament by voicing against the presence of nuclear weapons in the region 
                                                
128 As early as October 7, 1971 after having attended the UN-sponsored conference on peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy, I.H. Usmani, the chairman of PAEC told press reporters in Karachi, Pakistan, that “India is going to go 
nuclear and she will explode a nuclear device ostensibly for a peaceful purpose, but actually to demonstrate her 
capability to manufacture an atomic bomb,” DAWN, October 7, 1971. Therefore, the Indian nuclear test in 1974 did 
not surprise Pakistan. Bhutto’s subsequent Multan meeting with Pakistani scientists in1972 was an attempt to put 
Pakistan on the path of nuclearization given that India was already decades ahead at that time.  
129 Indian and Pakistani nuclear decision-making is not discussed in this dissertation. For an excellent account of the 
Indian nuclear development and decision-making see George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on 
Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999) and for the history of Pakistan’s nuclear 
development see Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass, 2012 
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and ; d) to acquire civilian nuclear technology from various international suppliers to firstly, 
meet its energy requirements and secondly, to develop its nuclear infrastructure.130  
This chapter examines three issues related to the development of Ford administration’s 
non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan: a) the resumption of military supplies to Pakistan; b) 
the administration’s attempts to persuade Pakistan to cancel the French reprocessing plant 
agreement and c) the origins and rationale of the Symington amendment. This examination is 
conducted within the framework of Pakistan’s narrative about denial of access to nuclear 
technology to meet its genuine energy needs during the 1970s; U.S. tolerance for India’s 
proliferation behavior and the latter’s breach of international nuclear agreements after its nuclear 
testing in 1974 and the discriminate nature of U.S. non-proliferation legislation towards Pakistan 
such as the Symington amendment.  
Contrary to the popular perception in Pakistan of a deliberate anti-Pakistan policy, U.S. 
non-proliferation policy under Ford was not directed against Pakistan. Discussion in the 
following pages reveals that despite congressional and Indian opposition to resumption of 
military supplies to Pakistan, the administration lifted the arms embargo on the two South Asian 
countries which benefited Pakistan more than India. Even though after the Indian nuclear test in 
1974, U.S. intelligence agencies had anticipated Pakistan to develop its nuclear weapons 
capability within the ten years time period yet the Symington Amendment passed by the U.S. 
                                                
130 Although Pakistan’s negotiations with France for the plutonium reprocessing plant resulted in signing of a 
contract for sharing of reprocessing plant designs between the two countries in March 1973, it is pointed out here 
that Pakistan’s intelligence in predicting Indian nuclear ambitions was advanced and accurate thereby allowing it to 
strategize ahead of time. The timeliness is also true for Pakistan’s international nuclear diplomacy. When Bhutto 
inaugurated the Karachi nuclear power plant in 1972, he publically proposed a nuclear weapons-free zone in South 
Asia two years before India’s PNE. For an introduction to Pakistan’s early nuclear decision-making see Kapur, 
1980.  
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Congress in 1976 was more general in its non-proliferation approach and was not Pakistan-
specific. 
Moreover, even though the administration generated some pressure on Pakistan to forgo 
the French reprocessing deal, it never explicitly made any attempt to ‘threaten’ refusal of 
military supplies on the basis of Pakistan’s proliferation behavior. 
The analysis of Pakistan-U.S. relations during Ford administration is critical in 
understanding Pakistan’s narrative development with respect to its selective targeting during the 
initial years of its nuclear weapons development. The evidence presented in this chapter reveals 
that Pakistani diplomacy achieved significant gains during the Ford administration. The most 
important being the lifting of the decade-old arms embargo which allowed Pakistan to purchase 
military arms from the United States without having to cancel its plutonium reprocessing plant 
deal with France despite U.S. demarches. 
 Resumption of U.S. Military Supplies to Pakistan 
Z.A. Bhutto sought ‘political insurance against India’s use of the nuclear threat’ by sending his 
emissaries to all the major capitals in the world to explain Pakistan’s position on Indian nuclear 
testing. He maintained that Pakistan had foreseen the events and in his capacity as the leader of 
the nation since December 1971, he had given ‘adequate urgency to the nuclear programme.’ 
Bhutto vowed that Pakistan would not compromise on its basic ‘national interest in the face of 
nuclear blackmail.’131 According to Feroz Khan in his book Eating Grass, Pakistan was unhappy 
about the U.S. response to the Indian nuclear test. Kissinger’s visit to India in October 1974, four 
months after the Indian test, and his remark that “India and the USA now shared another 
                                                
131 In his press conference in Lahore on May 19, 1974, Bhutto criticized the Indian nuclear testing and pledged to 
continue development of Pakistan’s nuclear program, for the complete text of Bhutto’s address see DAWN, May 20, 
1974   
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common tradition,” was not the reaction Pakistan was expecting. In addition to these comments, 
Kissinger’s reaffirmation that “the United States would continue to supply nuclear fuel to India’s 
two General Electric Tarapur reactors, despite the now-established fact that India had used the 
U.S.-supplied heavy water in the CIRUS reactor to produce the fuel for the nuclear bomb,” 
according to Khan, was seen as the U.S. ‘double-standard’ where India was rewarded while 
Pakistan was dissuaded from doing the same.132 Pakistan also approached the UN for creation of 
a nuclear weapons-free zone in South Asia after the Indian test but the nuclear weapons states 
abstained from voting on the resolution. It was then that Bhutto realized that “Pakistan had no 
choice but to acquire essential nuclear technology under safeguards, if possible, without it, if 
necessary, in order to neutralize India’s nuclear edge.”133 Along with building a nuclear 
capability, Pakistan required to modernize its conventional military as well. Pakistan approached 
the United States for renewal of military supplies hoping for a positive response towards its 
security needs vis-à-vis India.  
Aziz Ahmed, Pakistan’s Minister of State for Defense and Foreign Affairs met with 
Henry Kissinger in June 1974 and expressed the Government of Pakistan’s (henceforth the GOP) 
disappointment on the not-so-peaceful nuclear test. The discussion between Aziz and Kissinger 
was straightforward and to the point. Aziz said frankly, “We think we have to have military aid. 
We propose defensive equipment at the beginning. We would define defensive as anti-aircraft 
SAMs, anti-tank missiles, radar coverage of our borders and submarines.” Kissinger signaled his 
sympathetic position on Pakistan’s dilemma by replying favorably, “I don’t believe it’s a 
                                                
132 Khan, Eating Grass, 120 
133 Munir Ahmed Khan, “Development and Significance of Pakistan’s Nuclear Capability,” in Hafeez Malik, ed., 
Pakistan: Founder’s Aspirations and Today’s Realities (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 155, quoted in 
Khan, Eating Grass, 121   
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peaceful nuclear test. It’s a gross misapplication to try to use a nuclear explosion for peaceful 
purposes. We would take most grave view of their use of nuclear weapons….[meanwhile] you 
really need those arms [and] military aid.”134 India warned the United States that the reversal of 
arms embargo (even though it included India along with Pakistan) would make Indo-U.S. 
relations difficult alleging that Pakistan had used “American arms against them in at least two 
wars, and that the flow of weapons to Pakistan spurs unrest on the subcontinent.” However, 
Pakistan maintained that the arms embargo was “essentially discriminatory against a traditional 
friend.” In comparison to India, Pakistan’s weapons and military equipment were obsolete and 
were not suitable to even maintain “minimal defenses” therefore for Pakistan resumption of 
military supplies was essential for its security.135 However contrary to Pakistan’s narrative, not 
much had changed between India and the United States and Ford-Kissinger policies towards 
India continued to echo the Nixonian tilt sympathetic to Pakistan’s India threat while ignoring 
Indian reservations.  
Within the United States, there was general apprehension against the reversal of arms 
embargo on the two countries in South Asia but overall the congressional and press reaction was 
‘mild.’136 The New York Times argued in its editorial that the administration’s decision to 
resume military aid was a “stimulus to the arms race in the sub-continent, an exacerbation of 
Indian–Pakistan relations, a blow to American relations with India and new evidence of the ‘tilt’ 
                                                
134 Military Supply for Pakistan, Secret Memorandum of Conversation, June 3, 1974, 8pp, Kissinger Transcripts, 
KT01215 retrieved from http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-
2004&res_dat=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CKT01215 accessed on Aug 14, 2014 
135 Bernard Weintraub, “India says U.S. reopens wounds by lifting curb on aid to Pakistan,” New York Times (1923-
Current File), 27 February 1975 retrieved from http://search.proquest.com.er.lib.k-
state.edu/docview/120471211?accountid=11789 accessed on Aug 20, 2014  
136 Kux, 218 
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toward Pakistan.”137 In the administration itself, there were varied opinions about resumption of 
military aid to Pakistan given the ambiguity about Pakistan’s nuclear intentions. Fred C. Ikle, 
Director Arms Control Disarmament Agency (ACDA)138 was concerned about the emerging 
nuclear competition between India and Pakistan and he believed that the U.S. assistance to 
Pakistan had the potential to “accelerate India’s nuclear testing, which would, in turn, stimulate 
Pakistani development.” He argued that by attaching non-proliferation conditions with military 
aid to Pakistan, the United States would “succeed in committing the Pakistanis to abstain for a 
long time from a nuclear explosives program, while at the same time inhibiting the Indian 
program.” Ikle argued that assurances provided by Bhutto would neither inhibit Pakistan’s 
nuclear progress nor induce Indian restraint. He further warned that if Bhutto was not pressured 
enough then in effect the U.S. would have “acquiesced to Pakistan’s nuclear program.” In his 
memorandum to Kissinger, Ikle made three recommendations:  
1) That the announcement of the lifting of the embargo specify that military assistance to 
be provided will be based on a continuing review of Pakistan’s security needs that will 
consider, in addition to other factors, possible military implications of peaceful nuclear 
programs in Pakistan and other countries of the sub-continent.  
2) That our commitment to lift the embargo be conditioned on Pakistan’s agreement to 
accept safeguards on all nuclear facilities in the country (including adequate extension of 
the safeguards agreement on the Canadian reactor which is due to expire in two years) 
                                                
137 “Arms Supplier,” New York Times (1923-Current File), Feb 26, 1975, pg.38 retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com.er.lib.k-state.edu/docview/120478745?accountid=11789 accessed on Aug 20, 2014    
138 The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was created in 1961. Its mission was to “strengthen national 
security by formulating, advocating, negotiating, implementing, and verifying effective arms control, 
nonproliferation, and disarmament policies, strategies, and agreements.” ACDA’s director acted as a “principal 
adviser to the President, National Security Adviser and the Secretary of State on arms control, nonproliferation and 
disarmament matters.” Therefore, Ikle’s insight on the subject of developing non-proliferation linkages with military 
aid was critical for the formulation of U.S. foreign aid policy towards Pakistan. In 1997, ACDA was merged into the 
State Department, for details on the agency see http://www.state.gov/1997-2001-
NOPDFS/global/general_foreign_policy/rpt_981230_reorg5.html  
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and on a commitment to discuss any new peaceful nuclear developments in advance with 
the U.S. 
3) That explanations to India and to the U.S. Congress of our decision to lift the embargo 
emphasize the restraints thus placed on Pakistani nuclear development and the connection 
that will be made in the future between U.S. arms sales to Pakistan and the direction and 
pace of India’s nuclear program.139  
 
Henry Kissinger, who continued to serve in his capacity as the Secretary of State during Ford’s 
presidency, was the main architect of the administration’s South Asia policy. As a proponent of 
the resumption of the U.S. military aid, Kissinger believed that the decision to lift the embargo 
would “not alter the current military balance.” On the merits of resuming military sales to 
Pakistan and India, Kissinger in his briefing memorandum to the president made a strong case 
for strengthening Pakistan’s hand. He proposed to the president that the decision to lift arms 
embargo to permit cash sales to India and Pakistan would accomplish four U.S. foreign policy 
objectives: 
1) provide psychological and political reassurance to Pakistan, which would make it 
easier for Bhutto to continue the process of normalization with India, 
2) encourage Pakistan to remain identified as a friend and supporter of the U.S. in the 
Middle East/Persian Gulf region, 
3) correct an inherent inequity in our South Asian policy which friends such as Iran find 
difficult to understand, and 
4) strengthen the civilian government of Prime Minister Bhutto. [In addition] the lifting 
of the embargo will also demonstrate to the Chinese that we share their interest in a 
secure Pakistan and are willing to take unpopular actions to promote this interest. It 
will remind the Soviets, who are the principal external supplier of India, that we do 
not intend to give them a free hand in South Asia while ours remain tied by our 
embargo policy.140 
 
                                                
139 Memorandum for the Secretary of State from Director ACDA, Fred C. Ikle, January 30, 1975, National Security 
Adviser-Presidential Transition File, 1974, Subject File: Issue Papers (1), Box 1, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann 
Arbor, MI 
140 U.S. Policy on Military Supply for South Asia, Memorandum for The President from Secretary of State, February 
1, 1975, National Security Adviser, Presidential Briefing Material for VIP Visits, 1974-1976, VIP Visits: 2/5/75-
Pakistan-Prime Minister Bhutto (1) Box 6, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI 
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On the nuclear issue, the State Department had earlier briefed Kissinger on Pakistan’s attempts 
to procure “an independent nuclear fuel cycle and the technical skills that would make the 
nuclear explosion option feasible.”141 Based on this information, Kissinger wrote in his 
memorandum to Ford that there was “considerable evidence that Pakistan was embarking on a 
program that could in time give it the capability of duplicating India’s nuclear explosion.” He 
feared that if such a step was taken by Pakistan, it would be a set-back to broader U.S. “non-
proliferation goals and add a major new element of instability in South Asia.” He argued that 
even though the United States ideally would like to see Pakistan pursue a non-nuclear option and 
place all its future installations under IAEA safeguards, “such a far-reaching commitment would 
be politically difficult for Bhutto to make,” and the objective of U.S. policy was “not to make 
this a quid pro quo for lifting of the arms embargo.” Even though Kissinger was worried about 
Bhutto’s nuclear ambitions and had read Ikle’s suggestions, his memorandum to Ford argued 
against making aid to Pakistan conditional on receiving non-proliferation guarantees from 
Bhutto. In Kissinger’s judgment, the United States had more to lose in terms of the U.S. global 
posture by continuing the embargo” than lose in a “strictly South Asian context by relaxing 
it.”142 Kissinger had anticipated congressional and Indian reaction to the proposed embargo 
announcement but believed that such opposition would moderate over time. 
Prime Minister Bhutto (who in 1973 had changed offices from the President to the Prime 
Minister of Pakistan under the new constitution which established the parliamentary form of 
                                                
141 Kux, 219, provides the account of a briefing paper on Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions submitted to Kissinger by 
Alfred Atherton, assistant secretary of state for the Neat East and South Asia.  
142 Kissinger also proposed to Ford that those items to Pakistan that had been suspended due to existing embargo 
could also be considered for release such as “up-gunning of Pakistan’s M-47 and M-48 tanks, military helicopters 
and MK-55 torpedoes.” Bhutto had told Kissinger that he had $90 million available for arms purchases and 
Kissinger anticipated this amount would increase over time since Pakistan had generous oil-producing donors.   
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government) scheduled his first visit to meet President Ford on February 5, 1975 to seek relief 
from the arms embargo.143 During the meeting, Kissinger aired concerns about the likelihood of 
congressional opposition to the decision to supply arms to Pakistan and urged Bhutto to make a 
statement on nuclear non-proliferation to strengthen the administration’s position. Kissinger 
stated 
…if we could say to the Congress that we had discussed your nuclear program, that 
would help much. If we could say we achieved some nuclear restraint for some help in 
conventional arms, that really would defuse the opposition. 
 
To which Bhutto agreed and replied 
I am not enchanted by the grandiose notion that we must explode something, no matter 
how dirty, if our security needs are met. I want to spend money on something else. We 
have a nuclear program, but if our security is assured, we will be reasonable.  
 
Even though Ford had a committed stance on non-proliferation, he told Bhutto “coming from 
you it would be better than from us and look good on the Hill.”144 Immediately after meeting 
Bhutto, Ford met Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft, deputy assistant for the president for national 
security affairs to discuss their impressions of Bhutto. Following is the transcript of the meeting, 
which reveals that even though Kissinger was wary of Bhutto’s commitments, he decided to play 
along: 
Kissinger: A nuclear statement by Bhutto is a lot of eyewash. But without our arms, they 
would go all out, so it will be marginally useful. If we could get a statement that they 
wouldn’t explode a weapon if their security is assured, that would help.  
Ford: He was an impressive man.  
                                                
143 The participants of the meeting from Pakistan side were: PM Bhutto, Aziz Ahmed, Minister of State for Defense 
and Foreign Affairs, Agha Shahi, Foreign Secretary and Ambassador Yaqub Khan and from the U.S. side: President 
Ford, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Ambassador Henry Byroade, and Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.  
144 Memorandum of Conversation, Ford-Bhutto Meeting, February 5, 1975, p.6, The White House, National Security 
Adviser Memoranda of Conversation 1973-1977, Box 9, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI 
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Kissinger: He was great in ’71. That was one of Nixon’s finest hours. The Chinese 
ambassador told me we were big cowards and if we went in they would.145  
 
Bhutto complied with Ford’s request and after the meeting released a public statement affirming 
that “he would be willing to put all his current and future nuclear reactors under an international 
safeguard program to prevent the secret production of nuclear explosive devices, such as the one 
detonated by India last May.”146 But he used the opportunity to inform the international 
community of Pakistan’s position on the non-proliferation regime. In reply to a question on 
Pakistan signing and ratifying the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) during the press 
conference on February 5, 1975, Bhutto explained Pakistan’s stance on the NPT and stated  
…We have not signed the NPT and we will not be in a position to sign the NPT, not 
because we want to go nuclear or we want to have nuclear weapons but because of moral 
consideration. India has not signed the Non-proliferation Treaty and if we can get 
adequate safeguards through the United Nations or otherwise bilaterally then, of course, 
that would be a different matter. But in the absence of any adequate political safeguards it 
would be difficult for us to contribute to the NPT strictly on moral considerations.147 
 
On February 24, 1975 President Ford made the official announcement of lifting the decade-old 
arms embargo on the sale of lethal weapons to Pakistan and India, on cash only basis, initially 
accepting only defensive weapons requests.148 The National Security Decision Memorandum 
(NSDM 289) issued on March 24, 1975 established the guidelines for the United States 
                                                
145 Memorandum of Conversation, February 5, 1975, The White House, National Security Adviser Memoranda of 
Conversation Collection, Box 9, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI 
146 Ford sees Bhutto and hints U.S. may ease Pakistan arms curb, New York Times, Feb 06, 1975 (1923-Current File) 
retrieved from http://search.proquest.com.er.lib.k-state.edu/docview/120494715?accountid=11789  
147 “Excerpts from Bhutto’s Press Conference, February 5, 1975,” cable from Secretary of State to American 
Embassy Islamabad, February 8, 1975, File: U.S.-Pakistan, Bhutto 1975 Visit, Presidential Briefing Material for 
VIP visits 1974-1976, Pakistan PM Bhutto (1), Box 6, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI 
148 ‘Lethal’ weapons were not categorized in the official U.S. announcement. It was however discussed in the 
reviews leading up to the official announcement that initially only defensive military equipment requests from 
Pakistan and India would be accepted such as anti-aircraft or anti-tank weaponry. 
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Government (henceforth USG) to review requests by Pakistan and India for the sale of defense 
articles and services.149  
After having welcomed the public announcement of the decision, Bhutto started 
pressuring the administration for increased arms supply for advanced conventional weapons to 
Pakistan. Bhutto wrote two letters to President Ford and one to Kissinger seeking U.S. support to 
safeguard Pakistan’s territorial integrity against possible Soviet-Indo-Afghan designs. In the 
absence of “credible evidence of support from the U.S.,” Bhutto forewarned Ford that the Soviet 
Union might be encouraged “to expect that the security requirements of Pakistan would compel 
us to make readjustments demanded by the changing power equilibrium in our region.” Some in 
the administration believed that Bhutto’s references to Soviet desire for increased influence in 
South Asia and his statement about the ineffectiveness of U.S. assurances against Soviet attack 
on Pakistan were exaggerated and a scheme for increased U.S. arms supply.150 In addition to 
raising the specter of the Soviet threat, the GOP was also worried about an imminent Indian 
attack on Pakistan, in Kashmir (which they feared would have had the Soviet blessing under the 
Indo-Soviet treaty of 1971). A transcript of the meeting between Kissinger and Aziz Ahmed, 
Pakistan’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs on Sep 30, 1975 reveals Pakistan’s angst about 
                                                
149 U.S. Military Supply Policy to Pakistan and India, National Security Memorandum 289, The White House, 
March 24, 1975, Box 1, National Security Adviser Study Memoranda, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI 
150 Bhutto’s first letter on Soviet foreign policy in South Asia to Ford and Kissinger was sent on 13 June 1975 and 
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an imminent Indian threat justifying the urgent requirement for advanced A-7 fighter jets. After 
informing Ahmed about the approval of 24 Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided 
(TOW) launchers and 450 missiles for the GOP, Kissinger suggested that the arms supply 
relationship between the United States and Pakistan needed to be built slowly but steadily to 
which Ahmed replied151: 
Ahmed: We want A-7 and other weapons in a hurry. India might well attack us the 2nd or 
3rd week of November in Kashmir.  
Kissinger: Can they really attack there? I thought the terrain was too rugged, and it would 
seem as aggression anyway. 
Ahmed: According to the Indian Constitution, all of Kashmir is part of India. We can 
take them on in Kashmir but they will fight us all along the border. We cannot be 
certain but we think this will happen and we must look out for it. If it happens, it 
will be a two-front-war with Afghanistan joining in anytime there is war with 
India. But we can handle this with the A-7.  
Kissinger: It has a very long range and is an attack plane, isn’t it? 
Ahmed: Yes. Are you saying it is not considered defensive? It is a fighter as well.  
Kissinger: I am simply stating facts about the plane.  
Ahmed: We have been very interested in this plane for a long time. We want about 110 of 
them. We also need weapons in short time frame since ordinary delivery will 
never get them in our hands before the war in November. We will do our best by 
ourselves but we need arms. It all depends on the USSR. The Indians cannot 
move without Soviet approval because of their treaty, which obliges the USSR to 
help India.  
 
Considering that there were rumors about an Indian attack on Bangladesh after its first military 
coup on August 15, 1975152 (in which Bangladesh’s founding president Sheikh Mujib-ur-
Rehman was assassinated) to install a regime of its own choosing, it was unlikely that the Indians 
would have opened another front to attack Pakistan. Therefore, Ahmed’s approach to seeking 
military weapons from the U.S. on ‘urgent’ basis to thwart an imminent Indian attack on 
Kashmir was part of the GOP’s strategy to gain more arms in the bargain. By raising the Indo-
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Soviet threat, Pakistan did manage to convince the Ford administration to resume the arms sales 
to Pakistan on cash basis.  
 Pakistan’s Nuclear Program 
While the administration was trying to decode the rationale for the GOP’s threat perceptions vis-
à-vis the Soviets and the Indians, there were other developments taking place in South Asia at 
the time, with particular reference to Pakistan’s nuclear activities that had implications for the 
administration’s non-proliferation policy. Pakistan was expanding its nuclear energy program in 
the mid 1970s and was in negotiations with France for the sale of a plutonium reprocessing plant.  
The U.S. administration was skeptical of Pakistan’s intentions to acquire fuel cycle 
capabilities even after Bhutto’s public assurances and his willingness to place all current and 
future facilities under IAEA safeguards. The reasons for U.S. skepticism were multiple. First, 
Pakistan’s nuclear energy program during the mid 1970s did not justify the high cost ($1bn) of 
the reprocessing plant that the GOP wanted to construct and operate indigenously. Secondly, 
Pakistan’s consistent opposition to the NPT was suspicious since if it was genuinely interested in 
the expansion of its civilian nuclear energy program, it had much to gain from the international 
nuclear suppliers countries as a NPT state party than as a non-NPT state. Third, a plutonium 
reprocessing plant would have given Pakistan not only expertise in the back end of the fuel cycle 
but also the incentive to reprocess spent fuel (even if it was to be placed under the IAEA 
safeguards) from its only operational reactor at that time, the KANUPP reactor in Karachi, which 
utilized natural uranium-fuel. Based on these apprehensions and sensing latent proliferation 
potential in the prospective Franco-Pak plutonium reprocessing plant deal, the administration 
established a quid pro quo with Pakistan: USG would sanction the sale of advanced A-7 attack 
aircrafts 110 of which Pakistan was interested in buying from the United States, if Pakistan gave 
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up the option of acquiring French nuclear reprocessing plant. This was the quid pro quo, which 
Kissinger had advised against in his memorandum to Ford before the decision to resume military 
supply was taken but in the face of growing concerns about proliferation, it was inevitable.  
Table 3.1 Pakistan’s Civilian Nuclear Program: 1955-1974153 
August 1955: Pakistan signs a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States for $350,000 in 
aid to purchase a 5 MW (thermal) pool type reactor.  
March 1956: Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission is established. 
1963: Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH) is established in Nilore, 
Islamabad. Pakistan Atomic Research Reactor PARR-1 supplied by the United States is constructed in 
PINSCTECH – inaugurated by Z.A. Bhutto, the minister of minerals and natural resources. 
1965: PARR-1 achieves criticality. Utilizes low-enriched uranium and is operated under IAEA 
safeguards. 
1965: Canadian General Electric Company (CGE) signs an agreement with Pakistan to build a 137 
MW (electric) heavy water power reactor, Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) under turnkey 
contract. Construction in Karachi started in 1966. 
1970: A pilot scale facility for the concentration of uranium ores is built at Dera Ghazi Khan. 
1972: 137 MW KANUPP begins operations in expectation to supply 25 percent of Karachi’s power 
requirements – inaugurated by Z.A. Bhutto, the president of Pakistan.  
1973: To meet two-thirds of Pakistan’s power requirements, PAEC announces plans to build 15 new 
nuclear reactors in the next 25 years. 
April 1974: Pakistan secures a contract with France to supply a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant to be 
built at Chashma.  
 
 Bhutto’s Nuclear Ambitions 
Bhutto’s ‘eating grass’ comment made after the 1965 Indo-Pak war is famously related to his 
determination to nuclearize Pakistan. In his reply to a question about Pakistan’s response to India 
going nuclear, Bhutto, minister of foreign affairs at the time, had remarked with great resolve, 
“Then we should have to eat grass and get one or buy one, of our own.”154 In contrast to this 
famous statement, a decade later as Pakistan’s Prime Minister in 1975, Bhutto tried desperately 
                                                
153 This table has been compiled using various sources. For a detailed historical overview of the progress of 
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to assure the international community of the opposite. He said, “for poor countries like us, (the) 
atom bomb is a mirage and we don’t want it. In 1965, when I was the Foreign Minister, I said 
that if India had the atom bomb, we would get one too, even if we had to eat grass. Well, we are 
more reasonable nowadays.”155 In reality however, his resolve of ‘eating grass yet getting 
nuclear weapons capability’ had anything but weakened in ten years.  
As the president of Pakistan, Bhutto took personal charge of Pakistan Atomic Energy 
Commission (PAEC) on January 1, 1972. In his earlier tenure in Ayub Khan’s government, 
Bhutto had held the charge of the Atomic Energy Commission in addition to being the minister 
of foreign affairs. His attempts to convince Ayub Khan of Pakistan’s need for a nuclear 
capability had been unsuccessful but now as the head of the state and leader of a nation 
recovering from the loss of East Pakistan, Bhutto had a chance to realize his dreams of a nuclear 
Pakistan.156 Determined to ‘redeem national honour and pride’ Bhutto convened a national 
meeting of over 70 Pakistani scientists in Multan, Punjab on January 20, 1972 to review 
Pakistan’s atomic energy program, policy and future endeavors.157 During the meeting, Bhutto 
told Pakistan’s scientific and engineering committee to be prepared to ‘deliver’ in case of any 
eventuality (an Indian nuclear explosion) without having mentioned the word ‘bomb’ or ‘nuclear 
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weapons’.158 Bhutto appointed Munir Ahmed Khan, a close aide, who was serving as a senior 
staff member at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at the time, as the new 
Chairman of PAEC during the meeting. Within two months of the meeting, Munir Ahmed Khan 
presented Bhutto a comprehensive plan for Pakistan’s nuclear program “which envisaged 
complete control of the nuclear fuel cycle, and building numerous plants and facilities for the 
generation and application of nuclear know-how.”159 This marked the beginning of Pakistan’s 
journey towards a nuclear weapons capability but the task at hand was arduous. 
Agreement for the construction of Pakistan’s first commercial nuclear energy power plant 
had been signed on May 24, 1965 with the Canadian General Electric Company (CGE). Its 
construction began two years later. A year after it went critical under the IAEA safeguards 
Bhutto inaugurated KANUPP on November 28, 1972.160 According to the agreement, Canada 
supplied heavy water, nuclear fuel, technical information and spare parts for the plant. Pakistan 
negotiated another agreement with Canada in 1973 for the purchase of a fuel fabrication plant 
but after the Indian PNE of 1974, Canada informed Pakistan “it would not negotiate a new fuel 
contract for the KANUPP reactor until a strengthened safeguards agreement which precluded 
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PNEs was arranged.” This clause was unacceptable to Pakistan and it led to the Canadian 
suspension of spare parts for KANUPP and also the export of fuel fabrication plant.161  
 The Franco-Pak Reprocessing Agreement 
With France, Pakistan had been in negotiations for a reprocessing facility since the 1960s, long 
before Pakistan’s decision to acquire nuclear weapons, but due to Ayub Khan’s 
unresponsiveness these plans never materialized.162 After the Multan meeting, Pakistan 
established a pilot scale reprocessing facility at PINSTECH that allowed PAEC to sign a contract 
with the French company Saint-Gobain Techniques Nouvelles (SGN) in March 1973 for a ‘basic 
design’ of a large-scale reprocessing plant. The second contract with France was signed on Oct 
18, 1974 for a ‘detailed’ design of the industrial scale plant at Chashma Barrage on the Indus 
River. According to Feroz Khan, in the second agreement, the French company SGN “promised 
to provide blueprints, designs, and specifications; procure equipment from suppliers; and put the 
plant into operation” and the SGN in exchange would “earn $10 million, and other French 
contractors would earn upward of $45 million.” In addition to this agreement, “France was also 
trying to secure more orders –– at least three to four 600-MW power reactors, Mirage fighter-
bombers, and other hardware for Pakistan and other Arab states.”163 
The Franco-Pak reprocessing plant agreement created problems with Pakistan’s 
negotiations with Canada (which had restarted since 1975) as Canada felt that the “reprocessing 
plant was uneconomical for Pakistan, and that its real interest in acquiring the plant lay in its 
military applications.”164 Canada maintained a position whereby it demanded “to retain veto over 
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KANUPP’s spent fuel being reprocessed and have that veto extended to Pakistan’s entire 
program”. Furthermore, it required Pakistan to “renounce the option of termination written into 
the original 1959 Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, and instead would have to accept whatever 
new safeguards were agreed upon throughout KANUPP’s lifetime.” Pakistan refused to 
“renounce its option to terminate the 1959 agreement without an accompanying removal of 
Canada’s veto over KANUPP fuel reprocessing.” Pakistan also refused to allow “Canadian 
safeguards on its proposed French reprocessing plant or on its proposed second reactor, the 
CHASHMA,” purchased from China.165 After the final round of negotiations that resulted in a 
deadlock, Canada unilaterally terminated its nuclear cooperation with Pakistan on December 22, 
1976. Pakistan objected that Canadian decision was unjust since Pakistan as party to the 
agreement did not violate any terms of their contract and that it was being punished for ‘India’s 
crime.’ Pakistani press reported that “Canada, betrayed by India and publically acknowledging 
its inability to influence her…unaccountably sought to bill all that to Pakistan with interest.”166 
Along with the plutonium route however, Pakistan was also pursuing a parallel uranium 
enrichment program in Kahuta, Punjab headed by Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan. As Pakistani scholar 
Shuja Nawaz writes in his book Crossed Swords, Bhutto’s nuclear initiatives had inspired many 
Pakistani scientists to return to Pakistan and contribute to Pakistan’s national nuclear 
development. Dr. A.Q. Khan was one of the ‘more celebrated names.’ Pakistan had set up a 
uranium refining plant within the ‘Chemical Plant Complex (CPC) at Dera Ghazi Khan which 
provided uranium dioxide for the KANUPP reactor and uranium hexafluoride (UF6) for the 
Kahuta Enrichment Plant. According to Nawaz, Bhutto had asked General. Zia-ul-Haq, the Chief 
                                                
165 Ibid, 146 
166 Ibid, 148 
 100 
of the Army Staff to help the PAEC to develop the Kahuta plant in 1976. Dr. Khan had carried 
with him “the plans for the Urenco enrichment centrifuges from the Dutch firm, Fysscish 
Dynamisch Onderzoek (FDO).”167  
Figure 3.1 The Nuclear Fuel Cycle168 
 
The “Kahuta uranium enrichment project along with the fuel cycle facilities had all been 
successfully launched and were nearing completion” around the same time Pakistan was 
negotiating reprocessing agreement with the French. Given the absence of U.S. trepidation, 
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public or official, about Kahuta enrichment project during the Ford administration, it can be 
ascertained that perhaps the Chashma deal with the French “served to act as a decoy for the 
establishment of the secret nuclear infrastructure that Pakistan needed to develop a nuclear 
deterrent capability.”169 Pakistan and France signed a bilateral agreement of cooperation on the 
plant on 17 March 1976 and agreed to place it under the IAEA safeguards through a trilateral 
agreement. It would take several years for the construction to complete and the facilities to be 
operational. However Pakistan was in for a surprise.  
U.S. Demarches to Pakistan on The Reprocessing Plant Issue 
In early 1975, along with Canada, the United States was also exerting pressure on Pakistan to 
cancel the French reprocessing plant deal. One fundamental U.S. objection to Pakistan’s 
plutonium reprocessing agreement with France (and Pakistan’s negotiations with Federal 
Republic of Germany for a heavy water plant) was grounded in Pakistan’s lack of economic 
justification for having the need for a national reprocessing facility when the country’s only 
nuclear power reactor KANUPP ran on natural uranium fuel supplied by Canada.  On the U.S. 
objection to Pakistan’s ‘lack of economic justification’ to pursue acquisition of nuclear fuel and 
heavy water facilities, Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, Pakistan’s Ambassador to the U.S., argued that 
since Pakistan lacked fossil fuels it had to depend on nuclear energy to meet its future power 
needs. Referring to a joint Pakistan/IAEA study completed in 1975, Khan commented on 
Pakistan’s energy needs requiring “8-600 MW reactors in 1980’s decade to meet power needs.” 
Given that it would have taken Pakistan four years to complete the reprocessing plant, Khan 
maintained that delay in approval of IAEA safeguards agreement (due to objections by the 
                                                
169 Mansoor Ahmed, Pakistan’s Nuclear Programme: Security, Politics and Technology, unpublished PhD 
Dissertation, Chapter 6, “Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing and Plutonium Production,” p.25, School of Politics and 
International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad  
 102 
American delegate) would delay completion of the plant eventually delaying Pakistan’s ability to 
become self-sufficient in meeting its energy needs.170  
The trilateral safeguards agreement between Pakistan, France and the IAEA was signed 
on 18 March 1976 with the vote of the U.S. delegate. Kissinger advised Ford on direct 
intervention to stop Bhutto from progressing with the reprocessing project. Even if the plant 
were to be safeguarded, Kissinger warned, “it would be possible for the GOP to contravene or 
abrogate any safeguards agreements.” Kissinger argued “even if Pakistan kept its agreement, its 
possession of a potential nuclear explosives capability could by itself adversely affect South 
Asian stability” making it difficult to cooperate with Pakistan as “congressional and public 
opinion focus increasingly on the implications of Pakistan’s nuclear activities.”171  
As advised, Ford in his letter to Bhutto of March 19, 1976, directly addressed the issue of 
Franco-Pak reprocessing deal, raising similar concerns. Citing “the lack of persuasive economic 
justification for obtaining sensitive nuclear facilities,” Ford urged Bhutto to reconsider his 
decision to acquire a reprocessing plant until Pakistan’s “future nuclear program is sufficiently 
developed to establish a clear need and until other alternatives, such as a multinational venture, 
are thoroughly explored.” In the absence of such an understanding, if Pakistan decided to go 
                                                
170 Approach to Pakistan concerning sensitive nuclear facilities, Telegram from Department of State to American 
Embassy in Pakistan, Under Secretary Sisco’s meeting with Ambassador Yaqub Khan, February 19, 1976, National 
Security Adviser Files, NSC Staff Files for Middle East and South Asian Affairs: Convenience Files, Box 20, 
Pakistan (1), Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, MI  
171 Letter to Bhutto on Pakistani Nuclear Issues, Memorandum-Action 1625 for the President from Brent Scowcroft, 
March 19, 1976, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing office files: General subject file, National Security Adviser, 
Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, 1974-1977, Box 3, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann 
Arbor, MI  
 103 
ahead with the acquisition of reprocessing and heavy water facilities, Ford warned, Pakistan 
would stand to lose public and congressional U.S. support.172  
Ford’s letter urging Bhutto to show restraint and cancel the reprocessing agreement with 
France provided Bhutto with a card to play and since 1976 was the pre-election year for Bhutto 
in Pakistan, his public pronouncements on rejecting the U.S. pressure on the reprocessing issue 
became part of his re-election strategy. For the Pakistani public, what filtered through was how 
the U.S. was trying to stop Pakistan’s nuclear development by selectively targeting Pakistan and 
pressuring it to cancel a deal which was important to meet Pakistan’s energy needs and that 
Bhutto was holding the fort –––– yet another example of how Pakistani leaders have used 
isolated events to develop Pakistan’s narrative along the way.  
On March 30, 1976 Bhutto sent his reply to President Ford detailing the history of 
Pakistan’s civilian nuclear program, Pakistan’s agreement with France and Germany for the 
reprocessing and heavy water facilities, respectively, approved under stringent IAEA safeguards 
and, the GOP’s economic necessity for civilian nuclear facilities to meet Pakistan’s future energy 
needs referencing the 1973 energy crisis. Bhutto regretted that the administration was pursuing 
double non-proliferation standards where it admonished Pakistan for its genuine peaceful nuclear 
intentions and rewarded India with uninterrupted nuclear fuel supply even after its nuclear 
testing. Politely rejecting Ford’s request for cancelling the reprocessing deal, Bhutto stated  
I am sure that if the full significance of the kind of safeguards that Pakistan has accepted 
with respect to its nuclear facilities were fully known to your Congress and the public, 
there could be no ground to fear that they might, in certain circumstances, be used for 
non-peaceful purposes. With these apprehensions dispelled, one cannot imagine that the 
United States would wish Pakistan to reverse its considered decision, shelve its nuclear 
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energy programme and thus not only frustrate the expectations of its people about their 
development but also inflict lasting damage on their expectation of support from the 
United States in their legitimate interests.173 
 
In reply to Ford’s suggestion of seeking multilateral alternatives instead of national reprocessing 
facilities, Bhutto mentioned his positive discussion with the Shah of Iran on converting 
Pakistan’s national reprocessing facility into a regional project and the prospects of inviting one 
or two other countries as regional participants. This last statement however worried Kissinger to 
no end. It was Kissinger who had advised that Ford propose to Bhutto the option of building a 
multinational reprocessing facility to be based in Iran even when he himself was not too 
convinced about the merits of this option. During a conversation with his advisers at the State 
Department, Kissinger had inquired about the merits of a regional reprocessing plant. He was 
informed about the advantages of such a regional nuclear facility with “improved control and 
accountability for the sensitive materials which would result from having people involved in the 
operation of the plant in addition to those of the host country.” To which Kissinger had 
remarked, “unless there is collusion among the parties. The Iranians and Pakistanis could simply 
set quotas between them for the amount of diverted materials that would go to each.” Although 
Kissinger endorsed the idea publically, he believed it to be a “fraud.” Kissinger knew that Bhutto 
wanted the plant to be based in Pakistan and not Iran if he was to become party to a multinational 
agreement and he knew that “a plant in Pakistan would be just a cover.” Kissinger ended the 
meeting by conceding that:  
I know I have endorsed the idea, but when you study the practical application it is not so 
appealing. I can see a policy of opposing reprocessing, but I am not sure we should fall 
on our own swords to push others into multinational projects. Suppose the multinational 
plant were located in Pakistan. What would we have achieved?...Suppose the Pakistanis 
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came to us and said they have now got Iraq lined up to join with them –– or Sri Lanka. I 
would not be eager to spread this technology to those countries.174  
 
In addition to his disagreement with State Department’s proposals on regional multilateral 
reprocessing facilitates, Kissinger was also not happy with the State stalling on Pakistan’s 
military equipment requests. “Nothing makes the blood course faster through the veins of my 
colleagues than to be able to screw an ally,” Kissinger blasted in his opening remarks during a 
meeting with his advisers at the State Department. He made some interim decisions during the 
meeting to deal with Pakistan’s reprocessing issue and sale of conventional arms ordering the 
State to expedite the arms supply with the exception of the A-7’s requested by the GOP to retain 
some leverage.175 As an alternative to the current deal between Pakistan and France, it was 
decided that France should be urged to sell reactors to Pakistan but “postpone a reprocessing 
plant for 15-25 years, and then require its co-ownership” and the United States should help by 
“offering some U.S. components for the French reactors and favorable Ex-Im financing” in a bid 
to “buy off the French, since they won’t lose business.” As a carrot, the USG would offer A-7s to 
the GOP in exchange for Bhutto’s agreement to this proposal.176  
As the United States was increasing direct and indirect diplomatic pressure on Bhutto to 
forgo the reprocessing project, the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Henry Byroade wrote to 
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Kissinger and aired his reservations against pressuring Bhutto. Byroade observed that Bhutto’s 
stridency on the reprocessing deal was heightened by USG linking the reprocessing issue with 
the sale of A-7 aircrafts and cautioned that the negative linking approach towards the GOP 
would worsen U.S.-Pakistan relations. Bhutto, he argued, was “most unlikely to be brought 
around by threats and pressures, whether these are diplomatically phrased in terms of potential 
problems on the Hill or put in more direct language of negative linkage to ongoing or anticipated 
economic aid and military sales program.” Byroade’s insight about Bhutto’s determination to go 
ahead with acquisition of complete nuclear fuel cycle capabilities was fairly prudent as he 
argued:  
… if Bhutto is as determined to go ahead with a complete nuclear fuel cycle as we 
believe he is and if he perceives that his possibilities for obtaining and paying for the 
conventional weapons he feels Pakistan needs will be significantly reduced by our 
actions, a nuclear deterrent could become an even more attractive proposition for him. 
 
If it were to happen as Byroade articulated then such an occurrence would have directly 
challenged U.S. goals for regional stability. He suggested that if non-proliferation was the 
administration’s highest priority then addressing Pakistan’s security concerns via a rapid military 
sales program that upgraded Pakistan’s conventional military was the ‘positive way’ to approach 
Pakistan as opposed to negatively linking non-proliferation with arms supply.177  
Byroade was convinced of Bhutto’s arguments that Pakistan was not seeking any tactical 
advantage vis-à-vis India by pursuing a nuclear capability, instead his intentions were two-fold: 
to build a modern Pakistan and to boost the morale of the people of Pakistan which had been 
affected by the Indian nuclear explosion. In his defense, Bhutto told Byroade that he would have 
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re-considered the Franco-Pak reprocessing deal if the timing of U.S. objections delivered in 
Ford’s letter had not coincided with the actual signing of the deal. In sympathizing with Bhutto’s 
dilemma of walking the fine line between publically committing himself to the deal to give his 
people confidence and worrying about the U.S., Byroade warned that:  
it may make us look good in the eyes of those for whom we are seeking to construct a 
record of opposition to proliferation, and will give some people the feeling of virtuous 
satisfaction that we are doing our part. At the end of the exercise we will be able to say 
that we tried. We will regrettably have to add that we failed, and that a downward 
spiraling of US/Pak relations to zilch was a significant by-product of the effort.178 
 
His prognostication about deterioration of U.S. relations with Pakistan over nuclear proliferation 
issue was astute and Pakistan-U.S. relations during the Carter administration bore testimony to 
that fact.   
 U.S. Demarches to France and Germany On the Nuclear Deals with Pakistan 
The United States did not selectively pressure Pakistan into cancelling the French deal –– it also 
approached France for the same. As a nuclear weapons state (NWS), France proved to be a more 
challenging case for U.S. nuclear diplomacy in the mid-1970s than Germany with respect to their 
nuclear exports policies. Gaullist conceptions in the 1960s fashioned the policies of an 
independent and self-reliant France, which gatecrashed the nuclear club with its first nuclear 
weapons test in 1960. In its initial years as a NWS, the beginning of an independent French 
nuclear policy was marked by several steps some of which were the French refusal to sign the 
NPT, withdrawal from the Conference on Disarmament (CD), continuation of atmospheric 
testing, non-adherence to the international safeguards regime, refusal to participate in the London 
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Suppliers Group discussions and nuclear exports to non-NPT states with lax safeguards. These 
issues also became irritants in the U.S.-French foreign relations during the 1970s.179  
  The United States was finding it increasingly difficult to engage France in a nuclear 
suppliers arrangement (an initiative of the United States) after the Indian nuclear test in 1974 
which would have tightened nuclear technology export controls on countries that were not party 
to the NPT. On June 3, 1974, a NSDM 255 approved guidelines for use in consultations with 
nuclear-supplier countries on export of nuclear materials, supplies, technology and equipment. In 
coordination with the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), the Department of State was entrusted 
with the responsibility of conducting consultations with the supplier countries emphasizing the 
need for  
(1) establishing agreed international guidelines, preferably based on U.S. practice, to 
ensure the physical security of weapons-usable and highly toxic materials whether 
internationally transferred or indigenously produced; (2) reaching some common 
principles regarding the supply of sensitive enrichment technology or equipment; (3) 
avoiding or applying stricter terms for supply in situations where special hazards could be 
present; and (4) encouraging, where appropriate, multinational enrichment, fuel 
fabrication and reprocessing facilities.180  
 
French commitment to export controls was a major requirement for success of the U.S. nuclear 
non-proliferation policy. Even though the NPT recognized France as a NWS, France chose to 
remain a NPT holdout, refusing to participate in several international non-proliferation 
arrangements and became a major supplier of nuclear technology, materials, equipment and 
reprocessing facilities to non-nuclear weapons states not party to the NPT without much regard 
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for IAEA safeguards regime.181 The French however were dependent on the United States for 
supplies of highly enriched uranium (HEU) but that was not leverage enough to compel French 
cooperation in the non-proliferation regime. France finally decided to join the suppliers group for 
an exploratory meeting on 23 April 1975 after Kissinger accepted several French conditions, 
assuaged their fears that other suppliers would not be discriminatory towards France because of 
its non-NPT status and that the decisions made by the group would not be retroactively applied 
to contracts France had already signed with various countries.182 Bringing the French into the 
fold of the non-proliferation regime by pushing them to join the Suppliers Group is one of the 
most significant achievements of the U.S. non-proliferation policy during the Ford 
administration.  
French contracts with Pakistan were in compliance with the former’s obligations 
undertaken in London. On the conditions under which France supplied nuclear materials to 
recipient states, France maintained that it “respected the London agreement and that required the 
parties with which it signs these contracts to give the guarantee stipulated in the London 
agreements.” The Ford administration understood the French position and agreed that they were 
in compliance with the London agreement, which stipulated that France would  
exercise restraint in the supply of these exports; that they would encourage the concept of 
a multinational regional facility where possible; and that any sensitive facilities built from 
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these plans or their sale, would be safeguarded under IAEA conditions and that such 
facilities could not be duplicated and rebuilt using this transferred technology.183 
 
The trilateral agreement between Pakistan, France and the IAEA had inbuilt provisions for the 
safeguards that the French had agreed to in the London agreement. It was difficult for the 
administration to convince the French to cancel the reprocessing deal with Pakistan especially 
when they knew that the agreement did not violate the London Suppliers agreement.     
In his letter to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jean Sauvagnargues, Kissinger applauded 
French cooperation and contribution in making the Suppliers Group a success. Citing suspicions 
about Pakistan’s intentions to develop nuclear weapons using the French reprocessing plant as 
means towards that end, Kissinger urged France to join the United States “in an act of leadership 
to deter or delay Pakistani acquisition of a national reprocessing capability and to pursue, when 
the need is clear, safer and more economic alternatives, such a multinational venture in the 
region.” Airing his concerns about Pakistan’s interest in acquiring a large-scale reprocessing 
facility “for which it has no economic need,” Kissinger argued that it “does have considerable 
potential for being used either to counter India’s nuclear capability or to try to obtain concession 
for not doing so.” Knowing that the Franco-Pak agreement was under the IAEA safeguards, the 
Secretary emphasized that there always was “danger of contravention or abrogation of even the 
most effective safeguards agreement if a nation finds this to be in its national interest.” Kissinger 
requested the French government to “delay further actions on this transaction for a reasonable 
period of time” and join the United States in making “an enduring contribution to international 
stability” by “forestalling further transfers of national reprocessing capabilities, particularly in 
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circumstances where there is a substantial risk that they might be used for non-peaceful 
purposes.”184  
The USG issued several demarches to the French government to cancel the reprocessing 
plant agreement with Pakistan but France resisted the U.S. pressure and refused to rescind the 
reprocessing deal during the Ford administration. In his reply to Kissinger, Sauvagnargues 
argued that “the proposed sale was in keeping with the principles that emerged from the 1975 
London nuclear suppliers meetings and he thus saw no reasons not to sign the requisite 
agreements on the scheduled dates –– that is, this week.”185 Despite immense pressure on France 
and Pakistan, no significant successes were achieved by the Ford administration to push the two 
countries to cancel the Franco-Pak reprocessing deal.  
 Pakistan’s contract with FRG also met a similar fate i.e. Kissinger’s requests were 
disregarded. Pakistan was in negotiations with FRG in 1975 for sale of heavy water plant which 
was to be provided by “Linde Ag Werksgruppe and would produce about 10,000 Kgs heavy 
water per year.”186 In a letter to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher, Kissinger raised his concerns about Pakistan’s attempts to acquire a reprocessing plant 
from France and a heavy water plant from the FRG. “In reviewing the totality of Pakistan’s 
planned nuclear program,” Kissinger explained, “we find it difficult to avoid the conclusion that 
there is a substantial risk of nuclear proliferation. Neither a chemical reprocessing nor a heavy 
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water production capability is needed to meet Pakistan’s civil nuclear needs. Both facilities 
would however, provide important elements in an indigenous capability to produce nuclear 
explosives.” In a tone similar to his demarche to the French foreign minister, Kissinger 
appreciated FRG’s role in the Suppliers Group and Germany’s decision to “defer further action 
on the proposed heavy water sale” until the U.S. had received replies for its demarches from 
France and Pakistan on the subject of reprocessing. Kissinger cautioned that for Pakistan, “an 
independent ability to produce heavy water would be critical link in an indigenous fuel cycle 
which would give Pakistan the ability to develop nuclear explosives.”187 By mid 1976 however, 
the GOP was acutely aware that the future of heavy water plant from Germany or heavy water 
supplies for KANUPP was dependent upon resolution of the reprocessing issue.  
Towards the end of President Ford’s term, the administration had reached a standoff with 
Pakistan over the issue of the reprocessing plant. Bhutto was rigid against the U.S. pressure and 
the French regarded U.S. intervention as sabotage on their sovereignty.  The Ford 
administration’s position towards Pakistan however was strengthened by a congressional 
legislation with specific provisions to stop U.S. assistance to countries involved in proliferation 
activities. However, it only provided Kissinger a face-saving device in his dealings with Bhutto; 
by appearing to have his hands tied by the legislation, Kissinger made references to the threat of 
sanctions against Pakistan and suspension of military arms if the reprocessing deal was not 
cancelled. However, this threat did not materialize during Ford’s presidency.  
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 The Origin and Rationale For The Symington Amendment 1976 
During the Ford administration between 1975 and 1977, several nuclear non-proliferation bills 
and amendments were introduced in the 94th Congress, some of which became laws, some were 
defeated and some vetoed. Congressional interest in nuclear non-proliferation issues and the 
potential dangers of spread of nuclear weapons was sparked by a series of events that took place 
during that time period, some of which included  
The Indian nuclear explosion in 1974; illicit sale of nuclear technology to non-nuclear 
weapons states by France and West Germany; Nixon’s proposed supply of large nuclear 
power reactors to Israel and Egypt; public interest groups protesting against license 
applications to export of nuclear power reactors and fuel to South Africa, nuclear steam 
generator to Spain and slightly enriched uranium to India.188  
 
After the Indian PNE in 1974, a nuclear suppliers group named the London Suppliers Group 
(now the Nuclear Suppliers Group or NSG) was established to strengthen nuclear exports and 
safeguards which met for their first meeting in November 1974. The London Group was a 
selective group of countries in the beginning including the four NWS (with the exception of 
China): the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and three non-NWS 
Federal Republic of Germany, Canada and Japan. Fig 3.2. shows the network of supplier and 
recipient states in 1975.  Recently declassified documents show that Kissinger played an 
important role in the establishment of the London Suppliers Group and also persuaded France to 
join, whose involvement was critical for the success of the Group considering its extensive 
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global nuclear export technology commitments.189 The Group held several conferences in 1975 
and 1976 to seek cooperation amongst supplier nations for safeguards on their nuclear exports. 
However, by 1976, the group had expanded to include other supplier countries: German 
Democratic Republic, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Switzerland and 
Sweden.  
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Figure 3.2 Network of Nuclear Suppliers and Recipients in 1975190 
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Even though the London Suppliers Group was established, concerns remained about the impact 
of growing number of supplier nations and increased demand for nuclear power reactors in the 
global market. Initially at the heart of U.S. concerns were agreements signed by two major 
supplier nations, FRG’s agreement with Brazil (a NPT hold-out at the time) to export nuclear 
reactors and construction of complete nuclear fuel cycle in Brazil in 1975 and two French 
agreements for export of plutonium reprocessing plants to the Republic of Korea (NPT member 
state) in 1975 and Pakistan (NPT hold-out) in 1976. The U.S. demarches to France and Germany 
on the nuclear exports issue, as discussed in the previous section, were not the only form of U.S. 
nuclear diplomacy. After the establishment of the Group and French involvement as a supplier 
nation, the United States also used that forum to persuade France and FRG to cancel their 
planned agreement for the sale of nuclear facilities with several countries. France agreed to 
review its export policy for future sales of plutonium reprocessing but maintained that its 
decision would not apply retroactively to all previously signed agreements.191 Even though it was 
not what the Ford-Kissinger administration ideally wanted from France, it held some promise for 
the non-proliferation regime.  
By mid 1970s, Pakistan was no longer the only source of apprehension for the non-
proliferation lobbyists in the United States which took the focus off Pakistan to include other 
countries. There were strong concerns about nuclear ambitions of countries like Brazil and the 
Republic of Korea and some believed that export of nuclear power reactors, facilities and 
materials to these countries by international suppliers was equivalent of enabling their military 
nuclear options. It was based on these concerns that the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 
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(JCAE) encouraged the Executive to take actions to delay, discourage and prevent the spread of 
nuclear weapons. The JCAE was unique in its composition, mandate and legislative authority. 
The provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 called for the creation of the JCAE and it was 
established on August 2, 1946. The function of JCAE was to oversee the activities of the Atomic 
Energy Commission (AEC). The AEC was abolished as a result of the Energy Reorganizing Act 
of 1974 and two new agencies were created to divide its functions: the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) and the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) and the 
oversight responsibilities for these two new agencies was assumed by the JCAE on January 19, 
1975. Composed of equal numbers of Senators and Congressmen (nine each), its legislative 
powers were established by law and not by the Senate rule, therefore, the same bill would be 
reported to both the House and the Senate for deliberation. Until its dissolution in 1977 as a 
result of the Energy Reorganizing Act of 1974, the JCAE was responsible for all issues related to 
development, use and control of atomic energy and also broader issues related to nuclear non-
proliferation. In 1977, the functions of JCAE were transferred to four committees: a) The 
Committee on Armed Services, b) The Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, c) The 
Committee on the Environment and Public Works, and d) The Committee on Foreign 
Relations.192  
In its annual report to the respective houses of 94th Congress on the development, use and 
control of nuclear energy, for the common defense and security and for peaceful purposes, the 
JCAE outlined major issues of concern to the Congress for the next year. The Committee in its 
report defined proliferation of nuclear weapons as “the increase of weapons already possessed 
                                                
192 Inventory of the Records of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 1947-1977, Record Group 128, National 
Archives and Records Administration, DC 
 118 
by a nuclear-capable nation (vertical proliferation), and the increase of nations which are capable 
of developing, producing, or obtaining nuclear weapons (horizontal proliferation).”193 In its 
summary of important issues, six problem areas were identified warranting congressional 
oversight. Two of the six issues were related to threat of the spread of nuclear weapons and the 
need to control proliferation. The committee reported on: 
• The increased danger of more nations seeking an independent nuclear weapons capability 
and the need to develop more effective methods to deter and delay this threatened 
proliferation of nuclear weapons194 and 
• The need to increase the safeguards against the possible diversion or theft of nuclear 
materials; the sabotage of nuclear facilities; or other acts of nuclear related terrorism.”195 
 
The most important contribution of the report was the Committee’s understanding of the political 
motivation for proliferation in a country’s decision to acquire nuclear weapons. The report 
stated: 
The most important element in a nation deciding to develop a nuclear capability is the 
political motivation to do so. Current examples are numerous: the concern of India over 
the Chinese nuclear capability and a background of continuing ill-will between Pakistan 
and India; the concern of Pakistan over a nuclear-armed India; the concern of Israel for 
its preservation in the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict; the concern of the Arabs over a 
nuclear-armed Israel; the concern of South Korea, Taiwan and most especially Japan over 
their security during a time of decreased presence of the United States in the Pacific area; 
the concern of Israel over the strength of U.S. security assurances in the face of a possible 
resumption of the Middle East War; and, finally, the concern of the NATO Allies, 
especially the Federal Republic of Germany, over whether there will be a major 
withdrawal of U.S. forces and nuclear weapons from Europe.196 
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It is clear that based on this understanding, the 94th Congress was able to legislate effectively on 
issues of nuclear proliferation providing the Ford administration the tools to reign in ambitions of 
countries around the globe and not just Pakistan.  
Senator John O. Pastore (D-RI) Chairman JCAE, sponsored a resolution (Res. 221) –– 
passed by the Senate on December 12, 1975 –– calling on the President “to seek a cooperative 
international effort to strengthen and improve international safeguards on peaceful nuclear 
activities to reduce the risk of theft of nuclear materials.” It also directed the President “to seek 
restraint by suppliers of nuclear equipment in the transfer of nuclear technology.”197 The 
Resolution generated enough momentum to start a public discourse on the subject of non-
proliferation and nuclear exports questioning the Ford administration’s resolve towards non-
proliferation. Amongst the several editorials and articles that were published in late 1975, a NYT 
editorial criticized the administration for lack of influence to dissuade supplier nations from 
commercial export of nuclear reactors and noted that “the prolonged efforts of American 
officials to discourage France and West Germany from their nuclear deals undoubtedly would 
have had a far better chance of success if Secretary Kissinger and President Ford had not over-
pessimistically refused to engaged their own personal prestige, and the full influence of the 
United States, for fear of a profitless crisis with major allies.”198  
By early 1976, there was incredible interest in the Senate on non-proliferation issues and 
international nuclear export controls and it generated substantial pressure on the administration 
to issue demarches to concerned countries. The USG wanted to establish stringent measures for 
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export controls but the dilemma facing the Executive and the Congress was that they did not 
want to lose their share of nuclear export customers to supplier nations like France and Germany 
in the process. Kissinger in his statement before the Senate Government Operations Committee 
on March 9th, 1976 provided three reasons for a warranted change, from unilateral to a more 
concerted multilateral approach, in the U.S. non-proliferation strategy:  
• Other industrialized states were entering the international nuclear market, thereby 
challenging our longstanding dominance as a commercial nuclear exporter and 
threatening to diminish the ultimate effect of our national safeguards and control policies 
• The oil crisis has stimulated many developing as well as developed states to accelerate 
their peaceful nuclear power programs, both as a means of lowering the cost of 
generating electrical energy and reducing their reliance on imported petroleum products 
• The nuclear test by India underscored the fact that additional states, even those not part of 
the highly industrialized world, were capable of using nuclear technology to construct 
explosives.  
 
Kissinger further listed two elements of the administration’s non-proliferation strategy: 
1. Multilateral actions to move forward with other states in meeting the nonproliferation 
challenge; and 
2. National nuclear export policies to insure that the United States continues to exert 
responsible leadership in nonproliferation.199 
 
There was consensus amongst the administration and congress that the foremost goal of U.S. 
non-proliferation policy was to prevent the sale of plutonium reprocessing and uranium 
enrichment facilities. However, there were only two ways to go about it: a) to deter the supplier 
countries like France and Germany from selling reprocessing and enrichment facilities by 
denying them the nuclear fuel for their own domestic programs for which they were dependent 
on the United States or b) to strengthen the IAEA safeguards and urge all importers and 
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exporters to join the safeguards regime before the sale of nuclear facilities was finalized in order 
to minimize the risk of diversion of fuel for the production of nuclear bombs.  
The administration believed that since it was difficult to prevent other countries from 
selling nuclear reprocessing technology or full nuclear fuel cycles to other countries, the only 
way to persuade countries was to encourage them to adopt stringent safeguards on their facilities. 
Another way was to encourage multinational reprocessing and enrichment plants as opposed to 
nationally owned and operated plants where the incentives for countries joining such multilateral 
initiatives was a lifetime supply of uranium from the multilateral entity.200 The Ford 
administration had attempted to engage Iran to persuade Pakistan to join such a multinational 
effort based in Iran but Bhutto would only have agreed to such a facility if it were based in 
Pakistan.  
The congressional pressure on the administration increased after France and Pakistan 
entered into a trilateral safeguards agreement on March 18, 1976. Senator Abraham A. Ribicoff 
(D-CT) in a powerful article in the NYT on March 26, 1976 censured the administration for 
French and German rejections of U.S. demarches to give up their nuclear export deals to Brazil 
and Pakistan. Ribicoff advocated that  
the United States must persuade France and West Germany not to engage in dangerous 
nuclear trade. We should set a nonproliferation example they can follow, and we should 
remind them that they still depend heavily on us for the technology, components, and 
particularly the fuel used in their own ambitious nuclear programs. 
 
As Chairman of the Senate Committee on Governmental Operations, Ribicoff proposed several 
attendant steps for the United States:  
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Support a ban on the export of nuclear fuel facilities to nonnuclear-weapons countries, 
and on all nuclear exports to non-treaty nations,”; “a market-share arrangement among 
the suppliers” to guarantee “each supplier a minimum number of reactor sales a year,” to 
eliminate “cut-throat competition in the sale of reactors and for promoting fuel 
arrangements that will discourage production and stockpiling of weapons-grade materials 
outside the supplier nations,”; and if such an arrangement is not reached then “the United 
States should announce that future supply of enriched-uranium fuel and of all other 
nuclear assistance will be made only to nations that join in meeting these nonproliferation 
objectives.  
 
Ribicoff sternly warned, “if all else fails, the United States should stop supplying reactor fuel to 
the Germans and French.”201 But not everyone agreed with Ribicoff’s submission.  
Stuart Symington, a senator from Missouri (D-MO) and member of the JCAE, in his 
statement before the Senate on April 14, 1976 advised against Ribicoff’s warning of banning 
nuclear fuel exports to France and Germany. Symington, who was a lead proponent of non-
proliferation in the Congress, highlighted the need for the United States to control the spread of 
nuclear weapons and argued, “while a ban on nuclear fuel to those two nations may have a short-
term impact, it would not appear to achieve its desired effect,” emphasizing that “it could result 
in both countries acquiring larger uranium enrichment facilities of their own, thereby becoming 
ever greater nuclear competitors of the United States.” He cautioned that “such a ban could 
violate certain provisions of our own adherence to the Nonproliferation Treaty, as well as 
agreements with Euratom. In addition, it might violate other specific contracts with foreign 
utilities.” Symington hoped for “a realistic constraint on nuclear proliferation” which he 
reiterated “must begin with open discussion by the supplier nations on the real issues involved” 
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proposing “an agreement among the nuclear supplier nations not to export enrichment or 
reprocessing equipment to any individual country.”202  
 The Symington Amendment and Pakistan’s Reaction 
Legislative restrictions on nuclear exports were enacted in the United States for the first time in 
June 1976. An amendment uniquely relevant to establishing U.S. policy controls on countries 
receiving assistance from the United States was made to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
introduced by Senator Stuart Symington (D-MO) and enacted into law on June 30, 1976. A new 
Section 669 on nuclear transfers was added to Chapter 3 of Part III of the Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1961 and was approved on June 30, 1976 (Public Law 94-329) called the International 
Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (popularly referred to as Symington 
Amendment).  
According to the legislation,  
no funds authorized or appropriated under this Act, the Arms Export Control Act, or any 
other Act…may be used for the purpose of –– 
(1) providing economic assistance; 
(2) providing military or security supporting assistance or grant military education and 
training or; 
(3) extending military credits or making guarantees;  
to any country which –– 
(A) delivers nuclear reprocessing or enrichment equipment, materials, or technology 
to any other country; or 
(B) receives such equipment, materials, or technology from any other country; 
        unless before such delivery –– 
(i) the supplying country and receiving country have reached agreement to place 
such equipment, materials, and technology, upon delivery, under multilateral 
auspices and management when available; and 
(ii) the recipient country has entered into an agreement with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency to place all such equipment, materials, technology, and all nuclear 
fuel and facilities in such country under the safeguards of such Agency. 
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(b) The Act provided the President the authority to permit delivery to a country to which 
the above subsection would apply if he determines that 
(1) the termination of assistance would have a serious adverse effect on vital U.S.  
interests and 
(2) certifies that “he has received reliable assurances that the otherwise ineligible country 
will not acquire or develop nuclear weapons or assist other nations to do so” and 
transmits such determination to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; and such certification shall set forth 
the reasons supporting such determination in each particular case. 
 
The Congress, through a joint resolution, had the authority to terminate or restrict assistance for a 
country or “take any other action with respect to such assistance for such country as it deems 
appropriate.”203 Under this legislation, there was no compulsion on the affected countries to 
ratify the nuclear non-proliferation agreement –– assistance was to be cut off if the countries in 
receipt of nuclear materials and reprocessing equipment did not accept the IAEA safeguards and 
both the importer and exporter state did not place items under multilateral control arrangements. 
In terms of assistance, all U.S. foreign military and economic assistance including grants, credits 
(with the exception of humanitarian aid) were to be cut off if any supplier or recipient country 
was found in violation of this legislation. Although the legislation held great promise, some in 
the administration believed that “there were several large loopholes in the language, including 
Presidential waiver authority, that still allowed for considerable flexibility”204 to be exercised by 
the president to authorize sales if it was in the national interest of the United States.  
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 The United States was able to exert pressure on the Republic of Korea to cancel the 
French reprocessing agreement due to ROK’s economic and security dependence on the United 
States.205 But Pakistan was not explicitly under the U.S. nuclear umbrella and though it was a 
recipient of U.S. foreign assistance, it was not entirely dependent on it. The administration was 
aware that in the absence of U.S. leverage on Pakistan during the decade old arms embargo 
period (1965-1975), the GOP had sought nuclear cooperation agreements with other countries 
like Canada, France and Germany. And the talk of refusing arms sales to Pakistan by the U.S. 
would later only create an air of mistrust and bad faith whilst proving ineffectual as a coercive 
strategy. Nevertheless, challenged by the congressional pressure, the Ford administration decided 
to reinforce its stance on non-proliferation with Pakistan one last time in explicit terms: no A-7 
jets for the GOP if it proceeded with the reprocessing plant deal. Kissinger traveled to Lahore, 
Pakistan on 8 August 1976 to convince Bhutto in person but to no avail. According to Kux, 
linking the issue of the sale of A-7s to Pakistan, Kissinger had urged Bhutto “to accept the Ford 
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administration’s proposal: a substantial conventional arms package, including the potent A-7s, if 
Pakistan agreed to forego the nuclear reprocessing plant.”206 
 In public Kissinger sought reconciliation but his private tone with Bhutto was 
cautionary. On a dinner reception given by Bhutto, Kissinger proposed a toast to the long lasting 
friendship between Pakistan and the American people and sagely articulated that “… in the lives 
of all nations, there is a process of constant renewal, and nations have periodically to reprocess 
themselves. And they have to decide what it is that is worth reprocessing and what it is that is 
better left alone.”207 In his Lahore press conference after the meeting, Kissinger stated that the 
United States was seeking to reconcile its non-proliferation concerns with the agreements 
Pakistan made “in good faith on the basis of the knowledge it had at the time of making them,” –
– thereby not publically commenting on Pakistan’s intentions to develop nuclear weapons. On 
the question of the congressional attitude and the implications of the Symington amendment, 
Kissinger stated that he was “hopeful to avoid confrontation from any source” and refused to 
speculate about the affect of the congressional legislation on aid suspension for Pakistan.208 
However, Bhutto remembered Kissinger’s reproach differently:  
Dr. Henry Kissinger, the Secretary of State for the United States, has a brilliant mind.  
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He told me that I should not insult the intelligence of the United States by saying that 
Pakistan needed the reprocessing plant for her energy needs. In reply, I told him that I 
will not insult the intelligence of the United States by discussing the energy needs of 
Pakistan, but in the same token, he should not discuss the plant at all.209 
 
One year after Kissinger’s visit, Aziz Ahmed, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister “told [Pakistan] 
National Assembly that Dr. Kissinger had, during his August 1976 visit, threatened to cut off 
military supplies and economic aid to Pakistan if the plant deal was not abandoned; after which 
there was a rapid escalation in the nature of threats issued by the US to Pakistan.”210 According 
to Weisman and Krosney in The Islamic Bomb, “Bhutto gave a second, bloodier version of his 
meeting with Dr. Kissinger in a dramatic speech to Pakistan’s National Assembly in April 1977. 
Here Bhutto claimed that Kissinger had personally threatened him. Drop Chashma, he quoted 
Kissinger as warning him, or else “we will make a horrible example of you.”211 Yet another 
version of Kissinger’s ‘threat’ is detailed by Samina Ahmed who writes, “In his 10 June 1977 
speech during the National Assembly debate on the continuing US pressure for a cancellation of 
the deal, Prime Minister Bhutto disclosed that in September 1976, the US Secretary of State, 
Henry Kissinger, had warned the Pakistan Ambassador to Washington that a Democratic 
administration would make a “horrible example” of Pakistan if it did not cancel the deal; and 
regardless of which party won the US elections, there were “troubles galore” in store for 
Pakistan.”212 The declassified documents of Ford administration reveal that Samina Ahmed’s 
version is much closer to the ‘horrible example’ comment than that quoted by Wiseman and 
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Krosney and Kissinger had made that statement to Pakistan’s Ambassador, Yaqub Khan in 
September 1976 and not directly to Bhutto when he met him in Pakistan in August 1976.  
What actually happened was that on September 7, 1976, a month after Kissinger’s visit to 
Pakistan, Ambassador Yaqub met Deputy Secretary of State Charles Robinson to clarify 
Pakistan’s position on the reprocessing issue and the sale of A-7 aircraft. Khan was candid in his 
comments and told Robinson that the GOP did not believe the sale of A-7s should be linked with 
the reprocessing question. Khan reiterated that Pakistan required A-7s for “legitimate defensive 
purposes in view of the GOP’s relations with Afghanistan and India” and “to link the A-7 sale 
with the reprocessing plant would be the same thing as saying that the reprocessing plant was 
intended for purposes of security, i.e. Pakistan trying to make a bomb. Since that was not the 
case, the two issues could not be linked.”213  
A week later, in his meeting with Kissinger, Khan was told that Pakistan’s nuclear 
reprocessing issue had become a domestic issue (reference the Symington Amendment) and that 
there will be consequences for Bhutto’s intransigence on the subject. It was during this meeting 
that Kissinger warned Khan of the ‘horrible’ consequences if Pakistan or France did not cancel 
the agreement. Following is the transcript of their meeting, which reveals Kissinger’s frustration 
with Bhutto’s tactics:  
Yaqub: The Prime Minister thinks it is a very sensitive issue.  
 
Kissinger: Yes. Giscard [the French President] is sensitive, as is your Prime Minister. 
Frankly, there are two interpretations of what your Prime Minister told me in Lahore. 
First is that you have decided to go ahead and have simply taken an elegant way of 
saying that neither of you can take the initiative of cancelling it. Or, both of you are now 
on the horns of a dilemma with ramifications neither could foresee. You know what the 
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American domestic situation is. You know that if the Democrats win, they would like 
nothing better than to make a horrible example of somebody. They would love to take on 
the French, but they can’t. They cannot be accused of being anti-European integration 
and anti-NATO, let alone anti-Atlantic. If the Democrats win, you will face an assault 
and they will attack you. Credit and arms sales will be much more difficult, even 
impossible. You know that the last thing I want to do is to be responsible for this. 
Frankly, what I would like at this point is some sense of what you would like to do. 
 
Yaqub: …if I may speak frankly in reply to your question, your objections came after we 
signed an agreement with France. It is quite possible that we might be able to explain it 
that away. But the Prime Minister [Bhutto] reasoned that despite IAEA and other 
safeguards, there is still a chance that the 7% of unsafeguarded plutonium can be 
diverted. The Prime Minister suggests that without prejudice to our agreement with 
France, we look at what we might do with the seven percent.  
 
Kissinger: You know, of course, this “newspaper crisis” (referring to the controversy 
over the Symington Amendment) was manufactured. I had never read the Symington 
Amendment and then everyone said: “But what will you do?” I said it may apply. They 
then wrote: “Henry A. Kissinger threatens Pakistan!” 
 
Yaqub: The Symington Amendment, of course, refers only to non-IAEA safeguarded 
facilities.  
 
Yaqub: ….if the A-7 could be agreed to “en principe”, then perhaps we can see if we can 
do something about safeguarding the seven percent.  
 
Kissinger: Neither your Prime Minister nor Giscard said that it was done and irrevocable. 
What I understood was that your Prime Minister said that if Giscard took the first move, 
that your Prime Minister would then see what he could do about it.  
 
Kissinger: You and I know why you want the reprocessing plant. You also know why I 
don’t want it. You understand the problem. It’s whether you are prepared to pay the costs. 
Mr. Ambassador…we will look at the seven percent, if you will look at what can be 
done. Once we understand each other, then we can take a look at the problem of how we 
get you the A-7’s without making it look as though you had backed down. I have no 
desire to embarrass the Prime Minister. 214   
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Kissinger never threatened sanctions on Pakistan under the Symington Amendment. After 
Kissinger’s visit in August 1976, Pakistani newspaper DAWN in its editorial praised Kissinger 
for referring to the non-proliferation issue in general terms and not selectively targeting Pakistan 
but at the same time, raised issues with ‘dichotomy’ in the U.S. attitude towards India and 
Pakistan. On the Indian issue, the editorial reported the shipment of 20,000 lbs of enriched 
uranium to India “for use in the American-built Tarapur nuclear plant” and the U.S. 
administration ‘taking shelter’ behind the contract signed in the past between India and the U.S. 
even after India’s breach of trust. The editorial suggested that if the U.S. wished to be “such a 
stickler for reliability of contract, it should not find it difficult to uphold the Pakistan-French 
contract.”  
For the Ford administration, rationale for the continuation of U.S. supplied enriched 
uranium to India post-1974 was becoming increasingly difficult to justify to the domestic as well 
as the international audience, especially Pakistan. Immediately after the Indian test in May 1974, 
the United States had distanced itself from any ‘role’ in the Indian nuclear explosion. But in June 
1976, Senator Abraham Ribicoff, Chairman Senate Government Operation Committee stated that 
the United States had indeed supplied India “21 tons heavy water, an essential ingredient for 
enabling the Indian reactor, supplied by Canada, to transform natural uranium into plutonium.” 
The administration, although agreeing that the U.S. had supplied heavy water to India, contended 
that the heavy water “had been used up for four years before the explosion, in 1974.”215 Within 
the administration as well, there was confusion about the administration’s position on the U.S. 
role in Indian explosion. David Elliott, member national security council, scientific affairs in his 
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briefing memorandum to the national security adviser, Gen. Scowcroft wrote about the 
administration’s ‘new’ position. He said 
New information provided by Canada and India has made it clear that the initial U.S. 
heavy water loading of the unsafeguarded CIRUS reactor had not completely evaporated 
or leaked as was previously believed. Undoubtedly, some of our heavy water was in the 
reactor during the period when the plutonium was produced for the Indian explosion. Our 
position is, however, that India has produced many times more heavy water in their 
indigenous plant, and that the U.S. heavy water was not needed. If we had recalled our 
heavy water (which retrospectively would have been smart from a domestic political 
viewpoint) it would have had no impact on the Indian explosive development. [With 
India] we have virtually no hope in achieving full fuel cycle safeguards, NPT adherence, 
or a cancellation of its nuclear explosive program. But by connecting their good behavior 
to continued U.S. supply, we might produce an indefinite delay in their testing. And the 
longer they wait, presumably the harder it will be for them to commence testing again. It 
is hoped that we can get the genie half-way back into the bottle.216 
 
Even though the administration’s logic for continuation of nuclear cooperation with India was 
optimistic or idealistic, it was difficult to convince Pakistan of the same. The quid pro quo that 
the Ford administration was desperately trying to establish in order for Pakistan to quit the 
nuclear reprocessing option did not work with Bhutto. The Democrats did win but it would take 
the Carter administration two years to find Pakistan in violation of the Symington amendment 
leading to the suspension of U.S. military supplies and economic assistance to Pakistan in April 
1979 making it the first and only country ever to have received such suspension under the 
Symington legislation.  
Pakistan and France held on to their positions against strong U.S. opposition. It was 
perceived by France that “America really wanted to keep as much of the international atomic 
energy market as possible open for its own exporters” and that the United States “was not above 
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using the threat of proliferation to cover its own commercial ambitions.”217 The outgoing French 
Prime Minister, Jacques Chirac, before his resignation on Aug 25, 1976 announced “despite 
American objections, France would go ahead with the sales to Pakistan of a nuclear-reprocessing 
plant.”218 However with Chirac out of office, French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing aligned 
his non-proliferation policy to that of the incoming Carter administration and cancelled the $1 
billion reprocessing plant deal with Pakistan in 1978.  
 Conclusion 
Two issues became part of Pakistan’s narrative during Ford years: a) Pakistan’s attempts to 
access nuclear technology from France and FRG which the GOP maintained was for ‘peaceful’ 
purposes, the U.S. opposition to both the agreements resulting in FRG’s termination of the heavy 
water plant and b) the Indo-U.S. nuclear cooperation and continued sale of enriched uranium to 
India for its nuclear plants even after India had violated the terms of the Canadian-American 
agreement and conducted nuclear explosion in 1974 using U.S. supplied heavy water. These two 
contradictory U.S. policies in which the administration tried to stop Pakistan’s potential latent 
proliferation activities while enabling India to continue its nuclear program by supplying 
enriched uranium for its Tarapur plants augmented Bhutto’s nuclear resolve instead of 
weakening it. Moreover, Bhutto effectively used these two issues to regain his waning popularity 
at home in 1976 which was to be the election year.  
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The U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan that developed during the 
Ford administration was overshadowed by the Indian nuclear test in 1974. Pakistan’s security 
dilemma vis-à-vis India was all too apparent to the administration given the history of Indo-Pak 
enmity. Bhutto effectively used the threat of nuclear India to convince the Ford administration 
into lifting the decade old arms embargo in 1975 to the disappointment of both the U.S. Congress 
and the Indians. But Bhutto’s nuclear ambitions and plans to expand Pakistan’s nuclear program 
as a consequence of the Indian test increased congressional concerns about proliferation in and 
beyond South Asia. Pakistan’s $1 billion agreement with France for construction of a nuclear 
reprocessing agreement and acquisition of heavy water plant with West Germany came under 
scrutiny by the administration and the Congress but the pressure resulted in a stalemate. But by 
the mid-1970s there were other countries of concern which subsided the focus on Pakistan.  
The Symington Amendment passed on June 30, 1976 required importing and exporting countries 
to comply with the IAEA safeguards for nuclear materials, enrichment and reprocessing facilities 
and legislated for the suspension of U.S. economic and military assistance for those found in 
violation of the law. To Pakistan’s good luck, the Franco-Pak reprocessing plant agreement was 
sealed with a tripartite safeguards agreement with the IAEA and Pakistan knew it could not be 
sanctioned for it. Therefore, there was hardly any discussion on the ‘threat’ of sanctions under 
the Symington law in Pakistani press during 1976.  
 The two and a half years of the Ford administration were filled with challenges due to 
Pakistan’s efforts to acquire its own nuclear weapons capability and its attempts to conceal the 
real motive from the United States. The Ford-Kissinger administration underestimated Bhutto’s 
nuclear resolve to nuclearize Pakistan and made unsuccessful attempts to convince him to join an 
Iran-based multinational reprocessing plant arrangement. Kissinger’s nuclear diplomacy to 
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convince Pakistan and France to cancel the agreement was ineffective until the end of the 
administration’s term mainly due to the administration’s dichotomous policy to continue nuclear 
cooperation with India, which was again used effectively by Bhutto to develop the argument for 
continued nuclear cooperation with France. Bhutto’s biggest achievement and consequently the 
Ford administration’s biggest failure was that he managed to keep Pakistan’s uranium 
enrichment project under wraps from 1974 to 1976 by keeping the Ford administration busy in 
focusing only on his plutonium reprocessing attempts. To Pakistani public, Bhutto was the 
winner –– someone who had stood up to the pressures of the U.S. and survived.  
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Chapter 4 - Carter Administration’s Non-Proliferation Policy 
Towards Pakistan 
The Carter administration inherited two unresolved Pakistan specific issues from the Ford 
administration: Pakistan’s drive towards a nuclear weapons capability and the pending decision 
on the sale of 110 A-7 attack aircrafts to Pakistan. Carter won the presidential election on the 
promise of changing the face of U.S. foreign policy on global issues such as nuclear non-
proliferation, human rights and a restraint on U.S. arms-sales to Third World countries and 
Pakistan did not fare well on any of these issues during the Carter years. Thomas Thornton, who 
served on Carter’s North-South desk in the National Security Council, in his 1982 article 
succinctly summed up Carter’s foreign policy towards Pakistan in these words 
When Carter assumed office in 1977, Pakistan loomed fairly small on the policy horizon. 
The importance it had enjoyed as a link in Dulles’ chain of containment had long since 
faded. Pakistan’s geographical location was of dwindling interest to the United States 
since Iran had become the U.S. listening post and, along with Saudi Arabia, the principal 
support of U.S. interests in West Asia. The United States was seeking to negotiate itself 
and the Soviets out of the Indian Ocean power race. Pakistan’s other key asset in its 
relations with the United States in the Nixon years had disappeared since Washington 
now had direct access to China…. Pakistan thus occupied a midpoint on the scale of 
American policy interest. It was not important enough to compel the United States to 
change its global priorities to fit Pakistani interests (as could, say, Japan), but Islamabad 
is better able than most other nations to parry American pressures.219  
 
Bhutto’s resistance against considerable U.S. pressure by the Ford-Kissinger administration in 
canceling the Franco-Pak plutonium reprocessing deal was an obvious example of Thornton’s 
assessment about Pakistan being capable of deflecting American pressures. Pakistan’s worst 
fears about abandonment by the United States came true during the first two years of the Carter 
administration. But the last two years of the administration endorsed an entente of sorts between 
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the two countries thereby strengthening Pakistan’s narrative of the ‘seasonality’ of the U.S. 
friendship with Pakistan. In its first two years in office, the Carter administration took some steps 
that worried the Pakistanis about the Democrats actually making a ‘horrible example’ of 
Pakistan. Following are the six developments that contributed to Pakistan’s sense of 
victimization during the Carter years: 
First, as a demonstration of his restrictive arms supply policy, Carter denied Pakistan the 
sale of 110 A-7 aircrafts in 1977. Denial of the much-desired attack aircraft that was critical for 
Pakistan’s military modernization had followed Bhutto’s removal from power in a military coup 
in July 1977. Bhutto’s removal only reinforced the sense that he was punished for standing up to 
the U.S. pressure. Even though the administration maintained that the denial of advanced aircraft 
to Pakistan was part of its strategy to curtail the arms race in the region by not introducing 
offensive technology, the narrative that took root in Pakistan suggested that Pakistan was denied 
key military equipment for not canceling the Franco-Pak reprocessing agreement as per the U.S. 
request.  
Second, the credibility of Carter’s non-proliferation commitment was challenged by two 
developments overseas: a) West Germany supplied full nuclear fuel cycle to Brazil, a non-NPT 
state and the deal was not opposed by the United States unlike the Franco-Pak deal and b) Japan 
was provided a two-year exemption from a reprocessing ban by the U.S. even though Carter was 
facing domestic opposition to his policy against domestic reprocessing of plutonium. Both these 
developments were carefully followed by the GOP and did not bode well for Carter’s credibility 
and seriousness about non-proliferation issues. Moreover, since the pressure on Pakistan 
continued during this time to cancel the French reprocessing plant deal, it was seen as ‘selective 
targeting’ of Pakistan by the administration.  
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Third, in 1977 the U.S. Congress passed a nuclear non-proliferation legislation called the 
Glenn Amendment threatening suspension of U.S. military and economic assistance to those 
countries that were running unsafeguarded uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing 
programs and had ambitions to conduct nuclear explosions. Pakistan believed that the Glenn 
Amendment was a Pakistan-specific amendment providing the Carter administration necessary 
leverage to negotiate Pakistan’s nuclear future much like the Symington amendment was used by 
Ford-Kissinger administration to invoke the fear of sanctions.   
Fourth, added to Pakistan’s insecurity was Carter’s tilt towards India to improve Indo-
U.S. relations and his determination to continue the supply of enriched uranium for the Indian 
Tarapur plants while keeping a check on Pakistan’s nuclear development. This led Pakistan to 
believe that the dichotomy in U.S. actions towards India and Pakistan, as was witnessed during 
the Ford administration, was still the standard U.S. policy.  
Fifth, the pressure on Pakistan and France to cancel the reprocessing plant agreement 
finally resulted in the cancellation of the deal by France in 1978. It was a huge setback for 
Pakistan’s nuclear development but a triumph for the Carter administration. Even though 
General Zia-ul-Haq, who had deposed Bhutto’s government the previous year, was confident 
about the success of Pakistan’s clandestine uranium enrichment program to deliver the bomb, 
cancellation of the reprocessing plant in 1978 considerably slowed down Pakistan’s progress of 
plutonium reprocessing. 
Sixth, despite the French cancellation of its longstanding reprocessing plant deal in 1978, 
Pakistan continued its nuclear weapons development program. U.S. intelligence on Pakistan’s 
uranium enrichment program in unsafeguarded facilities automatically triggered the Symington 
amendment leading to suspension of military and economic assistance to Pakistan in April 1979.  
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Fortunately for Pakistan things changed in 1979 –– the year of profound regional changes 
–– compelling the Carter administration to transform its attitude towards Pakistan. First, the 
Islamic Revolution in Iran in November 1979 meant the loss of listening posts for the United 
States making Pakistan an obvious choice to replace Iran due to its proximity to the Soviet 
Union. Second, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 brought the U.S. 
containment policy back on the foreign policy board that had been eclipsed by Carter’s ‘other’ 
global priorities in his first two years in office. In order to enlist Pakistan to meet its Cold War 
policy objectives, the Carter administration lifted non-proliferation sanctions against Pakistan 
and resumed military and economic relationship with Gen. Zia’s military regime.  
This chapter provides an examination of Carter’s non-proliferation policy towards 
Pakistan and discusses the aforementioned six elements in the development of Pakistan’s 
narrative of being unfairly targeted for its ‘peaceful’ nuclear ambitions.  
 Carter’s Non-Proliferation Policy 
 The Campaign 
James Earl Carter Jr., a naval nuclear engineer and former governor of Georgia, became the 39th 
President of the United States and assumed office on January 20, 1977. With Walter Mondale as 
the vice president, Cyrus Vance as the secretary of state, Zbigniew Brzezinski as the national 
security adviser, Stansfield Turner as the director of CIA and Harold Brown as the secretary of 
defense, Carter’s national security and foreign policy team was impressive. Much like 
Kissinger’s stamp on foreign policy during the Ford administration, commentary on the Carter 
years places Brzezinski at the heart of Carter’s foreign policy elite, ‘tutoring’ the president on 
international affairs. Carter’s dependence on Brzezinski created rifts between his national 
security adviser and the secretary of state over differences of opinion about the direction of 
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Carter’s Soviet policy. Betty Glad introduces Brzezinski as a ‘hard-line Cold-Warrior at heart’ 
who moved Carter in an anti-Soviet direction advising him to adopt confrontational policies in 
opposition to Vance’s non-confrontationist approach.220 But there was minimal conflict within 
the administration towards Carter’s South Asia policy and efforts to stop Pakistan from acquiring 
nuclear weapons. With the end of the Indira Gandhi’s government in India and end of Bhutto’s 
era in Pakistan followed by a martial law regime, Carter’s tilt towards India was visible. 
However, the administration had to make some tradeoffs on its non-proliferation policy towards 
Pakistan to gain some foreign policy objectives after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.  
Carter’s election campaign centered around three major foreign policy issues: human 
rights, arms control and non-proliferation. Carter had an idealistic vision of a world where 
governments, instead of spending money on buying conventional weapons or developing nuclear 
weapons, would invest in human development to eradicate poverty. Therefore in his campaign he 
tied the promotion of human rights to the issue of arms control. But his policy record reveals that 
Carter was unable to “compartmentalize policies” and compromised on issues related to human 
rights, arms control and non-proliferation. 221   
Non-proliferation as a foreign policy priority early on became part of his election 
campaign. On May 13, 1976 Carter delivered a speech in a conference on Nuclear Energy and 
World Order sponsored by the UN, which served as a premiere for his non-proliferation policy. 
Carter warned the world against the risks of nuclear power, focusing on issues related to 
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radioactive damages resulting from malfunctioning power reactors, hazards related to storage of 
radioactive wastes and terrorists attempting to steal plutonium threatening nuclear violence. He 
reminded the NWS parties to the NPT of their treaty obligations “to pursue negotiations in good 
faith to reach agreement to control and reduce the nuclear arms race.” Carter called for a global 
moratorium on the “national purchase or sale of enrichment or reprocessing plants” and 
vehemently argued against the agreements for sale of nuclear facilities by supplier countries 
other than the United States.222 Although he did not name any country, the statement was a 
reference to the Franco-Pak reprocessing agreement and West Germany’s nuclear agreements 
with Brazil. He was more direct in his second election debate with President Ford on October 7, 
1976 on foreign and defense policy issues. Carter as the Democratic Presidential candidate 
censured Ford for his ‘absence’ of leadership on foreign policy issues, calling Kissinger the ‘long 
lone ranger’ conducting foreign policy in secrecy with a dismal record on non-proliferation. 
Carter rated proliferation of atomic weapons as the number one threat to humanity and criticized 
Ford for not being able to convince France and Germany to cancel their reprocessing agreements 
with Pakistan and Brazil.223 A month later, as president-elect of the United States, the time had 
arrived to deliver on his campaign commitments.  
 1977: Establishing Non-Proliferation Credentials 
Carter reorganized the NSC making it the “principal forum for international security issues 
requiring Presidential consideration” assisting the president in “analyzing, integrating and 
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facilitating foreign, defense, and intelligence policy decision.” He established two NSC 
committees: a) Policy Review Committee (PRC) under chairmanship of Secretary Vance of the 
State Department for foreign, defense, intelligence and international economic issues and b) 
Special Coordinating Committee (SCC) under chairmanship of the assistant for NSA 
(Brzezinski) for arms-control evaluation, oversight of intelligence activities or covert ops and 
crisis management.224 Brzezinski became the first NSA chief to chair a NSC committee, the 
SCC, and would prepare “the Presidential Review Memos (PRMs) that directed the NSC to look 
into certain matters.”225 Non-proliferation was one such matter on which several Presidential 
Directives (PDs) and Presidential Review Memoranda (PRMs) were issued. On January 21, 1977 
a PRM, (PRM/NSC 15) was issued on the administration’s non-proliferation policy. According 
to the memorandum, the President directed the Department of State’s Policy Review Committee 
to “undertake a thorough review of U.S. policy concerning nuclear proliferation” and provide the 
president both short and long-term non-proliferation policy options. The PRM directed a 
comprehensive review to be completed by February 28, 1977, on eight items to:  
1. Assess the current status of U.S. nuclear fuel assurance policies, reprocessing policy 
including alternatives to reprocessing, and possibilities for the handling and disposal of 
nuclear wastes. 
2. Review the decisions announced by President Ford in the statement of October 28, and 
identify the policy options required to implement those decisions.  
3. Provide a review of the current status of major ongoing negotiations with and among 
foreign nations concerning proliferation. 
4. Assess options for formal and informal international coordination of incentives, controls 
and sanctions throughout the nuclear fuel cycle in order to limit nuclear proliferation. 
5. Analyze the strengths and liabilities of bilateral negotiations, the London Suppliers 
Group, and the IAEA, as institutions for implementing U.S. non-proliferation goals.  
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6. Identify current U.S. nuclear export requirements, and examine what new requirements 
might be applied to current and future export agreements, and what measures must be 
taken to ensure U.S. credibility as a nuclear supplier state. 
7. Review current estimates of energy demand outside the United States and assess the 
potential of non-nuclear alternatives to meet those needs.  
8. Review congressional initiatives and suggest strategies for coordination of executive and 
legislative branch policies concerning nuclear export and non-proliferation.226 
 
In another PD (PD/NSC-8) issued on March 24, 1977, Carter identified the objectives of the U.S. 
nuclear non-proliferation policy directed at “preventing the development and use of sensitive 
nuclear power technologies which involve direct access to plutonium, highly enriched uranium 
or other weapons usable material in non-nuclear weapons states, and at minimizing the global 
accumulation of these materials.” Carter called upon all nuclear suppliers and recipient nations to 
“actively participate in, an intensive International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Re-evaluation program 
(IFCEP) whose technical aspects shall concern the development and promotion of alternative, 
non-sensitive, nuclear fuel cycles.” The PD announced that the USG would:   
 -- Indefinitely defer the commercial reprocessing and recycle of plutonium in the U.S. 
-- Restructure the U.S. breeder reactor program so as to emphasize alternative designs to 
the plutonium breeder, and to meet a later date for possible commercialization. As a first 
step the need for the current prototype reactor, the Clinch River project, will be 
reassessed. 
-- Redirect the funding of U.S. nuclear research and development programs so as to 
concentrate on the development of alternative fuel cycles, which do not involve access to 
weapons usable materials. 
-- Provide incentives, in the area of nuclear fuel assurances and spent fuel storage, to 
encourage participation of other nations in the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation 
Program. 
-- Initiate a program of assistance to other nations in the development of non-nuclear 
means of meeting energy needs. 
-- Increase production capacity for nuclear fuels.227  
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In addition, the directive reiterated U.S. support for strengthening the non-proliferation regime 
by encouraging states to join the NPT, adhere to the IAEA safeguards and sanctioning nations 
found in violation of nuclear agreements. Carter announced that the U.S. would “terminate 
nuclear cooperation with any non-nuclear weapons state that hereafter detonates or demonstrably 
acquires a nuclear explosive device; or terminates or materially violates international safeguards 
or any guarantees it has given to the United States.”228 
Carter’s decision to indefinitely defer plutonium reprocessing (an extension of Ford’s 
decision to temporarily halt plutonium reprocessing) was influenced by the findings of the Ford-
MITRE study. The study, funded by the Ford Foundation, was undertaken by a panel of twenty-
one scientists and economists headed by Spurgeon M. Keeny Jr., director of Washington 
operations of the MITRE Corporation (later the Deputy Director of Arms Control Agency). The 
panel of experts also included secretary of defense, Harold Brown and Dr. Joseph Nye, the 
undersecretary of security assistance in the State Department, both skeptics of the omnipotence 
of nuclear power. The study singled out nuclear proliferation as the direst consequence of 
nuclear power and recommended “a large number of different approaches, including intensive 
new diplomatic efforts to assure the rest of the world adequate supplies of uranium for 
conventional reactors and of the United States policy decision to abandon the use of plutonium 
for at least the next few decades.” The study also recommended that the administration consider 
defunding the Clinch River reactor and terminate the construction of the Barnwell reprocessing 
plant in South Carolina. Carter was impressed by the findings of the report and translated several 
recommendations into policy decisions. Carter’s decision to terminate the Clinch River breeder 
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reactor (as per PD/NSC-8) brought him in direct confrontation with Congress and the domestic 
nuclear industry.229  
Concerned about international implications of Carter’s policy on reprocessing, Robert 
Fri, acting administrator of Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) wrote a 
confidential letter to Brzezinski sharing his agency’s assessment. Fri advocated it was “essential 
that the United States not be perceived as now advocating a strategy of permanent denial of 
sensitive materials or equipment to the non-nuclear weapons states.” Fri stated that several 
Western European countries and Japanese were “stressing that reprocessing is important to their 
desires to achieve greater energy independence and to their avowed intentions to proceed with 
the breeder.” Given that the U.S. was already having problems convincing countries like Brazil, 
France, FRG, Pakistan, Iran and others, Fri feared that the United States “may face increasing 
isolation if it is perceived as favoring a regime that would reserve the major fruits of nuclear 
advancement to the nuclear powers.” And to counter any negative perception in the international 
community, ERDA strongly supported Carter’s idea “in developing an international evaluation 
program that would be designed to consider the merits of reasonable alternatives to commercial 
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reprocessing.”230 In a major foreign policy announcement on April 7, 1977, Carter appealed to 
other countries to join the United States in stopping the spread of nuclear weapons by rejecting 
the use of plutonium to fuel nuclear reactors. However, Carter was cautious of appearing to 
‘twist the arms of Britain, France, West Germany and Japan’ to abandon their reprocessing 
plants projects and stated, “we are not trying to impose our will….but I hope, that by this 
unilateral action, we can set a standard.”231  
Carter announced his national energy policy before a joint session of Congress on April 
20, 1977. The president emphasized that there was “no need to enter the plutonium age by 
licensing or building a fast-breeder reactor232 such as the proposed demonstration plant at Clinch 
River” and asserted that the United States should increase its “capacity to produce enriched 
uranium fuel for light-water nuclear power plants, using the new centrifuge technology, which 
consumes about 1-10th of the energy of existing gaseous diffusion plants.” In his speech, Carter 
also called for the establishment of the Department of Energy (DOE) to implement his national 
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energy program.233 Through this speech, Carter presented the United States as a model for other 
countries to emulate (echoing his April 7th statement), urging them to seek alternative fuel cycle 
approaches to plutonium reprocessing and discouraged supplier nations to export reprocessing 
technologies to countries that did not respect non-proliferation values.   
Carter’s expertise as a nuclear engineer gave him familiarity with nuclear technology and 
energy issues, however, several advisers influenced Carter’s views on nuclear energy resulting in 
the policies adopted by the administration. According to Dr. James Schlesinger, former chairman 
of the AEC and Carter’s secretary of energy (1977-79) 
He [Carter] had been worked on very hard on the issue of breeder reactors, as the epitome 
of evil in the energy area; and he was being worked on not only by the outsiders, the 
Ralph Naders and the like, but by people in the NSC, including Zbig Brzezinski…he 
tended to see this as the single most important source of nuclear proliferation, and that if 
he were able to scotch the breeder reactors that somehow or other all of the problems 
with nuclear proliferation would fall into line. He was unduly interested, I think, in 
nuclear power from the perspective of the Presidency. He would talk at some point about 
this tendency that he had of making himself prominent on issues in a way that earned 
enmity of special interest groups. The whole nuclear industry just went on hating Jimmy 
Carter from 1977 on and it need not have been that way.234 
 
Schlesinger was right. Not only did Carter manage to create unnecessary controversy on his 
reprocessing policy at home, he angered his allies overseas as well. Two major controversies 
arose internationally in the first year of Carter’s presidency that resulted in compromises which, 
in turn, sent mixed signals to countries like Pakistan over the credibility of Carter’s non-
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proliferation commitments: one was over the FRG-Brazilian nuclear deal and the other was on 
the Japanese reprocessing plant.  
 The FRG-Brazilian Nuclear Deal 
 The FRG-Brazil nuclear deal for the export of full nuclear fuel cycle to Brazil had been an 
irritant in U.S.-German relations since the Ford administration. Carter’s strong opinion against 
the export of nuclear technology to non-nuclear countries given the attendant risks of 
proliferation only made matters worse when he assumed office. The FRG-Brazilian deal for the 
export of eight nuclear power plants by private West German firms was signed in 1975 and was 
the largest export contract for West Germany. Brazil, like Pakistan at the time, was a non-NPT 
state and, much like the Franco-Pak reprocessing deal under strict IAEA safeguards, Bonn and 
Brazil had included IAEA safeguards guidelines in accordance with the procedures adopted at 
the London Suppliers Group in its nuclear export agreement. But since the export of a complete 
nuclear fuel cycle meant supply of both enrichment and reprocessing technologies to Brazil, it 
heightened Carter administration’s non-proliferation concerns vis-à-vis Brazil. The 
administration had reached an impasse with FRG over the Brazilian issue in its initial months. 
Paul C. Warnke, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency argued that the 
administration faced two serious non-proliferation policy problems with respect to Brazil: 
“Brazil’s acquisition of sensitive technologies under national control even under IAEA 
safeguards and, the fact that Brazil is under no international obligations to have her full fuel 
cycle under safeguards or forego acquisition of nuclear weapons.” He raised concerns about 
other countries (for example Pakistan) interpreting a standoff with Germany over the Brazilian 
nuclear deal “as a major defeat for the US, and an indication that countries can afford to ignore 
our strong representations on non-proliferation questions.” Warnke proposed a change in tactics 
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for the administration to break the impasse and suggested that U.S. should not oppose the FRG-
Brazilian nuclear deal if Brazil agrees to put its enrichment facilities under multilateral 
ownership and control and that Germany agrees to defer the delivery of the reprocessing plant to 
Brazil with Brazilian participation in the IFCEP.235 Though considered “imaginative” with 
“maybes” and “technical drawbacks --particularly provision of an enrichment facility in a 
country where multilateral control might really amount to nothing more than a token role for any 
other government”236 –– Warnke’s proposal was considered to be a “damage limiting strategy, 
designed to get Brazil off reprocessing; permit Germany to get commercial benefits; and to show 
some success from U.S. non-proliferation strategy.”237 Much like France announced the future 
ban on sale of sensitive nuclear technology excluding its agreement with Pakistan in 1976, West 
Germany announced that it would “no longer export sensitive nuclear technology that can be 
used to produce atomic bombs” and that the “controversial 1975 agreement to supply Brazil with 
advanced nuclear techniques would not be affected by the ban.”238   
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 The Japanese Reprocessing Plant Issue 
The first test case for the Carter administration’s new restrictive nuclear policy on reprocessing 
was their safeguards agreement with Japan. Built with French assistance, the Japanese 
reprocessing plant, a $200 million facility was scheduled to begin operation at Tokai-Mura in 
three months following Carter’s new nuclear policy announcement. According to the U.S.-
Japanese agreement, the United States had to certify the “safeguardability of the plant to insure 
that the end-product cannot be diverted to a nuclear bomb in a short period of time.” To add to 
the confusion of what the policy was, The New York Times reported that Carter in his April 7th 
statement “misspoke when he stated, we would very likely see a continuation of reprocessing 
capabilities in Japan and West Germany.” After several rounds of negotiations, the Japanese 
agreed to adopt an alternative method to reprocessing –– “co-processing or partial co-
processing”, a method where instead of pure plutonium, a plutonium-uranium mixture is yielded 
that is only good to be used as a nuclear fuel and is not weapons grade material.239 In order to 
avoid a major foreign policy fiasco and minimize significant costs for Carter’s plutonium 
reprocessing policy, Brzezinski recommended that Carter “approve start-up of the Tokai facility 
for reprocessing in the scheduled mode but with a limited amount of irradiated fuel, coupled with 
Japanese agreement to undertake a mutually acceptable major coprocessing experiment 
subsequently” even though coprocessing was not “widely regarded as a significant additional 
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proliferation-resistant step.”240 Gerard Smith, special representative and ambassador-at-large for 
nuclear non-proliferation was the lead U.S. negotiator in reprocessing negotiations with Japan. 
Smith successfully negotiated an agreement with Japan to open Tokai reprocessing facility for a 
period of two years for experimental coprocessing. In return for the two-year exemption from 
reprocessing ban, Japan agreed to defer the construction of a nuclear conversion plant, which 
severely limited progress of Japan’s nuclear energy development.241 U.S.-Japan negotiations in 
1977 later provided a model for France to renegotiate the reprocessing facility with Pakistan 
resulting in the cancellation of Franco-Pak reprocessing agreement in 1978 discussed later in this 
chapter.  
These two examples directly challenged Carter’s non-proliferation credentials –– the 
Brazilians received a full nuclear fuel cycle from West Germany and Japan received a two-year 
exemption from the ban on reprocessing and operated its reprocessing facility as per schedule. 
However, Carter’s initiative to start an international dialogue to evaluate fuel cycles brought 
together a large number of countries to develop consensus on seeking alternatives to nuclear fuel 
cycles and minimize risks of nuclear proliferation. One major achievement of the Carter 
administration’s non-proliferation policy during the first year was its initiation of a two and a 
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half year study on nuclear fuel cycle evaluation, the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation 
(INFCE) program. There were two major elements of the program: 
-- study of current generation reactors with a view toward solving front-end problems 
(e.g., fuel assurances and ways to extend utilization of uranium and other fertile/fissile 
material) and back-end problems (e.g., short-term and long-term spent fuel storage); and, 
-- study of future generation reactors and fuel cycles with emphasis on cycles that utilize 
non-sensitive fuels and on institutional arrangements for reducing proliferation risks in 
the more sensitive elements of the various fuel cycles.242 
Hosting a 38-nation International Fuel Cycle Evaluation inaugural conference on October 19, 
1977 in Washington, DC, to seek alternatives to reprocessing Carter called “for the establishment 
of an international nuclear fuel bank as an attempt to lower the incentives for nations to obtain 
equipment that could be used for military purposes.” The proposed bank was to “provide a 
reservoir of fuel in the event of a temporary breakdown in the bilateral supply of enriched 
uranium for power reactors.” Carter’s statement also “reassured nuclear importers” that U.S. 
nonproliferation policy was not going to interfere with “legitimate need of other nations for 
nuclear power.”243  
 The participant countries at the conference agreed that that INFCE was to be a “technical 
and analytical study and not a negotiation.” It was decided that the evaluation was to be carried 
out in a “spirit of objectivity, with mutual respect for each country’s choices and decisions in this 
field without jeopardizing their respective fuel cycle policies or international cooperation, 
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agreements, and contracts for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, provided that agreed 
safeguards measures are applied.”244 The European delegates at the conference worried about the 
controls imposed by the bank becoming a political issue. Delegates from the developing 
countries worried about their perpetual state of under-development and highlighted the issue of 
discrimination and restricted access to nuclear technology if the international nuclear fuel bank 
was to be formed. Pakistan, a non-NPT participant at the conference registered its grievance at 
the INFCE meeting: 
The incentives towards a proliferation spring from insecurity and the political climate in 
which we live … We must go on to the heart of the matter which is security perception of 
nations. In order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime we must not forget that there 
is an urgent need for controlling unrestricted vertical proliferation which poses an ever 
present awesome threat to human survival.245 
 
This statement was representative of Pakistan’s developing relationship with the Carter 
administration in 1977, a year of incredible transition in Pakistan.  
 Carter and Pakistan: The Transition in 1977 
As the outgoing secretary of state, Kissinger had advised the State Department to “turn over a 
functioning foreign policy” to the newly elected Carter administration asserting his belief that 
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“the foreign policy of the United States is a non-partisan enterprise.” 246 But he was worried 
whether the Carter administration was willing to continue with the Ford administration’s 
approach towards Pakistan on the reprocessing issue –– sale of arms in lieu of non-proliferation 
commitments. Kissinger had remarked that Cyrus Vance, his successor, would have “six heart 
attacks at the arms package for Pakistan” warning that  
Absolutely the worst thing we could do would be to imply to the Paks that we can deliver 
on the A-7s and other arms and then not do it. We could get them to stop the reprocessing 
that way and then screw them on the arms, but that would leave us with a mess not only 
with Bhutto but with the French, the FRG and the Brazilians.247 
 
In his final attempt to convince Pakistan on the reprocessing issue, Kissinger had warned 
Ambassador Yaqub Khan one last time that he would hate to see “Pakistan become the first 
object of a desire by a new Administration to score something” and that too an administration 
“which was elected on a plank of non-proliferation.” He had cautioned Khan that the Carter 
administration “won’t avail itself of escape clauses, or Symington amendment.” Khan, however, 
suggested that any solution to the reprocessing issue be deferred until after elections in Pakistan 
around April (1977) echoing Bhutto’s apprehension about the issue of reprocessing “becoming a 
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major political problem for him.”248 Discussion in subsequent pages in this section on the Carter-
Bhutto showdown on the reprocessing issue reveals the challenges faced by the Carter 
administration on achieving non-proliferation tradeoffs with a head of government who was the 
prime mover for nuclearization and the military regime which supplanted him.  
1977 did not only mark the beginning of Carter’s presidential term in the United States. It 
also brought an end to the Bhutto era. It was also the first year of what would be an eleven-year 
military rule in Pakistan. Instead of holding general elections as per schedule in August 1977, 
Prime Minister Bhutto announced in January that the general elections would be held earlier on 
March 7, 1977. This did not give his opposition, the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), which 
was comprised of nine political parties, enough time to campaign for the elections. In the contest 
for 200 seats in the national assembly, Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) won an 
overwhelming majority of 155 seats. PNA was only able to secure 36 seats and accusing Bhutto 
of rigging the elections, denounced the election results and demanded fresh elections. In the face 
of growing unrest created by PNA in the country, Bhutto directed the Election Commission to 
form judicial tribunals and conduct formal hearing of irregularities in the elections but refused to 
conduct new elections. However, this did not placate the opposition. In order to appease and win 
support of some of the elements in the PNA (which included some ultra-orthodox religious 
parties), Bhutto issued directives for “immediate prohibition of alcoholic beverages, banned 
gambling, proposed more strict censorship regulations ‘in conformity with the moral standards of 
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Islam’ and promised to move the country closer to the civil and criminal codes of the Koran.”249 
The opposition denounced the acts as Bhutto’s “attempts to divert the attention of the people 
from the main issue of the movement.”250 The law and order situation in the country deteriorated 
due to clashes between PNA and PPP workers in different cities. Street riots with police resulted 
in nearly 250 civilian deaths and Pakistan suffered huge economic disruption due to countrywide 
civil disobedience, processions, rallies and mass demonstrations. 
 No A-7 Aircrafts for Pakistan 
After his re-election in March 1977, Bhutto approached Ambassador Byroade revealing his 
willingness to seek settlement of the reprocessing issue with the United States. In its attempt to 
establish the same quid pro quo that the Ford administration had offered to Pakistan, the Carter 
administration considered arms sales to Bhutto to persuade him to forego the French nuclear 
agreement. In his memorandum to the president, Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State 
advised Carter to adopt an approach where an arms sales package to Pakistan would stand public 
and congressional scrutiny asserting that “while we are likely to encounter some criticism for 
having ‘bought off’ Pakistan, I think we would be on good grounds to defend our position. Given 
the high priority we attach to non-proliferation, we should be prepared to accept this risk.” 
Christopher proposed that the arms sales package offered to Pakistan on cash only basis should 
consist of F-5Es and if necessary, A-4s could also be added. Carter in the margins of this memo 
scribbled “no” against this proposition.  Carter also wrote “no” against Christopher’s suggestion 
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of appeasing Bhutto with A-7s request if need be. On economic and energy items as per Ford 
administration’s offer to Pakistan, Christopher noted “Pakistan will receive about $76 million in 
aid this year and AID has proposed $98 million for FY 78 under the regular development 
program” and suggested that the administration should “consider an additional $100-125 million 
economic assistance package to be extended over two to three fiscal years.” Carter disagreed by 
scribbling, “I don’t favor this.” Carter was “ok” with State Department’s suggestion of offering 
“assured fuel supply for Pakistan’s nuclear reactors, participation in an international fuel cycle 
evaluation program, and technical assistance in the non-nuclear energy field”, however, he 
questioned the rationale of Kissinger’s offer to Pakistan seeking to “facilitate financing of a 
French nuclear reactor and possibly a low enriched fuel fabrication plant in lieu of the 
reprocessing facility” by asking “why finance a French purchase?”251 Unfortunately Pakistan’s 
domestic political unrest after the elections which is discussed later in this section, did not give 
the Carter administration a chance to revise the package to sway Bhutto away from the French 
deal. Even though none of what was proposed ever made it to Bhutto, the contents of this 
memorandum are instructive in developing an understanding about the State Department’s initial 
approach towards exploring non-proliferation trade-offs with Pakistan.  
With regards to its arms sales policy, the Carter administration authorized $2 billion of 
arms sales on March 29, 1977 but it decided to withhold action on “$3 billion in sales of more 
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controversial arms overseas.”252 Pakistan’s A-7s were amongst them. The decision to cancel the 
sale of 110 A-7s to Pakistan was announced on June 2, 1977–– at a time when Pak-U.S. relations 
were at their lowest point with Bhutto accusing the U.S. of interference in Pakistan’s domestic 
affairs and the political situation in Pakistan rapidly deteriorating. It was believed that “the 
addition of A-7’s to Pakistan’s Air Force would be viewed, particularly by India, as disrupting 
the balance of power on the subcontinent.”253 According to Kux, given Carter’s “emphasis on 
promoting democracy and human rights” India was looked at more favorably than Pakistan. And 
in order to “strengthen relationships with regional influentials” the administration was looking at 
India, not Pakistan.254 On the U.S. decision to withhold A-7 aircrafts, Bhutto maintained that he 
never had any ‘illusions about Pakistan getting the A-7s’ even before the deal was ‘dangled 
before our eyes’ by Kissinger in exchange for certain ‘other things’ and cancellation of ‘some 
other contracts.’255 By July 1977, when there was a military regime in power in Pakistan and a 
newly elected democratic government in India –– Carter’s tilt was visibly opposite to that of 
Nixon and Ford.  
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On the nuclear reprocessing issue, it was clear to the Carter administration that neither 
Bhutto nor the opposition (once in power) would give up the reprocessing deal with France.256 
The Department of State worried that “if neither Bhutto nor French change their present 
positions regarding fulfillment of the contract, major equipment could shortly be transferred to 
Pakistan” and since France had already shared the blueprint of the reprocessing facility with 
Pakistan any equipment transfer would have been “highly visible and could trigger the 
Symington Amendment, which requires the cutoff of the United States aid.” Since there was an 
impasse due to uncertain political situation in Pakistan, negotiations could not be carried out and 
without further negotiations on the issue new trade-offs could not be explored. The Department 
of State believed their best hope rested on “moving the French to a new position concerning their 
contract in the context of upcoming United States-French discussions on the larger, global 
issues.”257 There certainly was hope to persuade France against the reprocessing deal with 
Pakistan. 
 Prelude to the Coup and Bhutto’s Anti-U.S. Card 
With the rapidly deteriorating law and order situation in the country, the opposition repeatedly 
demanded the military to step in temporarily to bring order in the country for new elections to be 
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held. Bhutto on the other hand, ordered martial law for three major cities in Pakistan and wanted 
his military men to indiscriminately open fire on demonstrators, if need be, to keep the streets 
empty. The military leadership, hesitant to do either, pressured Bhutto to negotiate with the 
opposition before the country plunged into a violent civil war. The opposition refused to 
negotiate with Bhutto and demanded his resignation as a precondition for elections. In an effort 
to discredit the opposition, Bhutto found his face-saving in blaming the United States for 
supporting the opposition and encouraging them to oust him from power. In his April 28, 1977 
address before the parliament, Bhutto “alleged that the United States and others had tried to 
unseat him for his past independence in foreign policy and his present determination to go ahead 
with a nuclear reprocessing plant.”258 In addition to the nuclear reprocessing issue, Bhutto also 
resented the Carter administration’s decision on April 21, 1977 to suspend shipment of “$68 
thousand worth of tear gas on the grounds that this would signal U.S. support for a ‘repressive 
regime’ and be contrary to the administration’s human rights policy.”259 The opposition however 
rejected Bhutto’s allegations of U.S. support stating that “we have had no contact with any 
outside power and we have received no dollars for our campaign.” The U.S. charge d’affaires, 
Peter Constable delivered a “protest note to the Foreign Ministry” calling Bhutto’s allegations 
“groundless.”260  
                                                
258 Marvin G, Weinbaum, “The March 1977 Elections in Pakistan: Where Everyone Lost,” Asian Survey, Vol. 17, 
No. 7, July 1977, pp.599-618, pg. 618  
259 “Memorandum from Assistant Secretary Alfred Atherton to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, April 22, 1977,” 
quoted in Kux, Disenchanted Allies, p.229  
260 James Markham, “Pakistan Mediation by Arabs Reported,” The New York Time, April 30, 1977, New York 
Times (1923-Current File), p.53 retrieved from http://search.proquest.com.er.lib.k-
state.edu/docview/123353587?accountid=11789 accessed on Sep 6, 2014 
 160 
The Carter administration was finding it increasingly difficult to deal with Bhutto given 
his statements alleging U.S. involvement and role in political unrest in Pakistan. In the initial 
months of the new Carter administration, department of state briefing memos and evening 
reports were filled with daily situational analysis of Pakistan’s political unrest. Vance told Carter 
that the Pakistani Ambassador was conveyed the charges were “false and tendentious” and that 
he had sent a message to Bhutto “making clear that his charges are groundless and urging that 
any differences between us be aired in private.”261 But Bhutto did the contrary. For additional 
political mileage, Bhutto misused confidential diplomatic message sent to him by Vance. In his 
oral history interview, American charge d’affaires at the U.S. embassy in Islamabad at the time, 
Peter Constable recollected how Bhutto went public: 
Bhutto, being a real political rogue and rascal, went out in an open jeep around 
Rawalpindi and had all his supporters out in the streets and he was waving this letter from 
Secretary Vance, saying that the Americans have apologized to him. Of course, it wasn’t 
an apology at all, and then we got the Department to release the text.262 
 
The department of state released the contents of the cablegram from Vance to Bhutto dated April 
28, 1977: 
We are always prepared to discuss any concerns you may have quietly and 
dispassionately. Considering the long history of close and amicable relations between our 
two countries, I suggest that we seek ways to avoid public charges which can only 
damage our relations. The United States Government is not engaged in any form of 
interference in Pakistan’s domestic affairs and has no intention of becoming so involved. 
We have given no assistance, financial or otherwise, to any political organizations or 
individuals in Pakistan.” Furthermore, Vance asserted that, “despite occasional difference 
on specific points, the United States continued to work with Pakistan on a broad range of 
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issues. There has never been any interruption in military equipment sales or economic 
assistance.263  
 
Despite the dramatic turn of events and Bhutto going public with private cables, Warren 
Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State in his memo to the vice president advised against public 
confrontation with Bhutto while continuing to reject his statements on U.S. interference as a 
signal to Bhutto that the United States still wanted to maintain a “productive relationship with 
Pakistan.” He told vice president Mondale that the United States, as per policy, would continue 
the economic assistance and permit shipment of military items “previously ordered and approved 
for sale but hold up the pending items” and consideration of any new military orders would be 
reviewed in view of the developing bilateral relations. Although the administration doubted 
Bhutto was looking for “irreversible confrontation” with the United States, he seemed “willing to 
trade the short-run advantages of a nationalistic campaign for the possible long-term effects” on 
Pak-U.S. bilateral relationship.264 The decision to continue with military shipments as planned 
was made “on the grounds that Bhutto could choose to interpret an export embargo as proof of 
his charges and concern that the Pakistan military might misinterpret such an action as indication 
that the USG had made a fundamental change in policy towards Pakistan and would no longer be 
willing to supply legitimate defensive equipment.”265 The United States did continue with 
shipment of pending military orders and “ironically, on April 28, 1977, the very day that Bhutto 
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had blasted American for ‘colossal’ interference, the U.S. Navy transferred two destroyers to 
Pakistan under a long-term loan arrangement.”266 
 The Martial Law 
In an attempt to conclude the four-month-old bloody standoff between Bhutto and the 
opposition, Pakistan Army finally stepped in. On July 5, 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq, Chief of the 
Army Staff seized power, suspended the constitution and assumed the position of Chief Martial 
Law Administrator. Bhutto and several opposition leaders were placed under custody. The 
American embassy in Islamabad was informed that the measures were “purely internal steps 
taken to save the country from disorder and will not affect its foreign policy.” It was also told 
that the elections were to be held as per schedule on October 6, 1977 and the leaders in custody 
will be released to contest them.267 The irony for Bhutto was that he had appointed Gen. Zia-ul-
Haq as Chief of the Army Staff on March 1, 1976 “over the heads of generals with more 
seniority, because of his reputation as a professional ‘soldier of Islam’ with only mediocre ability 
and little political ambition.” A biographic sketch of Gen. Zia prepared by the U.S. Defense 
Intelligence Agency specified Zia’s lack of political ambition as non-threatening to “Bhutto’s 
populist rule.” According to the sketch, “Zia has been described as ‘dumb like a fox’ and it has 
been suggested that ‘he may have deliberately cultivated his image as inexperienced and 
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indecisive in order to lull potential opponents into underestimating him.” On politics, Zia was 
considered to be “very pro-American, at least privately.”268  
At the time of the coup there was no reason to disbelieve General Zia’s motivations for 
intervention to be anything other than to hold free and fair elections in Pakistan. Bhutto, 
however, was not the only one to have misread Zia –– many in the Carter administration 
underestimated Zia’s political ambitions. Having released Bhutto after one month’s detention, 
Zia was struck by Bhutto’s popularity (which he thought would have dampened after the coup) 
and ability to win the elections if they were to be held. To everyone’s surprise, Bhutto was able 
to regroup a strong support base and Bhutto’s likely win would have been “intolerable for the 
Army that had just thrown him out.” It was then that “Zia and his advisors developed the strategy 
of trying Bhutto for his misdeeds, and then ultimately having him sentenced to death and 
hanging him.”269  
 Zia and the French Reprocessing Deal 
In a cable to secretary Vance on July 20, 1977, Arthur Hummel the new American ambassador to 
Pakistan (Byroade’s successor) informed of his meeting with the French ambassador who tried to 
persuade the GOP “of the advisability of slowing down or cancelling plans and transfers in 
connection with reprocessing plant.” The French ambassador had strongly recommended his 
government to convince the GOP that “reprocessing plant is neither necessary nor economic, and 
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that GOF should attempt to offer alternatives, perhaps in connection with other power reactors 
that France might supply.” This was the first time the French had expressed uneasiness about 
selling reprocessing technology to Pakistan, however, Hummel believed that the French still 
seemed “hung-up on principle of carrying out the contract unless Pakistanis can be induced to 
request otherwise.”270 
The State department in its initial assessment of Gen. Zia thought that he “did not feel 
quite as strongly as Bhutto about the need for the nuclear reprocessing plant and may come to 
view its acquisition as unwise.” It was argued that, “despite Zia’s pledge, he may, as he gets 
deeper into the process of governing, become convinced that the political price of acquiring the 
reprocessing plant is too high.” In the administration’s view, some officers in Pakistan viewed 
Bhutto’s nuclear policy “as a primary factor in preventing Pakistan from benefitting from the 
lifting of the U.S. arms embargo” and “unlike Bhutto, who always said that he could not drop the 
reprocessing plant without losing ground with the military, the generals need not consult 
anyone.”271  
Zia however “proved to be a very shrewd and astute politician, and very adept about 
maneuvering his opponents”272 and contrary to the initial U.S. assessments, was difficult on the 
nuclear issue.  
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 The Glenn Amendment 
The Carter administration was keen on achieving a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB). According 
to Or Rabinowitz, Carter saw CTB as a ‘tool to reinforce the NPT regime’ and the sanctions 
proposed in the Glenn amendment “reinforced American opposition to nuclear tests and nuclear 
proliferation.”273 On August 4, 1977 President Carter signed the International Security 
Assistance Act of 1977, which amended the existing Symington amendment (Public Law 94-
329-Sec. 669 of FAA of 1961) by adding a new Sec. 670 to the FAA of 1961. Proposed by 
Senator John Glenn in May 1977 (and popularly referred to as the Glenn Amendment) the 
amendment called for cutoff of U.S. assistance to any country, which the President determines: 
(A) delivers nuclear reprocessing equipment, materials, or technology to any other 
country on or after August 4, 1977, or receives such equipment, materials, or technology 
from any other country on or after August 4, 1977…or 
(B) is a non-nuclear-weapon state which, on or after August 8, 1985, exports illegally (or 
attempts to export illegally) from the United States any material, equipment, or 
technology which would contribute significantly to the ability of such country to 
manufacture a nuclear explosive device, if the President determines that the materials, 
equipment, or technology was to be used by such country in the manufacture of a nuclear 
explosive device. 
 
The literature on U.S. non-proliferation legislation confuses the rationale and objective of the 
Symington and Glenn amendments. Mitchell Reiss in his book Bridled Ambition clarifies that 
confusion as follows 
The Symington amendment amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 by adding 
Section 669, which concerned nuclear transfers of both uranium enrichment and 
reprocessing equipment, materials, and technology. The Glenn amendment eliminated 
this section 669 and added (1) a new section 669 dealing only with uranium enrichment 
transfers, and (2) a new section 670 dealing with reprocessing transfers. The Symington 
amendment is generally invoked when discussing uranium enrichment transfers and the 
Glenn amendment when discussing reprocessing transfers, although technically the Glenn 
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amendment is the appropriate citation for either type of transfer. As a compromise, and 
further complicating matters, the entire legislative package is sometimes referred to as the 
Glenn-Symington or Symington-Glenn amendment.274 
 
The amendment carried a waiver which authorized the President to furnish assistance to a 
country found in violation of the amendment if he could certify in writing that the “termination 
of such assistance would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States 
nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security.” However, 
the amendment provided Congress the authority to disapprove such presidential certification 
through a joint resolution to suspend all deliveries of assistance furnished in that certification.275  
Several months before the legislation was passed, the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on 
Arms Control, Oceans and International Environment and the Subcommittee on Foreign 
Assistance of the Committee on Foreign Relations met for a hearing of the witnesses on the 
proposed Glenn amendment on May 2, 1977. Before the hearing, Glenn explained the rationale 
for his amendment as follows 
My amendment would carry the Symington amendment one logical step further. In effect, 
the Symington amendment allows reprocessing transfers under certain conditions. I 
believe we have come to realize now that it would be far better if reprocessing 
equipment, materials and technology were not transferred around the world under any 
circumstances. The cut off of assistance to a country detonating a nuclear explosive 
device is a logical and proper extension of our developing nonproliferation policy, a great 
deal of time and energy has gone into the development of provisions, both bilateral and 
multilateral, which would bind nonnuclear weapons states to a peaceful nuclear program 
and make those nations honorbound not to develop nuclear explosives. The detonation of 
a nuclear explosion is a sign that a nation is in a position to embark on a weapons 
program. India is the only nonnuclear weapons state which has exploded a peaceful 
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nuclear explosion, but other nations have from time to time shown an interest in peaceful 
nuclear explosions.276  
 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program in 1977 was still in embryonic stages and there was no 
device ready for nuclear testing even though work on developing the test sites was underway at 
that time.277 The only other country that had a nuclear weapon and was in a position to conduct a 
nuclear explosion in 1977 was South Africa. By mid 1977 there were indications of nuclear-test 
site preparations by South Africa in the Kalahari Desert although Pretoria denied any intentions 
to test nuclear weapons. According to Rabinowitz 
In May 1974, the same month India conducted its PNE, South African engineers 
completed a scale model of the first South African gun-type nuclear fission device and it 
was successfully cold tested using a depleted uranium core; later that year the AEB 
[Atomic Energy Board] informed Prime Minister John Vorster that it was able to build a 
nuclear explosive device for peaceful use. In 1976 a first full-scale test of the device, 
using natural uranium instead of enriched uranium, was conducted successfully. In the 
following year, 1977, the first nuclear device was ready for a static test; it did not contain 
HEU [highly enriched uranium] but was loaded with depleted uranium in preparation for 
a planned cold test in August 1977.278 
 
Therefore, it can be determined that Pakistan could not have been on the minds of the architects 
of the Glenn amendment when they specified aid cut off after a nuclear explosion. The other 
component of the Glenn amendment referred to the sale of reprocessing plants. According to 
Leonard Weiss, John Glenn’s most influential staffer and the brains behind the amendment, “The 
Glenn amendment was not targeted specifically at Pakistan. The concern that prompted the 
amendment was our perception that reprocessing was so dangerous for non-proliferation that 
                                                
276 Security Assistance Authorization, Proposed Amendment to S.1160, Hearing of the United States Senate 
Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans and International Environment, and Foreign Assistance Committee on 
Foreign Relations hearing, May 2, 1977  
277 According to Feroz Khan in Eating Grass, “The sites had to be completed by December 31, 1979…the nuclear 
test sites were ready in 1980, well before Pakistan had developed a nuclear weapon,” 183  
278 Rabinowitz, Bargaining on Nuclear Tests, 112 
 168 
trade in such technology should be discouraged even if accompanied by international safeguards. 
Pakistan was not uppermost in our minds when the amendment was conceived.”279 It was 
Pakistan’s reprocessing plant agreement with France that became the focus after the amendment 
was passed. Carter used the Glenn amendment in the same manner Ford had used the Symington 
amendment –– to pressure Pakistan to forego the French reprocessing deal. However, 
unbeknownst to Pakistan at the time, the Glenn-Symington amendments were going to have 
serious implications for Pakistan-U.S. relations in coming years.  
An August 10, 1977 statement by a spokesman of Pakistan’s ministry of foreign affairs 
revealed details of a secret visit by Joseph Nye, deputy to the under-secretary for security, 
science and technology affairs on 29-31 July 1977 to discuss the contentious issue of plutonium 
reprocessing plant. According to the statement “Pakistan side reiterated the determination of the 
interim Government to implement the agreement with France and made it clear that Pakistan 
would not countenance delays of any kind in the execution of the various steps envisaged for 
going ahead with the project.”280 The purpose of Nye’s visit was not only to threaten the cutoff 
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of economic assistance as per the Glenn amendment –– as documented by Kux281, but also to 
persuade Zia to participate in Carter’s International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCEP) 
program. And it was through Pakistan’s participation in INFCE that the problems associated with 
U.S. non-proliferation legislations were to be relieved. The idea was to tell Zia that if he agreed, 
his deferral on receiving French technology transfers would be placed in a “global context as the 
Pakistani contribution to the INFCE.”282 In his meeting on July 30, 1977 with Agha Shahi, 
interim foreign affairs adviser to Gen. Zia, Nye pointed out that “reprocessing may become 
obsolescent after INFCEP and that recycle is of questionable value even for the U.S. with a large 
number of reactors.” Shahi nevertheless replied by stating that the reprocessing issue for the 
interim military regime was “political dynamite” and the interim government had no choice. In 
reply to Nye’s question of what would the interim government prefer –– “two month de facto 
delay or foreclose various options for cooperation, including economic aid and perhaps military 
sales with the United States,” Shahi replied “Zia knows he would be politically discredited if he 
touched this issue.” Munir Ahmed Khan, Chairman PAEC also attended the meeting and when 
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Nye inquired about the status of ‘transfer of technology from France,’ Munir Khan confirmed 
that “all important technology for the plant had been transferred by July 1974.” Ambassador 
Hummel informed Secretary Vance that although no breakthrough was intended on the 
reprocessing issue it confirmed the administration’s view that the reprocessing “plant is no 
longer an economic or technical issue for the GOP, rather it is seen as fundamentally a political 
question, involving face, national pride and the bona fides of the interim government.”283  
Shahi was correct in his observations –– Zia was relentless on the issue of reprocessing. 
On the question of pressure from the United States on the reprocessing issue during a press 
conference on September 1, 1977, General Zia once again reaffirmed his commitment  
We stand in a much better position than we were on the fifth of July 1977. The 
reprocessing plant is no longer either a political or a national issue. The previous 
Government had initiated the deal, and I have said that I will abide by it. The leaders of 
the previous Opposition have all said, one by one, that they want it. And knowing what I 
do of France, I have no doubt that the French will stand by their commitment. They are 
honourable people.284 
 
The reprocessing issue overshadowed Pak-U.S. diplomatic relations under Zia from mid-1977 
onwards and resulted in brief U.S. development aid suspension for Pakistan in September 1977, 
which was resumed after a year. The French decision to cancel the reprocessing plant agreement 
with Pakistan was privately taken in 1977 and officially announced in 1978. In their interview 
with Leonard Weiss, Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins in their book The Nuclear Jihadist 
document Weiss’s meeting with Bertrand Goldschmidt, one of the directors of the French 
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nuclear agency, in the spring of 1977 before the Glenn amendment became a law. Weiss had 
flown to Paris “to meet with senior officials to relay John Glenn’s opposition to the pending sale 
of the reprocessing plant to Pakistan.” According to the authors, “even before Weiss finished 
laying out Glenn’s concerns, Goldschmidt said the French had decided to stop the transaction.” 
But Goldschmidt also told Weiss that “unfortunately the French company involved in the deal 
had already sold Pakistan the blueprints for the plant.” Although one critical device known as 
‘chopper’ used to ‘slice the highly radioactive spent fuel rods into pieces as a part of producing 
plutonium’ was still not provided to Pakistan by the French. While this provided some relief to 
Weiss, it also made him think out of the box. Weiss thought, “What if the reprocessing plant was 
not the true focus of the Pakistani nuclear plans? What if the plutonium route was a ruse? What 
if, while the United States spent precious diplomatic capital and intelligence resources trying to 
stop the French deal, Pakistan had another option for developing a weapon?” Weiss knew of 
Pakistan’s uranium enrichment program and thought perhaps, “enrichment was the real way the 
Pakistanis planned to produce fissile material.”285 Weiss was right. General Zia did not cause a 
ruckus over the loss of French reprocessing deal not because he did not ‘feel as strongly as 
Bhutto’ about reprocessing but because he was confident about achieving nuclear capability 
through an alternate route. On his way home from visiting New Delhi in January 1978, Carter 
stopped in Paris to meet the French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing to discuss the Franco-
Pakistan deal. Although it was privately confirmed that the French had taken the decision to 
cancel the deal, Giscard “agreed to make the decision official, but he insisted on waiting long 
enough to make it seem as if France was not submitting to American pressure. Six months later, 
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the French Council on Nuclear Policy declared the contract with Pakistan null and void.”286 With 
the cancellation of the French agreement, there was no longer any need to sanction Pakistan 
under the Glenn amendment. The cancellation of the French reprocessing plant only delayed 
Pakistan’s plutonium route to the bomb and efforts to acquire the bomb through uranium 
enrichment continued covertly under Zia’s regime.  
 U.S. Aid Suspension and The Symington Amendment 
A U.S. intelligence report in 1978 examined Pakistan’s nuclear and non-nuclear options after the 
Indian nuclear test in 1974. According to the report, Pakistan’s decision to acquire nuclear 
weapons capability was influenced by its earlier failed attempts to pursue non-nuclear options 
which included: Pakistan’s proposal for a ‘South Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone’ in 1974 
passed by UNGA but never implemented and Pakistan’s unsuccessful attempts to seek nuclear 
guarantees from great powers and assurances from nuclear weapon states for non-use of nuclear 
weapons against non-nuclear states. Pakistan contemplated reliance on an extensive military 
procurement program from major arms supplier states including China, U.S., U.K and France to 
match Indian conventional superiority and also considered exercising its right to ‘peaceful 
nuclear explosion’ in order to balance the equation with India and alert international community 
to arrest further Indian nuclear developments. The report safely estimated that “Pakistan could 
not develop a nuclear warhead suitable for delivery by a ballistic missile in less than five years 
from the date of a demonstration device.”287  
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A similar assessment was made about Pakistan’s technical capability to enrich uranium 
even if such a program was underway. A State Department working group put together to 
examine Pakistan’s proliferation issues brought together two groups of CIA analysts and 
scientists from national laboratories. According to Frantz and Collins, “both groups were 
unanimous in their assessment of Pakistan’s program: There was no threat, and it would take 
decades for Pakistan to master the arcane principles of developing centrifuges to enrich uranium” 
since the country was “too backward, no matter how much technology it smuggled in from 
Europe.” The authors write that “there was arrogance in the assumption, best exemplified when 
one of the CIA analysts told [Robert] Gallucci [nuclear expert and former division chief in the 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research], ‘You should be happy that they are pursuing centrifuges, 
because they will never get those centrifuges to work.”288 Once again Pakistan’s resolve to 
obtain nuclear weapons at any cost was underestimated. Feroz Hassan Khan in his book Eating 
Grass writes  
The popular narrative surrounding Pakistan’s uranium enrichment is one of 
nonproliferation and export control failure. There is little focus on the domestic 
environment and the intense demands Pakistani experts had to meet. Such was the 
pressure and determination: the more hurdles the scientists had to overcome, the more 
their resolve increased. In an organizational culture where the end justified the means, 
and left with so few alternatives, the Pakistani leadership turned to self-reliance and 
creativity to overcome the nonproliferation barriers erected. Eventually it was the 
leadership of A.Q. Khan, a leading Pakistani scientist, and competition within the 
Pakistani scientific community that led to the project’s success.  
 
A month after the cancellation of the French reprocessing plant agreement, Cyrus Vance 
approached Agha Shahi with an offer of resumption of the suspended development aid with a 
consideration for military sales. But Shahi was warned that if Pakistan developed an indigenous 
nuclear explosive capability or attempt to acquire reprocessing technology from any other 
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country then the non-proliferation legislation (reference Glenn-Symington amendments) would 
automatically be triggered resulting in the suspension of U.S. military and economic assistance 
to Pakistan.289 Pakistan’s enrichment program continued –– A.Q. Khan was at work and by early 
1979 was not only on the U.S. radar but also in the European press. Frantz and Collins write that 
“Khan had operated in relative secrecy since arriving home, but that came crashing down on 
March 28, 1979 when the German television network Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen broadcast a 
program disclosing Khan had obtained access to centrifuge technology while working under 
contract to the Urenco consortium and taken it back to Pakistan.”290 The authors also quote 
Khan’s ‘first public response after an article in Der Spiegel, the German newsmagazine.’ Khan’s 
words echoed his frustration with the organized hypocrisy of the West on nuclear non-
proliferation issues and have since become part of the Pakistani narrative on Pakistan’s right to 
possess nuclear weapons to safeguard its sovereignty. The authors quote Khan’s response to the 
magazine as follows 
I want to question the bloody holier-than-thou attitudes of the Americans and the British. 
Are these bastards God-appointed guardians of the world to stockpile hundreds of 
thousands of nuclear warheads and have they the God-given authority to carry out 
explosions every month? If we start a modest program, we are the Satans, the devils, and 
all the Western journalists consider it a crusade to publish fabricated and malicious 
stories about us.291 
 
The Carter administration terminated all military and economic assistance to Pakistan invoking 
the Symington Amendment on 6 April 1979. According to Feroz Khan 
On April 4, 1979, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the political father of the Pakistani bomb, was 
hanged. Just two days later, on April 6, the Carter administration applied the Symington 
Law to Pakistan and suspended aid. Although there was no direct causal relationship 
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between the U.S. sanctions and Bhutto’s death, some theorize that Zia-ul-Haq’s disregard 
for President Carter’s appeal for clemency may have triggered Washington’s anger. If the 
Symington law was intended to punish Pakistan, it only bolstered Pakistan’s 
determination to pursue its nuclear program.292 
 
Richard Burt reported in The New York Times on August 12, 1979 that the Carter administration 
in an all-out effort to stop Pakistan’s enrichment program had set up an interagency taskforce 
under the leadership of Gerard C. Smith who was the Ambassador at Large, U.S. special 
representative for non-proliferation matters. Though the taskforce remained inconclusive, it had 
prepared three options to slow Pakistan’s march towards the bomb: one, offer conventional arms 
to Pakistan to modernize its military (may be offer F-5 or F-16 advanced aircrafts) as an 
incentive to forego the nuclear option; two, use stringent economic sanctions to cripple 
Pakistan’s economy and; third, “use paramilitary forces to disable the Pakistani uranium 
enrichment facility” to retard Pakistan’s nuclear progress.293 According to Thomas Thornton, 
“the study produced no useful results and the publicity it received inevitably disturbed the 
Pakistanis.”294 Pakistan’s program continued despite Symington sanctions and the cancellation of 
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other foreign supplies by Pakistan’s European partners.295 Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-
Clark in their book Deception write  
Khan had a plan B. Sensing a time when foreign parts would dry up altogether, he [Khan] 
had been ingenious, fitting out machine shops at Kahuta to reverse-engineer centrifuge 
components based on the ones he had already bought in Europe, using design molds 
provided by his European contractors.296  
 
1979 however, turned out to be a difficult year for both Pakistan and the United States for 
reasons other than their own strained relations. First, the Soviet backed communist government 
in Afghanistan, which had come to power a year earlier in August 1978, was a threat to Pakistan 
and the GOP feared Soviet eastward expansion. Even though Zia requested Carter to upgrade the 
Pak-U.S. bilateral cooperation agreement of 1959 to a treaty in order to signal U.S. support for 
Pakistan against potential communist threat, Carter resisted compliance. According to Robert 
Gates (who served as the staff member of the National Security Council at the time), the State 
Department had advised Cyrus Vance that “the United States shouldn’t go beyond a modest 
effort to publicize Soviet actions and intentions, both through diplomatic contacts and publicly” 
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furthermore Vance was asked “to wait for the Pakistanis to react to a recent U.S. approach on 
their nuclear program before pursuing consultations with them on Afghanistan, and asserting that 
intelligence liaison contacts should be limited to exchanges of information on Soviet activities 
and insurgent capabilities.”297 Brzezinski and Vance had also told the same to Deng Xiaoping, 
deputy premier of China on a dinner during his official visit to Washington on January 29, 1979. 
According to the memorandum that documented the notes exchanged between Vance, Brzezinski 
and Deng on issues related with Pakistan, Deng had expressed his concerns about the ‘future of 
Pakistan, particularly in the light of developments in Afghanistan.’ He told his American 
counterparts that the U.S. should consider providing Pakistan with ‘substantial economic and 
military aid.’ Brzezinski and Vance told Deng that there were considerable concerns in the U.S. 
about Pakistan’s nuclear explosives development and that “the whole reprocessing issues makes 
it difficult for us to provide the level of support to Pakistan we would like, but if this issue is 
resolved, then we are willing to make major commitments.” To this Deng asked why the U.S. 
could not “turn a blind eye to the nuclear reprocessing issue” and why could not the U.S. non-
proliferation law be changed on the subject. Both Brzezinski and Vance emphasized that the 
“law was clear, and that it reflected the will of Congress which would not be changed.”298 
Second, the Islamic Revolution in Iran, which brought Ayatollah Khomeini to power in 
February 1979, was threatening for Pakistan. Zia was uncomfortable because of his staunch 
‘Sunni’ orientation and a popular Shia leader in the neighborhood meant unrest in Pakistan’s 
Shia population which was unhappy with Zia’s Sunni-oriented Islamization of Pakistan. But 
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before the U.S. came around on both these threats, the GOP gambled to improve its bargaining 
position by threatening to conduct a peaceful nuclear explosion.  
 Pakistan’s PNE Gossip and The Nuclear Ambiguity 
As the insurgency in Afghanistan intensified leading to a Marxist coup in April 1978, Pakistan 
worried about safeguarding its territorial sovereignty given Soviet expansionism and looked 
towards the U.S. for protection under the terms of their bilateral 1959 cooperation agreement. 
But the USG and Congress were only willing to consider a limited arms supply  “if there were a 
reason to believe it would help persuade Pakistan to stop its efforts to acquire a nuclear explosive 
capability or to come to some form of non-proliferation arrangement with India.”299  
Eight months prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, Pakistan 
was still petitioning the administration to consider Pakistan’s security imperatives given the 
unrest in Afghanistan and the spread of Soviet influence in the region independent of how USG 
viewed Pakistan’s nuclear problem. But for the Carter administration, delinking Pakistan’s 
nuclear proliferation problem from its regional security concerns was not a preferred foreign 
policy aim in the absence of credible assurances from Pakistan on discarding the nuclear option, 
a critical issue on which the government of Pakistan was not forthcoming. Pursuant to sanctions 
under the Symington amendment, the State Department explored arrangements with Pakistan to 
undertake three steps: “… freeze their current enrichment activities, place all reprocessing 
facilities under safeguards, and provide credible assurance that they will not proceed with 
nuclear weapons development” and assured the GOP that upon receiving such assurances, there 
will be efforts to either resume the suspended aid or a Presidential waiver would be added to the 
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Symington legislation.300 In its defense, the GOP maintained that its nuclear program was for 
peaceful purposes although it hinted at the orientation of its pursuit for nuclear capability being 
tied to its national security as flexible and not set in stone.  
In her examination of bargaining on nuclear tests, Rabinowitz uses Mitchell Reiss’s non-
proliferation paradox to describe the South African bargaining on nuclear testing. However, this 
non-proliferation paradox is also relevant in understanding Pakistan’s PNE gossip. Rabinowitz 
writes that according to the non-proliferation paradox, “when Washington puts an emphasis on 
curbing and preventing a threshold state from overtly testing, the potential tester is motivated to 
use the threat of a test as a political bargaining chip in its dealings with Washington.”301 Pakistan 
(unsuccessfully) attempted the same.  
At one occasion on May 30, 1979, Pakistan’s Foreign Affairs Advisor, Agha Shahi, 
“implied” during a conversation with the U.S. Charge in Islamabad that the program’s goal was a 
“nuclear explosion” and that it should not be a cause of concern if Pakistan conducts a “peaceful 
nuclear explosive in a few months” because “any such development would be in the context of 
defensive measures against Indian nuclear capability.”302 This was the closest Pakistan had ever 
come to admitting the objectives of its nuclear program ever since it began under Bhutto’s 
leadership in 1972. The statement though not explicit, was allusive enough to make the State 
Department review and update its earlier estimates about Pakistan’s capability of testing a 
nuclear device and reach out for support from other major countries to stop Pakistan’s PNE.  
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State Department’s attempts to gather support in Europe against Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions 
however generated little enthusiasm. Many in Europe remained non-committal and lacked 
optimism that “any combination of available disincentives or incentives” would influence 
Pakistan’s nuclear course primarily because they remembered that both U.S. and Europe “did not 
punish India in 1974.”303  
As the momentum to stop Pakistan from conducting a PNE increased, some members of 
the House Foreign Affairs Committee asked the administration to review a “new security support 
for Pakistan, including supplying conventional arms, in an effort to stop that country’s drive to 
build nuclear weapons.” In their letter to Cyrus Vance, several lawmakers expressed their “deep 
concerns that atomic capability for Pakistan could lead to a nuclear arms competition and 
ultimately a nuclear war on the Indian continent and also could profoundly destabilize the 
Persian Gulf and Middle East.”304 In a news conference on Oct 27, 1979, Pakistan’s president 
ruled out the possibility of Pakistan conducting a PNE but asserted that it would be done “only if 
it is needed as part of country’s search for peaceful nuclear power.” However in the Q&A of that 
news conference, Zia stated that in his opinion there was “no such thing as a peaceful explosion” 
and that all explosions could be taken for “nonpeaceful measures” perpetuating the ambiguity 
that surrounded Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions.305  
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 In the months following the PNE statement by Agha Shahi, Pakistan and the U.S. held 
several consultative meetings on the nuclear explosion issue in Washington. During one such 
meeting, Pakistan made unsuccessful attempts to seek “flexibility in U.S. willingness to resume 
economic assistance and military sales in the absence of progress on the nuclear issue”. But the 
State Department conveyed to the Pakistani delegation its unwillingness to delink “the two issues 
of Pakistani security and its nuclear activities” and even though the U.S. wanted to develop a 
strategy to meet Pakistan’s economic, political and security goals, “Pakistan’s pursuit of a 
nuclear weapons option ran counter to such a balanced approach.” By planting the PNE gossip 
Pakistan had thought that the Carter administration could be a) pushed to revert the Symington 
sanctions and resume aid with no non-proliferation conditions attached and b) convert the 1959 
bilateral cooperation agreement into a treaty, which according to Pakistan was the most 
important thing U.S. could have done to secure Pakistan against anticipated Soviet aggression. 
But when the administration declined to do either, the GOP dissociated itself from the PNE 
gossip. Distancing itself from his earlier PNE statement, Agha Shahi reassured the State 
Department about Zia’s intentions against a nuclear explosion since “Pakistan was not near the 
stage where it could conduct” such a test and that Pakistan was “doing its best to reassure India 
and to avoid the dire consequences the U.S. feared” concluding that “U.S. concerns were 
unwarranted.” However, like Zia, Shahi also maintained nuclear ambiguity about the objectives 
of Pakistan’s nuclear program by stating that the goal of the program remained to be determined 
and Pakistan’s development of a nuclear explosive capability was “an open question.” 306  
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Shahi had hoped that the USG would not single out Pakistan’s nuclear issue and develop 
a foreign policy around it or discriminate against Pakistan’s access to nuclear technology for 
‘peaceful purposes’ and oppose its indigenous efforts to develop enrichment capability.307 But 
the Carter administration remained firm with respect to upholding its non-proliferation 
commitments specific to Pakistan’s case and refused to negotiate with the GOP as long as it 
pursued the nuclear option. Pakistan’s luck however, was about to change. According to Levy 
and Scott 
Pakistan and the US found common cause when, as one of his first acts, Khomeini closed 
down two US listening stations in northern Iran, knocking out Washington’s most 
important intelligence collection points for the entire region. Blind and threatened, the US 
began discussing with Pakistan its taking a more active role in Afghanistan, and Pakistan 
agreed to become America’s new eyes and ears in the region.308 
 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and the loss of listening posts in Iran 
elevated Pakistan’s geostrategic status, aligning it with the American strategic priorities in the 
region. The U.S. Congress waived aid conditions under the Symington amendment in 1980 and 
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in 1981 approved a $3.2 billion multi-year aid package for military and economic aid to Pakistan 
in return for its assistance to train Afghan mujahedeen’s to fight the Soviets. Pakistan used its 
new geostrategic importance for the United States at the height of the Cold War to its advantage, 
limiting U.S. policy options towards restraining Pakistan’s nuclear developments.  
 The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and Pakistan’s Bargaining Chip 
Soviet military moves and installation of a new regime in Kabul, Afghanistan in December 1979 
was a source of tremendous concern for the entire international community. At a personal level 
for Carter, Soviet actions amounted to betrayal of détente and for him, his “failure to ratify the 
SALT agreements, and to secure other arms control agreements, was the greatest disappointment 
of his presidency.”309 For Pakistan however, it was an excellent opportunity to bargain not only 
on its nuclear program but also a lucrative U.S. military and economic assistance package.  
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan changed the geopolitical landscape in Southwest Asia 
projecting the worst-case scenario of a Soviet eastward expansion towards Pakistan, confirming 
the GOP’s fears. With respect to Pakistan, Carter administration was in a bind: a) it had linked 
any discussions on addressing Pakistan’s security concerns with the assurances from the the 
GOP on abandoning its nuclear program and b) the Symington amendment it had effected in 
April 1979 against Pakistan, prohibited any military or economic assistance to Pakistan unless a 
Presidential waiver was introduced. For an efficient U.S. response against the Soviets, Pakistan’s 
commitment to fight Soviet expansion was vital and winning Pakistan over with those conditions 
attached, was a challenging task for the administration.  
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Cutting short his Christmas holidays at Camp David, Carter chaired an urgent National 
Security Council (NSC) meeting on December 28, 1979 to discuss the situation in Afghanistan 
and U.S. options. Brzezinski outlined four issues for consideration, one of them being the 
question of U.S. cooperation with the GOP in the wake of Soviet attack on Afghanistan. The 
Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance outlined steps for U.S. actions for Pakistan and recommended 
that first, a high level delegation should be sent to consult the GOP; second, the U.S. should 
resume military sales; third, since the U.S. government “cannot sell on credit to Pakistan because 
of the Symington Amendment, it would be necessary to _____ (redacted sentence) finance 
Pakistani purchases. In this connection, the sale of Gearing-class destroyers to the Pakistanis 
would not particularly help them against the Soviets but would be of enormous political help in 
Pakistan.” On the nuclear policy, Vance asserted that the administration should reaffirm its 
present position “specifically, that they would not build nuclear weapons, they would not transfer 
sensitive technology, and there would be no nuclear tests during Zia’s regime.” Carter stressed 
that the high level mission “should tell Zia that we are bound by law on the non-proliferation 
issue and can’t change it, but let’s try to get together on Afghanistan and work out the non-
proliferation issue later.”310 In his letter to Zia the next month, Carter assured Zia that the United 
States stood by its commitment under the 1959 bilateral Agreement of Cooperation. Carter wrote 
The overthrow of the Afghan Government and occupation of that country by Soviet 
military forces represents a profoundly disturbing threat to the stability of the region and, 
most directly, to the security of Pakistan. In these circumstances, it is essential that there 
be no misunderstandings as to the commitment of the United States to the security and 
territorial integrity of Pakistan. The 1959 Agreement for Cooperation between the United 
States and Pakistan represents a firm commitment between our two governments which 
remains fully valid. I want you to know that the United States intends to stand by its 
commitments under this Agreement. I am particularly concerned with the crescendo of 
charges and threats emanating from certain quarters regarding the presence in your 
country of hundreds of thousands of unfortunate refugees fleeing oppression and violence 
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in Afghanistan. In these circumstances, the United States reiterates that it considers the 
Durand Line to be the international frontier between Afghanistan and Pakistan and that 
our actions under the 1959 Agreement will reflect that fact.311  
 
Later at another occasion, Carter highlighted the importance of Pakistan-U.S. relations to Zia 
reaffirming that, “it is of the greatest importance that the United States and Pakistan share a 
common appreciation of the situation and build a basis of trust for dealing with each other. In 
that context, specific issues, as important as they may be, can be addressed in a way that 
strengthens rather than weakens, the overall relationship.”312  
It was believed by many in the administration that Pakistan would agree to halt progress 
on its nuclear program in return for resumption of aid since Pakistan did not have the resources 
to buy military supplies and equipment to safeguard its territory against any possible Soviet 
attack. But Pakistan attempted to use its nuclear program as a bargaining chip to negotiate 
lucrative military and economic aid packages with the Carter administration while retaining its 
nuclear option. In his meeting with Pakistan’s Deputy Chief of Mission, Ambassador Sultan 
Khan on January 4, 1980 Brzezinski reassured U.S. commitment to meeting Pakistan’s security 
needs while stressing that “continuation of Pakistani “ambiguity” about its nuclear intentions” 
posed a difficult problem and even though the administration was “not making a specific linkage 
at this point, the Pakistanis must understand that cooperation, especially for the long haul, once 
the drama of the moment subsides, will be much easier if the “ambiguity” is resolved.” Khan 
openly reiterated that “Pakistan could not abandon its nuclear efforts.”313 This statement by Khan 
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was the first indication of the GOP’s position on the nuclear ‘problem’, suggestive of a shift in 
Pakistan’s candor thereafter. In his review of assistance to Pakistan, Carter initially approved the 
following:  
1. Legislation to exempt Pakistan from the provisions of the Symington Amendment to the 
Foreign Assistance Act” including a reference to the non-proliferation assurances 
provided by the GOP.  
2. $100 million in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit for FY 1980 
3. $100 million in Economic Support Fund (ESF) for FY 1980 
4. “Intent” to provide same amount for FY 1981 
5. PL-480 (U.S. food assistance program under the Agricultural Trade Development and 
Assistance Act) to be increased by $10-20 million  
6. International Military Education and Training (IMET) program of up to $600,000 
7. Increase in U.S. refugee assistance of $6 million with a possibility of increase up to $25 
million 
8. No offer of advanced aircraft (F-16) to Pakistan 
 
Carter directed that “weapons which can be used to defend Pakistan be approved as soon as 
possible” and “not include those systems which posed a significant threat to India.”314  
Pakistan’s reaction to the initial $400 million aid package announced by Carter was not as 
enthusiastic as some might have anticipated in the administration. Both Zia and Shahi made a 
case for increased military assistance to bolster Pakistan’s defenses against an Indo-Soviet-
Afghanistan nexus.  
  Zia and Shahi in their subsequent individual meetings with the U.S. Ambassador and the 
Secretary of State respectively alluded to their fears of an Indo-Soviet collusion for a communist 
aggression against Pakistan with the prospects of India acting as the “Soviet surrogate”315 and 
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requested that USG appreciate this qualitative change in the situation post-Soviet intervention. 
Agha Shahi visited Washington to meet President Carter to discuss the Afghanistan situation.  
In an interview with U.S. press, Zia dismissed the two-year U.S. aid offer of $400 million, as 
“peanuts” stating that Pakistan could not “buy its security with $400 million. It will buy greater 
animosity from the Soviet Union, which is now more influential in this region than the United 
States.”316 In his attempt to secure long-term security guarantees for Pakistan, Agha Shahi 
“requested that the US consider converting the present bilateral executive agreement of 1959 into 
a treaty…since he feared a future administration might repudiate an agreement.”317 
 In order to convince Zia about the seriousness of U.S. commitment to Pakistan’s security 
after the GOP’s rejection of the aid offer, a presidential delegation visited Islamabad for talks 
with Zia and his team on February 2-3, 1980 led by Zbigniew Brzezinski (NSA Advisor) and 
Warren Christopher (Deputy Secretary of State). The Brzezinski-Christopher mission stressed 
that the aid offer made by the USG was deliberately “preliminary” and “initial” with substantial 
contributions to follow in years ahead. Addressing Pakistan’s central concern regarding 1959 
cooperation ‘treaty’, the delegation submitted that USG was not prepared to “embark on the 
treaty-making process” given the difficulties it would cause in Congress and suggested that 
instead of engaging in a “theoretical discussion of the adequacy” of U.S. commitment, the need 
of the hour required “practical steps to demonstrate that the US-Pakistani security tie” was a 
“force to be reckoned with in the region.” The delegation also underscored the danger to 
Pakistan’s own security if it pursued a nuclear explosives capability and tested a nuclear device 
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and stressed that while there would be international repercussions, Pakistan’s relationship with 
the U.S. in the event of a nuclear test would alter considerably, risking long-term cooperation.318 
In his exchange with the delegation, Zia reiterated his determination about seeking security 
guarantees from the U.S. not only against the Soviets but also against the Indians. On the nuclear 
issue, Zia stated that no guarantees on a nuclear explosion would be provided to the U.S. and 
suggested that instead of seeking presidential waiver for non-proliferation legislation or revising 
economic or military aid, the administration should simply concentrate on talking about security 
guarantees. For several months following the Brzezinski-Christopher mission to Islamabad, U.S. 
policy towards Pakistan continued in a stalemate giving way to speculations about the credibility 
of the United States as a reliable ally amongst several Middle Eastern countries. Pakistan 
rejected the U.S. security assistance package, rejected the FMS credits and requested the USG to 
reconsider security and economic assistance to Pakistan in the form of “(a) debt rescheduling (b) 
quick disbursing program/commodity aid and (c) project assistance.”319 
The deadlock on the nature of U.S. security and economic assistance to Pakistan 
continued throughout the year till the time the two leaders met in person for the first time. Zia’s 
visit to Washington on October 3, 1980 was planned two years earlier and his representation in 
Washington was on behalf of the Islamic Conference, a forum Zia had used effectively to play a 
crucial role during the Iran-Iraq war. The session between Carter and Zia was recorded as “warm 
and friendly.” During the meeting, Zia did not raise the subject of security ‘treaty,’ and the two 
leaders also did not discuss Pakistan’s nuclear issue. On the issue of economic assistance, Zia 
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stressed the need for larger aid package from the U.S. mainly in the form of debt relief. Zia 
downplayed the subject of “bilateral assistance, recognizing the Symington problem and not 
wanting to appear as a suppliant.”320 The meeting ended on a cordial note with Zia appreciating 
U.S. commitment to Pakistan’s security and Carter applauding Pakistan standing up to Soviet 
pressures. Absence of discussion on Pakistan’s nuclear issue and Zia’s distancing himself from 
seeking waiver on the Symington amendment was reflective of the fact that Pakistan was 
unwilling to compromise on its nuclear program and if economic assistance offered by the U.S. 
carried non-proliferation conditions, it was not welcome. With this change in Pakistan’s attitude, 
the Carter administration lost any leverage it had over establishing a quid pro quo with Pakistan 
in terms of economic assistance to Pakistan in return for the GOP adopting a no-nuclear option. 
In his last letter to Zia as President of the United States, Carter registered his regret to settle 
differences over Pakistan’s nuclear program. He wrote: 
Please believe me when I say that we have not been motivated by any desire to limit 
Pakistan’s peaceful development of nuclear power nor by fear that Pakistan would make 
its skills and knowledge available to untrustworthy nations. Our sole concern is that the 
security of all nations is better protected in a world free from nuclear proliferation. In all 
honesty, I think that the security of Pakistan in particular is ill-served by a program that 
appears to lead to the production of nuclear explosives. I hope you will reassess your 
country’s position on this matter so that our two countries can collaborate more fully and 
with greater confidence.321 
 
According to Thornton 
By staking out clearly the areas of difference, Carter in fact laid the groundwork for a 
viable relationship focused on those narrow areas where American and Pakistani interests 
coincide, and insulated as much as possible from continuing irritations in those areas 
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where their interests diverge. A second Carter administration might or might not have 
been able to complete the structure.322 
 
However, as the outgoing president, Carter’s choice of words was careful but the policies he 
pursued were opposite to the kindness he penned down.   
 The NNPA and The Tarapur Controversy 
1980 was also the year which tested Carter’s non-proliferation credentials with respect to the 
supply of uranium fuel for Indian nuclear reactors at Tarapur generating a controversy.  
 Background  
President Carter had signed into law H.R. 8638323, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act 
(NNPA) in 1978 reaffirming the administration’s commitment to non-proliferation goals of 
halting the spread of nuclear weapons while preserving the global right to nuclear energy.  The 
NNPA was an attempt to control U.S. exports of nuclear materials and technology based on a 
comprehensive export licensing criteria urging recipient non-nuclear states to adopt full scope 
safeguards on their nuclear facilities. Under this Act, existing U.S. nuclear cooperation 
agreements with recipient nations were also to be renegotiated to make it NNPA compliant, a 
clause that challenged the Indo-U.S. peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement of 1963.  
According to the Indo-U.S. 1963 agreement, U.S. had agreed to supply low enriched 
uranium fuel for the Indian nuclear reactors at Tarapur, for thirty years (the life of the reactors). 
The agreement required that India maintain safeguards on the U.S. supplied fuel, not undertake 
reprocessing without U.S. consent and not use enriched uranium for nuclear explosives. Even 
though India conducted a peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974, it was still considered a non-
nuclear weapon state according to the NPT and the NNPA of 1978 required that all non-nuclear 
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weapon states place their nuclear facilities under full-scope international safeguards in order for 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to license the applications for export of nuclear fuel, 
reactors and other sensitive nuclear technology. Furthermore, as stipulated in the NNPA, any 
applications submitted after September 10, 1979 and under which the exports were to be made 
after March 10, 1980, had to fulfill the requirement of safeguards. Since India did not have all its 
facilities under full-scope international safeguards, it was problematic for the NRC to provide 
new export license for applications for India after the September 10, 1979 deadline. However, 
the U.S. had two pending export applications for India awaiting shipments and since these 
requests for transfer of shipments were submitted to the U.S. prior to September 10, 1979, to be 
delivered before March 10, 1980, they were exempted from the safeguards requirements.324  
 Carter’s Decision 
The administration was caught in a dilemma when the NRC referred the applications to the 
president when delays in considering the applications crossed the statutory cutoff date. 
According to a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report,  
On May 16, 1980, the NRC, by a 4-0 margin, decided that it could not find that the 
proposed export met the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act, and referred the 
applications to the President pursuant to Section 126b(2) of the Act. The NRC noted in its 
Memorandum and Order of May 16, 1980, that its ‘inability to issue these licenses should 
not be read as a recommendation one way or another on the proposed exports. Rather, we 
have found that the particular statutory findings with which the NRC is charged cannot be 
made.   
 
The decision now rested with Carter and he had the option of “approving the sale on grounds that 
its denial would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of U.S. nonproliferation objectives 
or would otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security.” According to the report, the 
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State Department was of the opinion that the United States needed to “bolster its ties with India 
in view of developments in Iran and Afghanistan, and also to avoid rupture in Indo-U.S. nuclear 
cooperation that might lead India to terminate existing international safeguards on the Tarapur 
facility.” Opponents of the authorization believed that India had ‘two years to renegotiate the 
Tarapur agreement to bring it into conformity with U.S. laws.’ Hardcore non-proliferation 
advocates in the administration and Congress nevertheless argued that the 1978 NNPA should 
not be compromised.325   
Despite significant domestic support for withholding the fuel shipments to India326, the 
Carter administration announced its decision to send shipment of enriched uranium to India on 
May 08, 1980. This U.S. decision was disturbing for domestic and international audience 
especially since it came after the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s announcement on March 
14, 1980 of conducting (more) nuclear tests in future if it served Indian national interest.327 
Carter signed an executive order on June 19, 1980 to authorize Tarapur exports stating the need 
for bolstering ties with South Asian nations that can play a role in checking Soviet expansionism, 
ignoring the fact that India was actively pursuing defense and security cooperation with the 
                                                
325 Richard P. Cronin, “The Tarapur Fuel Issue And U.S. Diplomatic And Security Interests in South Asia,” 
Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, June 16, 1980, RG 7/1-62/1, Kathy Prosser, Subject 
Files, Tarapur (India), Nuclear Fuel Exports, March-June, 1980, John H. Glenn Archives, Ohio State University, OH  
326 Briefing Memorandum, Joint Hearing by the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Governmental Affairs 
on the Tarapur Exports, June 19, 1980, Nuclear Non-Proliferation, NP01800 
http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CNP01800 
accessed on March 30, 2014 
327 "Peaceful Nuclear Tests Defended by Gandhi." The Washington Post (January 18, 1980, Friday, Final Edition): 
73 words. LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Accessed: 2014/04/23  
 193 
Soviet Union even after its invasion of Afghanistan in 1979328 –– which disturbed Pakistan to no 
end.   
 Pakistan’s Reaction 
Carter’s decision to support India contravening the NNPA of 1978 provided Pakistan a card to 
play in its on-going negotiations with the U.S. on military aid with non-proliferation conditions 
at a time when Pakistan had become a critical ally against Soviet expansion in Asia. Pakistan 
maintained that India a) violated the terms of the 1963 Indo-U.S. nuclear cooperation and used 
U.S. supplied heavy water in its 1974 PNE and that b) its refusal to place all its nuclear facilities 
under full-scope safeguards would allow India to produce nuclear weapons in future (a grave 
security concern for Pakistan), especially when the resolve to conduct further tests was publically 
announced. The take home message for Pakistan then was that nuclear non-proliferation was a 
flexible item on Carter’s foreign policy notwithstanding the rhetoric.  
Given the evidence and how the turn of events took place, I argue that it was difficult for 
Carter to balance between India and Pakistan at a time when the U.S. needed to have the two 
South Asian countries on its side given the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. Indira Gandhi who 
was back in power in 1980 had refused to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and 
although it had come as a shock to many in America, there was little that could be done to 
change India’s position. As the discussion in the previous section reveals, the Carter 
administration made special exemption for Pakistan on the Symington amendment so that 
economic and military aid to Pakistan could be resumed. After all that too was a compromise of 
U.S. non-proliferation policy over regional foreign policy objectives. If Carter had decided to 
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withhold the Tarapur shipments, India would have used the same card Pakistan was using now to 
blame the administration for having double standards, pushing India further towards the Soviet 
Union.  
It was not an easy decision for Carter. According to Dennis Kux in Estranged 
Democracies, the American press had heavily criticized Carter’s decision. In its editorial, The 
New York Times argued, “if the United States yields on safeguards to the only nation known to 
have carried out an explosion…it can hardly expect other suppliers and receivers of fuel to give 
the protective stipulations a high priority.” Kux documents Ambassador Gerard Smith’s position 
on the issue who argued that “failure to provide the fuel would risk the loss of safeguards on 
Tarapur and undercut the US reliability as a nuclear supplier” and that there was “no question of 
yielding to India on safeguards since the shipments fell within the two-year grace period 
permitted by the law.”329 Kux maintains that Carter’s fight for Tarapur shipments hardly proved 
worthwhile since it weakened the administration’s “overall nonproliferation posture without 
substantially helping relations with India or advancing a solution to the problem.”330 
 Conclusion 
Pakistan remained very much on Carter’s foreign policy radar from 1977 to 1981. Bhutto and Zia 
continued to provide nuclear non-proliferation assurances to Carter while progress continued on 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. The cancellation of the A-7 aircrafts and the suspension of 
developmental aid for Pakistan set the tone for Pakistan-U.S. relationship in the first year of the 
Carter administration.  
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The Glenn amendment passed by the U.S. Congress in August 1977 did not selectively 
target Pakistan. As per the amendment, the call for aid-cut off was to deter countries from 
conducting nuclear explosions or pursuing reprocessing programs. It was a general approach to 
control the spread of nuclear weapons and was not directed at any specific country. Yes, the 
Glenn amendment would have triggered automatically against Pakistan if the French had not 
cancelled the sale of reprocessing plant agreement with Pakistan in 1978. The non-proliferation 
trade-offs made by the Carter administration, though not desired by it, were dictated by U.S.’ 
Cold War politics. However, they provided Pakistan relief from the Symington sanctions 
allowing General Zia to negotiate a military and economic assistance package from the United 
States from a stronger bargaining position.  
According to Pakistan’s perception, the Carter administration followed two different sets 
of non-proliferation policies towards India and Pakistan, which challenged Carter’s non-
proliferation credibility. Even though the issue of nuclear shipments to Tarapur nuclear power 
plant in India ended up straining Indo-U.S. relations, the fact that Carter kept the issue alive 
during his presidency despite Indian transgressions on accepting full scope safeguards and 
retaining the nuclear testing option, exposed the ‘flexibility’ of Carter’s non-proliferation policy. 
But the evidence presented in this chapter suggests that Carter did not do anything differently for 
India. The compromise Carter made by lifting the Symington amendment and resuming military 
supplies to Pakistan after the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union was identical to his 
decision to authorize nuclear fuel shipments to India in order to keep India favorable to the U.S. 
at the height of the Cold War. At least that was his motivation.  
From the time of the PNE gossip until the end of Carter’s term, Pakistan made significant 
progress on uranium enrichment despite the Symington sanctions. While it did have the intended 
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disquieting effect on the Carter administration, the PNE gossip failed to provide Pakistan any 
leverage over dictating the terms of security assistance sought from the United States in the wake 
of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Zia waited to negotiate with the newly elected Reagan 
administration with which he later managed to secure a substantial economic and military 
assistance package in addition to a presidential waiver, sanctioned by the Congress, for lifting the 
Glenn and Symington sanctions.  
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Chapter 5 - Reagan’s Non-proliferation Policy Towards Pakistan 
Pakistan-U.S. relations took a turn for the better when Ronald Reagan became the President of 
the United States on January 21, 1981. Reagan’s two terms in office from 1981 to 1989 secured 
waivers for Pakistan from the Symington sanctions and provided the GOP with a security 
assistance package (equal parts economic aid and military sales) totaling $3.2 billion in the first 
six years (1981-1986) and another $4.02 billion pledged in 1986 for the following six years. As 
Dennis Kux sums up,  “ … Reagan and his top foreign policy aides, Secretary of State Alexander 
Haig, Director of Central Intelligence William Casey, and Secretary of Defense Casper 
Weinberger, believed that Pakistan deserved far more U.S. support than Carter had offered.”331  
The Reagan administration however was dealing with a non-aligned Pakistan, a more 
realistic and assertive Pakistan, signs of which were visible in Zia’s dealings with the outgoing 
Carter administration and his dismissal of Carter’s initial aid package as “peanuts”. Even though 
the GOP needed U.S. support against potential Soviet aggression or the threat of possible Indo-
Soviet collusion against Pakistan after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it struggled to 
maintain its independence as a new member of the NAM to which it had been admitted in 1979 
after its withdrawal from CENTO.332 General Zia had established good relations with the Arab 
countries in the Middle East and was championing the cause of Arab-Israel peace process on the 
forum of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Pakistan’s NAM status had allowed it 
to play the ‘neutral’ card to extract more concessions from the United States when the latter tried 
to enlist the GOP to run covertly the Afghan jihad against the Red Army in Afghanistan. 
According to Pakistan’s foreign minister, Agha Shahi, the Pakistan-U.S. relationship was 
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‘redefined’ on Pakistan’s terms before Pakistan accepted the $3.2 billion security assistance offer 
by the Reagan administration as follows  
One, Pakistan as a non-aligned country would not grant any bases; Two, Pakistan would 
not become a party to any Middle East “strategic consensus” against the Soviet Union 
along with the US, Israel, Egypt and some other conservative Middle East states; Three: 
Pakistan would not agree to become a conduit for the flow of US arms to the Afghan 
Mujahideen; Four: The US would not make Pakistan’s nuclear program the centre-piece 
of US-Pakistan relations, but wanted Pakistan to be aware of the negative impact of a 
nuclear explosion on the disposition of the US Congress to vote for the military sales and 
economic aid programme for Pakistan.333 
 
According to General Khalid M. Arif, Vice Chief of the Army Staff and General Zia’s right hand 
man, Pakistan was no doubt sensitive about its NAM status as a new entrant but  
the Foreign Office over-played the importance of this factor. To the surprise of the 
Americans, Mr. Agha Shahi insisted and Mr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan [Finance Minister] 
agreed that the military component of the package must be fully paid for by Pakistan, in 
order to demonstrate her neutrality. General Zia went along with the views of his two 
ministers. There was unanimity on some issues. One, Pakistan should not compromise on 
her nuclear programme. Two, she should avoid becoming a conduit of arms supplies to 
the Mujahedeen. Three, she should not provide military bases to any foreign country.334 
 
However, the terms of engagement did change between Pakistan and the United States over the 
course of eight years. Pakistan did become a covert conduit for the flow of U.S. arms to Afghan 
Mujahedeen and although the Reagan administration did not make Pakistan’s nuclear program a 
centerpiece of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, the U.S. Congress kept the issue alive. The passage 
of two Pakistan-specific non-proliferation legislations, the Pressler amendment and the Solarz 
amendment passed by Congress in 1985, agitated the GOP but since Pakistan was not sanctioned 
under those amendments during the second Reagan administration, Pakistan-U.S. relationship 
did not derail. Pakistan had, thus, little to complain about during Reagan’s first and second 
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terms. This was the beginning of the period of relative calm with respect to Pakistan’s narrative 
of betrayal which would last the entire decade since the United States needed Pakistan’s help in 
defeating the Soviets and Pakistan was in a position to leverage this U.S. dependency to gain 
maximum advantage: economic and military.   
 This chapter provides an overview of Pak-U.S. security relationship and Reagan’s non-
proliferation policy, passage of the Pressler amendment in view of the progress of Pakistan’s 
uranium enrichment program, Pakistan’s nuclear technology procurement activities resulting in 
the passage of the Solarz amendment and the GOP’s assurances to the U.S. administration of its 
pursuit of a peaceful nuclear program that allowed for Reagan’s certifications to Congress about 
Pakistan being Pressler-compliant. Evidence presented in this chapter suggests that Pakistan got 
the best of both worlds –– conventional and nuclear –– during its decade long strategic 
engagement with the United States under two Reagan administrations. While this decade long 
engagement resulted in the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the subsequent breakup of 
the Soviet Union bringing an end to the Cold War, Pakistan as a threshold nuclear state emerged 
as the clear winner. But this did not happen without the cooperation of the U.S. administration 
and Congress.  
The legislative history examined in this chapter reveals that contrary to Pakistan’s 
narrative about the Pressler amendment being the most damaging Pakistan specific U.S. non-
proliferation law, the Pressler amendment was a blessing in disguise for Pakistan allowing 
Reagan to certify that Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons and that the U.S. aid was helping 
in moving Pakistan away from a weapons option. In the absence of this certification option, 
Reagan’s hands would have been tied and it would have been impossible for him to ignore 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development given the evidence that was already available on the 
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progress of Pakistan’s uranium enrichment program by the early 1980s. This was an easier 
certification as opposed to the certification required by a non-proliferation bill proposed by 
Senator John Glenn – which was shot down by Congress – requiring the president to certify that 
Pakistan neither possessed nor was developing a nuclear weapon as a condition for continuing 
economic and military assistance to Pakistan.  
The administration held its ground and Reagan certified thrice based on the GOP’s 
assurances that Pakistan was pursuing a peaceful nuclear program. As discussed in this chapter, 
even in the face of overwhelming evidence of Pakistan’s breach of its nuclear assurances (when 
two Pakistani citizens were arrested in 1987 attempting to smuggle components of nuclear 
technology from within the United States), Reagan certified and waived the provisions of the 
Solarz amendment that called for aid cutoff for Pakistan to continue the economic and military 
assistance program.  
 Pakistan-U.S. Bilateral Security Relationship and The Symington Waiver 
The presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan had created a dilemma for Pakistan that was 
compounded by Indira Gandhi’s decision to abstain from voting in the UN on Moscow’s 
aggression. Given Pakistan’s previously unsuccessful attempts to seek security guarantees from 
the U.S. against Indian aggression, the GOP knew that it could not afford to compromise on its 
NAM status. Therefore, its foreign policy demanded that the channels of communication be kept 
open with the Soviet Union and India during the Afghanistan crisis without straining relations 
with the U.S. Agha Shahi articulated Pakistan’s foreign policy decision at the time as follows 
The terms of the 1981 economic aid and military sales agreement with the United 
States…were so negotiated as to make them consistent with Pakistan’s obligations as a 
member of the Non-Aligned Movement. To abandon non-alignment in favour of the role 
of a strategic ally of the United States without a credible guarantee against aggression 
from any quarter together with an assured flow of large-scale military aid including 
sophisticated weapons as well as more even-ended US attitude towards Pakistan’s 
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nuclear programme, would be to court peril to Pakistan’s existence from the Soviet Union 
which now sits on its north-western border. There is no reason to believe that a future 
United States administration, whether Republican or Democrat, would be any more 
willing to extend security guarantee to Pakistan against aggression by India than the 
present US government or its predecessors. As a superpower with global interests, the 
United States has demonstrated time and again that it is not prepared to antagonise India 
by underwriting Pakistan’s security in the event of an Indian threat. Therefore, any steps 
taken by Pakistan to strengthen its credibility as a non-aligned nation with the Soviet 
Union would not be incompatible with the nature of the present Pakistan-US 
connection.335 
 
In order for the Reagan administration to pursue an aid relationship with Pakistan, Congressional 
approval was required on a waiver for the Symington amendment to allow the GOP to receive 
U.S. aid of the proposed $100 million in FY 82. In their testimony before the Subcommittees on 
Asian and Pacific Affairs and on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee on April 27, 1981, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Jane A Coon and 
Mr. Leslie Brown, Deputy Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of 
State testified on the administration’s position on the proposed assistance to Pakistan. The 
session was presided over by Stephen Solarz, chairman of the Subcommittee on Asian and 
Pacific Affairs. On the proposed change in the Symington language, Brown stated 
What we are trying to do is to make the Symington amendment conform with the Glenn 
amendment which gives the President authority to waive, on the basis of a national 
security interest. Unfortunately, the Symington amendment requires the President to 
make a finding, not only of national interest, but also he must receive reliable assurances 
that the country is not and will not engage in a nuclear weapons program. What we are 
really asking for is symmetry with the Glenn amendment. We are not asking that the 
Symington amendment be abolished.336  
  
In making a statement about the administration’s non-proliferation policy, Coon argued 
Our proposed amendment to Section 669 in no way reflects a diminution of concern by 
this administration over the threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons. We remain 
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convinced that the spread of nuclear explosives capability and testing of nuclear devices 
threatens global security and, in fact, detracts from the security of states pursuing such 
programs. The issue is how best to pursue our non-proliferation interests as well as our 
regional security interests. We do not believe that there is any necessary conflict in the 
pursuit of both objectives. We certainly cannot claim that sanctions have been successful. 
We would suggest, rather, that our interests be better served by addressing the underlying 
security concerns of countries such as Pakistan and by developing more useful and 
cooperative relations which could engage us with them in a positive fashion.337  
 
After the witnesses testified before the committee, Congressman Solarz asked Coon and Brown 
if the administration had sought explicit nuclear assurances from Pakistan in the context of the 
offer of $100 million in ESF for FY 82 ‘concerning the GOP’s apparent efforts to acquire the 
capacity to explode a nuclear device.’ But to the Senator’s surprise, Brown answered that no 
such assurances were sought from Pakistan instead the administration ‘anticipated’ that if ‘a 
stable security relationship between Pakistan and the United States’ was created ‘including the 
possible provision of assistance,’ that would help ‘mitigate some of the perceptions of insecurity’ 
related to Pakistan’s nuclear explosives program.  
On the issue of the Symington waiver, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) 
approved the waiver for the Symington amendment but only after making it conditional and 
time-bound, courtesy of John Glenn. Senator John Glenn (D-OH) had opposed the 
administration’s proposal for a change in the Symington amendment language. Glenn shared his 
views with the SFRC and proposed an amendment to the FAA of 1961 “which would affirm that 
the Congress is prepared to be responsive to Pakistan’s needs for assistance, while limiting 
damage to the critically important non-proliferation regime.” In his letter to the Committee, 
Glenn wrote  
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The Administration wants to change the Symington waiver provisions to conform with 
the Glenn Amendment, which provides for cutoffs of aid to nations which receive or 
provide nuclear reprocessing equipment, materials or technology, or which, if non-
nuclear weapons states, detonate a nuclear explosive device. However, what that would 
mean is that the penalty against those who use enrichment as an avenue toward nuclear 
weapons would be removed. The Symington cutoff can be waived, but only if the 
President can certify to Congress that he has reliable assurances that the country at issue 
is not seeking nuclear weapons or helping others to do so. The Glenn Amendment does 
not contain that requirement. I believe that we should be very careful about changing the 
Symington language – which is a serious impediment to Pakistan or any other nation 
seeking nuclear weapons.338  
 
Glenn’s proposed amendment approved by the Committee resulted in the adoption of Section 
620 E of FAA of 1961, which reads as follows 
Sec.620E. Assistance to Pakistan. –– (a) The Congress recognizes that Soviet Forces 
occupying Afghanistan pose a security threat to Pakistan. The Congress also recognizes 
that an independent and democratic Pakistan with continued friendly ties with the United 
States is in the interest of both nations. The Congress finds that United States assistance 
will help Pakistan maintain its independence. Assistance to Pakistan is intended to benefit 
the people of Pakistan by helping them meet the burdens imposed by the presence of 
Soviet forces in Afghanistan and by promoting economic development. In authorizing 
assistance to Pakistan, it is the intent of Congress to promote the expeditious restoration 
of full civil liberties and representative government in Pakistan. The Congress further 
recognizes that it is in the mutual interest of Pakistan and the United States to avoid the 
profoundly destabilizing effects of the proliferation of nuclear explosive devices or the 
capacity to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear devices. (b) The United States 
reaffirms the commitment made in its 1959 bilateral agreement with Pakistan relating to 
aggression from a Communist or Communist-dominated state. (c) Security assistance for 
Pakistan shall be made available in order to assist Pakistan in dealing with the threat to its 
security posed by the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The United States will take 
appropriate steps to ensure that defense articles provided by the United States to Pakistan 
are used for defensive purposes. (d) The President may waive the prohibitions of Section 
669 of this Act at any time during the period beginning on the date of enactment of this 
section and ending on September 30, 1987, to provide assistance to Pakistan during that 
period if he determines that to do so is in the national interest of the United States. (e) No 
assistance shall be furnished to Pakistan and no military equipment or technology shall be 
sold or transferred to Pakistan, pursuant to the authorities contained in this Act or any 
other Act, unless the President shall have certified in writing to the Speaker of the House 
of Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
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Senate, during the fiscal year in which assistance is to be furnished or military equipment 
or technology is to be sold or transferred, that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear 
explosive device and that the proposed United States assistance program will reduce 
significantly the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device.339 
 
A Pakistan-specific waiver to the Symington amendment for a fixed period of six years was 
therefore granted. The language of the waiver to the Symington amendment stipulated in Section 
620 E was explicit: as long as the president certified for the next six years that Pakistan did not 
possess nuclear weapons and would not possess one in the future, aid was to continue. In 
addition to the certification, the president was also required to provide an annual report to 
Congress on Pakistan’s nuclear activities in order for the Congress to ensure that aid transfers to 
Pakistan were keeping Pakistan non-proliferation compliant.  
In his meeting with General Zia-ul-Haq on 14 June 1981 at the Chief of the Army Staff 
residence in Rawalpindi, Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs James L. 
Buckley presented administration’s position on the U.S. economic and security proposals for 
Pakistan and shared his concerns about the delay in the GOP’s acceptance of the administration’s 
aid offer. General Zia told Buckley that the delay in deliberations from Pakistan’s side was 
because they needed time to assess the entire package and see if it met Pakistan’s economic and 
military requirements. Zia was very categorical in telling Buckley how carefully Pakistan had to 
view the developing security relationship with the Untied States. He said 
We walk a tightrope, and the moment we indicate a change from walking on a tightrope 
to association with the free world, we will face real Soviet pressures. We fear what the 
Soviets may attempt to do before October 1982 [referring to the first months of Fiscal 
1983] and what do we do to meet that threat? If we are beaten, the people will lose faith. 
Meanwhile, we are at the bottom of the barrel in terms of equipment … I want no one to 
take liberties [with us], I want to keep the skies clear and give the army some muscle… 
but the needs are urgent that is why I have spoken of ‘hot lease’ or lend-lease 
arrangements…this is not an ultimatum. It is a very realistic submission…and the US 
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must show its determination to assist Pakistan with some potent gesture. This is not a 
condition…but some dramatic gesture is necessary.  
 
During their meeting, Buckley also brought up administration’s concerns about Pakistan’s 
nuclear explosive program and the requirement for the U.S. presidential certifications for any 
provision of aid to Pakistan. Zia replied 
Please testify on my behalf. I have told Ambassador Hummel half a dozen times, I have 
told the Indians, I have told others, that Pakistan has no use for a nuclear program other 
than peaceful. We have no intention of making nuclear weapons. We are acquiring the 
technology to make up for severe deficiencies in our energy needs for 1983 onward. Our 
program of enriching uranium is a simple research program, which would not be able to 
produce a weapons quality of enriched uranium for many years. We will not transfer any 
materials or technology to third parties. I told Mr. Hummel three years ago, I told him 
two years ago, I told him a year ago, and I tell him and you now that I am not making 
nuclear weapons. I have told you the truth, and we will never embarrass you on this.340  
 
Buckley was satisfied with Zia’s assurance on the nuclear program since it helped the 
administration’s case for congressional approval on its proposed aid offer to Pakistan. On 
September 16, 1981 the House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs, International Economic Policy 
and Trade and on Asian and Pacific Affairs met again to hear testimonies from the 
administration on its military and economic aid package to Pakistan. By this time the proposed 
aid offer for the GOP was $3 billion for a period of six years with an additional proposed sale of 
F-16s to Pakistan. Congressman Clement J. Zablocki, chairman of the Subcommittee on 
International Security and Scientific Affairs presided over the session. The witnesses for this 
hearing were James Buckley, Undersecretary for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, 
Department of State and Peter McPherson, Administrator, Agency of International Development.  
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Buckley told the committee that the administration was requesting on immediate basis an 
appropriation of ‘$100 million in economic support funds in FY82 in addition to $50 million for 
Public Law 480 assistance.’ And beginning 1982, the administration would seek annual 
appropriations ‘in support of a 5-year program’ totaling $3 billion to be divided equally between 
‘economic assistance and foreign military sales credit guarantees.’ On the proposed sale of F-
16s, Buckley informed the committee of the administration’s position 
We have agreed to sell a total of 40 F-16 aircraft. These sales, I should note, are not 
expected to result in a significant adverse impact on U.S. capabilities. The first six 
aircrafts, to be paid for in cash, will be delivered no later than 12 months following the 
signing of the letter of offer and acceptance. The balance of the aircraft would be 
provided on an expedited basis over a subsequent period of a year and a half, beginning 
27 months following the signing of the LOA, and would probably be financed by a mix 
of cash and credit.341  
 
Buckley apprised the committee that the GOP had sought an aircraft from the U.S., which 
combined ‘contemporary technology and an affordable cost in order to upgrade its existing 
limited capabilities in the vital area of air defense’ and that F-16 met those requirements. As a 
sign of its commitment to Pakistan, the administration was willing to supply 40 F-16s to Pakistan 
from the production line that was developing F-16s for the NATO and USAF inventory since 
that was the only way to meet Pakistan’s expedited delivery requests. As per the International 
Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981, $100 million in economic support funds 
(ESF) were earmarked for Pakistan for FY 82. The Senate bill (sec. 714) adopted by Congress 
also allowed the president to waive the prohibitions of Section 669 of the FAA 1961, “relating to 
transfers of nuclear enrichment equipment, for up to 6 years, solely for Pakistan, if he determines 
that to do so is in the national interest of the United States, and disallows the use of the 
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Presidential waiver provided in section 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act if any non-nuclear-
weapon country detonates a nuclear explosive device.” A classified presidential report was 
required for “foreign assistance programs proposed by the administration for each fiscal year, for 
each year the waiver for Pakistan” was in effect, beginning with FY 1983.342  
The House of Representatives cleared the Foreign Aid Bill on December 9, 1981 that 
allowed the administration to renew the economic and military assistance relationship with 
Pakistan. The House adopted an amendment through a voice vote proposed by Congressman 
Stephen Solarz (D-NY) whereby the aid to Pakistan was to promptly cut-off “if Pakistan was to 
develop or acquire atomic weapons” unless a waiver was requested by the President. 
Furthermore, the Congress retained the authority through this amendment to “veto any such 
waiver request by a majority vote of the two houses.” The House then authorized “$200 million 
for Pakistan in current fiscal year [1981] and $275 million in the next [1982].”343   
President Reagan used the Symington waiver on February 10, 1982 to begin a six-year 
security assistance program worth $3.2 billion for Pakistan marking the beginning of the U.S.-
Pakistan security assistance relationship. Fig. 4.1 shows the U.S. Arms Supply to Pakistan from 
1980 to 1987. 
 U.S. F-16 Sale to Pakistan in 1981-82: How Pakistan Negotiated 
Using documents from the Reagan presidential library, this dissertation provides the first 
historical account of how skillfully and successfully the GOP negotiated the much opposed (by 
the Indian Congress lobby) supply of F-16 aircrafts, the first batch of six planes that were 
earmarked for the USAF, to be diverted to Pakistan. F-16s were first offered to Pakistan by 
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President Carter when Zia met him in 1980. As discussed in the previous chapter, Zia had 
refrained from seeking economic or security assurances from Carter since he had already 
rejected his $400million aid offer. According to General K.M. Arif who had accompanied Zia in 
this meeting 
President Carter himself broached the issue and offered to provide F-16 fighter aircraft to 
Pakistan. General Zia thanked his host and said, “I do not wish to burden you with 
Pakistan’s problems at a time when you are pre-occupied in an election campaign. Let us 
defer this issue till after the US elections.”344 
 
But with the Reagan administration in office and sympathetic to Pakistan’s threat perceptions 
vis-à-vis the Soviets and the Indians, Pakistan did not waste any time in negotiating the deal to 
get the F-16 aircraft from the U.S. which provided it the much needed technological parity with 
India.  
 Peace Gate I and II 
With the Reagan administration in office and increased Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, 
Pakistan was in a better bargaining position. Under the Peace Gate (PG) program, 40 F-16 
aircraft ‘valued at $1.1 billion’ were to be sold to Pakistan under PG1 and PG2 programs. 
According to the PG 1 Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA), Pakistan was to receive “six F-16 
aircraft (4A and 2B [2-seater] models from July through November 1982 with an in-country 
delivery date of December 1982, 12 months after LOA signature.” Needed technical services 
were to be provided by ‘General Dynamics Contractor Initial Support (CIS)’ from December 
1982 through February 1984. For PG 1, ‘the total estimated LOA value was $241.4 million.’ 
Under the PG II program, ‘34 F-16 aircraft (30A and 4B models)’ were to be produced from 
‘December 1983 through September 1985 with initial in-country delivery in February 1984.’ For 
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this batch, the CIS was to last from ‘February 1984 through May 1985.’ For PG II, ‘the total 
estimated value was $958.0 million.’345   
Table 5.1. Cost Breakdown of Peace Gate I & II Programs ($ in million)346 
 
           GATE I GATE II 
F-16A Aircraft                       
F-16B 
Other Cost 
$35, 662, 000 
74,688,000 
122,591,000 
$410,310,000 
56,504,000 
452,894,000 
Estimated Cost $232,941,000 $919,708,000 
Estimated Packing, Carting and Handling Cost 75, 845 414,949 
Estimated G&A 6,817,200 27,427,050 
Non-Standard Items 285,050 273,650 
Estimated Supply Support Arrangement -0- -0- 
Other Estimated Cost 1,095,758 10,260,945347 
ESTIMATED TOTAL COST $241,214,853 $958,084,594 
  
The GOP paid the initial deposit of $1.1 million at the time of the LOA signature, which marked 
the beginning of the PG I program and ‘continued with quarterly payments for eight payments 
until December 1983.’ The payment schedule for PG II began with ‘an initial deposit of $2.2 
million at LOA signature, payments began in June 1982 with quarterly payments to be made 
until 15 December 1985.’348 
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 The Negotiations 
After initial rounds of negotiations with the Reagan administration, Pakistan’s foreign minister 
Agha Shahi met U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig in Washington on April 29, 1981 to 
continue their discussions on the U.S. security assistance package for Pakistan. In presenting 
GOP’s demand for the aircraft he told the secretary that Pakistan’s first priority was two 
squadrons of F-16s (forty planes) in addition to ‘speeded up delivery and quick conversion 
courses for its pilots.’ And in order to ‘bridge the gap between now and the actual delivery date’, 
Shahi requested that the USG should consider providing Pakistan two squadrons of F-16s on ‘hot 
lease.’ Haig informed Shahi that expedited delivery of F-16s to Pakistan was a controversial 
issue because it meant providing F-16s to Pakistan from the production intended for the U.S. Air 
Force and would require a presidential determination to provide Pakistan the planes instead of 
the US Air Force. Moreover, providing F-16s to Pakistan on ‘hot lease’ was also problematic 
since the issue of the sale of F-16s to Pakistan required congressional approval. However, given 
his discussions with the Saudis, Haig assured Shahi that he was hopeful about the availability of 
Saudi financing to make cash payments for the F-16s if the GOP approached the Saudis on the 
subject.349  
Four months later, in his meeting with General Zia on 9 September 1981 in Islamabad, 
Undersecretary of State James Buckley handed over Reagan’s letter to Zia containing the aid 
offer and a confirmation on the sale of F-16 aircraft. Reagan offered six of the forty jets to be 
delivered to Pakistan within a year of the signing of the LOA on cash basis and the remaining 
within twenty-seven months of the conclusion of the LOA. Along with the forty F-16s, their 
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support equipment, spare parts, technical assistance and training equipment was also to be 
supplied to Pakistan. Zia accepted the proposed U.S. aid offer without reservations and told 
Buckley that the GOP was going to go public with the proposed U.S. aid package. However, he 
informed the undersecretary that the people of Pakistan still doubted U.S. dealings with Pakistan 
and wondered, “was U.S. reliable and would U.S. attach strings to sophisticated military 
equipment?” This was a clever plugin of Pakistan’s narrative by General Zia that was to help 
shape Pakistan-U.S. relations in later years by pressuring the new administration ‘to do more’ 
from the beginning.  
Zia was pleased with the offer of six F-16s being delivered in the first twelve months but 
worried that the ‘austere package of spare parts’ (mentioned in so many words in Reagan’s 
letter) suggested that they would not be combat operational. Buckley told Zia that under the 
present arrangement, it was not possible to provide the planes to Pakistan “with full maintenance 
equipment”, however, he assured the president that upon delivery the planes would “be ready for 
combat if not up to full combat readiness.”350 Although Zia did not make an issue of the prospect 
of somewhat deficient operational equipment for the F-16s during the meeting, this subject 
resurfaced a year later. On September 15, 1981, Pakistan formally announced its acceptance of 
the administration’s proposal for a $3.2 billion security assistance package for a six-year term 
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and the Reagan administration in turn accepted the GOP’s terms of engagement with the United 
States (as was articulated by Agha Shahi and discussed in the previous section).351  
The Indians were unhappy about the administration’s decision to introduce F-16s in the 
subcontinent and arming Pakistan with the most sophisticated technology thus pushing them to 
approach the Soviets for new defense agreements. Some Indian defense analysts believed that the 
highly sophisticated F-16s would “match or beat the strike and defense capabilities of India’s 
British-built Jaguars, Indian-made MIG-21s, and Russian-built MIG-23s.” Since cash sales 
between Pakistan and the U.S. were not covered by the Symington amendment, invoked against 
Pakistan in 1979, it was feared that Pakistan ‘could theoretically put the F-16s in the air’ as soon 
as the planes were ready for delivery and the GOP was ready with its cash and its pilots 
trained.352 For Pakistan, as documented by Dennis Kux in Disenchanted Allies, F-16s were 
essential for two reasons. Citing Pakistan’s Vice Chief of the Army Staff, General Khalid 
Mahmud Arif, Kux writes 
First, the Pakistani military had concluded that the army could absorb the entire aid 
package and still not remedy major equipment deficiencies. But by using the bulk of the 
funds to acquire forty F-16s, the Pakistani air force could gain a capability that would last 
a generation and ‘give us a slight edge over India and what forces there were in 
Afghanistan.’ The second reason, Arif emphasized, was psychological. The F-16s would 
‘signal to the people of Pakistan that we have done something to improve our defense 
capability’ and could ‘give a damn good fight’ against the Soviets.353  
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 U.S. Senate’s Vote on the F-16s 
Critics at home of the administration’s offer of F-16s to Pakistan argued that the sale would fuel 
the arms race between India and Pakistan and also suspected that Pakistan’s real reason for the 
acquisition of these planes was to counter the Indian threat instead of the Soviet. The Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) debated and voted on the issue of F-16s on November 18, 
1981. The senators against the F-16s deal, in their statement before the Committee, argued that 
the sale of America’s most sophisticated aircraft to Pakistan was ‘ill-advised and contrary to the 
national security interests of the United States.’ They maintained that “the F-16s will greatly 
increase Pakistan’s ability to reach and destroy sensitive Indian facilities such as the Bombay 
High offshore oil facilities, the Tarapur nuclear power plant, the Mathura oil refinery near Agra 
as well as North India’s population centers.” In addition, the senators worried the planes could 
also deliver ‘the nuclear weapons Pakistan was developing.’ On the nuclear issue, the opponents 
of the F-16s deal noted that “the restrictions on aid contained in the recently passed Foreign 
Assistance Bill, which would necessitate an aid cut-off if a nuclear device is detonated, do not 
apply to the F-16 package” and unless the administration guaranteed a cut-off of the F-16 
deliveries to Pakistan, the sale of the planes served to ‘undermine the effectiveness of the Senate 
restrictions.’354  
However, when the resolution for disapproval of F-16s to Pakistan was introduced in the 
SFRC by Senators Mark Hatfield (R-OR) and Daniel Moynihan (R-NY), co-sponsored by 
Senator Dale Bumpers (D-AR) and put to vote, the resolution failed to carry with a 7 to 10 vote. 
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Amongst the senators who voted against the resolution and in favor of the sale of F-16s to 
Pakistan was Senator John Glenn (D-OH), a hardcore non-proliferationist and the author of the 
Glenn Amendment, whilst amongst the senators who voted for the resolution and against the sale 
of F-16s to Pakistan was Senator Larry Pressler (R-SD). These two senators would later play a 
vital role in proposing Pakistan-specific non-proliferation legislation that came to be known as 
the Pressler Amendment during Reagan’s second term but at this point in time, in 1981, when the 
latest U.S. relationship with Pakistan was in its initial phase, Glenn and Pressler were at the 
opposite ends of the divide on the issue of selling F-16s to Pakistan. Senator Glenn nevertheless 
was uneasy about his vote in favor of the sale of F-16s to Pakistan and in his statement before the 
SFRC a month after the vote on 14 December 1981 he said 
The report as filed does not adequately reflect my views concerning the sale of the F-16s, 
particularly with respect to the implications for our nonproliferation policy…on this issue 
I am more in sympathy with the view of the minority. It is important that we keep close 
tabs on the political consequences of the sale…I believe it is important to examine this 
program year by year…One of the major concerns I have about our involvement in the 
South Asian subcontinent is that we not push our nonproliferation concerns into the 
background as a result of dealing with the Soviet threat in that area…my concerns about 
the nuclear situation in Pakistan are rising, not subsiding, as time goes by… I do not 
believe we should view the approval of sales of F-16s or of economic or military 
assistance to Pakistan as being a gesture of the United States, independent of any quid-
pro-quo from the Pakistanis as far as their nuclear policy is concerned.355  
 
SFRC’s concluding comments on three issues: a) the sale of F-16s to Pakistan b) the GOP’s 
rationale to have the F-16s to meet Pakistan’s defense needs and c) its effects on Pakistan’s 
proliferation behavior were highly favorable towards Pakistan and presented Pakistan’s case 
even better than the GOP because it incorporated the strong support of the Reagan White House, 
which considered Pakistan’s alliance in the Afghan resistance both indispensable and 
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irreplaceable.356 Following are the excerpts of the SFRC’s concluding comments:357 On the F-
16s issue, the SFRC concluded by stating that 
…sale of the F-16 aircraft to Pakistan enhances the overall foreign policy interests of the 
United States, including the efforts to improve the security of the region and strengthen 
non-proliferation efforts. The military sales component is only part of the broader 
assistance package. Such a long-term balanced approach to foreign assistance should be 
encouraged. 
 
The Committee concluded in favor of Pakistan’s need for sophisticated aircrafts by strongly 
stating Pakistan’s case  
The Pakistanis need an advanced aircraft which is available currently and will give them 
a credible deterrent until the turn of the century. The Pakistanis do not wish to purchase 
the F-5G in part because it has not yet been built or tested. The Pakistanis contend that 
because the F-16 will have a longer useful life for their air force, than a cheaper plane 
their overall cost will be less. The Pakistanis have a history of keeping aircraft 
operational for many years. The F-16’s are an important symbol to the Pakistanis of the 
level of American commitment. A rejection of the sale would revive Pakistani doubts 
about the ability of the United States to establish a lasting relationship. 
 
On the concerns about Pakistan’s proliferation behavior, the Committee concluded that 
The proposed sale will enhance American non-proliferation policy. The termination of 
assistance to Pakistan in the past under the provision of the Symington amendment did 
not deter the Pakistanis from attempting to attain a nuclear capability and may have even 
led to an acceleration of their program. The Pakistanis perceive they are threatened by 
India which is the only non-member of the original nuclear club to have exploded a 
nuclear device. The termination of assistance by the United States only enhanced the 
Pakistanis sense of insecurity. The current U.S. policy is designed to reassure the 
Pakistanis that their security concerns are understood by the United States and to 
convince them that the nuclear option is not acceptable. Legislation has been included in 
the Senate Foreign Assistance bill ensuring that any nuclear explosion would result in the 
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termination of all assistance. A cut off of military equipment, six hundred million dollars 
of aid a year and other U.S. support could not be sacrificed easily. If the sale of F-16’s is 
turned down, there is much less of a chance of deterring the Pakistanis from detonating a 
nuclear device. If we do sell the aircraft, there is a good chance of keeping Pakistan from 
testing a nuclear device.  
 
On the concerns about the South Asian military imbalance, the Committee concluded that 
The sale of 40 F-16 aircraft will not alter the roughly 3 to 1 Indian superiority in the air 
balance with Pakistan. The Indians have ordered MIG 23s and 25 from the Soviet Union 
and Jaguars from the British. Their dominance over Pakistan in advance aircraft is far 
greater than 3:1. Even if India does not purchase 150 Mirage 2000’s, which have been 
under negotiation for more than two years, Indian air superiority is guaranteed. Forty F-
16’s will not appreciably alter the balance of power.  
 
Winning the SFRC’s vote on the sale of F-16s to Pakistan was the second most important victory 
for the Reagan administration in its first year in office –– the first was getting the Symington 
waiver –– and convinced the GOP of Reagan’s commitment to help Pakistan facilitate the 
Afghan jihad and bleed the Soviets until their withdrawal from Afghanistan.  
 The ALR-69 Radar Warning Receiver (RWR) Issue and PAF’s Requirement 
The ALR-69 is a passive receiver that warns the pilot whenever any hostile airborne or ground 
radar is illuminating his plane or any radar that controls the launch of a guided air-to-air or 
surface-to-air weapon aimed at him is locked on to his plane. The warned pilot then initiates 
defensive and offensive actions appropriate to the threat. As Fig. 5.2 illustrates Pakistan started 
facing Soviet-Afghan air intrusions from 1980 onwards and if the F-16s came equipped with the 
ALR-69, they would have given Pakistan Air Force (PAF) pilots timely warning to either 
retaliate or disengage. Therefore, given the threat environment the PAF was operating in at that 
time, ALR-69 for the F-16s was a critical equipment to reduce the frequency of Soviet-Afghan 
air violations of Pakistan’s airspace.358  
                                                
358 This background information was shared with me by the former Pakistan Chief of the Air Staff Jamal Ahmed 
Khan (henceforth JAK) in his email interview on Feb 22, 2015 
 217 
The first time General Zia raised the issue of ALR-69 with the U.S. Ambassador to 
Pakistan Ronald Spiers (who replaced Arthur Hummel) was during their 22 February 1982 
meeting in Islamabad. Zia wanted to discuss several issues with Spiers, one of them his fears 
about a possible Indo-Israeli attack on Pakistan’s ‘little nuclear facilities’ on which Zia requested 
Washington’s ‘assessment of Israeli intentions’ and also requested if Washington could ‘talk to 
the Israelis about this threat.’ Zia gave the reference of the Israeli attack on the Iraqi reactor to 
make Spiers understand that such a possibility existed and if it did happen it would ‘drastically 
set back his efforts to normalize things with India.’ Secondly, he informed Spiers about 
‘increasing restiveness within Pakistan Air Force on F-16 equipment related issues.’ Zia 
particularly referred to ‘ALR-69’ and told Spiers that there was a growing feeling in Pakistan 
that the U.S. was trying to ‘limit Pakistan to outdated ALR-49 system.’ Zia warned the 
Ambassador that “this issue was reaching serious dimensions and threatened to damage some of 
the good that had been done in recent months in U.S.- GOP relations.” Spiers promised to bring 
the Secretary of State Alexander Haig up to speed on the issue and Pakistan’s concerns.359 
General Zia had accepted Reagan’s invitation to visit Washington in December 1982 but 
a month before his visit the GOP raised the issue of still pending avionics equipment 
configuration of the F-16s especially the ALR-69, which could become a deal-breaker. 
According to Pakistan’s Former Chief of the Air Staff Jamal Ahmed Khan, “the Foreign Military 
Sales (FMS) staff were insisting that the PAF F-16s could only carry a less-capable ALR-46 
while the PAF said it would only accept the ALR-69.”360  
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Ambassador Spiers, in his cable to Secretary of State George Shultz informed of a 3 
November 1982 meeting between congressman Charles N. Wilson (D-TX) and Pakistan’s Air 
Chief Marshal Anwar Shamim in which the latter had told the congressman that “the GOP would 
not accept delivery of F-16’s, including six due to arrive in December, unless they are equipped 
with ALR-69.” In Shamim’s opinion, the Pakistan Air Force intended to defend Pak airspace 
against Soviet and Afghan incursions but engaging Soviet/Afghan aircraft without ALR-69 
would result in ‘downing of an F-16 which would “strike at the credibility of the GOP and raise 
doubts in the people’s minds about the GOP’s ability to defend Pakistan.” Shamim made 
references to the Soviet-Afghan incursions into Pakistan’s airspace, one having occurred a day 
before their meeting, on November 1, when an ‘Afghan aircraft had penetrated nine miles into 
Pakistan.’ In total, 91such airspace violations had occurred in 1982 and Pakistan, Shamim said, 
did not have the equipment to react. The Air Chief made the case for ‘an airborne electronics and 
radar capability’ given that the western part of Afghanistan was hilly and ground based radar and 
electronics would be ineffective. 361 According to Spiers, Air Chief Shamim did not belong to 
Zia’s inner circle and that it was difficult to determine from his statement if he was speaking on 
behalf of the GOP. Spiers therefore advised Haig not to confront the GOP on the issue and let the 
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scheduled shipment of six F-16s arrive in Pakistan as planned unless informed otherwise by the 
GOP.362  
It turned out that Shamim’s word was the ‘official’ word and that Spiers was incorrect in 
his assessment about the Air Chief. Two days later, Spiers wrote to Shultz once again about the 
F-16/ALR-69 issue and informed the secretary that Deputy Chief of the Air Staff Jamal A. Khan 
(who succeeded Shamim as the Air Chief Marshal in 1984) had informed the chief of Office of 
Defense Representative, Pakistan (ODRP), that Shamim’s statement on the GOP not accepting 
the first batch of six F-16s without ALR-69 was the ‘official government of Pakistan policy and 
not just Pakistan Air Force policy.’363  
A week later when General K.M. Arif, General Zia’s chief of staff informed the 
undersecretary of state for political affairs Lawrence Sidney Eagleburger during the latter’s visit 
to Islamabad, of the same, echoing Shamim’s words, Ambassador Spiers panicked. Since 
General Arif was considered to be Zia’s right-hand man, Spiers wrote to Shultz stating that Arif 
making the statement meant that Zia would refuse the F-16s shipment due to arrive in Pakistan 
on 2 December 1982 if it was not equipped with ALR-69 and instead would prefer no shipment 
be sent until the issue was resolved.364 Prior to his arrival in the U.S., General Zia met Vice 
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President George H.W. Bush and George Shultz at the Soviet General-Secretary of the 
Communist Party Leonid Brezhnev’s funeral on 15 November 1982 and discussed the ALR-69 
issue where he was assured that some ‘solution’ would be worked out.  
With Zia’s impending visit to Washington within days of his meeting with Bush and 
Shultz, the administration was caught in a serious bind over the issue. Shultz was worried about 
the optics of the U.S.-Pakistan security relationship if the issue was not resolved before Zia’s 
arrival on December 6-9, 1982. However, he decided to push the issue one last time perhaps to 
see if the GOP was serious enough about their threat of not receiving the F-16s without ALR-69. 
In his message to Ambassador Spiers on 19 November 1982, Secretary Shultz directed him to 
inform the GOP that by introducing the ‘new’ condition that the GOP would not accept the first 
six F-16s if they are not equipped with ALR-69 now threatened ‘indefinite delay in delivery’ of 
the aircrafts due to the ‘unavailability of ALR-69 for early installation.’ In addition, Shultz asked 
Spiers to inform the GOP that, “indefinite delay caused by Pak decision, after our earlier efforts 
to accelerate delivery, could raise serious doubts in Congress and security assistance community 
about the overall direction of the sales/assistance program for Pakistan and would certainly be 
interpreted publicly here and in Pakistan as a major U.S.-Pak confrontation.” Shultz regretted the 
GOP’s decision and stated that this information would be kept private but given the number of 
people who knew about the delivery schedule, leaks were likely, however, USG would ‘play 
down any suggestion of controversy’ and hoped the GOP to do the same.365  
 Interestingly, the news leaked out. Two weeks before Zia’s arrival in the U.S., an article 
in the Indian press The Statesman by Warren Unna, the Washington based correspondent of the 
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newspaper, reported on Pakistan requesting delay in the delivery of the first six F-16s due to 
radar issues. U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission in Islamabad, Barrington King, feared that given its 
timing the news was going to become an ongoing story during Zia’s visit which would not only 
give the critics of the deal in the U.S an opportunity to exploit USG-the GOP differences but 
would also provide critics in Zia’s establishment a chance to say that “the U.S. is incapable of 
keeping its commitments.”366  On 27 November 1982, Shultz directed Spiers to inform the GOP 
that USG was prepared to “release the ALR-69 to Pakistan contingent upon Pakistan’s 
acceptance of US on-site inspection of the ALR-69 on a random basis in accordance with Para 6 
of the GSOMIA.”367 If Pakistan were to accept that condition, Shultz wrote, then the USG would 
make “every effort to ensure that the system is delivered along with the first of the thirty-four 
Peace Gate II Aircraft.” The six F-16s ready to leave for Pakistan were ‘fitted with standard 
ALR-69 wiring and were configured so that the system could be installed once the software 
package was developed’ however ‘the components were not in the aircraft because of the past 
uncertainty of releaseability.’ Shultz further instructed Spiers to inform the GOP that USG was 
prepared to reschedule the delivery of the F-16s, however, “further delay in the delivery of the 
first six aircraft until the software package is ready will entail substantial storage costs, 
additional costs for the rephrasing of the contractor interim support team and the loss of months 
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of hands-on in-country operational training for their personnel with a consequent degradation of 
their capability,” nevertheless, this decision ‘on delivery or storage’ was the GOP’s to make.368  
DCM King shared Shultz’s message with Pakistan’s foreign secretary Niaz A Naik who 
appeared positive about the news of the release of ALR-69 for the remaining aircraft. However 
Naik told King that “during lengthy discussion that led up to the decision to request 
postponement, General Arif several times asked Air Force [S] Chamim to explain the 
hardware/software problem to him” which led King to believe that it was likely that “Arif played 
a major role in postponement decision and he may have not have understood the problem at all at 
that time.”369 On 29 November 1982, King shared the GOP’s response with secretary Shultz on 
the release of ALR-69. The GOP appreciated the decision to release ALR-69 and had no 
objection on the condition of inspection but had difficulty understanding USG’s position on the 
software and preferred to wait for the first six F-16s to “be fitted with a completely operational 
ALR-69 RWR before taking delivery.” Furthermore, the GOP did not feel that “any additional 
costs should be its obligation.” Naik informed King of the meeting on this issue between General 
Zia, General K.M. Arif, Air Force Chief Shamim and himself and that it was Zia’s decision to 
reaffirm that the GOP would not accept immediate delivery of the F-16s without the RWR. On 
the difficulty of USG fitting the RWRs on the first six planes, Naik indicated that “….it was the 
GOP view that considering work that had already been done it should not take all that long to get 
the software ready.” Naik read out the aide memoire prepared for King which stated: “(A) be that 
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as it may, the GOP would not wait for the first six aircraft also to be fitted with complete 
operational systems before taking delivery and (B) PAF being directed to get immediately in 
touch with USAF regarding any additional data required” (given that PAF had already provided 
the necessary technical information to USAF in March 1982). Overall, King rightly assessed that 
the GOP was having trouble accepting USG’s argument that ‘development of software package 
will require considerable time’ and wanted things to speed up so that it could receive the first six 
F-16s fitted with the ALR-69 ‘without much delay’.370  
 U.S. Decision on ALR-69 
The administration complied and the issue was resolved before Zia’s arrival in Washington. 
General Zia met Reagan as scheduled on 7 December 1982 and their discussion made no 
mention of the ALR-69 issue and discussions on Pakistan’s nuclear program were only held 
privately between the two leaders. Section 4 of the Arms Export Control Act precluded 
‘extension of credits or guarantees under that Act in connection with the Sale of ‘sophisticated 
weapons system’ to underdeveloped countries’ until the President determined and reported to 
Congress that ‘such financing was important to the national security of the United States.’ And 
therefore, a Presidential Determination (PD) was required in order for the administration to sell 
the GOP F-16 aircraft. Moreover, the President also had to certify to Congress that he had 
reliable assurances from the country that transfer of sensitive U.S. ‘defense equipment, materials 
or technology’ would not take place. With respect to Pakistan, Reagan provided a Presidential 
Determination on January 3, 1983, which stated that supply of F-16s (with ALR-69) to Pakistan 
was in the national security interest of the United States. The PD No. 83-4 read as follows 
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Pursuant to the authority vested in me by Section 4 of the Arms Export Control Act, I 
hereby determine that the financing under the Arms Export Control Act of the sale to 
Pakistan of F-16 aircraft, together with associated equipment, munitions, and services, is 
important to the national security of the United States. Pursuant to the authority vested in 
me by Section 163 of the second Joint Resolution appropriating funds for fiscal year 1983 
(P.L. 97-377), I hereby certify that I have reliable assurances that Pakistan will not 
transfer sensitive United States equipment, materials, or technology in violation of 
agreements entered into under the Arms Export Control Act to any communist country, 
or to any country that receives arms from a communist country.371 
 
The certification on ‘reliable assurances’ received from the GOP on non-transfer of sensitive 
U.S. defense equipment and materials, was based on its agreement with the United States on 
General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). This agreement established 
“principles governing the protection of classified military information exchanged between the 
two governments, such as technical data or equipment sold on an FMS basis or provided through 
intelligence exchanges and joint planning.” According to the agreement, both countries had 
agreed to allow security experts to “make periodic visits to its territory to discuss procedures and 
facilities for the protection of classified military information,” in addition to investigating “all 
cases of suspected disclosure of classified military information and take corrective action to 
preclude recurrences.” The administration had received specific written assurances from General 
K.M. Arif “committing Pakistan to the full protection of sensitive U.S. defense articles.”372  
Pursuant to the PD, the administration not only speeded up the deliveries of the F-16s, it also 
decided to equip the PG aircrafts with ALR-69. The first six F-16s arrived in Pakistan in 1983 
                                                
371 “Presidential Determination with Respect to Pakistan,” Memorandum for the Honourable George Shultz, The 
Secretary of State, January 3, 1983, Presidential Determination No. 83-4 by President Reagan, The White House, 
Pakistan 1/1/82-8/31/84 (3), Box 46, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Office of Records: Country File, Reagan 
Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA 
372 “Determinations for Pakistan,” Memorandum for the President from Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy Secretary of 
State, December 24, 1982, Pakistan 1/1/82-8/31/84 (3), Box 46, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Office of Records: 
Country File, Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA 
 225 
and were ‘retrofitted with ALR-69 by 1984.’373 However, the next batch of F-16s that arrived in 
Pakistan in 1984 came equipped with ALR-69. As of 1984, Pakistan had taken delivery of 15 F-
16 aircraft, ‘six from PG 1 and nine from PG II’ and had paid the ‘entire cost of PG I.’374  
 Soviet-Afghan Air intrusions: Role of The F-16s 
The frequency of Soviet-Afghan air violations across the Durand Line increased dramatically 
during 1986-87 as shown in Fig. 5.2, well after the deployment and commencement of round-
the-clock armed patrols by the PAF F-16s. According to Air Force Chief Anwar Shamim’s logic, 
possession of F-16s equipped with ALR-69 in PAF’s inventory should have resulted in a 
decrease of air violations and casualties, but PAF had little success against the Soviet-Afghan air 
intrusions albeit not without reason. Jamal Ahmed Khan who was the DCAS at that time and 
later the Air Chief recalls that 
Shamim’s logic did not claim that Pakistan could seal the Afghan border with the F-16s. 
That task was made very difficult against hit-and-run attackers owing to the political 
restrictions [placed] on the PAF pilots [by the GOP] that forbade their crossing the 
Afghan border (even in hot pursuit) and also demanded that PAF pilots could shoot down 
only those enemy aircraft whose wreckages were sure to fall over the Pakistani territory. 
The evident underlying objective was to avert a sudden and uncontrollable 1962-like 
confrontation between Moscow and Washington.  
 
Through this unique political directive to the PAF, the GOP had enforced strict policy 
restrictions but the PAF employed the F-16s and its other fighter planes in a manner as consistent 
with that policy as was tactically feasible.   
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Table 5.2. Pakistan’s Ground And Air Violations By Soviet-Afghan Aircraft/Artillery375 
 
Violations 
 
 
Year         Air            Ground        Total 
Casualties 
 
 
Air          Ground    Total 
 
1980 
 
192 
 
--- 
 
192 
 
Statistics not 
Available 1981 120 27 147 
1982 67 26 93  
1983 102 125 227 11 8 19 
1984 165 129 294 277 165 442 
1985 348 405 753 107 50 157 
1986 774 663 1,437 152 308 460 
1987 657 778 1,435 723 310 1,033 
1988 292 435 727 85 165 250 
1989 13 11 24 --- 1 1 
TOTAL 2,730 2,599 5,329 1,355 1,007 2,362 
 
Jamal Ahmed Khan further maintains that 
The Soviet-Afghan air intrusions did sharply escalate in 1986-87 despite the increasing 
number and frequency of the F-16 combat air patrols (CAPs). The Red Army made these 
the two most violent years of the war, while attempting to crush the Mujahedeen 
resistance. Synchronising with this Soviet-led surge in 1986, treaty-partner India tried to 
divert Pakistan’s west-assigned resources and preoccupation by initiating a massive 
armed forces mobilization (called Exercise Brass Tacks) on Pakistan’s eastern border. 
From early 1986, the Indian Air Force began moving to forward airfields and repeatedly 
rehearsed for air strikes on Kahuta, one of Pakistan’s nuclear facilities. In June the same 
year, Moscow also warned the Pakistani president that his country’s nuclear facilities 
may come under Soviet attack if Pakistan did not change its Afghan policy.  
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Khan argues that “within this serious strategic escalation, it would be impossible to quantify the 
extent to which the F-16 patrols deterred the Afghan border intrusions” and states that  
They obviously did, and a very large number of Soviet-Afghan intruders were forced by 
the F-16s to turn back before completing their attacks. The PAF destroyed the maximum 
number of Soviet-Afghan planes during the same year, without losing any aircraft in the 
war. Also, in a post-war meeting with a former Pakistani F-16 squadron commander, a 
Soviet counterpart and Afghan war veteran disclosed that the presence of F-16 CAPs 
greatly degraded the bombing accuracy of his pilots.376  
 
Pakistan Air Chief Shamim’s propositioning for the inevitability of the F-16s to counter the 
Soviet threat was a strategically smart move. While the intended immediate need for the F-16 
was to counter the Soviet threat, it also served against the Indian threat and helped Pakistan 
achieve technological parity with the Indian Air Force for a brief period of time. Pakistan played 
its cards well and extracted the best deal out of its relationship with the United States in the final 
decade of the Cold War.   
 Pakistan’s Nuclear Progress and U.S. Non-proliferation Laws 
While the Pakistan-U.S. security assistance relationship flourished during the first Reagan 
administration, it had little to no impact on the progress of Pakistan’s nuclear program especially 
the uranium enrichment project, which achieved critical milestones towards the end of Reagan’s 
first term.  
There were concerns in the West about Pak-China nuclear cooperation in the early 1980s 
in exchange for Pakistan’s assistance to China for centrifuge technology. Khan writes that Zia 
sought cooperation from China and as a result of his overtures, Pakistan “received the Chinese 
CHIC-4 weapon design along with fifty kilograms of HEU in 1981, material sufficient for two 
bombs.” This was confirmed by A.Q. Khan in a letter to his wife in 2004 in which he wrote, 
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“The Chinese gave us drawings of the nuclear weapon, gave us 50 kg of enriched uranium, gave 
us 10 tons of the UF6 (natural)[uranium] and 5 tons of UF6 (3%) [enriched].”377 A dossier on 
A.Q. Khan network published in 2007 by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) 
reported on Pakistan’s bomb designs and Chinese cooperation as follows 
It is reasonable to assume that Pakistan has at least two different basic nuclear weapon 
designs. The first was developed by PEAC and was intended to be carried by PAF 
aircraft. Its yield is reported to be 10-20 kilotons. The second is a 15-25 kt HEU warhead 
of Chinese origin meant to be carried by aircraft or ballistic missiles. This design came 
from the fourth Chinese test in 1966. By 1983, US intelligence was aware that Pakistan 
was in possession of this design. In 1998, A.Q. Khan seemed to confirm the design’s 
origin when he stated that there was no technical need to proceed with hot tests, since 
Pakistan had a design of ‘proven reliability.’378  
 
According to U.S. intelligence estimates in 1983, Pakistan was still two to three years away from 
overcoming operational difficulties related to uranium enrichment. A State Department briefing 
paper on Pakistan’s nuclear program on June 23, 1983 began its review of the program by stating 
that  
There is unambiguous evidence that Pakistan is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons 
development program. Pakistan’s near-term goal evidently is to have a nuclear test 
capability, enabling it to explode a nuclear device if Zia decides its appropriate for 
diplomatic and domestic political gains. Pakistan’s long-term goal is to establish a 
nuclear deterrent to aggression by India, which remains Pakistan’s greatest security 
concern. In enrichment Pakistan is embarked on an effort to build a gas centrifuge facility 
capable of producing high enriched uranium. The program uses European technology (the 
designs for the machines were stolen by a Pakistani national) and has involved energetic 
procurement activities in various countries. We believe the ultimate application of the 
enriched uranium produced at Kahuta, which is unsafeguarded, is clearly nuclear 
weapons.379 
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The State Department briefing paper rightly predicted Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions and the 
timeline of its progress in overcoming technical difficulties related to uranium enrichment. But 
for PAEC, 1983 was a successful year. Khan writes that “the PAEC had developed the expertise 
to measure the yield and efficiency of their device” by 1983. In his interview with Feroz Khan, 
Chairman PAEC Munir Ahmed Khan recalled, “On March 11, 1983, we successfully conducted 
our first cold test of a working nuclear device. That evening I went to General Zia with the news 
that Pakistan was now ready to make a nuclear device.” Dr. Samar Mubarakmand who 
succeeded Munir Ahmed Khan as Chairman PAEC told Khan in an interview that “Pakistan’s 
nuclear capability was confirmed the day in 1983 when the PAEC carried out cold nuclear 
tests…The tests, however, were not publically announced because of the international 
environment of stiff sanctions against countries that sought to acquire nuclear capability.”380 
Pakistan overcame difficulties with uranium enrichment too thereafter. Khan documents that it 
took Kahuta Research Labs (KRL) under A.Q. Khan’s leadership, two years (from the time of 
that assessment) “to produce enough weapons grade uranium for one nuclear device.”381 
Table 5.1 Timeline of Pakistan’s Uranium Enrichment Program382 
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Despite having ‘unambiguous evidence’ on the progress of Pakistan’s nuclear activities to 
develop a nuclear explosive device, President Reagan submitted his report to the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives, Thomas P. O’Neil, on June 24, 1983 assuring Congress that his 
administration was in control of the situation with respect to Pakistan’s nuclear activities. Reagan 
wrote 
As you know, we are particularly concerned with Pakistan, and believe that our new 
security relationship and assistance program are our most effective weapons in 
dissuading the Government of Pakistan from pursuing a nuclear weapons program. We 
have made it clear to the highest levels of the Pakistani Government that the development 
of nuclear explosives would be inconsistent with the continuation of U.S. security and 
economic assistance.383  
According to the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981, Reagan had 
to submit an annual report to Congress on Pakistan’s nuclear program. This report was prepared 
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by the Department of State in collaboration with other departments and agencies. The heavily 
redacted report, a copy of which has been declassified by the Ronald Reagan library and 
archives, provided a modulated version of the status of Pakistan’s nuclear program to Congress. 
The report stated 
We do not expect Pakistan to detonate a nuclear explosive device in the near future for 
both technical and political reasons. President Zia has assured us, and stated publicly that 
Pakistan will not develop a nuclear explosive of any kind. However, Pakistan’s 
unsafeguarded nuclear program, which could contribute to a nuclear explosive capability, 
has not halted and remains a subject of concern. We are monitoring the Pakistani nuclear 
program very closely and believe that our security assistance program provides the best 
inducement to Pakistan to pursue a strictly peaceful nuclear program.  
 
Pakistan continues to order and procure equipment abroad for its unsafeguarded 
enrichment and reprocessing facilities as well as machine tools, some of which we 
believe could be intended for making the non-nuclear components of a nuclear explosive 
device. Through coordinated international export controls, the U.S. and other nations 
continue to impede these procurement activities, thereby buying time for efforts to reduce 
Pakistan’s political and security motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons by meeting 
its legitimate security needs.  
 
Prior to renewal of our security assistance program, the Government of Pakistan had 
refused to renounce the development of “peaceful nuclear explosives.” In the context of 
our renewed economic and security assistance, we have received repeated high level 
assurances including those by President Zia that Pakistan has no intention of 
manufacturing or testing a nuclear device of any kind. This, in itself, is an important 
step.384 
 
By mid-1980s, however, the U.S. intelligence agencies, the administration and the Congress 
were quite familiar with A.Q. Khan’s name and his international procurement network of nuclear 
technology and components. And despite Zia’s public and private assurances echoing in 
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Reagan’s Congressional determinations, there were few who believed there was a real chance of 
dissuading Pakistan from going the nuclear explosives route.  
 The Pressler Amendment: Saving Pakistan-U.S. Security Relationship 
On March 28, 1984 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee adopted an amendment to the 
already amended Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 by two Democrat Senators, Senator Alan 
Cranston (D-CA) and Senator John Glenn (D-OH) by adding the following after Section 620 E 
(e) No assistance shall be furnished to Pakistan and no military equipment or technology 
shall be sold or transferred to Pakistan pursuant to the authorities contained in this Act or 
any other Act unless the President shall have certified in writing to the Chairman of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, during the year in which assistance is to be furnished or military 
equipment or technology is to be sold or transferred, that Pakistan does not possess a 
nuclear explosive device, is not developing a nuclear explosive device, and is not 
acquiring, overtly or covertly, technology, materials, or equipment for the purpose of 
manufacturing or detonating a nuclear explosive device.385  
 
But this amendment was reconsidered and deleted on April 3, 1984 by the SFRC after a narrow 
vote in favor of a revised amendment. According to the legislative history of the amendment, the 
administration thought that the Cranston-Glenn amendment was too stringent in its provision 
requiring the President to certify that Pakistan was not developing nuclear explosive device and 
was not acquiring technology and equipment to develop one. After some informal discussions on 
the floor of the SFRC, three Republican Senators, Senator Larry Pressler (R-SD), Senator 
Charles McC. Mathias Jr. (R-MD) and Senator Charles Percy (R-IL) co-sponsored a revision to 
the original Cranston-Glenn amendment, which was acceptable to the administration. The 
proposed language of the revised provision was reported in Section 1007 of the International 
Security And Development Cooperation Act of 1984 and made U.S. economic and military 
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assistance to Pakistan conditional upon two certifications, one factual and one judgmental.386 As 
a substitute to Cranston-Glenn amendment, the SFRC adopted this provision on April 4, 1984 by 
a 9-8 vote. Although the SFRC reported the revised amendment, it was not enacted in 1984. This 
provision was enacted in a separate bill in August 1985 and since then Section 620 E (e) of the 
FAA of 1961 has been called the Pressler Amendment, which reads as follows 
Sec 620 E(e) No assistance shall be furnished to Pakistan and no military equipment or 
technology shall be sold or transferred to Pakistan, pursuant to the authorities contained 
in this Act or any other Act, unless the President shall have certified in writing to the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the Senate, during the fiscal year in which assistance is to be furnished or 
military equipment or technology is to be sold or transferred, that Pakistan does not 
possess a nuclear explosive device and that the proposed United States assistance 
program will reduce significantly the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive 
device.387 
 
The certification on Pakistan’s non-possession of the nuclear explosive was a factual finding 
where the President was required to review all relevant intelligence information and analysis 
about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons related activities and report to the Congress that Pakistan did 
not possess a nuclear explosive device. The second certification was a judgmental finding where 
the President was required to testify on the non-proliferation impact of the U.S. assistance to 
Pakistan in reducing the risk of Pakistan possessing a nuclear explosive device. There are 
interesting elaborations on both. 
 While the term ‘nuclear explosive device’ was clear, there were issues with respect to 
making the judgment about what ‘possession’ meant. Terms like ‘manufacturing’ or ‘acquisition’ 
of nuclear explosive device were commonly used, but the word ‘possession’ of a nuclear 
explosive device had never been used which left it open to interpretation and a ‘matter of first 
                                                
386 Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate on S. 2582, International Security And 
Development Cooperation Act of 1984, Report No. 98-400, April 18, 1984  
387 Subsec (e), Sec 902 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, Public Law 99-83  
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impression.’ A report prepared by the State Department legal advisers analyzing the Pressler 
amendment and the language therein argued  
It is clear that if a country has either manufactured or otherwise obtained an assembled 
nuclear explosive device, it possesses such a device. Further, it seems clear that if a 
country has all the necessary components and can assemble them into a functioning 
device, but they are disassembled and kept either at different rooms of the same building, 
in different buildings, or in different locations, the country possesses such a device. This 
latter view is justified because a country may decide to keep a device unassembled for 
safety reasons, and may be in a position rapidly to assemble it upon a decision to do so. 
The Congressional intent in enacting the provision would be vitiated if Pakistan could 
avoid the prohibition by having the disassembled components of a device ready for 
assembly on short order.  
 
On the factual certification regarding possession, the report further analyzed 
It would seem equally clear that a country does not possess a nuclear explosive device if 
one or more of the essential elements required to assemble a device – non-nuclear parts, 
nuclear material, technical capabilities, or the ability to integrate them into a functioning 
device – are lacking. Such an element may be lacking either because the country has not 
reached the stage of development technically necessary to achieve completion, or because 
it has made a policy decision not to proceed with that step. In either event, what the 
country possesses is not yet a “nuclear explosive device.” 
 
However, the report stated that the finder of the fact about a country possessing a nuclear device 
should be alerted to the consideration that there are ‘grey areas’ between ‘possession and non-
possession’ 
If a country has made a policy decision to halt development of its capabilities two days 
short of having everything in place to possess a nuclear explosive device, it would seem 
inappropriate to determine that they did not possess such a device. If the country had 
decided to stop its development program one year short of completion, it would seem 
inappropriate to determine that it did possess such a device. The longer the amount of 
time the more significant the policy constraint is and the more uncertainties there are 
about whether a country would ultimately be in a position to possess such a device.  
 
On the judgmental certification, the report stated  
Obviously, this certification is only an issue if it is determined that the certification that 
Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device can be made. Assuming, therefore, 
that the former certification is warranted, whether the second certification should be 
made requires a subjective judgment based on the prediction of future events. It may also 
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be borne in mind that the more imminent it appears that Pakistan will possess a nuclear 
explosive device, the less credible the argument becomes that the assistance program will 
significantly reduce that risk. Nevertheless, if a significant component of a nuclear 
explosive capability is lacking, either because of technical or policy constraints, it is 
clearly possible and justifiable for a policy-maker to make the second certification.388  
 
Although this report did not represent the official view of the Department of State, it clearly 
explained the innuendos in the Pressler language that could have allowed Pakistan to avoid 
Pressler sanctions had the administration chosen to share it with the GOP.389 The language of the 
Pressler amendment however was ingenious. If analyzed carefully, it favored the continuation of 
economic and military assistance to Pakistan by using ambiguous terms like ‘possession’ of a 
nuclear explosive device, which as the report discussed, was open to interpretation. This 
ambiguity enshrined in the language of the amendment also gave the President enough flexibility 
in case his certifications were later challenged in the court of law. The President could say that 
he made the certification based on his best judgment given the available intelligence at the time 
on Pakistan’s nuclear activities. And as is obvious, intelligence on any country’s nuclear 
explosives program that is being run clandestinely could never be complete since facts about the 
program would always be shrouded in secrecy making it unreasonable to expect foolproof 
intelligence.  However, two years later, the definition of ‘possession’ by the office of legal 
advisor U.S. State Department was published in the hearings of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee and it read as follows 
In assessing the question of “possession” under Section 620 E (e), two considerations are 
key, recognizing that it is the President who must make any ultimate judgment. First, the 
statutory standard is whether Pakistan possesses a nuclear explosive device, not whether 
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Pakistan is attempting to develop or has developed various relevant capacities. 
Formulations that would have required certification of the absence of activities relevant 
for the development of a nuclear explosive device were rejected by the Congress in favor 
of the current statutory language requiring certification of non-possession. A distinction 
must therefore be drawn between the ability to achieve possession of a nuclear explosive 
device, and actual possession of such a device. Second, a state may possess a nuclear 
explosive device, and yet maintain it in an unassembled form for safety reasons or to 
maintain effective command and control over its use or for other purposes. The fact that a 
state does not have an assembled device would not, therefore, necessarily mean that it 
does not possess a device under the statutory standard. A judgment concerning 
possession can only be made upon an evaluation of all relevant facts and circumstances 
of a particular case.390 
 
Pakistan was informed of the Pressler amendment before the Congress passed it in 1985. 
According to Najamuddin Sheikh who served as Pakistan’s ambassador to the U.S. from Oct 
1990 to November 1991, “When the Pressler amendment was first passed in 1985, we were told 
that without this Congress would not approve the continuance of the aid package passed in '81-
'82, and it was adopted with our consent on the clear understanding that certification would not 
be a problem for the duration of the aid package.”391 In 1985, with the start of Reagan’s second 
term in office, the administration was seeking Congressional approval for a bigger aid package 
for Pakistan worth $4 billion for another six- year term and it was critical that the GOP 
understood the implications of the Pressler amendment with respect to aid cut-off and 
administration’s inability to persuade Congress otherwise if Pakistan ‘possessed’ a nuclear 
explosive device. Kux writes in Disenchanted Allies   
When U.S. officials discussed the issue with the Pakistanis, they characterized the 
Pressler amendment as a way to avert more damaging legislation, not as a device for 
cutting of assistance. The fact that the amendment was country-specific and thus 
discriminatory was not at the time deemed to be a problem by the Pakistanis, although 
Islamabad complained loudly about this after sanctions were imposed in 1990. Indeed, 
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Pakistani officials seemed to regard the Pressler amendment as an internal U.S. affair, 
part of the executive branch’s management of its nuclear problem with Congress, rather 
than something that Pakistan should be concerned about.392 
 
There could have been two reasons for the GOP’s calmness despite the country-specific Pressler 
amendment: a) Pakistan’s over-confidence that the U.S. needed Pakistan more than Pakistan 
needed the U.S. and b) Pakistan’s successful cold tests in 1983 and 1984. The Reagan 
administration was extremely pleased with Pakistan’s efforts to assist the Afghan Mujahedeen in 
fighting against the Soviets and Pakistan had become a conduit for the U.S. to achieve the 
impossible –– collapse of the Soviet Union. With Reagan’s victory for a second term in office, 
Pakistan knew that the administration would go to any extent to continue its security assistance 
relationship with Pakistan in order to realize its foreign policy objectives in the region. Secondly, 
by the time the Pressler amendment was passed by the Congress (but not yet enacted), Pakistan 
had already conducted two successful cold tests, one carried out by the PAEC in 1983 and one 
by the KRL in 1984.393 And the GOP saw that despite ‘unambiguous’ evidence obtained by the 
administration on Pakistan’s nuclear activities, the Congress just wanted proof of ‘non-
possession’ of the nuclear bomb and as long as Zia kept reassuring Reagan on that account, aid 
would flow. Therefore it is likely the GOP thought that any Pakistan specific amendment would 
not become a problem as long as Pakistan remained relevant in the superpower Cold War rivalry 
and the administration believed its nuclear assurances. However shortsighted that strategy was, it 
served the GOP’s purpose at the time.  
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 Pakistan’s Illegal Procurement and The Solarz Amendment 
The U.S. Congress approved another amendment in 1985 by amending Section 670 of the FAA 
of 1961. Sponsored by Congressman Stephen Solarz (D-NY), chairman of the House Asian and 
Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, the amendment proposed suspension of U.S. economic and 
military assistance for those non-nuclear weapons states that were found in violation of U.S. 
nuclear export control laws. Even though a direct reference to Pakistan was not made in the 
amendment, the legislation was proposed ‘in response to recent disclosures about the activities of 
a Pakistani who was arrested for attempting to smuggle devices useful in making nuclear 
weapons out of the United States.’394   
 Pakistan’s attempts to illegally procure equipment and technology from North America 
began in the early 1980s. There were reports about Pakistan’s re-export of some components of 
inverters that were used in gas centrifuge enrichment technology via Canada. According to a 
Wall Street Journal article, two members of the PAEC, Anwer Ali and I.A. Bhatti in July 1980, 
‘brought with them a list of parts needed for a key item embargoed by the U.S. and others, a high 
frequency inverter… an electrical device used to spin a gas centrifuge at extremely high speeds 
to enrich uranium.’ The article stated that ‘the parts were bought from manufacturers including 
General Electric Co., Westinghouse Electric Corp., RCA Corp. and Motorola Inc. by two small 
electrical equipment stores in Montreal…repackaged and shipped to the Middle East.’395 The 
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Montreal Police intercepted the packages and since Ali and Bhatti were traveling on diplomatic 
passports, they used their diplomatic immunity to immediately leave Canada.396  
There were export attempts made from within the United States as well and the Secretary 
of State Alexander Haig made a polite mention of administration’s knowledge and concern about 
Pakistani attempts in his letter to Foreign Minister Agha Shahi on 21 Nov 1981. After discussing 
U.S. concerns on Pakistan-IAEA negotiations on the safeguards at Pakistan’s KANUPP reactor 
and issues related with reprocessing and the Glenn amendment, Haig briefly brought up the issue 
and wrote 
A new and troublesome matter has just come to our attention. A substantial quantity of 
Zirconium alloy addressed for shipment to Pakistan has been seized by U.S. customs for 
violation of U.S. export control legislation. We would appreciate it if your government 
could look into this matter.397 
 
1981 was also the year when Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney published their book The 
Islamic Bomb which detailed A.Q. Khan’s attempts to illegally purchase nuclear equipment and 
materials from the international market. That publication made it difficult for the administration 
and the Congress to ignore the fact that Pakistan was actually attempting to procure nuclear 
technology for its nuclear weapons program through clandestine international networks. There 
were two cases in particular involving Pakistanis caught in the United States, which weakened 
the administration’s position on the nuclear non-proliferation issue with respect to Pakistan. This 
resulted in the administration’s quiet acceptance of Pakistan-specific non-proliferation 
legislations thereafter.  
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 Nazir Ahmed Vaid’s Case 
On February 25, 1985 Seymour M. Hersh broke the story in New York Times in his detailed 
investigative article about Pakistan’s attempts to operate inside the U.S. for ‘nine months in an 
attempt to illegally obtain timing devices’ whose main function was to ‘trigger nuclear bomb.’ 
Federal agents had captured Vaid, ‘a 33-year-old from Lahore’ while he was trying to ‘smuggle 
50 of the devices, known as krytrons398, out of Houston.’ According to Hersh, Vaid was being 
monitored since 1983 by undercover customs agents and at the time of his arrest in 1985, ‘series 
of letters directly linking Mr. Vaid to S.A. Butt, who was identified as a director of procurement 
for the Government-run Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission’ were found.  
After Vaid’s arrest, the Pakistani ambassador to the U.S., Ejaz Azim, said in an interview 
that the GOP had ‘absolutely nothing to do with this individual’ denying official involvement. 
Ambassador Azim further stated that Vaid was “a private trader, and that is all we know about 
him. He acts and operates entirely in his individual capacity as a private businessman of 
Pakistan.” According to Hersh, Federal prosecutors failed to make the connection between Vaid 
and the GOP. Therefore, instead of his prosecution under the Atomic Energy Act or the Export 
Administration Act sentencing him to 20 years in prison, Vaid was ‘permitted to plea-bargain to 
a reduced charge’ limiting his jail sentence from twelve years to two and no public trial. The 
Federal judge passed a gag order to minimize the publicity for the case at the request of Vaid’s 
attorney, his original indictment was re-written ‘to exclude any mention of the possible nuclear 
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use of a krytron.’ Vaid was found guilty of ‘one count of violating American export law, given 
mildest sentence possible and deported within three weeks.’ Hersh wrote that on his sentencing 
on Oct 22, 1984, Vaid was declared ‘merely a businessman trying to expedite what he thought 
was a business deal.’ Hersh further stated “Justice Department and Customs officials in Houston, 
presented later with evidence of Mr. Vaid’s link to Mr. Butt, acknowledged that they had over-
looked the significance of the materials in their possession.” In their defense, a State Department 
official when interviewed said, “I know this has all the makings of a grand fix, but its really a 
pretty screw-up.”399 
 After Vaid’s arrest and subsequent deportation from the United States, Reagan wrote Zia 
a letter stating that 
enrichment of uranium above five percent would be of the same significance as those 
nuclear activities such as unsafeguarded reprocessing which I personally discussed with 
you in December 1982 and would have the same implications for our security program 
and relationship.400  
 
At that time Zia assured Reagan that the enrichment would not go beyond five percent. However, 
in November 1985, when President Reagan met General Zia at the sidelines of the UN General 
Assembly meeting, Kux writes of Zia telling Reagan that “Pakistan had a minimum nuclear 
programme necessitated by its security environment” nevertheless assuring Reagan that “the 
program would never reach the point where it would embarrass U.S.-Pakistan relations.” Kux 
correctly articulates Zia’s mindset as follows 
A shrewd judge of how far he could push the Americans on the nuclear issue, Zia 
calculated that occasional trouble over clandestine procurement of nuclear-related 
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equipment –– any link with the Pakistani government could be denied ––and even 
enriching uranium to weapons grade, would not breach the ‘embarrassment’ barrier.401 
 
This case became the reason for the passage of the Solarz amendment, which was proposed by 
Congressman Solarz as a bill, a month after Hersh’s story was published. As Director ACDA, 
Kenneth Adelman was staunchly against the administration’s mild non-proliferation policy 
towards Pakistan which he believed threatened the administration’s credibility before Congress. 
In his letter to the Assistant to the President on National Security Affairs in 1986, Adelman 
argued that  
US failure to do more than ‘jawbone’ risks the President’s credibility and has virtually no 
prospect of convincing Pakistan to cease its enrichment activities. This threatens to 
undermine Congress’ support for our security assistance, needed both to maintain the 
present program and to ensure its continuation after September 1987. Unchecked Pak 
stockpiling of nuclear material also heightens pressures on India to accelerate its nuclear 
weapons activities.  
 
He further recommended the following 
(1) we need to go beyond just ‘jawboning’ if we are to have any chance of convincing 
Zia to honor his pledges; (2) abiding by the ‘red lines’ will best advance all our 
interests in the region; and (3) Zia will blink if we give our warning some ‘bite.’402 
 
Adelman was right on all three accounts. Had the administration followed his advice, there could 
have been some non-proliferation successes possible with respect to Pakistan but at the height of 
the Cold War, nobody in Reagan’s foreign policy elite was interested in his counsel. However, 
after Vaid’s publicized case, the GOP was under the spotlight.  
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 Arshad Pervez’s Case 
This case generated quite a controversy when President Reagan initially refused to invoke the 
Solarz amendment and proceeded instead with presidential certification for Pakistan thus 
continuing the economic and military assistance program.  
 A Pakistani businessman Arshad Z. Pervez, a resident of Canada, was arrested in 
Philadelphia on July 10, 1987 after a twenty-month sting operation for attempting to a) export 
illegally 50,000 pounds of ‘maraging steel’, metal used in the making of centrifuges and b) 
buying unspecified amount of beryllium, a metal used in the making of internal components of 
nuclear weapons. He had identified various false end-users for his purchases including the 
‘Pakistan Council of Scientific and Industrial Research’ and a Pakistan-based firm called 
‘Multinational Inc.’ Upon interrogation Pervez revealed that he was working for a high-ranking 
Pakistani military officer and indicated that the real end-use of these materials was Pakistan’s 
uranium enrichment program in Kahuta. Both maraging steel and beryllium are highly controlled 
materials due to their ‘applications in the fabrication of nuclear weapons.’ The GOP denied any 
connection with Arshad Pervez and his associates. Senator John Glenn in his statement before 
the Senate on July 14, 1987 strongly condemned Pakistan for violating U.S. export control laws 
and jeopardizing future U.S. assistance for the country. He also criticized the administration for 
its “feckless non-proliferation efforts in South Asia.” Glenn called for sanctioning Pakistan under 
the Solarz amendment given that Pervez’s case was a clear violation of U.S. export laws. Glenn 
stated 
Mr. President, the United States cannot, and must not, set a precedent under which a 
country may violate our laws with impunity, offer solemn promises to our president that 
are not kept, and persist in clandestine nuclear procurement activities. This is not the kind 
of behavior we expect from a close military partner, and it is not behavior that we should 
reward. I know of no member of this Congress who would choose to step forward and 
cast the first vote for cutting off our support for the Afghan resistance forces – but this is 
not a matter of choice, it is a matter of law. If the president determines that there has been 
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a violation of the law – and evidence available to me strongly suggests that there has – he 
should bring the full weight of the law to bear on Pakistan. Any waiver of the Solarz 
Amendment, either on non-proliferation or national security grounds as provided for by 
the law, would gravely undermine our global nonproliferation efforts.403 
 
On August 1, 1987 the Senate unanimously passed a resolution introduced by Senator Glenn in 
support of diplomatic efforts to limit Pakistan’s secret nuclear weapons program. The resolution 
states that “the Senate strongly supports the President in his forthcoming efforts to gain 
Pakistan’s compliance with its past commitments not to produce weapon-grade nuclear 
materials.” The resolution further urged the President to “inform Pakistan that Pakistan’s 
verifiable compliance with these past commitments is vital to any further United States military 
assistance.”404 A week after Pervez’s arrest, three more agents were indicted in California for 
illegally exporting electronic equipment to Pakistan used for nuclear weapons. It was becoming 
increasingly difficult for the administration to ignore the issue of Pakistan’s violation of U.S. 
export laws in the face of overwhelming evidence especially when the Senate was pressuring the 
administration to warn the GOP to choose between aid and the bomb.  
 The GOP’s Reaction to Arshad Pervez’s Case 
Pakistan’s Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo, who had assumed office after the 1985 
elections that had made General Zia the president of Pakistan, was working closely with the 
Reagan administration and had ordered cessation of procurement activities in the U.S. after 
Vaid’s case. When Pervez’s case surfaced, it was an embarrassment for Pakistan. PM Junejo 
established a special group to investigate the case and assured the administration that a) the GOP 
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would ‘act against those involved’ and b) gave a ‘new commitment that the GOP would establish 
procedures to ensure that such procurement incidents in the US did not occur.’ In U.S. 
Ambassador Arnold L. Raphael’s cable about his meeting with President Zia on the subject, he 
documented that Zia was ‘genuinely taken aback’ by the charges and assured the ambassador 
that ‘heads would roll’ if there was any connection between Arshad Pervez and those working in 
the enrichment facility in Pakistan. However on providing the U.S. assurances about the 
restricted enrichment levels, Zia did not provide Raphael any answer.405 A week later, Pakistan’s 
foreign secretary Abdul Sattar during his meeting with Ambassador Raphael, noted some 
anomalies in Arshad Pervez’s case. He told the Ambassador that first, ‘maraging steel’ was 
available elsewhere ‘without export restrictions’ and as late as March could have been obtained 
from a ‘Western European country’ then why would the ‘procurement effort continue in the 
US?’ Secondly, the GOP had determined that the ‘Letter of Credit for the sale was issued from 
the London Bank without any funds backing the LOC’ and that the GOP was trying to find out 
how that was possible. Sattar then emphasized the GOP’s position and stated that he understood 
the opposition which the GOP faced in Washington, however, Pakistan was not asking the U.S. 
to ‘choose between Afghanistan and non-proliferation’ and that in the South Asian context, non-
proliferation must be ‘regional in character’ and Pakistan should not be expected to take 
‘unilateral steps.’406  
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 Pakistan’s Nuclear Progress and Reagan’s Pressler Certifications  
1987 was an important year in various respects. It was the year in which Pakistan had set itself 
up for criticism from all quarters after A.Q. Khan boasted of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons 
capability in an interview with an Indian journalist Kuldip Nayar (later published in Observer 
London on Mar 1, 1987) at the height of the Operation Brasstacks crisis on the Indo-Pak border 
in March 1987. Nayar in his autobiography writes 
India organized a large-scale military exercise, called Brasstacks on the borders of 
Pakistan and China during November 1986 and March 1987. The chief of the army staff 
Gen. K. Sundarji almost wandered into Pakistan and China while leading the exercise! 
Some senior politicians and bureaucrats in Islamabad doubted New Delhi’s intentions. It 
was perhaps they who decided to sound a warning to India that Pakistan had a nuclear 
bomb. 
 
Khan told Nayar that Pakistan had already conducted laboratory tests and stated 
Haven’t you heard of a prototype plane flying with the help of a simulator? We do not 
have to explode a nuclear bomb to ascertain its potency. Sensitive and advanced 
instruments in a laboratory can show the scale of the explosion. We are satisfied with the 
results….We have upgraded uranium to 90 per cent to achieve the desired results. 
 
Nayar asked Khan, “Why haven’t you announced that you have a nuclear bomb?” to which Khan 
replied, “Is it necessary? America has threatened to cut off all its aid…The US is aware that 
Pakistan has a nuclear bomb and what the CIA has been saying about our possessing a nuclear 
bomb is correct as are the speculations in the foreign media.”407 Feroz Khan writes in Eating 
Grass that “the publication of the interview on March 1, 1987 embarrassed Zia-ul-Haq and 
created an internal controversy, resulting in the dressing down of A.Q. Khan by authorities and 
the immediate transfer of the R&D back to the PAEC.”408   
With respect to the Pakistan-U.S. security relationship, the Symington waiver was up for 
renewal in the fall of 1987. Given the recent reports of export law violations and A.Q. Khan’s 
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statement on Pakistan possessing the bomb, getting Congressional support for continuation of aid 
to Pakistan, a proposed $4.02 billion dollar economic and military assistance package for six 
years, seemed impossible. But three things happened which, if analyzed from a Pakistani 
perspective, were nothing short of a political miracle.  
First, on the Symington waiver, the Congress legislated to provide the President the 
authority to waive the Symington amendment provisions for two and half years instead of the 
requested six-years to continue providing security assistance to Pakistan. Members of Congress 
were disturbed about Pakistan’s efforts to procure nuclear technology in its relentless pursuit of 
nuclear weapons and denying aid to Pakistan for another six years and restricting it to two years 
was a way of showing their annoyance but this compromise was reached after a showdown 
between senators in the Foreign Affairs Committee who wanted tougher waiver conditions for 
Pakistan and those who were sympathetic to Pakistan’s support for the U.S. in the Afghan war. 
Senator Solarz (D-NY) had drafted a “much harsher amendment that would had the effect of 
forcing Pakistan to retreat from its nuclear program or face a cutoff of U.S. aid.” Senator Charles 
Wilson (D-TX) and Jim Leach (R-IA) were in the Pakistan camp and they prepared an 
amendment that aimed at continuing U.S. assistance to the GOP. Their amendment would have 
“linked the nuclear policies of rivals India and Pakistan, allowing the president to waive the 
Symington amendment in either country’s case if the other continued its nuclear-weapons 
program.” After these competing proposals were discussed on the floor, their sponsors agreed to 
“stick with the two-year waiver in the committee bill.” The pact between “Solarz and Wilson 
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was brokered by David R. Obey, D-Wis., who chaired the Appropriations Subcommittee on 
Foreign Operations.”409 
Second, as soon as Congress approved the aid package for Pakistan in December 1987, a 
Federal court found Arshad Pervez guilty of violating U.S. export laws and Pervez was later 
sentenced to five years in prison. Had the conviction come at the time of the deliberations on the 
aid package in Congress, it would have met strong resistance.  
Third, in January 1988 President Reagan issued a formal determination that given the 
details of Pervez’s case and his conviction, the GOP had violated the Solarz amendment yet at 
the same time he exercised the waiver allowed by law as per the Solarz amendment. He then 
certified that the termination of U.S. assistance to Pakistan would be damaging to the 
achievement of U.S. nonproliferation objectives and national security interests. The Presidential 
Determination and Certification on the Solarz amendment read as follows 
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and statutes of the United 
States of America, including 620 E (d) and Section 670 (a) of the Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1961, as amended (“the Act”), I hereby: 
 
(1) determine pursuant to section 670 (a)(1) of the Act that material, equipment, or 
technology covered by that provision was to be used by Pakistan in the manufacture 
of a nuclear explosive device; and, 
(2) determine and certify, as a result of the determination in paragraph I and pursuant to 
section 670 (a)(2) of the Act, that not providing assistance referred to in section 
670(a)(1) of the Act to Pakistan would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of 
United States nonproliferation objectives and otherwise jeopardize the common 
defense and security; and, 
(3) determine, pursuant to section 620E(d) of the Act, that the provision of assistance to 
Pakistan under the Act through April 30, 1990 is in the national interest of the United 
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States and therefore waive the prohibitions of section 669 of the Act with respect to 
that period.410 
 
In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Robert A. Peck, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State, Near East and South Asian Affairs provided the following 
justification for the Presidential decision to waive provisions of the Solarz amendment against 
Pakistan. According to Peck, Reagan’s decision was based on the following considerations 
- As evidenced by the conviction of Pervez, there was an “illegal export or attempt at 
an illegal export” 
- The maraging steel “would have increased substantially Pakistan’s ability to 
manufacture a nuclear device” by increasing its ability to produce weapons usable 
enriched uranium. 
- The maraging steel would have been used in Pakistan’s uranium enrichment plant, 
and therefore would have been “used in the manufacture of a nuclear explosive 
device.” 
- The Solarz amendment applies to procurement by “agents of, or persons acting in the 
interest of, a government” as well as by government officials. A review of all 
available information, indicated this standard had been met. 
-  
Peck further stated 
The President also used his authority to waive application of the Solarz Amendment 
sanctions to Pakistan. The justification for the waiver was that a termination of assistance 
would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of U.S. non-proliferation objectives 
and otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security.  
 
Peck referred to the President’s statement to Congress on the importance of ‘long-standing 
security relationship with Pakistan’ and that in the face of ‘intense pressure from the Soviet 
Union’ it was U.S. assistance which had ‘bolstered Pakistan’s ability to withstand this effort at 
intimidation by strengthening Pakistani conventional military capabilities and by supporting its 
economic development.’ And failure to continue U.S. assistance to Pakistan ‘would undermine 
efforts to bring about a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, place in doubt, the credibility of 
                                                
410 “Determination Pursuant to Section 670 (a) and Section 620 E(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended,” 
Draft Memorandum for the Secretary of State George Shultz from the President, undated, Tahir, Kheli-Shirin, R: 
Files, PAKIS: Nuclear-Pervez Case, Box 91880, Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA 
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established U.S. security commitments, and jeopardize important U.S. security interests 
throughout the region.’ Moreover, termination of U.S. assistance would have made it more likely 
that ‘Pakistan would build and test nuclear weapons, which could provoke an Indian reaction and 
precipitate a nuclear arms race between two countries.’ Peck told the committee that  
Pakistanis have told us at the highest level that they will take appropriate steps to ensure 
that there is no repetition of the Pervez case. They have followed up these assurances 
with specific actions designed to halt illegal procurement of U.S. goods. We have seen 
clear indications that procurement of some U.S.-origin goods has been halted, although 
we are aware of some activities which gives us cause of continuing concern. While our 
overall assessment is that the Government of Pakistan is making a serious effort to 
prevent another Pervez case, it must be recognized that there exists a substantial 
international network of nuclear procurement agents working on Pakistan’s behalf that 
must be closely monitored, and Pakistan will have to make sustained efforts to ensure 
that no element of this network runs afoul of U.S. law.411 
 
On 17 December 1987 President Reagan wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to 
submit his third formal certification on Pakistan to permit economic and military assistance for 
FY 88. He wrote 
I am writing you with respect to Section 620 E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 
as amended, which requires an annual certification concerning Pakistan to permit 
assistance to be furnished and military equipment or technology to be sold or transferred 
to that country during that fiscal year. I made this certification for FY 1986 on November 
25, 1985 and for FY 1987 on October 27, 1986.  
 
The proposed United States assistance program for Pakistan remains extremely important 
in reducing the risk that Pakistan will develop and ultimately possess such a device. I am 
convinced that our security relationship and assistance program are the most effective 
means available to us for dissuading Pakistan from acquiring nuclear explosive devices. 
Our assistance program is designed to help Pakistan address its substantial and legitimate 
security needs, thereby both reducing incentives and creating disincentives for Pakistani 
acquisition of nuclear explosives. Pakistan is clearly aware of the inevitable cessation of 
                                                
411 “The Implications of The Arshad Pervez Case For U.S. Policy Towards Pakistan,” Hearing Before the 
Subcommittees on Asian and Pacific Affairs And on the International Economic Policy And Trade of The 
Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, 100th Congress, Second Session, February 17, 1988 
retrieved from http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t29.d30.hrg-1988-foa-
0084?accountid=11789 accessed on Jan 2, 2015 
 251 
our security assistance program should it acquire a nuclear explosive device. Thus, I 
believe the proposed United States assistance program will reduce significantly the risk 
that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device.412  
 
Based on this certification, Congress authorized in 1987 a thirty-month waiver until 1 April 1990 
and marginally reduced aid for Pakistan: $260 million in FMS and $220 million in ESF were 
approved for FY 1988. However, ‘the reduction was offset by writing off $30 million as a 
grant.’413 Arshad Pervez’s case was a huge embarrassment for the GOP and the Reagan 
administration. If only the GOP had settled for no procurement in the U.S., both countries would 
have sailed smoothly and the waivers would have been easily justifiable. President Reagan’s 
Symington waiver enabling aid to proceed to Pakistan and the Solarz waiver to relieve Pakistan 
of Solarz sanctions and aid cut-off angered many in the Congress. Pakistan was now literally on 
the edge with no more room for crossing the red lines.  
  
                                                
412 Presidential Determination N. 88-4, December 17, 1987, The White House, Tahir-Kheli, Shirin R: Files, PAKIS: 
Certification 1986 (1) Box 91880, Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA 
413 “Update on Pakistan Nuclear Matters and Security Assistance,” Memorandum from Robert Oakley NSC Staff to 
the National Security Advisor Colin. L. Powell, December 24, 1987, PAKIS: Nuclear Program, 1987, Box. 91880, 
Tahir-Kheli, Shirin R: Files, Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley CA 
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Table 5.2 Pakistan: Nuclear Related Legislations to FAA of 1961 
Amendments Aid Cut-off Conditions Waivers 
Symington 
Amendment 
Sec. 669, 1976 
Bars aid to non-weapon countries 
exporting or importing 
unsafeguarded uranium 
enrichment technology 
Pakistan-specific waiver added in 
1981-Sec 620 E (d) 
Original waiver for 6 years; Renewed 
in 1987 for 2.5 years; Renewed in 1990 
for one year until April 1, 1991 
Glenn Amendment 
Sec. 670,1977 
Bars aid to countries exporting or 
importing unsafeguarded 
reprocessing technology 
 
1977 ban (Sec 670) bars aid to 
non-nuclear weapons states that 
receive, detonate, or transfer a 
nuclear explosive device 
Included ‘Common defense and 
security’ waiver waived by Presidential 
action in 1982 
Solarz 
Amendment 
Sec 670, 1985 
Bars aid to non-nuclear weapons 
states that illegally export (or 
attempt to export) nuclear 
materials, equipment, or 
technology from the US for the 
manufacture of a nuclear 
explosive device 
Included ‘Common defense and 
security’ waiver which was determined 
and simultaneously waived for 
Pakistan in 1988 
Pressler 
Amendment 
Sec 620 E (e), 
1985 
 
Pakistan-specific legislation to 
bar aid to Pakistan if the president 
fails to certify annually that 
Pakistan does not possess nuclear 
device and U.S. aid reduces the 
risk of Pakistan possessing a 
device 
No waiver was included/Annual 
certifications made in 1985, 1986 and 
1987 
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 The Narrative Comes Alive 
General K.M. Arif’s book Working With Zia is a very popular book in Pakistan for various 
reasons: it is written by someone who was very close to Zia, someone who witnessed historic 
decision-making and understood Zia’s dealings with the United States and the rationale of his 
foreign policy. Therefore, it is an incredibly useful insider account of how Pakistan dealt with the 
U.S. and other countries during the eleven years of General Zia-ul-Haq’s regime. This book has 
single handedly shaped Pakistan’s narrative since the time it was written in 1995. The work itself 
and the timing of its publication are indicative of the narrative that had begun to take shape after 
H.W. Bush succeeded Reagan as the president of the United States in 1989 and declined to 
certify on Pakistan’s nuclear program resulting in the invocation of the Pressler amendment. 
Arif’s commentary on three issues/events is important in order to understand what contributed to 
Pakistan’s narrative about the ‘unreliability’ of the U.S. as an ally, a circumstance that began 
towards the end of the Reagan administration and which only strengthened thereafter.  
 On Pakistan’s Illegal Procurement 
General K.M. Arif dismissed allegations of Pakistan’s violations of U.S. export laws as a U.S.-
led ‘disinformation campaign’ against Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. He writes 
Pakistani traders importing items of common use for the civil sector industry were 
accused of indulging in business malpractice and ulterior motives were attributed to their 
routine business transactions. The fact that the government of Pakistan did not exercise 
control over the business dealings of her private citizens was conveniently ignored.  
 
It was alleged that Pakistan businessmen tried to import from the United States small 
quantities of zirconium, kryptron switches, and maraging steel without obtaining export 
permits. In all the three incidents, the accused were trapped by CIA agents who first lured 
them into buying the material. The alleged defaulters faced trial in the USA under US law 
in US courts, which resulted in their acquittal on the main charges. Strangely, the public 
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leakage of such attempts always coincided with the discussion on Pakistan’s aid 
programme in the US Congress.414 
 
Arif further writes of the U.S. carrot and stick policy adopted towards Pakistan 
Following a carrot and stick approach, President Reagan certified to the US Congress on 
18 November 1988 that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device. Simultaneously, 
Washington made it known to Islamabad that the bilateral aid relationship was on the 
rocks. The feeble policy-makers in Pakistan failed to comprehend that the US tactics 
were based on a grand design in which the special relationship with Pakistan had 
undergone a change after the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan. The aid was to be phased 
out anyway but in the interregnum Islamabad was to be kept guessing, in order to extract 
concessions.415  
 
 On The Geneva Accords 
At the end of Reagan’s second term, two events took place, which contributed to the unease 
about the future of Pakistan-U.S. relations: a) Zia’s dismissal of PM Junejo’s government in May 
1988 and b) Zia’s sudden death in a plane crash in August 1988.416   
Three months before his death, Zia had dismissed Prime Minister Junejo’s government 
and had dissolved the assemblies. Zia’s differences with Junejo had cropped up over two issues. 
First, the Ojhri Camp incident in Rawalpindi where an ammunition depot had exploded in which 
over a  hundred people lost their lives and thousands were injured. Junejo and Zia differed on 
who to punish for the incident.  
  Second, Junejo’s rushed approach to sign the Geneva Accords on 14 April 1988 
establishing the timeline for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, bilateral agreement of mutual 
                                                
414 Arif, 369 
415 ibid, 376-377 
416 There were thirty-one people with Zia on the C-130 plane and amongst the dead were two U.S. citizens, 
Ambassador Arnold L. Raphael and the Chief of U.S. military mission in Pakistan Brigadier-General Herbert 
Wasson. 
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relations/non-interference/return of Afghan refugees between the governments of Afghanistan 
and Pakistan and international guarantees signed by the USSR and the U.S.  
According to K.M. Arif, Gorbachev had approached Reagan to indicate the Soviet 
intention to remove forces from Afghanistan in 1988. At that point differences of opinion 
occurred within the GOP. Arif maintained that “General Zia, the architect of the Afghan policy, 
wanted the Geneva accord to ipso facto include an agreement on the formation of a broad-based 
transitional government in Kabul” however the Soviet Union “for reasons of her own 
compulsions had de-linked the withdrawal of forces from other factors.” Junejo managed to 
generate a political consensus in Pakistan –– which weakened Zia’s position –– and led Pakistan 
to sign the Geneva Accord “without first reaching a settlement on the vital question of the 
formation of an interim government in Afghanistan.”417  Riaz Ahmed Khan in Untying the 
Afghan Knot also discusses this aspect of Pakistan’s desire to negotiate on both the external and 
the internal aspects of the Afghan situation. Khan states 
Pakistan approached the Geneva negotiations taking withdrawal to be the key to a 
settlement , but without losing sight of the internal aspect of the problem. The concession 
implicit in its agreement to drop self-determination from the agenda was regarded by 
Pakistan as essentially formalistic. It believed that Moscow would not discuss withdrawal 
without simultaneously showing willingness to accept replacement of [Babrak] Karmal 
by a broad-based government of national reconciliation, and assumed that progress in the 
negotiations would elicit moves from Moscow to address and resolve the internal aspect.  
 
Khan maintains that Pakistan “came under criticism for accepting the Geneva negotiations 
without the participation of the mujahideen, who were popularly seen as a real party in the 
Afghan conflict” and for that reason Khan writes “Pakistan kept insisting on consultations with 
                                                
417 Arif, 324 
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the refugees as a means to ensure that the mujahideen were associated with the Geneva 
negotiations.”418   
Arif also highlighted ambiguity prevalent in Pakistan at that time on the issue of whether 
it was the U.S. that wanted the Soviets to de-link the issue of withdrawal from the set-up of the 
transitional government in Afghanistan or was it at the insistence of Pakistan’s foreign office that 
the U.S. persuaded the Soviets to de-link the two issues. U.S. Secretary of State, George Shultz 
apparently had told Arif that it was Pakistan’s foreign minister Sahabzada Yaqub who had 
persuaded Shultz to “get the Soviets to agree” to the de-linking and therefore even if the GOP 
wanted otherwise, it was “difficult for the US to go back to the Soviets and argue with them in 
reverse.”419 However, according to Zia’s version, the U.S. had convinced the Soviet Union of de-
linking the two issues and Pakistan was “informed about this development long after the two 
superpowers had already reached an agreement on this point” leaving Pakistan with a ‘fait 
accompli.’ According to Arif, the Geneva Accords had helped the U.S. achieve its strategic 
objective ‘of Soviet withdrawal’ and the ‘remaining elements of the Afghan dispute’ or ‘Afghan 
solution’ was not its priority. In the absence of the final Afghan solution, therefore, Pakistan, at 
the end of the nine-year long war, was left with a huge refugee crisis that was a tremendous 
economic and social burden on the GOP, had inherited a weaponized political culture it did not 
want and, an unstable Afghanistan in which infighting continued amongst various armed Afghan 
factions with severe repercussions for Pakistan’s security.  
                                                
418 Riaz Ahmed Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot: Negotiating Soviet Withdrawal (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 1991), 94-95 
419 Arif, 325 
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 On Zia’s Death 
After Zia’s death in 1988, there were theories galore in Pakistan about the cause of his untimely 
death. One theory was about the involvement of a ‘foreign hand’ in removing Zia from the 
national scene. General Arif documents that a Board of Enquiry was held by the Pakistan Air 
Force to ‘investigate the cause of the crash’ and a ‘US team of six air force accident investigators 
assisted the Board.’ After a process of eliminating all possibilities, the Board concluded that ‘the 
most probable cause of the crash was a criminal act of sabotage perpetrated in the aircraft leading 
to the crash of the aircraft.’420 Arif concludes that  
If Zia was a red rag to the Soviet bull, he was not a favourite of America either…it was a 
coincidence that Pakistan’s Afghan policy and that of Reagan administration enabled the 
two countries to develop a mutually supportive relationship. With the contemplated 
withdrawal of the Soviet military forces from Afghanistan, Zia was dispensable, as his 
utility had diminished in the US scheme of maneuver. Zia’s religious fervor and pan-
Islamic approach were strong irritants to Washington. His vision of a rightist Muslim 
government in Afghanistan, as in Pakistan, ran counter to the strategic interests of the 
USA and the USSR in the region. If Zia had stood firm against the Soviet Union, he was 
                                                
420 According to Kux, the report carried conflicting views from Pakistani and American investigators. Based on his 
interviews with U.S. officials and media reports, Kux writes, “In the absence of hard evidence of mechanical failure, 
the Pakistani investigators concluded that sabotage was the probable cause. In contrast, the U.S. team, not finding 
credible evidence for sabotage, concluded that a mechanical failure probably led to the crash,” 292. However, 
writing in 1989, Robert D. Kaplan in his New York Times article titled “How Zia’s Death Helped the U.S.,” did not 
mention of any such contention between the U.S. and Pakistani investigator. He wrote, “A report on the technical 
causes of the disaster by the Pakistan Government’s Board of Inquiry – aided by six U.S. Air Force specialists – 
indicated that the crash was not an accident. Explosives were found in the wreckage, the investigators said, and the 
plane was likely brought down by the deliberate contamination of the main hydraulic system and its back-up, which 
would have made the plane almost impossible to control. The board concluded that “the use of ultra-sophisticated 
techniques would necessitate the involvement of a specialist organization well versed with carrying out such tasks 
and possessing all the means and abilities for its execution,” August 23, 1998 available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/08/23/opinion/how-zia-s-death-helped-the-us.html General K. M. Arif wrote in his 
book that for some ‘inexplicable reasons,’ the findings of the investigative report was leaked to the American press 
before the GOP officially released its contents and a “pre-emptive story quoting unnamed administration sources, 
suggested that the crash might have been caused by a malfunction in the aircraft, a possibility which had been fully 
examined and firmly rejected by the Board of Enquiry,” 408.  
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not likely to yield to the United States either. His exit, in the assessment of the CIA, 
might have been desirable. 421 
 
However, the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Robert Oakley who was sent to take charge after 
Ambassador Arnold Raphel’s death in the plane crash, remembers the results of the joint 
investigation report differently to state that the decision of the Board was not unanimous. In his 
oral history interview, Oakley recalls the time when he arrived at the embassy right after the 
crash as follows 
I found a high degree of uncertainty and anxiety in Pakistan. No one knew who the 
perpetrators of the plane crash had been. The remaining leadership was convinced that it 
was part of a plot which would claim more victims in the forthcoming days….the [U.S.] 
team indicated that it could find no evidence – either inside or outside the plane – of any 
explosion…Our team attributed the crash of the Pakistani plane to a) the inexperience of 
the Pakistani pilots with C-130s and b) the low level at which the plane was flying before 
the crash. In the previous cases [examined by the team], the fault seemed to lie with the 
hydraulic system; we believed that that was also the cause of the crash of the Pakistani 
plane.  
 
Oakley further states 
 
Of course, it was easier for we Americans to be more dispassionate about the event than 
the Pakistanis. They were very nervous; they were certain that some outside power was 
behind the plane crash. But they too began to wonder when no foreign action was 
forthcoming; then they turned to theories of Pakistani-sabotage – by the Army or some 
political opposition. At one point, some Pakistanis even blamed the CIA – a convenient 
whipping boy. But none of the theories seemed very convincing and there certainly was 
no sign of any follow-up activity which might have taken advantage of Zia’s demise. 
Tom Clancy, in one of his books, attributed the crash to a laser beam emanating from a 
satellite under the management of some Soviet controllers in Central Asia. 
 
Both sides held on to their beliefs in the absence of a definitive proof and the Pakistanis 
maintained that “they felt the accident was the result of a ploy by a person or persons unknown” 
and the “Americans said that we believed that mechanical failure had been the cause.” In his 
final comments about the plane crash, Oakley said 
                                                
421 Arif, 408 
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I think you have to remember that South Asia is conspiracy-theory-oriented – even more 
than we are about who killed JFK. It was hard for them to accept the accident theory, 
particularly since we had no hard evidence to support our findings. I thought therefore 
that the split conclusion in the final report was the best possible outcome; neither side 
could definitively prove its conclusion and therefore both sides were satisfied. 
Eventually, the issue died away.422   
 
Arif’s version of events provides an insight into the workings of General Zia’s government and 
how the GOP rationalized U.S. decisions that were unfavorable towards it. It is, however, open 
to debate whether Arif’s overall conclusions about Pakistan-U.S. relations would have been any 
different had he written this book before the Geneva Accords ended the nine-year long war.  
Table 5.3 Overview of U.S. Security Assistance Program: Sales and Deliveries to Pakistan 
1981-1986423 
I. Dollar Increase in Foreign Military Sales ($ in millions) 
FY 1979 $20.8 
FY 1980 $28.8 
FY 1981 $58.3 
FY 1982 $1520.0 
FY 1983 $147.3 
FY 1984 $207.8 
FY 1985 $250.9 
FY 1986 $178.0 
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II: Pakistan Program Deliveries 
Mission Area/Item 
Description 
Air Defense 
Total Quantity Amount Delivered 
 
F-16 Aircraft 40 40 
AIM-9L Missiles 500 100 
Redeye Missiles 100 100 
Stinger Missiles 120 120 
 
Mission Area/Item Description 
Anti-Armor 
Total Quantity Amount 
Delivered 
 
M48A5 Tanks 200 200 
N901 Improved TOW Vehicles 24 24 
AHIS Helicopters 20 10 
I-TOW Missiles 7,550 7,550 
TAS-4 Night Sights 100 2 
M344 106MM Heat CTG 20,000 20,000 
M456A2 105MM Heat-T CTG 5,000 5,000 
M735 105MM APFSDS-T CTG 5,000 5,000 
M724 105MM DS-TP CTG 2,500 2,500 
M490 105 MM TP-T CTG 5,000 5,000 
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Mission Area/Item Description 
Fire Power 
Total 
Quantity 
Amount 
Delivered 
 
M110A2 SP Howitzer 40 40 
M109A2 SP Howitzer 152 64 
M198 TOWED Howitzers 95 75 
AN/TPQ-36 Radars 15 6 
M106 8” HE Projectiles 17,000 9,002 
M107 155MM HE Projectiles 20,000 20,000 
M549A1 155MM HE RAP Projectiles 12,000 6,000 
M650 8” HE RAP Projectiles 4,002 0 
 
Mission Area/Item Description 
Sea Defense 
Total Quantity Amount 
Delivered 
Harpoon Missiles  36 2 
CIWS 7 3 
SBROC 400 0 
OTHER 
M88A1 Recovery Vehicles 35 35 
M11342 Armored Personnel Carriers 75 75 
PVS-5 Night Sights 500 500 
TVS-5 Night Sights 100 100 
PVS-4 Night Sights 100 100 
TAS-6 Night Sights 100 59 
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III. U.S. Assistance Program For Pakistan424 
FY 1982-1987 ($ in millions) 
Fiscal Year FMS Credits ESF DA P.L.480 IMET 
82 - 100 - 50 0.6 
83 260 200 - 50 0.8 
84 300 225 - 50 0.8 
85 325 200 50 59 1.0 
86 311 239 24 50 .9 
87 340 250 25 50 1.4 
Totals 1,536 1,214 99 309 5.5 
Total (Military): $ 1.541.5 
Total (Economic): 1,622.0 
Grand Total: $3.163.5 
 
 Conclusion 
Pakistan became a threshold nuclear weapon state during the Reagan administration. On that 
account alone, the U.S. non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan resembled anything but a 
policy. At the beginning of the U.S-Pak security relationship, Pakistan made it clear to the 
administration that it would not compromise on its nuclear program and it did not. The 
administration assured the GOP that it would not make Pakistan’s nuclear program a centerpiece 
of its foreign policy and it did not. Throughout its eight years in office, the administration 
provided waiver certifications on the non-proliferation legislations to accommodate Pakistan and 
continue economic and military relationship with Pakistan. But this accommodation was not 
                                                
424 FMS= Foreign Military Sales, ESF= Economic Support Fund, DA= Development Assistance, 
P.L.480=Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, commonly known as Food for Peace, 
IMET=International Military Education and Training 
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without reason. The U.S. needed Pakistan onboard for the Geneva Accords and had Reagan not 
waived the provisions of the Solarz amendment after the Arshad Pervez’s case of illegal 
procurement from the U.S., aid to Pakistan would have been cut off in 1987. Consequently, 
Pakistan would not have signed the Geneva Accords in April 1988 and the Soviet withdrawal 
from Afghanistan would have taken much longer time. Reagan’s tradeoff on non-proliferation 
policy to achieve the most pressing U.S. foreign policy objective at the height of the Cold War 
paid off resulting in the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the subsequent collapse of the 
Soviet Union bringing an end to the Cold War and the bipolarity.  
At Pakistan’s end, Zia and his foreign policy team negotiated well the terms of Pakistan’s 
economic and military engagement with the United States. Acquisition of the F-16s alone and 
that too on the GOP’s terms was a huge victory for Pakistan which temporarily neutralized the 
Indian Air Force’s technological superiority at the height of the Afghan war. As discussed in this 
chapter, the F-16s did not help Pakistan much against the Soviet air violations but it did send a 
message to the Indians. By the late 1980s, Pakistan had established existential deterrence with 
regard to India whilst the prospect of possessing F-16s as a delivery vehicle for its nuclear 
weapons helped augment Pakistan’s deterrence. More than that, the F-16s were the symbol of 
U.S. ‘friendship’ and ‘commitment’ to Pakistan and a comfort to the latter that it had chosen the 
right side during the war. The air defense, anti-artillery and firepower deliveries that Pakistan 
received between 1981 and 1986 (Fig.4.6 Table III) included highly capable aircraft, night 
fighting capabilities, tanks, air defense missiles, TOWED and self-propelled artillery. All of 
these items significantly boosted Pakistan’s defense capability and increased the potential costs 
to India and the Soviet Union in fighting with Pakistan. the GOP’s successful negotiation with 
the United States on these deliveries was a huge success story for Pakistan.  
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Pakistan’s nuclear capability was an unintended consequence of Reagan’s mild non-
proliferation policy towards Pakistan for which it received much criticism from the Congress. 
However, as the end of the Afghan war approached, things were going to change for both 
countries with a new U.S. administration in office and a new government in Pakistan.  
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Chapter 6 - Bush’s Non-proliferation Policy Towards Pakistan 
George Herbert Walker Bush succeeded Ronald Reagan as the 41st President of the United 
States. Having served as Reagan’s Vice President for eight years, Bush was part of the previous 
administration’s decision-making elite on the non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan. His 
insider knowledge on the status of Pakistan’s nuclear program, his frustrations with the GOP’s 
repeated assurances on the uranium enrichment levels, his dealings with the militarized regime 
under General Zia and the uphill struggle with the strong non-proliferation lobby in the Congress 
with specific reference to Pakistan helped shape his foreign policy worldview towards the region 
when he became the new President of the United States. President Bush issued his first and last 
certification for the Pressler amendment in 1989 determining that Pakistan did not ‘possess’ a 
nuclear weapon and that the U.S. aid was helping dissuade Pakistan from acquiring one. But his 
letter accompanying the certification to Congress carried his sense of alarm about Pakistan’s 
continuing efforts to progress with its nuclear weapons program hinting that it might become 
difficult for Pressler certifications to continue in the future.425 As his cabinet, Bush selected 
trusted close aides to take key policy positions. With Dan Quayle as his Vice President, Bush 
appointed James Baker as the Secretary of State, Dick Cheney as the Secretary of Defense and 
Brent Scowcroft as his National Security Advisor.  
 Bush’s first term in office coincided with a new democratic government in Pakistan. 
After General Zia’s death in a plane crash in August 1988, Ghulam Ishaq Khan (henceforth 
GIK), who was Chairman Senate at the time, became the acting President of Pakistan as per the 
constitution of Pakistan. General Mirza Aslam Beg, the new Chief of the Army Staff, called for 
                                                
425 Michael R. Gordon, “Nuclear Course Set by Pakistan Worrying U.S.,” New York Times, Oct 12, 1989, A1 (The 
New York Times 1923-Current File) retrieved from http://search.proquest.com.er.lib.k-
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the general elections to be held in November 1988. Benazir Bhutto, daughter of Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto, a Radcliffe and Oxford graduate and the leader of the populist Pakistan’s Peoples Party 
(PPP) won the general elections to become Pakistan’s 11th and the first female Prime Minister of 
a Muslim country.  
Benazir Bhutto made several compromises when she came to power, the first one was to 
retain Gen. Beg as the COAS and GIK as the president of Pakistan. GIK was given a PPP ticket 
and he went on to win the elections to retain his title as the president of Pakistan. However, had 
more powers than the prime minister.  Under the 1985 eighth amendment to the constitution of 
Pakistan passed during Zia’s regime –– which had strengthened the authority of the President by 
giving him the power to dismiss the parliamentary government –– GIK called the shots. In 
counsel with the Army Chief General Beg, GIK maintained complete control over decisions 
regarding the future of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and its nuclear policy. Both GIK and 
Beg were Zia’s protégés (GIK was Zia’s finance minister from 1977 to 1985) and only accepted 
Benazir Bhutto because of her popular support base that had won her the elections. Their 
resentment of Benazir Bhutto can be assessed from General Zia’s comments to Congressman 
Stephen Solarz in his meeting with Zia on 25 May 1986 in Islamabad a year after successful 
transition to democracy had taken place under Zia’s presidency. Solarz had probed Zia about 
Benazir Bhutto’s participation in future politics in Pakistan. Following is an excerpt of their 
conversation which provides an insight into Zia’s thinking about Z.A. Bhutto’s legacy –– his 
daughter. And given how influenced GIK was by Zia, there should hardly be any doubt that he 
believed the same 
Solarz: Benazir is obviously committed to her father, and cannot accept that he did any 
wrong. But is she her father in her character and her attitudes? 
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Zia: She is well known for her leaning towards the Soviet Union. Where did all her 
money come from? We have Pakistani students at Patrice Lumumba University 
[Moscow]. While I was in Moscow for Brezhnev’s funeral, I went to check on them. I 
instructed that they should have passports and be looked after. All the cases of violent 
subversion in Pakistan were sponsored by other countries and by people educated in the 
West. There has been no trouble with those who went to Lumumba University. Those 
who turned leftist were those who went to the United States. Benazir would be her 
father’s daughter if she had no leanings to the Soviet Union. They promised to help her as 
a way of destabilizing Pakistan, which would then have an impact on Afghanistan. 
 
Solarz: If she came to power, would she hold to democracy? 
 
Zia: She would be the worst ruler Pakistan had. She has a Machiavellian mind. She must 
not pollute our democratic environment.426 
 
But Benazir won the majority vote. GIK’s relationship with PM Bhutto was acrimonious since 
the beginning, which was apparent by his decision to delay her appointment as the Prime 
Minister of Pakistan until she made certain compromises to form a coalition government to 
assume office on December 2, 1988.427 Once in office, Bhutto attempted to legislate to remove 
the eighth amendment to the constitution to strip GIK of his powers and wanted to become part 
of the nuclear decision-making elite, to stake a claim to the program that was her father’s legacy. 
But the GIK-Beg duo was successful in keeping her away not only from Pakistan’s nuclear 
weapons program but all other governance issues to keep her from challenging the pre-existing 
set-up comprising the military and the civil bureaucracy. In particular, Bhutto had to make 
several concessions: support GIK’s five-year term as the President, retain Sahibzada Yaqub 
Khan as the foreign minister for continuity in Pakistan’s foreign policy and ‘promise not to make 
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unilateral reductions in defence expenditure and service conditions.’428 In further concessions, 
Bhutto agreed to let the Army decide Pakistan’s Afghan and Indian policy, essentially allowing 
the Army to continue doing what it had been for the past eleven years under Zia’s regime. 
Unfortunately, Bhutto’s government lasted only twenty months in office and on 9 August 1990, 
GIK called for general elections after arbitrarily dismissing her government on the charges of 
incompetence and corruption. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif became the new Prime Minister of 
Pakistan after the October 1990 elections with GIK still as the president. 
 1990 was an important year for Pakistan-U.S. relationship and Pakistan’s narrative-
building. Early spring 1990 Pakistan and India had engaged in a crisis over Kashmir, with 
nuclear overtones. Pakistan’s nuclear signaling during the crisis changed the ambiguous status of 
its nuclear weapons program, facts of which could no longer be concealed from Congress by the 
administration. In October 1990, President Bush refrained from certifying that Pakistan did not 
‘possess’ a nuclear weapon and in the absence of his presidential certification, the Pressler 
amendment was automatically invoked resulting in suspension of U.S. economic and military 
assistance to Pakistan. Invocation of the Pressler amendment did not come as a surprise for the 
GOP since they had been forewarned but when along with the suspension of assistance, military 
equipment transfer including 28 F-16s signed and paid for by the GOP ($658 million in cash 
through national funds) under Peace Gate III and IV programs in 1988 and 1989 also ceased, the 
GOP protested. The F-16s issue became an extremely sore point for the U.S.-Pak relationship 
during the Bush administration and became an essential part of Pakistan’s narrative about the 
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U.S. ‘abandoning’ and ‘forsaking’ Pakistan now that it was no longer needed to serve the 
former’s foreign policy interests in the region. 
This chapter analyzes the Bush administration’s interpretation of the Pressler amendment 
and its little known efforts to find ways to circumvent the Pressler law in order to provide spare 
parts for the military equipment in Pakistan’s inventory through private commercial sales. Even 
though Pakistan became part of the U.S. coalition during the first Gulf War in 1991 to liberate 
Kuwait from Iraq’s invasion, the Pressler sanctions and the F-16s issue continued to strain U.S.-
Pak relations for the rest of Bush’s time in office.   
 Bush’s Pressler Certification in 1989 and More F-16s for Pakistan 
In his reply to President Bush’s message of felicitations on restoring democracy in Pakistan, GIK 
applauded U.S. partnership with Pakistan in restoring freedom and dignity to the people of 
Afghanistan and said he was looking forward to working with his administration. On the nuclear 
issue, GIK wrote 
We do have our known differences over the nuclear issue but I am confident these could 
be bridged in the spirit of mutual confidence and trust that has historically marked our 
relations. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has already stated publically that Pakistan has 
no intentions to acquire nuclear weapons. The statement augurs well as an earnest 
reflection of nuclear restraint….I am sure the new government would be keen to resume 
the on-going dialogue with the United States on this subject before long.429 
 
In early 1989 when General Beg visited the United States, the outgoing National Security 
Advisor General Colin Powell and his successor General Brent Scowcroft in two separate 
meetings warned Beg that Pakistan’s nuclear activities were being closely monitored. In his 
interview with Dennis Kux, Scowcroft recalled telling Beg that the administration’s hands were 
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‘tied on the nuclear issue’ and that “President Bush [will] certify as long as he [can] under the 
Pressler amendment, but he [will] not lie. Pakistan [stands] very close to the line.”430 After Beg’s 
return home, the U.S. intelligence reported that Pakistan was no longer enriching uranium431 
which meant that there was hope for U.S.-Pak relationship to progress.  
Benazir Bhutto’s visit to the United States in June 1989 was very successful. Making a 
statement on Pakistan’s nuclear program, Bhutto stated, “Speaking for Pakistan, I can declare 
that we do not possess, or do we intend to make, a nuclear device, that is our policy.”432 
However, there are different versions of Pakistan’s nuclear policy under Benazir Bhutto in 1989. 
In her interview with Dennis Kux, Bhutto maintained that an ‘understanding’ was reached with 
the United States that Pakistan could “keep its existing nuclear capability and continue to receive 
military and economic aid.”433 General Beg ‘denies’ any such understanding with the United 
States and credits Benazir Bhutto for pursuing the policy of nuclear restraint in 1989 without any 
external pressure. He maintains that after his joint meeting with GIK and Benazir Bhutto it was 
decided not to further enrich uranium to weapons grade quantities because by that time Pakistan 
already had nuclear weapons that were regarded enough to serve as a deterrent to India. 
Moreover, in order to maintain nuclear ambiguity it was decided that no nuclear tests should be 
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conducted.434 General K.M. Arif in his book Working With Zia also writes of this meeting that 
Beg referred to that took place in January 1989 in which GIK, Beg and Benazir Bhutto (also 
popularly referred to as the troika) mutually decided to freeze the enrichment of uranium at low 
level.  The United States was informed of the decision accordingly.435 Feroz Hassan Khan in his 
book Eating Grass elaborates on the content of troika’s meeting based on his interview with 
General Beg. According to Beg, the policy of nuclear restraint had five elements 
(1) maintain the minimum force posture necessary for a credible deterrent, (2) refrain 
from conducting hot tests, (3) freeze fissile stocks at the current level, (4) reduce 
uranium enrichment to below 5 percent, and (5) affirm that nuclear weapons do no 
replace conventional force capabilities.  
 
This policy of nuclear restraint adopted in early1989 helped Pakistan win Bush’s Pressler 
certification later that year, congressional approval of U.S. economic and military assistance and 
an agreement for the sale of 60 F-16s.  
 In his Pressler Determination No. 90-1 and certification letter to Congress on 5 October 
1989, President Bush wrote that using his best judgment based on the information available to 
the U.S. government, he had determined that Pakistan did not ‘possess’ a nuclear explosive 
device. Bush stated that U.S. assistance program was designed to “help Pakistan address its 
substantial and legitimate security needs, thereby reducing incentives and creating disincentives 
for Pakistani acquisition of nuclear explosives…and helps to sustain Pakistan’s commitment to 
democratic government.” Senator John Glenn was not satisfied by the president’s Pressler 
certification for Pakistan and questioned its logic in his Congressional debates. In one such 
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debate on 16 November 1989, Glenn cited a story attributed to Dr. Samuel Johnson, the great 
English writer of 18th century, which was recorded two hundred years ago as follows, “A 
gentleman who had been very unhappy in marriage, married immediately after his wife died….it 
was triumph of hope over experience.” Glenn equated it with the U.S. experience of Pakistan’s 
repeated assurances about its nuclear program and the Pressler certifications by stating “there are 
perhaps no better words to describe the most recent presidential certifications that cite Pakistan’s 
peaceful nuclear assurances as a basis for concluding that we are making progress in halting 
Pakistan’s relentless march for the bomb.”436 Glenn concluded his statement by urging that the 
administration reconsider its certifications and stated that “Pakistan wants to have its cake and 
eat it too. I understand that but just how far can we play along at this game without sacrificing 
our other international obligations – especially our commitment to nonproliferation?” 
 Even though the Congressional non-proliferation lobby criticized the administration’s 
non-proliferation policy, it was hoped by the USG that continuation of aid would deliver as Bush 
had determined and help Pakistan deal with its legitimate security needs. Therefore, to that 
effect, the decision to sell 60 F-16s to Pakistan was undertaken. In her testimony on 2 August 
1989 before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security, and Science, House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, on proposed sale of F-16s to Pakistan, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary, Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Teresita Schaffer told the Committee that 
Benazir Bhutto had requested more F-16s after thoroughly reviewing Pakistan’s military 
modernization needs given the prevalent security environment. Schaffer stated that despite 
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Indian reservations on the proposed sale of F-16s to Pakistan, the administration had concluded 
that 60 more F-16 A and Bs would “not contribute to an escalation of military technology on the 
subcontinent; change the military balance; nor destabilize the region.” Making a statement on F-
16s and the dangers of nuclear proliferation, Schaffer stated that  
None of the F-16s Pakistan already owns or is about to purchase is configured for nuclear 
delivery. Pakistan, moreover, will be obligated by contract not to modify its new 
acquisitions without the approval of the United States. Most importantly, a Pakistan with 
a credible conventional deterrent will be less motivated to purchase a nuclear weapons 
capability.437 
 
On September 28, 1989 the two governments signed an agreement under which Pakistan was to 
buy ‘60 more F-16s worth a reported $1.4 billion to be delivered between 1992 and 1996.’ In 
addition to the 60 F-16s, LOA’s for Peace Gate III and IV were also signed. The LOA for Peace 
Gate III for the sale of 11 F-16s was signed between the two governments on 9 January 1989 for 
a total value of $199.738 million, all in FMS credits. And the second LOA for Peace Gate IV 
was signed three days before Bush’s Pressler certification, on 2 October 1989 for another 17 F-
16s. The total value of the aircrafts was $1.407 billion with $658 million to be paid by the GOP 
over FY 1990-1993.438  
After having secured the F-16s deal with the Americans in exchange for fresh nuclear 
assurances, Benazir Bhutto also managed to establish good relations with her Indian counterpart, 
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Their efforts to stabilize relations between the two countries 
resulted in the signing of an important agreement between the two governments on 31 December 
                                                
437 “Proposed Sale of F-16s to Pakistan,” Statement by Teresita Schaffer to House Subcommittee on Arms Control 
on 2 August 1989 retrieved from http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t29.d30.hrg-1989-foa-
0014?accountid=11789 accessed n January 15, 2015  
438 “Chronology of Pakistan’s F-16s program,” Memorandum to Sen. John Glenn from Randy Rydell Staff of the 
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, April 12, 1995, RG, 57/a – 67/2 JHG Subject Files, Pakistan Nuclear 
Nonproliferation issue, General File, 1995-96, John Glenn Archives, Ohio State University, OH 
 274 
1989. They agreed to not attack each other’s nuclear facilities as well as to annually exchange 
lists of their nuclear facilities. While Bhutto was popular amongst the Americans and the Indians 
for her charismatic leadership and democratic values, the situation at home was not so 
encouraging for her. Benazir Bhutto had a fall out with GIK and Beg over military personnel 
matters in early 1990 which resulted in domestic instability with massive anti-Bhutto 
demonstrations demanding her resignation. Her government was accused of corruption and of 
incompetence in dealing with basic law and order situation in the country. To make matters 
worse, events in the country coincided with an Indo-Pak crisis over Kashmir in the spring of 
1990 and the international community feared a clash between the two nuclear-capable countries. 
The United States intervened to manage the crisis between India and Pakistan and issued stern 
warnings to Pakistan over its nuclear capability.  
 The 1990 Indo-Pak Crisis And The Build Up To The Pressler Sanctions 
The 1990 crisis had its roots in an armed insurgency in the Valley of Jammu and Kashmir that 
began in late 1980s. The Kashmiri separatist movement had picked up pace towards the end of 
1989 against the suppression and injustices of their government. Many young Kashmiris were 
influenced by the success of the Afghan Mujahedeen’s struggle for freedom against the Soviet 
Union and believed that they could also change the course of their destiny. Clashes between 
approximately one million people, who took to the streets defying government-imposed curfew, 
and police claimed the lives of many people. The situation in Kashmir worsened after Indian 
government’s ‘assessment’ that Pakistan Army was supporting the Kashmiri armed insurgents. 
The timings of the Kashmir insurgency coincided with a large military exercise, Zarb-e-Momin 
by the Pakistan Army, which seemed like General Beg’s response to the Indian Brasstacks 
exercise in 1986-87. As Feroz Khan documents in his book Eating Grass, the Indians detected 
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that some Pakistan army units did not return to their barracks after the military exercise ended 
which gave them the impression that they had stayed back to support the insurgents. Pakistan 
reached a similar conclusion about the Indian troop movement along the border in February 
1990. According to Khan, “the two countries were suspicious of each other, and each military 
movement led to another, creating a spiral of deployment and counterdeployment.”  And by 
April 1990, both Indian and the Pakistani armies “were partially mobilized, some units patrolling 
the border and mechanized forces activated near their operational areas.” Even though these were 
not offensive force deployments, the sheer size of the deployed men and armored divisions 
‘within fifty miles of the Pakistani border in the Rajasthan desert’ and the presence of some 
‘two-hundred thousand Indian troops’ in Kashmir gave the impression that it was not a 
peacetime deployment pattern either.  
In addition to the partial military deployments, Khan writes based on his interview with 
General Beg, that Pakistan had received ‘credible’ intelligence information about a probable 
Indo-Israeli attack on its nuclear facilities in Kahuta. Beg told Khan that he instructed Foreign 
Minister Yaqub Khan to inform the Indians of Pakistan’s retaliation against India if such a plan 
was carried out and Yaqub Khan did the needful. Yaqub Khan, however, in his interview with 
Feroz Khan dismissed Beg’s account of him delivering a ‘naked nuclear threat’ to the Indians. 
Yaqub Khan maintains that the foreign ministers did meet on January 20-23, 1990, to discuss the 
crisis but that his ‘tone was friendly’ when he told his Indian counterpart I.K. Gujral that the 
whole world was “inflamed” at the time and that both India and Pakistan ‘shared the 
responsibility to save the subcontinent from crisis.” Yaqub regretted that Gujral misunderstood 
his word to mean “nuclear flames” and ‘interpreted this reference as a threat.’ Feroz Khan also 
quotes his interview with Tanvir Ahmed Khan, Bhutto’s Secretary of Information and 
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Broadcasting, who believed that Pakistan did intend to deliver “a veiled nuclear threat during the 
1990 crisis in three ways: the media, diplomatic channels, and military movement” and that the 
‘talk of fire and flames’ was part of that nuclear threat.439 In order to signal Pakistan’s resolve to 
deter the Indians, General Beg told Feroz Khan that Benazir Bhutto “ordered the army and air 
force to get ready. A squadron of F-16s was moved to Mauripur [an air force base in Karachi] 
and we pulled out our devices and all to arm the aircraft, [which carried out] movement from 
Kahuta, movement from other places, which were picked up by the American satellites.” Beg 
revealed that maximum visibility for the movement was aimed for “because the purpose was not 
to precipitate a crisis but to deter.” Beg maintained that no Indo-Israeli attack could have 
occurred without American knowledge of it and therefore it was “necessary to convey deterrence 
signaling by letting the Americans pick up Pakistani preparations and convey it to both India 
(and Israel) about the consequences.”440  
While the aspect of nuclear signaling during the 1990 crisis is not settled in the literature 
on the subject, Feroz Khan’s interview with General Beg on the 1990 crisis in 2005 as 
documented in his book published in 2012 is the latest description of the ‘nuclear signaling’ 
aspect thus far. There is no mention of American satellites picking up information on the Kahuta 
movements in Dennis Kux’s Disenchanted Allies or in Mitchell Reiss’s Bridled Ambitions (both 
accounts discuss the 1990 crisis based on interviews with American officials involved in crisis 
management at the time). Kux writes that U.S. intelligence sources confirmed that Pakistan 
‘possessed’ nuclear weapons during the crisis since they had started ‘machining uranium metal 
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into bomb cores.’441 And Reiss maintains that though the nuclear signaling aspect of the crisis 
remains disputed ‘there was a real, if relatively low, probability of nuclear war between India 
and Pakistan in Spring 1990.’442  
The only account that mentions use of American satellites to gather intelligence during 
the 1990 crisis is of Seymour Hersh who wrote in The New Yorker in 1993, quoting an 
anonymous American analyst who was privy to the White House situation room meetings during 
the 1990 crisis that “satellite and other intelligence later produced signs of a truck convoy 
moving from the suspected nuclear-storage site in Balochistan to a nearby Air Force base.” 
Hersh also wrote that the U.S. intelligence community had seen Pakistani F-16s ‘pre-positioned 
and armed for delivery.’443 Many American and Pakistani officials and analysts have refuted 
Hersh’s story after it was published stating that his account of the nuclear dimension of the 1990 
crisis was exaggerated. Bush’s National Security Advisor General Scowcroft dismissed Hersh’s 
story the same week it was published by saying that “We were worried about a delicate situation, 
but I wouldn’t go any further than that.” On Hersh’s assertion of Pakistan’s F-16s armed and 
ready with nuclear weapons Scowcroft maintained that “there was no indication that it ever got 
that far.”444 
 Given how delicate the situation was between India and Pakistan by the summer of 1990, 
the Bush administration sent a delegation headed by Robert Gates, Deputy National Security 
Advisor on a mission to South Asia to exercise preventive diplomacy. Gates delivered two stern 
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warnings to GIK and Beg: one, to stop supporting the armed insurgency in Kashmir and second, 
to roll back the nuclear capability otherwise Bush would not be able to provide the annual 
Pressler certification. To India, Gates warned to withdraw troops from the border alerting that 
Pakistan could resort to the use of nuclear weapons in an act of desperation. According to the 
oral history interview of Ambassador Robert Oakley who was the U.S. Ambassador in Islamabad 
at the time, he along with Bill Clark, the U.S. Ambassador in India, recommended that “the U.S. 
initiate a concerted effort with the Soviets, Chinese, Japanese and the EU countries to have each 
of these governments bring some pressure on Pakistan and India – in their own way and on their 
own time.” Oakley maintains that concerted efforts by ‘all major powers’ influenced India and 
Pakistan and by the time Gates mission had met and warned both countries of the consequences 
of their armed conflict, ‘tensions had already begun to abate.’ According to Oakley,  
Both sides used his [Gate] visit well by using it as an excuse to back off –– which they 
had already decided prior to his visit. Gate’s trip was very useful as a cover for both 
Pakistan and India and to insure that the tensions stayed in abeyance.445 
 
The crisis ended after several weeks with India and Pakistan pulling back their troops from the 
border. However, for Pakistan another crisis was in the making. On August 6, 1990 President 
GIK exercised the eighth amendment to dissolve the national assembly and dismissed Benazir 
Bhutto’s government. A caretaker government was installed and new general elections were 
called on October 24, 1990. There were two main challenges for GIK after Bhutto’s dismissal: 
one, Pakistan’s decision to join the U.S. led coalition to liberate Kuwait after the Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait that took place on August 2, 1990, and second, convince the Bush administration that 
the status of Pakistan’s nuclear program was ‘unchanged’ since last year’s certification. While it 
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succeeded on the first account and joined the U.S. led coalition, it failed to convince the 
administration on the status of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program.  
 The Pressler Sanctions on Pakistan 
October 1, 1990 is etched in the memory of many Pakistanis as the date on which the United 
States of America showed its ‘true colors’ and parted ways with its one-time ally, Pakistan. But 
more than that date, what Pakistanis remember of October 1990 is that it was when U.S. 
slammed Pakistan with ‘Pressler’ sanctions. And the popular account of the U.S. sanctions 
relates to the ‘disposability’ of Pakistan for the United States after the latter had achieved its 
strategic foreign policy objectives by ‘using’ Pakistan to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan. 
Based on his observations during his stay in Pakistan from November 1995 to April 1996, 
Dennis Kux writes of his impressions of the resentment in Pakistani public after the Pressler 
sanction as follows 
Pakistanis were particularly incensed that Pressler amendment sanctions penalized only 
their country and did not punish India, which had actually exploded a nuclear device in 
1974. They charged that the United States had once more –– as in 1965 –– proved to be a 
“fickle friend.” Observers commented acidly, “With Afghan war over, the United States 
no longer need[s] Pakistan. You Americans have discarded us like a piece of used 
Kleenex.”446 
 
In the absence of President Bush’s certification and determination on Pakistan’s lack of 
‘possession’ of nuclear weapons, the Pressler amendment automatically went into effect after 
October 1, 1990. But it was not a surprise for Pakistan, not at least for the GOP for it had been 
forewarned. On 19 September 1990, a month after GIK had dismissed Benazir Bhutto’s 
government, U.S. Ambassador Robert Oakley met him in Islamabad. He carried with him a 
detailed letter from President Bush informing GIK of the consequences if presidential 
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certification on Pakistan’s nuclear program was withheld for Pakistan for FY 1991 triggering the 
Pressler amendment. Bush outrightly told GIK that it would not be possible for him to certify in 
October 1990. He wrote 
In recent months we have obtained information giving us reason to believe that the status 
of your nuclear program has changed. This is deeply disturbing to me, particularly 
because of my responsibilities under the Pressler amendment. I must in all honesty advise 
you that under present circumstances, it is not possible for me to certify Pakistan’s 
compliance with this law. Much is at stake for our bilateral relationship, for democracy in 
Pakistan and for peace and stability in the subcontinent.  
 
Bush informed GIK that he would try to approach Congress to delay cutting off U.S. assistance 
to Pakistan for a period of time until the new government was in place and had a fair chance to 
stop Pakistan’s progress towards nuclear weapons but that in order for Pakistan to warrant such 
flexibility, the GOP had to do more than simply give more assurances. Bush reminded GIK of 
his earlier warnings to him and Benazir Bhutto about the steps Pakistan needed to undertake if 
the Pressler certification was to be made. In addition to Pakistan working cooperatively with the 
U.S. towards a ‘negotiated, regional non-proliferation solution,’ Ambassador Oakley repeated 
three steps in his meeting with GIK that President Bush had referred to in his letter and which 
were essential for certification 
1. Cease production of highly enriched uranium 
2. Refrain from production of highly enriched uranium metal 
3. Ensure that Pakistan does not possess any highly enriched uranium metal in the 
form of nuclear device components 
 
After sharing the contents of Bush’s letter, Ambassador Oakley told GIK that each step was 
critical to the President’s ability to certify. Oakley informed GIK that the United States 
appreciated Pakistan’s nuclear restraint policy the previous year (1989) of stopping uranium 
enrichment ‘because it halted the further accumulation of material which could be used to 
fabricate nuclear weapons.’ And the GOP was warned that restarting uranium enrichment would 
 281 
seriously ‘undermine the credibility of the new government’s assurances that it has no intention 
of acquiring nuclear weapons and would therefore undermine the president’s ability to certify.’ 
In elaborating each of the steps mentioned above, Oakley stressed that refraining from the 
production of highly enriched uranium metal was essential because ‘production of metal’ clearly 
suggested ‘an intention to fabricate nuclear weapons components.’ Moreover, if the highly 
enriched uranium is kept in the UF6 (uranium hexafluoride gas) form rather than converting to 
metal, it is an indication that ‘political and technical barriers have been inserted in the process of 
weapons fabrication.’ Oakley repeated all the previous times Pakistan was warned to ensure that 
it did not ‘possess any enriched uranium metal in the form of nuclear device components, or 
nuclear cores’ for if one such core component was fabricated, ‘Pakistan would be able to 
assemble a nuclear device on very short notice’ thereby making it impossible for President Bush 
to certify. For the Pressler law to take effect, ‘final assembly of a nuclear explosive device’ was 
not a requirement to meet the Pressler amendment definition of possession of a nuclear device. 
Further, in order for Pakistan to escape the Pressler sanctions, it was essential that Pakistan not 
‘possess’ even ‘one highly enriched uranium core.’447 In his oral history interview, Ambassador 
Oakley remembers the delivery of Bush’s letter to GIK as a ‘unique experience’ in his life. He 
stated 
It was a very uncomfortable experience which I did not perform with any great relish. I 
gave it to the President; I told him that I had talked to him about this eventuality for 
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months. He was shocked and most upset because he, like most of the Pakistani 
leadership, never expected the U.S. to take such drastic action…. The Pakistani 
government did not release the letter so that the press and the public were really unaware 
of our decision until October 1 when our assistance programs were stopped entirely. In 
fact, as I remember it, the first public announcement of our action was made by some 
Congressmen –– the supporters of non-proliferation.448 
 
Ambassador Oakley also recalled Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan meeting Secretary of 
State James Baker in the UN in October 1990, a meeting Oakley attended since he was in the 
U.S. on leave from the mission in Islamabad. As Oakley recollects, Yaqub Khan told Baker that 
Pakistan could take actions to re-freeze the uranium enrichment program but would not destroy 
what had already been built and that was unacceptable to the United States.449 But the decision 
was still not shared with the Pakistani nation and an impression was given that some solution to 
the Pressler issue was being worked out. Even though Yaqub Khan and Secretary Baker’s 
meeting ended on a categorical note, upon his return to Pakistan on 12 October 1990, Yaqub 
Khan stated that the Pressler amendment certification was ‘under review by the US 
administration’ and high-level discussions were underway to ‘resolve the issue of restoring 
military and economic assistance to Pakistan.’450 Ambassador Najmuddin Shaikh who was 
Pakistan’s Ambassador to the U.S. from October 1990 to November 1991 recalls that the U.S. 
did share information about the non-issuance of the Pressler certification shortly after the 
Benazir government was dismissed and believes that ‘the victory in Afghanistan [which was 
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consequently a reduced requirement of Pakistan’s cooperation] and the immediate accretion in 
the strength of the “non-proliferation lobby” precipitated the decision to refuse certification.”451 
 The ‘non-proliferation lobby’ in the United States referred to by Ambassador Shaikh was 
indeed satisfied with President Bush’s non-certification on Pakistan even when Bush was 
‘genuinely sad’ about his hands being tied by the Pressler amendment.452 But some were more 
sympathetic to Pakistan in the aftermath of Pressler than others. In his memo to the members of 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Oct 2, 1990, Peter Galbraith, staff member of the 
SFRC informed the Senators of the impact of non-certification on Pakistan. He wrote 
Non-certification has two consequences. First, it should cut off all assistance and arms 
deliveries to Pakistan including aid in the pipeline and military equipment purchased but 
not yet delivered. This will deliver a severe blow to a Pakistan economy reeling from the 
fall-out of the Gulf crisis and to a military heavily dependent on U.S. equipment.  
 
The second severe consequence of non-certification will be on India. Although the legal 
standard for certification is affirmative knowledge of a negative (i.e. Pakistan’s non-
possession), non-certification will be widely seen in India as a U.S. declaration that 
Pakistan has nuclear weapons. This in turn could lead to a politically weak V.P. Singh 
government…to declare India an official nuclear power and perhaps to stage a second 
test. This would be the prelude to a South Asia nuclear arms race.  
 
Galbraith suggested to the committee that in order to avoid both these consequences and instead 
of extending or making a legislative change to the amendment, it would be ‘a better course’ if the 
administration was to announce that the certification was ‘under review.’ Doing so would 
provide the newly elected government (post-24 October 1990 elections) time to ‘take the 
necessary steps to bring Pakistan into compliance.’ Such ‘compliance’ Galbraith argued would 
not be difficult and would ‘essentially involve a two-week (or so) lead time prior to possession of 
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nuclear weapons rather than actual possession.’ Furthermore, Galbraith suggested that the ‘under 
review’ approach would ‘avoid the shortcoming of the U.S. backing down on a major demand.’ 
He reasoned that “for years the Administration and Congress have both told Pakistan it could not 
have aid or arms sales if it developed nuclear weapons. Now that they appear to be crossing this 
line, we would lose all credibility on the nuclear issue (and perhaps other issues) if we now say 
we didn’t really mean it.”453 However, voices like Galbraith’s were few and far in between.  
The administration’s efforts to ‘funnel short-term foreign aid’ to Pakistan in the absence 
of presidential certification met resistance at Capitol Hill. Congressman Stephen Solarz, 
Chairman House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs said at a meeting of 
his subcommittee that ‘Pakistan’s continued efforts to develop nuclear weapons required the 
administration to enforce a law that would end about $500 million in annual economic and 
military aid’ and that ‘under these circumstances, it would appear we would have no choice but 
to terminate all U.S. assistance to Pakistan, as required by law.’ Solarz reflected Congressional 
impatience with the GOP and stated that ‘he would no longer agree to such waivers.’454 In 
addition to Senators Solarz, Larry Pressler, Alan Cranston and several others, Senator John 
Glenn’s record of opposition to Pakistan’s nuclear program was not new. He had registered his 
opposition to Pakistan’s bomb and to U.S. aid facilitating Pakistan’s nuclear program through 
numerous floor statements, letters to various presidents, newspaper editorials, Congressional 
hearings and his drafted non-proliferation legislations for more than a decade. And when the 
administration approached Congress one more time to waive the Pressler provisions, Glenn said 
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‘no way’ and that as long as he was in the Senate, aid was not to be resumed so long as Pakistan 
remained non-compliant to U.S. non-proliferation laws. Part of Glenn’s conviction of Pakistan’s 
lack-of-innocence was that the administration had shared with Glenn in April 1990 the news of 
the secret existence of a ‘design of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb’ developed by U.S. national 
laboratories that had been shared with two the GOP officials in 1986. This information was part 
of a declassified secret working paper submitted to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
by Admiral James D. Watkins, Secretary of Energy, Department of Energy (DOE), in response 
to the Committee’s inquiries about DOE’s involvement in the certification of Pakistan’s nuclear 
program under previous administrations. In his paper, Watkins informed the Chairman of the 
Committee David L. Boren, that ‘prior to 1990, DOE’s principal role in the development of the 
Administration’s certification of Pakistan’s nuclear program involved providing input to the 
preparation of an Intelligence Community estimate on Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities.’ In 1990, 
the DOE became ‘an active participant in the Pressler certification process for the first time.’ 
According to the heavily redacted declassified copy of Watkin’s working paper, the DOE had 
submitted the following replies to the Committee’s questions 
Was this model ever shown or briefed to other foreign nations; when and under what 
legal authority? 
Pakistani Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan was accompanied by Pakistan’s Ambassador to 
the U.S., Ejaz Azim Malek, when he was shown the model in 1986. Mr. Robert Gates, 
then-Deputy Director of the CIA, approved the State Department request to show the 
model to Pakistan’s Foreign Minister. The then-DOE Assistant Secretary for Defense 
Programs, Admiral Sylvester M. Foley (retired) approved the release of Secret Restricted 
Data. 
 
Who in the Congress has been shown this model? 
To our knowledge, no member of Congress has seen this model.  
 
How long was the gap in time between creation of the model and notification of 
Congress? 
Ambassador Richard T. Kennedy briefed Senator Glenn on the model’s existence in 
April 1990.  
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Have any other models of nuclear weapon designs of any other nations been prepared or 
shared with foreign nationals? If so, which nations, when were these models created, and 
who in Congress has been notified (and when)? 
No other models of proliferant nuclear weapon designs have been built by DOE or by its 
laboratories.455 
 
This document also reveals that despite the administration’s knowledge of Pakistan ‘possessing’ 
nuclear weapons since 1986, certifications of Pakistan’s non-possession were provided for the 
continuation of U.S. economic and military assistance until 1990. However, that was about to 
change. Given the strong congressional opposition, the administration’s attempts to seek a 
Pressler waiver in order to continue aid to Pakistan until after the elections proved unsuccessful. 
Mian Mohammad Nawaz Sharif, who was the leader of the opposition during Benazir Bhutto’s 
government, won the October 1990 elections to become the 12th Prime Minister of Pakistan. In 
his election campaign, Sharif had blamed Benazir Bhutto of selling out to the “American nuclear 
imperialism, blackmail and exploitation.”456 But Benazir Bhutto was not out of the national 
scene. She accepted her defeat graciously and became the leader of the opposition.  
 The Aftermath of The Pressler Sanctions 
The Sharif government had inherited the Pressler sanctions and its consequences –– the biggest 
being the issue of continued payments and the subsequent release of the PG III and IV F-16s. 
The administration attempted to find a way to get those to Pakistan but the Congressional odds 
were against them. According to Dennis Kux, few in the Bush administration were happy about 
the Pressler sanctions especially the Defense Department. The most immediate issue on which a 
settlement had to be reached by both governments was whether Pakistan was to continue making 
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payments for those F-16s that were signed to be delivered but were now withheld due to the 
sanctions. Kux writes 
In part to help the financially troubled General Dynamics Corporation, with whom 
Pakistan had contracted to purchase the aircraft, the Pentagon urged Islamabad not to stop 
payments –– even though deliveries were frozen by the Pressler amendment. Defense 
Department officials asserted that nonpayment would breach the F-16 contract and make 
it harder to gain congressional support for an easing or lifting of Pressler sanctions. 
 
Pakistan agreed to continue to make the payments and “even though the F-16s remained 
mothballed on the western desert sands of Arizona, the U.S. supplier received an additional 
several hundred million dollars before Pakistan finally suspended disbursements in 1993.”457 
According to some Pakistani perspectives, continuation of payments for the F-16s gave Pakistan 
hope to recover the F-16s if the Pressler sanctions were lifted. Riaz Mohammad Khan who was 
Director General for Afghanistan and the Soviet Union affairs at Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs from 1989 to 1992 explained Pakistan’s position on the Pressler amendment and 
payments for the F-16s as follows 
Initially what greatly rankled with Pakistani side was that the sanctions imposed under 
Pressler were applied as if with a vengeance. A large number of tanks sent for retrofitting 
and substantial quantities of equipment which was purchased were literally off loaded 
from ships and confiscated. F-16s deal also presented a dilemma for Pakistan. If Pakistan 
had stopped payment of installments, it would have been blamed for default and 
according to the negotiated terms, the agreement would have legally lapsed with Pakistan 
losing the money already paid. By keeping to the schedule of payments Pakistan hoped to 
maintain the legal integrity of the agreement and to keep alive the possibility of either 
receiving the planes or the money under improved circumstances in the future.458 
 
Former Ambassador Najmuddin Shaikh also maintains the same  
From the State Department’s perspective it was important that the installments for the 
undelivered F-16s continue to be paid since this was an FMS contract which the US 
government has reached with the suppliers and in case of our default the bill would have 
to be picked up by the US government. We were therefore pressed to continue payments 
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and even pay parking fees for the planes that were parked at a US air force base. Again, 
this was done because there was the futile hope that they would eventually be released.459  
 
In addition to the challenges Pakistan faced on continued payments for the withheld F-16s, 
Pakistan’s economic progress also suffered due to the Pressler sanctions. Feroz Hassan Khan 
writes that “in 1990, Islamabad embraced economic liberalization, which led to an average 
growth rate of 5 percent until 1993.” In his interview with Khan, former Finance Minister Sartaj 
Aziz recalled the damaging impact of the Pressler sanctions on Pakistan’s economy as follows 
It is ironic to recall that the much-delayed economic liberalization programme of 1991-
1993 coincided with the Pressler sanctions….Pakistan undertook these investments in the 
expectation that multilateral and bilateral donor agencies would support the required 
investments. But the stoppage of American assistance reduced the net flow of foreign 
assistance from $3.4 billion in 1990 to $1.9 billion in 1993…..[M]any industrial units 
closed down and the rate of that brought down the overall GDP growth rate from 6.5% in 
the 1980s to 4.6% in the 1990s.460 
 
However, despite the Pressler sanctions, Pakistan under Nawaz Sharif’s government entered into 
several contracts with China to build nuclear power plants in Pakistan and to acquire missile 
technology. In 1992, based on the U.S. intelligence of missile technology transfers between 
Pakistan and China, especially the nuclear-capable missile M-11, the Bush administration 
imposed sanctions and blacklisted the ‘Chinese and Pakistani entities involved in the 
transaction.’ Even though neither Pakistan nor China were part of the Missile Technology 
Control Regime (MTCR), U.S. law ‘imposed sanctions on countries that violated MTCR 
standards, which prohibited export of missiles capable of delivering a payload of more than 500 
kilograms over a distance greater than 300 kilometers.’461 After China’s agreement to abide by 
the MTCR guidelines, the sanctions were lifted in 1992 only to be reversed again in 1993.  
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While the issue of the release of F-16s for which Pakistan had made payments did not 
resolve during the Bush administration, the State Department did find a way to support Pakistan 
by its decision to allow private commercial sales of defense articles and spare parts for those F-
16s that were already in Pakistan’s inventory even after the sanctions were invoked.  
 Bush Administration’s Interpretation of the Pressler Amendment 
In early 1992, the administration was embroiled in a controversy about its interpretation of the 
Pressler amendment that allowed private commercial sales of defense articles and supplies to 
Pakistan from October 1990 to March 1992. What made it difficult for the administration to 
justify its approval of private commercial sales to the GOP was a statement by Pakistan’s 
Foreign Secretary Shahryar Khan on Pakistan’s nuclear capability at the UN forum on 07 
February 1992. His statement became the first formal acknowledgement by the GOP of 
Pakistan’s possession of nuclear capability. Khan stated that Pakistan had possessed the nuclear 
capability since 1989 but decided not to develop the nuclear bomb and instead froze the 
program.462  
The Bush administration had continued to provide Pakistan the supply of commercial 
sales of over $100 million despite the ban on military sales under the Pressler amendment. It 
appeared that the administration failed to apprise Congress of its commercial sales to Pakistan 
when it was under the Pressler sanctions and it was through an inquiry from the State 
Department Inspector General’s Office in March 1992 that brought this violation to light leading 
to a hearing on the subject by Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 30, 1992.  
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 The administration’s position was that ‘no new technology’ was being provided to 
Pakistan and the ‘commercial sales’ to the GOP consisted of ‘spare parts for the F-16s’ that were 
already in Pakistan’s inventory. As a result of the Pressler sanctions and aid cut off, Pakistan had 
suffered a loss of approximately $600 million since October 1990 and it was argued that it was 
‘more punishment than any other country had suffered for a violation of U.S. law.’  
On 30 July 1992, Senate Foreign Relations Committee conducted an important hearing 
on the administration’s interpretation of the Pressler amendment presided over by the Chairman 
of the Committee Senator Claiborne Pell. Senator Pell told the committee that the Pressler 
amendment clearly stated that ‘no military equipment or technology may be sold to Pakistan’ 
under any law unless the presidential certification of Pakistan’s non-possession of nuclear 
weapons is provided and Pakistan was given a clear choice to choose between a ‘sophisticated 
conventional military capability’ and a ‘nuclear capability.’ In his opening statement, Senator 
Pell admonished the administration for breaking the law by permitting Pakistan to ‘buy spare 
parts for its existing American-supplied weapons and to make commercial purchases in the 
United States.’ Pell argued that doing so defeated the ‘nonproliferation goals of the Pressler 
amendment’ and was a ‘blatant violation of the law’.  
Senators Larry Pressler, John Glenn and Alan Cranston –– the original authors of the 
Pressler amendment –– presented extensive arguments during the hearing on the administration’s 
violation of the Pressler amendment to accommodate Pakistan. Senator Pressler shared with the 
committee, a jointly drafted letter by the three Senators written to Secretary of State James Baker 
expressing their shock and disappointment at the administration’s ‘interpretation’ of the Pressler 
amendment to continue commercial arms sales to Pakistan. The letter stated  
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We are stunned to learn that the Department of State is considering the sale of spare parts 
and other military equipment to Pakistan in violation of Section 620 E(e) of the Foreign 
Assistance Act (the Pressler Amendment)….Since October 1, 1990 the President has 
been unable to make the Pressler certification. As a result, all military sales and transfers, 
including all spare parts and items paid for by Pakistan but not yet delivered, are 
prohibited. The language of the Pressler Amendment is straightforward and absolutely 
clear. No military equipment or technology is to be sold or transferred to Pakistan 
without the required certification. We are the authors of this provision, and we chose our 
words carefully. We used the broadest possible language so that all military sales and 
transfers, regardless of source or type of control, would be blocked in the event Pakistan 
failed to comply with its non-proliferation obligations….We cannot comprehend how our 
simple and direct language could conceivably be interpreted as permitting commercial 
sales. We recognize that some elements of your Department do not like the policy 
embodied in the Pressler Amendment. The appropriate response, however, is to seek a 
revision of the law, not to find some totally baseless legal rationale for evading it….No 
military equipment or technology may go to Pakistan –– whether such technology is FMS 
or commercial sales, or whether such technology is a gift or a loan –– under the terms of 
the Pressler Amendment.463  
 
Michael J. Matheson, Principal Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. State Department provided the 
administration’s position on the interpretation of the Pressler Amendment. Matheson stated 
We believe that the Pressler Amendment does not, as a matter of law, prohibit the 
licensing of commercial arms exports. And by that, I mean exports conducted by private 
parties and not financed by the U.S. Government….the operative language of the Pressler 
amendment does not, in our view, deal with the licensing of commercial arms exports. 
Like the rest of the Foreign Assistance Act, the amendment is directed to the U.S. 
Government rather than to private parties….In commercial arms export transactions, the 
Government does not sell or transfer military equipment or technology. Nor are such 
private sales and transfers authorized by any act, and in fact, they require no statutory 
authorization. Where Congress has intended to prohibit the licensing of commercial arms 
exports, it has done so explicitly, recognizing that this is an unusual step….we examined 
the legislative record of the Pressler amendment to see whether Congress had indicated 
any attempt to depart from this clear pattern, and we found none….the record focuses on 
the effect of U.S. assistance programs and FMS sales on Pakistani actions in the nuclear 
area. The record suggests that Congress intended to reverse the effect of the waivers that 
the executive branch had given to exempt Pakistan from sanctions under the nuclear 
nonproliferation provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act. But these sanctions do not 
include the suspension of commercial arms exports. Given this history, we could not 
reasonably have advised our clients [policymaking officials of the State Department] that 
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the Pressler amendment prohibited the licensing of commercial arms exports, and we did 
not do so.464  
 
The administration had a case. While Senators Pressler and Glenn argued during the hearing that 
their ‘intent’ was to include ‘private commercial transactions/sales’ to Pakistan be suspended as 
part of the Pressler sanctions, the legislative record did not include the term ‘commercial sales’ 
to express that intent –– in the absence of which it was reasonable to assume that commercial 
sales were permitted. In explaining the administration’s intent to continue provision of limited 
commercial sales to Pakistan, John R. Malott, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near 
Eastern and South Asian Affairs stated 
After the invocation of the Pressler amendment, our relationship with Pakistan has been 
severely strained. What we are trying to do is to maintain some degree of access and 
influence with a government whose cooperation is essential to meeting key American 
objectives in the region, including nonproliferation, but also narcotics and stability in 
Afghanistan. We believe that if we are to promote a regional solution to nonproliferation, 
then cooperative ties with both countries, India and Pakistan, are essential. Instead of 
helping us accomplish our nonproliferation and other policy objectives, a termination of 
all sales could work against their achievement. It would undercut those people in the 
Pakistani Government who are seeking to improve their government’s relationship with 
the United States. And rather than cave in, Pakistan most likely would look for other 
options.465 
 
The administration officials informed the Committee that due to the Pressler amendment the U.S. 
was withholding 11 F-16s in addition to another batch of 60 F-16s for which Pakistan had 
already made the payments and that it was a ‘heavy price to pay’ for a country that had ‘great 
concerns about its national security’ and which was heavily dependent on the U.S. ‘military 
supplies and spare parts.’ Fig. 5.1 provides the approved amounts of defense articles and services 
under ‘commercial arms exports’ for Pakistan subsequent to the application of the Pressler 
amendment in October 1990.  
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Table 6.1 Approved Sales of Defense Articles and Services to Pakistan After The Pressler 
Sanctions 1990-1992 (in $ million)466 
 
 
 
 Conclusion 
The Bush administration tried to continue Reagan’s non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan 
and provided certification on Pakistan’s non-possession of nuclear weapons in 1989. But 
Pakistan’s nuclear program and its continued progress towards a nuclear weapons capability 
came to focus in 1990 after the Indo-Pak crisis over Kashmir. U.S. intelligence on Pakistan’s 
nuclear program made it difficult for President Bush to issue the presidential certification on 
Pakistan’s nuclear program which triggered the Pressler amendment. Pressler sanctions on 
Pakistan from October 1990 onwards strained Pak-U.S. relations. Although Pakistan suffered the 
loss of $600 million worth of economic aid and military sales due to Pressler sanctions, the 
outstanding issue remained the delivery of 28 F-16s under the PG III and IV agreements with an 
additional agreement of 60 more F-16s that Pakistan had signed with the U.S. in 1988 and 1989. 
Pakistan had to continue to make payments for the withheld F-16s albeit with a hope that the 
sanctions would be removed sooner than later.  
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Jan.1 to Mar. 31, 1991 21,781,980 
Apr. 1 to June 30, 1991 44,369,819 
July 1 to Sept. 30, 1991 41,060,873 
Oct. 1 to Dec. 31, 1991 50,175,898 
Jan. 1 to Mar. 31, 1992 21,781,980 
 294 
The non-proliferation lobby in the Congress had made it difficult for the administration to 
accommodate Pakistan’s economic and military needs until the GOP rolled back its nuclear 
program. And even though the GOP showed continued progress towards a nuclear weapons 
capability to the extent of issuing public statements about possessing such capability since 1989, 
the Bush administration found ways to cautiously facilitate Pakistan. From October 1990 until 
March 1992, the administration allowed $100 million worth of private commercial sales to 
Pakistan for defense articles and spare parts of F-16s that were in PAF’s inventory. The 
administration maintained that in doing so it did not violate the Pressler law and that its intention 
was not to isolate Pakistan after the sanctions but to continue to engage the GOP on issues of 
regional stability.  
The administration did achieve its limited objectives after the Pressler sanctions and 
Pakistan-U.S. relations did not deteriorate as they had when Carter invoked the Symington 
amendment in 1979. Pakistan joined the U.S.-led coalition to send its forces to Saudi Arabia 
during the first Gulf War, again with the hopes that by doing so the administration might have a 
change of heart over Pressler. But given the now-open status of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons 
program, its capability and its acquisition of nuclear-capable missiles, it was hard for the Bush 
administration to look the other way. There was not going to be another presidential certification 
or determination on Pakistan’s non-possession. After a hiatus of ten years, another chapter got 
added to Pakistan’s narrative of its disposability as an ally to the US after the Pressler sanctions 
during the Bush administration. Given their timing, the sanctions were viewed in the light of the 
U.S. disengagement with Pakistan after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. As Bush’s term 
drew to a close, one thing was clear: Pakistan had taken the Pressler challenge and it was not 
going to roll back its nuclear weapons program.  
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Chapter 7 - Clinton’s Non-proliferation Policy Towards Pakistan 
William Jefferson Clinton became the 42nd President of the United States and stayed in office for 
two consecutive terms with his first four-year term beginning in January 1993. With Al Gore as 
his Vice President, Clinton appointed Warren Christopher as his Secretary of State (who had also 
previously served as Carter’s Secretary of State) and Anthony Lake as his National Security 
Advisor. Clinton had won the presidency in the first U.S. campaign after the Cold War and his 
vision was to refresh the look of American foreign policy in this new world where the U.S. had 
clearly emerged as the sole superpower. Clinton pledged to promote the values of democracy, 
human rights and non-proliferation –– areas in which the Democrats had always considered 
themselves at a higher pedestal than their Republican counterparts. Out of these three policy 
areas, nuclear non-proliferation and the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) emerged 
as the most important policy area for the Clinton administration in his first term given the 
proliferation dangers in the Newly Independent States (NIS) of Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus 
–– all three of which had inherited approximately 3000 former Soviet nuclear weapons. While 
Clinton had some success bringing the NIS into the NPT fold, he was not so lucky in South Asia.  
Amongst the foreign policy challenges that Clinton inherited from the Bush administration, 
Pakistan’s continuing advances in nuclear weapons development, Pak-China nuclear technology 
cooperation and Indo-Pak tensions over Kashmir dictated his South Asian foreign policy agenda. 
At the beginning of his term, Clinton set out his non-proliferation agenda to achieve a 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty by 1996 and also to achieve global consensus on the 
fissile material production cutoff for nuclear weapons. Though the international community 
welcomed his initiatives, South Asia with India and Pakistan as two nuclear threshold states 
posed enormous challenges for the administration on both counts.     
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 Corresponding to Clinton’s two terms in office, ‘political musical chairs’ ensued in 
Pakistan between Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto where the two leaders alternatively set shop 
for brief periods between 1993 and 1999. When Clinton started his first term, Nawaz Sharif was 
still in office. It was not until March 1993 when Sharif attempted to repeal the eighth amendment 
to strip the president of his powers that President Ghulam Ishaq Khan decided Sharif’s fate. A 
month later, GIK called for fresh general elections by dissolving the National Assembly and 
dismissing Sharif’s government. The charges against Sharif –– corruption, incompetence, 
nepotism –– were almost identical to those GIK had used to dismiss Benazir Bhutto’s 
government in 1990. But Sharif refused to go down without a fight and in May 1993 he filed a 
petition challenging GIK’s order of his government’s dismissal in the Supreme Court. In what 
became a historic decision in Pakistan’s political and constitutional history, the Supreme Court 
unanimously decided to reinstate the National Assembly and Nawaz Sharif as the Prime Minister 
of Pakistan stating in its decision of 26 May 1993 that the President of Pakistan, GIK’s decision 
to dismiss Sharif’s government was an unlawful act since there was no constitutional breakdown 
warranting the president’s use of his powers under the eighth amendment. However, the rivalry 
between GIK and Sharif after the latter’s reinstatement had made it impossible for the 
government to function. The political standoff between GIK and Sharif ended after Army’s 
mediation forcing both to resign from their respective offices in July 1993. General elections 
were held in October 1993 and Benazir Bhutto became the Prime Minister of Pakistan for the 
second time. After the presidential elections, Bhutto appointed Farooq Leghari as the 8th 
President of Pakistan and the first Baloch to become the president since Pakistan’s independence 
in 1947. Leghari did not have a political background and he was carefully chosen to serve as a 
puppet head but he surprised everyone by dismissing Benazir Bhutto’s government in November 
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1996 exercising his powers under the eighth amendment. This time the charges against Bhutto’s 
government were yet again corruption, incompetence to maintain law and order in the country 
especially Karachi, extra-judicial killings but above all, Benazir’s blaming the Army and the 
President for the death of her younger brother Murtaza Ali Bhutto who was shot in a public 
police encounter on 20 September 1996. Elections were held in February 1997 and once again 
brought Nawaz Sharif to power as the 12th Prime Minister of Pakistan. It was during this second 
term that Sharif was successful in repealing the eighth amendment curtailing presidential powers 
to dismiss an elected national assembly. Sharif’s stay in power however was shortened by a 
military coup in October 1999 led by General Pervez Musharraf who had been handpicked by 
Nawaz Sharif to become the Chief of the Army Staff and also the Chairman Joints Chief a year 
prior to the coup.   
 During approximately three-year long terms each of Benazir Bhutto’s government from 
October 1993 to September 1996 and Nawaz Sharif’s government from February 1997 to 
October 1999, U.S.-Pakistan bilateral relations were anything but steady. However, there was but 
only one constant –– Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program.  
This chapter examines the Clinton administration’s non-proliferation policy towards 
Pakistan from 1993 to 2001 in the wake of the developments in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons 
program, enactment of the Brown amendment resulting in the release of defense equipment for 
Pakistan, the administration’s ‘blind-eye’ to Pak-China and Pak-North Korea missile and nuclear 
technology cooperation, resolution of the embargoed F-16s for Pakistan, Pakistan’s nuclear 
weapons tests in May 1998 and U.S. nuclear diplomacy during the Indo-Pak Kargil crisis in 
1999.  
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President Clinton’s eight years in office corresponded with Pakistan’s final march 
towards an overt nuclear capability. India and in response, Pakistan, tested their nuclear weapons 
in May 1998 triggering the Glenn-Symington sanctions against both countries –– perhaps the 
only time Pakistan was satisfied about equitable non-proliferation justice meted out by any U.S. 
administration. The Clinton administration’s non-proliferation policy has been heavily criticized 
over a period of years but for Pakistan, these final eight years were critical in perfecting and 
testing its nuclear weapons capability. Both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif’s government 
refused to give in to any pressure, negligible as it was, on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. 
The events discussed in this chapter reveal how Clinton administration’s non-proliferation policy 
resembled that of Reagan and Bush’s policies towards Pakistan and instead of curtailing 
Pakistan’s drive towards an overt nuclear status –– indirectly facilitated it. The Clinton 
administration believed that the Pressler sanctions were not an effective way of integrating 
Pakistan into the non-proliferation regime and supported the Brown amendment. This eased the 
effect of the Pressler sanctions allowing for a one-time release of the defense equipment for 
which Pakistan had paid before the Pressler amendment but had been withheld after its sanctions 
by the USG. The U.S. administration made several accommodations for Pakistan like ignoring 
the sale of M-11 missile transfer from China to Pakistan, Pakistan-North Korea missile 
technology trade, and China’s sale of ring-magnets (a critical component for gas centrifuge 
plants) to Pakistan to facilitate its uranium enrichment program. By shifting its non-proliferation 
goalposts, the Clinton administration deliberately overlooked Pakistan’s nuclear weapons 
development, which allowed Pakistan to be in a position to test its nuclear weapons in 1998 in 
response to the Indian nuclear tests. 
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 Pakistan’s Embargoed Defense Equipment, F-16s and  
The Brown Amendment 
Benazir Bhutto started her second term in office in October 1993 by openly stating in her 
televised inaugural address that Pakistan would not dismantle its nuclear weapons program, a 
statement that was in deep contrast to her assurances to the United States against the existence of 
such a program just three years earlier when she was in power.467 No longer deterred by a hostile 
president or excluded from the nuclear decision-making circle by the Army, Benazir Bhutto 
vigorously worked towards the release of Pakistan’s F-16s and other defense equipment for 
which Pakistan had been making payments until 1993. Fig. 6.1 shows the total value of 
Pakistan’s FMS program and payments made by the GOP for the F-16s from 1989 to 1993 for 
the PG III and IV programs that were signed in 1989.  
  
                                                
467 Edward A. Gargan, “Bhutto Stands by Nuclear Program,” The New York Times, 21 Oct 1993 (New York Times 
1923-Current File), A.12, ProQuest Historical Newspapers  
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Table 7.1 Pakistan’s 28 Undelivered F-16s468 
11 F-16s Undelivered 
PEACE GATE III: LOA Signed in 09 Jan 1989 
Case Value: $199.738 M - Funded with $199.738 M in FMS Credits  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 F-16s Undelivered 
PEACE GATE IV: LOA Signed in 02 Oct 1989  
Case Value: $1.407 B, Collections $658 M - Funded entirely by the GOP national funds $658 M  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
468 Tables reproduced from “Undelivered Pakistan F-16,” RG: 57/a-67-2, JHG Files, Pakistan Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Issues, General File, 1995-1996, 139-025-8, Box 67, John Glenn Archives, Ohio State University, 
OH. After the dismissal of Sharif’s government in July 1993, the caretaker Prime Minister Moinuddin Qureshi, a 
Pakistani economist and former vice president of the World Bank stopped payments to the General Dynamics 
Corporation for the F-16s that were stored in Arizona at Pakistan’s expense. Dennis Kux also provides a similar 
account in Disenchanted Allies, 325 
Fiscal Year Amount of FMS 
Credit Used 
($ Million) 
FY 1989 0.105 
FY 1990 48.905 
FY 1991 39.276 
FY 1992 87.262 
FY 1993 24.190 
Total $199.738 M 
Fiscal Year Amount of Cash 
Paid 
($ Million) 
FY 1990 50.000 
FY 1991 150.000 
FY 1992 243.000 
FY 1993 215.000 
Total $658.000 M 
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In the Clinton administration there was sympathy with Pakistan’s case regarding the Pressler 
sanctions in both the State Department (especially the Bureau of South Asian Affairs headed by 
Assistant Secretary Robin Raphel) and the Department of Defense (headed by Secretary of 
Defense William Perry). In addition to Secretaries Raphel and Perry working for Pakistan’s case 
for relief from the Pressler sanctions, Senator Hank Brown (R-CO) who became the Chairman of 
the SFRC’s South Asia Subcommittee in 1994 also worked for it on the Hill. In an interview 
with Dennis Kux, Senator Brown told Kux that “a trip to the subcontinent had convinced him 
that the draconian sanctions against Pakistan were damaging U.S. interests” and he was 
“particularly annoyed” when Senator Pressler who had accompanied him on the trip “defended 
the sanctions in terms of preventing an ‘Islamic Bomb’” during a press conference in 
Islamabad.469 Senator Brown was referring to his trip to Korea, Burma, India, Pakistan, Kuwait 
and the IAEA with Senators Larry Pressler (R-SD) and William Cochran (R-MS) from 
December 5 through December 19, 1993. In their meetings with political leaders and defense 
personnel in Pakistan, the Senators were briefed on Pakistan’s perception of the Pressler 
sanctions. In their first meeting with the Chairman Senate, Wasim Sajjad, the Senators were told 
that “the Pressler Amendment was discriminatory and had weakened Pakistan’s defense 
capability by denying the country arms from the United States, its longtime ally” and that “the 
Amendment had neither promoted stability nor prevented proliferation on the subcontinent.” 
Sajjad told the Senators that Pakistan was willing to sign the NPT if India did and would accept 
any non-proliferation initiatives as long as India was on board. Pakistan’s Minister of Defense, 
Aftab Shaban Mirani, Foreign Secretary, Shahryar Khan and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sardar 
Assed Ali, shared similar sentiments with the Senators and unanimously asserted that the 
                                                
469 Kux, 329 
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Pressler sanctions against Pakistan and the non-delivery of 28 paid F-16s was an act of 
discrimination. President Farooq Leghari and PM Benazir Bhutto also echoed the same. Bhutto 
told the Senators that “Pakistan was not asking the United States or Senator Pressler to give up 
their commitment to nonproliferation, only that nonproliferation requirements apply to all 
countries and not just Pakistan.” By the time the Senators were ready to leave Pakistan they had 
understood one thing –– Pakistanis were very angry about the Pressler sanctions. Before leaving 
Pakistan, Senator Brown hinted at possible modifications to the Pressler amendment and told the 
Pakistani leadership that if Congress adopted such modification it would address the issue of 
non-proliferation in a broader and more general sense making it less discriminatory for 
Pakistan.470 Pakistan was more than keen on any such development. 
 In early 1994, the administration tired to propose a ‘broad rewrite’ of the Foreign 
Assistance Act which was shot down by Congress. Rebecca Hersman argues in her book Friends 
or Foes: How Congress and the President Really Make Foreign Policy that after the 
administration’s failed attempt to revise the FAA “the Pressler amendment was widely perceived 
as a congressional sacred cow” and “the Pressler amendment had become symbolic of 
Congress’s place at the vanguard of nonproliferation policy” making Senator Pressler along with 
Senator John Glenn “one of its most ardent champions.”471 After the administration’s failure to 
win congressional support to rewrite the FAA, Senators Glenn and Pressler effectively blocked 
                                                
470 “Report of the Visit of Senators Cochran, Pressler and Brown to Korea, Burma, India, Pakistan, Kuwait and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency,” Congressional Daily Edition, March 02, 1994, Vol. 140, No.21, pg. S2219 
retrieved from 
http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t17.d18.c4b49b8e170014fe?accountid=11789 accessed on 
Jan 29, 2015 
471 Rebecca K. C. Hersman, Friends or Foes: How Congress and the President Really Make Foreign Policy 
(Washington DC: The Brookings Institute, 2000), 72 
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its second attempt to provide relief to Pakistan by opposing the administration’s proposal to 
release the stored 28 F-16s to the GOP. In addition to strong congressional opposition by Glenn, 
Pressler and the arms control lobby, the proposal was also ‘rebuffed by the Indians and the 
Pakistanis.’ One U.S. official thought, “the Pakistanis would not bargain away their security for 
twenty-eight aircraft and the Indians believed that any initiative to bolster Pakistan’s defenses 
was a threat to their security.”472 With little to no progress on the Pressler sanctions, Pakistan’s 
narrative of U.S. betrayal and discrimination had taken definitive root and had made Pakistan 
more aggressive in its efforts towards consolidating nuclear weapons capability. Secretary of 
Defense William Perry visited Pakistan in 1995 in an attempt to renew senior level military 
relations with Pakistan despite the sanctions. Secretary Perry was criticized by the New York 
Times in its editorial for his policy of appeasement towards Pakistan whereby he had assured the 
GOP that military-to-military contacts could be restored between the two governments despite 
Pressler sanctions. He told Pakistan that the money could be returned if the GOP found another 
buyer for the F-16s.473 Upon his return he addressed the Foreign Policy Association on January 
31, 1995 and made the case against the effectiveness of the Pressler sanctions to achieve U.S. 
non-proliferation goals. In ‘describing Pakistani frustrations’ over the Pressler amendment, 
Secretary Perry said, “I’ve never been to a country where even the taxicab drivers and the school 
children know in detail about a law passed by the U.S. Congress.”474 Perry was right in his 
observations. Pakistanis were obsessed with all things Pressler and wanted a relaxation in 
sanctions or a return of their F-16s. Nothing short of this was acceptable.  
                                                
472 ibid, 72 
473 “Deferring Arms Curbs in South Asia,” Editorial, The New York Times, January 13, 1995, (New York Times 
1923-Current File), pg. A30 retrieved from http://search.proquest.com.er.lib.k-
state.edu/docview/109417011?accountid=11789 accessed on Jan 29, 2015 
474 Hersman, 73 
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Benazir Bhutto visited Washington in April 1995. Even though she had once again 
managed to charm the American audience, her message this time was crisp and firm: ‘Refund the 
money or deliver the equipment, including 28 F-16 jet fighters.’475 For Bhutto, acceptance of 
anything less than what she had demanded meant political suicide given the sentiments back 
home. Delivering on the F-16s would have allowed her to stay a little longer in office this time. 
President Clinton was forthcoming and the Pakistan-U.S. joint statement issued during her visit 
to Washington on April 11, 1995 reflected the President’s “intention to work with Congress to 
revive the Pressler Amendment to facilitate both a stronger relationship with Pakistan and 
nuclear nonproliferation aims in South Asia.”476 In her speech at Johns Hopkins University on 12 
April 1995, she reminded the audience of Pakistan’s ‘contract’ with America and stated 
After the creation of our nation in 1947, Pakistan’s commitment to the forces of freedom 
and to the containment of communism never wavered. Not for a minute. On every front, 
on every issue, through a prolonged Cold War and a brutal hot war, Pakistan fulfilled its 
obligations under its contract with America, Pakistan kept its contract with the ideals of 
freedom.  
 
During that speech, Benazir Bhutto gave Pakistan’s ‘narrative’ the much-needed voice –– the 
narrative that had taken shape at the end of the Cold War and was reinforced by the Pressler 
sanctions –– and articulated Pakistan’s position on the nuclear issue as follows 
…Let us be candid. The conflict in Kashmir is compounded by the nuclear threat in the 
region. Let’s get the facts on the table, Pakistan did not introduce the nuclear issue to 
South Asia. It was in 1974 that India produced and detonated a nuclear device which it 
ironically names the “smiling Buddha” (I wonder what the real Buddha would have 
thought of that). India remains the only nation in South Asia to have exploded a nuclear 
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device. As a matter of policy, Pakistan has not made nor tested a nuclear device. We 
believe in non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Our nuclear programme is 
peaceful. But if the existence of our technology and perceived capability has served as a 
deterrent to India –– as a deterrent to a proven nuclear power that has gone to war against 
us three times in the last 48 years –– I certainly have no apologies to make –– not in 
Islamabad, not in New Delhi, and not in Washington D.C.  
 
Bhutto then listed the elements of Pakistan’s nuclear restraint regime and proposals that 
underscored Pakistan’s commitment to non-proliferation and told the audience that Pakistan was 
ready to “sign any treaty encompassing nuclear non-proliferation, a nuclear-free South Asia, a 
missile-free South Asia, a regional cap on the production of fissile material”. She put the blame 
for India’s non-responsiveness to Pakistani and American non-proliferation proposals on the 
sanctions upon Pakistan. Bhutto argued that the Pressler sanctions “acted as an obstacle for a 
regional solution for nonproliferation” and called for a “review of this discriminatory statute, a 
review designed to see whether it has fulfilled its purpose or failed.” Bhutto’s message to the 
Americans, Congress and the administration was loud and clear: 
Stuck up under the garb of sanctions are $1.4 billion of military equipment paid for out of 
Pakistan national funds. Pakistan would like equipment made by American workers. If 
America cannot give us our equipment –– give us our money back. And yes, the Pressler 
Amendment is a setback for Corporate America. It denies risk insurance coverage to 
American firms wishing to invest in lucrative opportunities in Pakistan. But we also want 
the delivery of the equipment which is ours, which sits in the deserts of Arizona, 
including F-16 aircraft that we long ago paid for…We have honoured our contract with 
America. We want America to honour its contract with us. But if the United States will 
not honour its legal contract with Pakistan, we want the United States to respect its 
obligations, act honorably and return our money. The planes or our money back. Plain-
simple-and fair.477  
 
Perhaps Bhutto’s speech was what made Senator Pressler write an article in The New York Times 
after Bhutto’s trip titled ‘Bhutto came, She Saw, She Conquered’ arguing that if she gets any aid 
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from Clinton, it would be ‘illegal.’478 Senator John Glenn, who was then member of the 
Committee on Governmental Affairs, also wrote a letter to President Clinton a week after 
Bhutto’s visit concerned about the direction of his non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan and 
fearing that his motivation to ease Pressler sanctions on Pakistan would destroy the integrity of 
U.S non-proliferation values. He also reminded the President that 170 plus nations were meeting 
in NY to decide on the indefinite extension of the NPT, coinciding with the timings of Bhutto’s 
visit, and any subsequent presidential decision in favor of relaxing Pressler sanctions on Pakistan 
would shake the faith of all the believers in the non-proliferation regime. Glenn told Clinton “the 
U.S. cannot be a champion of nonproliferation on the one hand and a facilitator of nuclear 
weapons development or delivery on the other.”479 By the time President Clinton replied to 
Glenn’s letter two things had happened: one, the NPT Review conference that ended in May 
1995 successfully decided on indefinite extension of the NPT and second, India which was not a 
party to the NPT publically rebuffed NPT’s indefinite extension stating that it was a 
discriminatory treaty and also made public its consideration of deploying medium-range, 
surface-to-surface Prithvi missile with a range of 250 km along its western border with Pakistan. 
President Clinton’s reply to Glenn made a subtle note on both points and said that the goal of his 
South Asia nonproliferation policy was to engage both India and Pakistan on the measures 
adopted by the NPT conference on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Fissile Material 
Cutoff Treaty negotiations. On the Pressler sanctions, Clinton stated that the sanctions were not  
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‘curbing Pakistan’s nuclear activities’ but stimulating them and that Pakistan maintained that the 
sanctions ‘unfairly’ penalized an ‘old friend’ and sought solution by which ‘both Pakistan and 
India, not Pakistan alone, would step towards nonproliferation.’ Clinton informed Glenn of his 
decision 
The Pressler Amendment’s blanket prohibition on U.S. aid has also hampered the 
achievement of other U.S. goals in the area and has undermined our influence with 
Pakistan. I have concluded that the current situation does not serve our interests and that 
it is time to consider appropriate changes. We are consulting with Congress on how best 
to revise the Pressler legislation…We want to find an approach that will improve U.S.-
Pakistani relations, will advance our nonproliferation objectives in the region and will not 
upset the regional security balance.480 
 
Clinton tried to keep his end of the ‘contract’ with Pakistan that Benazir Bhutto referred to in her 
speech while visiting Washington. The administration backed an amendment proposed by 
Senator Hank Brown to the 1996 Foreign Aid and Appropriations Bill to modify the Pressler 
sanctions on Pakistan. Fig.6.2 shows an itemized list of military equipment (minus the F-16s) 
purchased by Pakistan but not delivered due to the Pressler sanctions.  
To support the proposed Brown amendment, Secretary of Defense William Perry and 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher wrote letters to Congressmen explaining the 
administration’s position on the Pressler sanctions on Pakistan. In his letter to Senator Sam 
Nunn, member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services on August 2, Secretary Perry shared 
President Clinton’s strategy to deal with the issue of embargoed defense equipment to Pakistan 
and wrote 
Based on a detailed review within the Administration and consultations with Congress, 
the President has decided to address this matter on three fronts:  
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First, he strongly supports provisions already contained in the House and Senate version 
of the Foreign Aid Authorization bill that would permit us to resume economic assistance 
and limited military assistance affecting clear U.S. interests (including assistance in 
peacekeeping, counterterrorism and counternarcotics as well as IMET).  
 
Second, the President has decided to seek authority, as provided by an amendment to be 
proposed by Senator Brown, that would release approximately $370 million worth of 
embargoed military equipment purchased by Pakistan before the imposition of Pressler 
sanctions. This authority would specifically exclude the release of the F-16s. Among the 
items that would be released are three P-3C aircraft, Orion maritime patrol aircraft, 
Harpoon anti-ship missiles, counter-mortar radars, howitzers, and support kits for F-16s 
and Cobra helicopters already in the Pakistani inventory. These items will not disturb the 
conventional arms balance in South Asia which overwhelmingly favors India.  
 
Finally, the President has decided that, rather than releasing the 28 F-16s to Pakistan, he 
will seek to sell them to a third country and deposit the proceeds of any sale in the 
Pakistan Trust Fund to reimburse, as much as the sale permits, Pakistan’s investment in 
these aircraft.481 
 
In a similar effort to reinforce administration’s support for the Brown amendment, Secretary 
Christopher wrote a letter to the Democratic leader, Congressman Thomas A. Daschle on 20 
September 1995: 
We appreciate the bipartisan interest we have seen in improving our relationship with 
Pakistan. We would support an amendment that would permit aid to Pakistan that is in 
our own interest, such as trade promotion, counternarcotics assistance, and 
counterterrorism programs. We also support language that would allow for the return of 
military equipment for which Pakistan has already paid. To engage Pakistan on issues of 
concern to us, including non-proliferation, it is essential to resolve this unfair situation.482  
 
                                                
481 Secretary of State William Perry’s letter to Senator Sam Nunn on August 2, 1995, Congressional Record Daily 
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Table 7.2 Undelivered Military Equipment Purchased by Pakistan Before The Pressler 
Sanctions (Less F-16 Aircraft)483 
 
Item 
Army 
Stored  
Qty 
Stored  
Value 
Funding  
Source 
C-NITE Modification Kits 18 24.1M FMF 
M198 Howitzers 24 18.7M FMF/Cash 
TPQ-36 Radars 4 10.5M FMF 
M-Series Rebuild Parts N/A 6.8M FMF 
TOW Launchers 135 6.1M FMF 
2.75 inch Rockets 16,720 9.4M FMF 
Miscellaneous Army Items N/A 1.7M FMF/Cash 
Army Subtotal                                  $77.4M  
 
 
Item 
Navy 
Stored  
Qty 
Stored  
Value 
Funding  
Source 
P-3C Aircraft 3 139.1M FMF 
Harpoon Missiles 28 30.8M FMF/Cash 
AIM-9L Missile 
Components 
360 19.7M FMF/Cash 
MK-46/Mod 2 Torpedo 
Components 
N/A .1M Cash 
Miscellaneous Navy Items N/A 2.1M FMF/Cash 
Navy Subtotal                                  $191.8M  
 
  
                                                
483 Pakistan FMS Pipeline, RG: 57/a-67-2, JHG Subject Files, Pakistan: Nuclear Nonproliferation Issue, General 
File, 1995-96, 139-025-8, Box 67, John Glenn Archives, Ohio State University, OH. FMF=Foreign Military 
Financing 
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Item 
Air Force 
Stored  
Qty 
Stored  
Value 
Funding  
Source 
Peace Gate II Support 
Equipment  
220E Engine Kits 
30,968 28.5M FMF/Cash 
Depot Engine Spares 
Program 
4,746 8.0M FMF 
ILC Kits: Spares for ILC, 
ALQ-131, F-100, ALR-69 
support 
2,035 7.9M FMF/Cash 
Peace Gate III Support 
Package 
Peculiar Support 
Equipment 
Engine Spares 
Spares 
Standard Support 
Equipment 
 
 
37 
 
511 
154 
67 
 
 
.9M 
 
9.1M 
1.6M 
.4M 
 
 
FMF 
 
FMF 
FMF 
FMF 
Peace Gate IV Support 
Package 
Engine Components 
Developmental Support 
Equipment 
Standard Support 
Equipment 
Non-Standard Support 
Equipment 
Standard Spares 
Test Equipment 
ALQ-131 Pods and Spares 
Class A Explosives 
Other Air Force Items 
 
 
14 
144 
 
386 
 
9 
 
204 
N/A 
20 
245,046 
N/A 
 
 
.1M 
8.0M 
 
1.2M 
 
.5M 
 
1.3M 
.1M 
21.7M 
1.5M 
8.2M 
 
 
Cash 
Cash 
 
Cash 
 
Cash 
 
Cash 
Cash 
Cash 
Cash 
FMF/Cash 
Air Force Subtotal $98.8M  
 
Grand Total 
 
$368 M 
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The text of the Brown Amendment proposed to add the following subparagraph to Section 620E 
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961: 
(a) The restrictions of section 620E (e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 shall 
continue to apply to contracts for the delivery of F-16 aircraft to Pakistan.  
Notwithstanding the restrictions contained in section 620E (e), military equipment, 
technology or defense services, other than F-16 aircraft, may be transferred to 
Pakistan pursuant to contracts of cases entered into before October 1, 1990.  
 
The proposed Brown amendment intended to achieve the following impact 
The proposed legislation would authorize the release of approximately $368 million 
worth of military equipment purchased by Pakistan before the imposition of Pressler 
sanctions (1 October 1990) but not delivered to Pakistan due to Pressler sanctions. 
Specifically prohibited from release to Pakistan under this legislation are the 28 Pakistani 
F-16s.484  
 
The Senate adopted the Brown amendment on September 21, 1995 for one-time release of $368 
million worth of defense equipment ordered and paid for by Pakistan prior to the Pressler 
sanctions on October 1, 1990 by a margin of 55-45 votes. The House also passed the legislation 
authorizing foreign assistance for FY1996 and FY1997. A congressional newspaper Roll Call on 
October 16, 1995 reported on the lobbying efforts by Pakistan that ensured the passage of the 
Brown amendment favorable to Pakistan and Indian lobbying efforts to block its adoption by 
Congress. According to the report, the Brown amendment had been the “focus of a two-year 
campaign coordinated by Pakistan’s top lobbyist, Mark Siegel, and including the PR firm 
Burson-Marsteller and the lobby-law firm Preston Gates Ellis & Rouvelas Meeds, which 
collectively cost Pakistan about $540,000 per year.” In addition to this, the report stated, Pakistan 
also retained “the law firm PattonBoggs for a reported $10,000 a month” according to Pakistani 
sources “for legal work, not lobbying.” Along with this, a “Kashmiri-American group hired the 
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lobbying firm Black, Manafort, Stone & Kelly to help Pakistan.” However, the report stated that 
the most “effective single lobbyist in the entire campaign” had been Pakistani Prime Minister 
Benazir Bhutto, who during her visit to Washington in April “repeatedly sounded the refrain in 
speeches, TV shows, and visits with Members of Congress: ‘Our equipment or our money –– it’s 
only right, it’s only fair’.” The report ended by stating, “the US is caught in a crossfire between 
two countries it wants to be friends with…Congress at least should quit unilaterally punishing an 
old ally and one of the few moderate nations in the Islamic world.”485 
Ambassadors Howard and Teresita Schaffer write in their book How Pakistan Negotiates 
with the United States that the passage of the Brown Amendment was a triumph for Pakistan due 
to its lobbying efforts in Washington under the leadership of Pakistan’s Ambassador Maleeha 
Lodhi. According to the authors 
The [Pakistan] embassy had engaged lobbyists to amplify its congressional outreach, but 
in this case, Lodhi thought she would be her own best advocate and worked hard to 
enhance her own direct access to the members of Congress critical to the passage of the 
legislation….Lodhi’s impressive public persona was a tremendous asset….Lodhi also 
“marketed” Benazir Bhutto….Lodhi believed that India was trying to block the 
legislation. Also concerned about opposition from pro-Israeli sources, she asked National 
Security Adviser Sandy Berger to request the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee 
(AIPAC), the strongest pro-Israel lobbying group, to stay neutral and not urge its 
congressional supporters to oppose the Brown legislation.486  
 
The bill was not passed until January 1996 due to some unrelated issues and finally on February 
12, 1996, President Clinton signed into law P.L. 104-107, which was a clean version of the 
Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill for FY 1996 (H.R. 1868) which ‘unconditionally’ 
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waived all U.S. economic sanctions on Pakistan and authorized one-time delivery of the 
embargoed defense equipment (minus the F-16s).487  
At the time that the administration was fighting to ‘right the wrong’ for Pakistan with 
Congress, concerns resurfaced about Pak-China missile and nuclear technology transfers that 
created problems for the implementation of the Brown amendment. However, the administration 
decided to ‘ignore’ the evidence to favor Pakistan and proceeded with the release of the defense 
equipment for Pakistan in 1996.  
 Pak-China Missile/Nuclear Technology Transfer  
And Bhutto’s North-Korean Connection 
During Clinton’s first term there were concerns about missile proliferation activities between 
China and Pakistan and Pakistan and North Korea. Between 1993 and 1995, Pakistan continued 
to receive missile technology from China and North Korea with out any significant penalties by 
the United States. Although China was briefly sanctioned by the Bush administration in 1991 for 
providing M-11 short-range ballistic missiles to Pakistan, the sanctions were lifted in 1992 after 
the Chinese government assured the administration that it would not provide Pakistan any 
missile technology in the future. The transfer of missile technology resumed between China and 
Pakistan during the Clinton administration and since China was not a party to the MTCR, it not 
only provided missile technology to Pakistan but also to Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran.  
Unable to ignore the intelligence reports on the Sino-Pak missile technology transfers, the 
State Department issued a public notice of MTCR sanctions against 11 Chinese and 1 Pakistani 
arms exporting entities involved in missile proliferation activities on August 24, 1993. China 
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strongly denounced the U.S. sanctions stating that its sale of M-11 missiles to Pakistan did not 
violate the MTCR guidelines and that the range of missile did not exceed 300 kilometers –– the 
same position it had adopted with the Bush administration.488 Even though the M-11 missiles did 
not fall strictly within the MTCR parameters and reportedly had a range of 290 km capable of 
carrying a payload of 800 kg, there were concerns that its inherent capability could be enhanced 
to deliver a payload of 500 kg over a range of 300 km. Once again, the sanctions hardly lasted a 
year and were lifted in 1994 after China promised to respect the MTCR guidelines –– without 
becoming a signatory to the MTCR –– and not transfer surface-to-surface missile technology 
exceeding the MTCR parameters to any country. According to a Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) report, the sanctions against China were eased off after the U.S. aerospace industry and 
aerospace company executives strongly lobbied against sanctions on China in their bid to expand 
satellite exports to China.489  
At the time Pakistan was benefitting from the Chinese missile cooperation, Dr. A.Q. 
Khan, head of Pakistan’s uranium enrichment program at the Kahuta Research Labs (KRL), 
approached Benazir Bhutto and requested her to visit North Korea to sign a missile deal with the 
Pyongyang government. Unbeknownst to PM Bhutto, Khan had already made deals for the No-
dong ballistic missiles from North Korea in return for ‘KRL technology’. North Korea was under 
the U.S. radar for its non-compliance issues with the IAEA over the suspicions about the 
direction of its nuclear program and even though there was strong intelligence available about 
Pakistan-North Korea missile cooperation and Khan’s illicit nuclear network expanding to 
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provide North Korea with nuclear technology in exchange for the missiles –– the White House 
did not act. Benazir Bhutto visited North Korea on 29 December 1993 and brought back the 
computer disks carrying the blueprints of the No-dong missiles.490 
Feroz Hassan Khan in his book Eating Grass confirms both accounts of Pakistan’s 
missile cooperation with China and North Korea. According to Khan, ‘Pakistan’s missile 
program faced two major problems from the outset: a limited indigenous technological base and 
the constraints posed by the MTCR.’491 In order to meet the technological deficiencies it was 
decided that transfer of technology from China should be sought as a ‘single off-the-shelf 
purchase’ to meet the ‘immediate needs’ to help develop ‘infrastructure and equipment to 
produce missiles indigenously in the future.’ China had tested the short-range, single-warhead 
ballistic missiles, M series, specifically M-11 in 1990 and deployed them in 1992. Discovery of 
transfers between China and Pakistan of approximately thirty M-11 missiles was made in 1992 
by U.S. intelligence sources which had led to the brief period of sanctions by the Bush 
administration. After the U.S. intelligence had discovered these missiles via satellite imagery, 
‘stored in crates at the Pakistan Air Force base in Sargodha,’ the Chinese ‘began supplying the 
M-11s in unassembled form’ and since Pakistan did not have a dedicated missile assembly 
facility, it developed one with Chinese help. Feroz Khan documents that  
Under direction of Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) General Abdul Waheed, the Project 
Management Organization (PMO) was created in 1994…the principal task of the PMO 
was to create the foundations for a solid fuel missile, absorb the transfer of technology, 
and learn the art of reverse engineering and assembly techniques for the unassembled M-
11 (DF-11) and M-9 (DF-15) ballistic missiles. In 1995, when the NDC [National 
Defense Complex] and AWC [Air Weapons Complex] successfully completed the cold 
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tests for aircraft delivery, General Abdul Waheed [COAS] directed Dr. Samar 
Mubarakmand [Chairman PAEC] to lead the Pakistani missile program.492 
 
Khan maintains that the Chinese missile M-11 technology was ‘only for high-explosive 
warheads’ and after years of hard work, the missiles were made nuclear capable. While the 
Clinton administration lifted sanctions from China to appease the industry lobbyists –– for 
example, Boeing was in negotiations with Chinese aviation industry and the Westinghouse 
Electric Corporation had dealings with China National Nuclear Cooperation493 –– Chinese 
nuclear technology transfer to Pakistan continued and created serious non-proliferation 
challenges for the administration.  
With Pyongyang, the deal Benazir Bhutto made in 1993, “cemented in late 1995, with 
North Korea…providing twelve and twenty-four unassembled missiles and their transporter 
erector launcher (LET) vehicles.” Khan writes that  
The missiles were delivered in the fall of 1997 in several cargo flights from Pyongyang 
that also included telemetry crews. These flights were predictably under the watch of the 
Western intelligence agencies that were monitoring the traffic and increased frequency of 
visitors from KRL and Pakistan. Having received the shipments, A.Q. Khan chose the 
name Ghauri for the liquid missile derivate of the Nodong.494  
 
The Clinton administration ignored the Chinese and North Korean missile cooperation with 
Pakistan despite considerable intelligence. But the time missile cooperation was taking place, 
China was also supplying Pakistan with critical components for its uranium enrichment program. 
In 1995, there were reports about ‘Chinese defense industrial companies’ exporting ‘5000 
ring magnets’ to Pakistan which was a strictly controlled item on the export control list since 
their use in gas centrifuges allowed for extraction of enriched weapons grade uranium from 
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uranium gas. The administration was caught in a bind given the evidence of the sale of ring 
magnets from China to Pakistan with respect to its timings which coincided with the enactment 
of the Brown amendment adopted by the Congress in September 1995 (as discussed in the 
previous section) according to which $368 million worth of arms equipment Pakistan paid for 
was envisaged to be released. If the administration publically determined that the sale of ring 
magnets had indeed been made by China to Pakistan, it would automatically have triggered 
sanctions under the Symington amendment which provided for the suspension of U.S. economic 
and military assistance to countries engaged in the transfer of nuclear enrichment equipment. 
And triggering of the Symington sanctions would have interfered with the implementation of the 
Brown amendment, which would have been detrimental to the U.S.-Pak bilateral relations.495  
There were strong congressional concerns about the administration’s non-proliferation 
policy towards Pakistan and its leniency towards Chinese entities involved in export of nuclear 
and missile technology components to Pakistan. Senator Larry Pressler who had opposed the 
Brown amendment and was against the release of defense equipment to Pakistan, in his February 
7, 1996 letter to Clinton strongly urged the President to determine that China and Pakistan 
engaged in illicit sale of nuclear technology and take ‘immediate action to enforce the law…and 
freeze all assistance, civilian or military, to Pakistan’ and sanction Chinese exporting companies 
involved in the sale.496 Senator John Glenn also wrote to President Clinton on February 12, 1996 
(the same day that Clinton signed the Brown amendment into law) registering his disappointment 
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with the administration and its knowledge of the Chinese sale of ring magnets to Pakistan at the 
time of the amendment. Glenn wrote 
Pakistan is not eligible to receive the military equipment authorized last year by the so-
called Brown Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act that was supported by the 
Administration. It was a particular disappointment for me to recently learn that the 
Administration was aware of the sale of the magnets at the very time the Brown 
Amendment was being debated on the Senate floor, but did not provide this information 
at the time. Nor does there appear to be any evidence that the promised transfer of our 
military equipment following the passage of the Brown Amendment has had any effect 
whatsoever on the Pakistani nuclear program…. What will it gain us, Mr. President, if we 
win all those sales and joint ventures for U.S. business at the expense of our world 
leadership on one of the greatest moral as well as international security issues of our time, 
the spread of nuclear weapons? Will the economic activity with China stop the South 
Asia nuclear arms race from spreading to Iran and to terrorists? Will such economic 
activity engender more respect for U.S. views on nonproliferation when we attempt to 
dissuade other countries from transferring dangerous nuclear technologies? Who will 
speak up for restraint in nuclear trade if the United States shows it cares more about 
bucks than bombs?497 
 
All the questions posed so passionately by Glenn to the President were not the questions the 
administration was willing to answer just yet. President Clinton replied to Glenn two months 
later and in his letter he did not address a single one of the questions posed by Glenn. Clinton 
thanked Glenn for his leadership on non-proliferation issues and stated 
I share your concern over the great danger faced by the countries in the region, and I am 
committed to curb the potential nuclear and missiles arms race there. It is precisely 
because of these concerns that I supported the Brown Amendment, which seeks to put 
our relationship with Pakistan on a stronger footing and thereby increase our ability to 
deal with the proliferation threat in South Asia. With this objective in mind, I have 
decided to implement a portion of the Brown Amendment, including the release of $368 
million of previously embargoed military equipment to Pakistan. Independently of the 
Brown Amendment, we will also refund approximately $120 million of Pakistani national 
funds that have accumulated in Pakistan’s FMS Trust account. As I have made clear to 
Prime Minister Bhutto, our ability to move ahead with partial implementation of the 
Brown Amendment is based on a continuation of Pakistan’s current restraint in its 
nuclear and missile activities. I am convinced that this course of action provides the best 
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opportunity to engage Islamabad in our nonproliferation strategy and to reinforce 
restraint in Pakistan’s behavior, as well as improve cooperation with Pakistan on such 
vital issues as counterterrorism and counternarcotics. At the same time, I agree that the 
reported transfer of nuclear-related equipment from China to Pakistan, such as ring 
magnets, raises serious concerns. Therefore, I have decided to restrain from 
implementing those portions of the Brown Amendment that are subject to restrictions 
under the Symington Amendment, which prohibits assistance under the Foreign 
Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act to countries that export or receive 
unsafeguarded uranium enrichment equipment.498  
 
Clinton’s assurance to Glenn sufficed for the time being. A month later on May 10, 1996 the 
State Department issued a public announcement stating that the Secretary of State concluded that 
“there was not sufficient basis to warrant a determination that sanctionable activity occurred 
under section 2(b)(4) of the Eximbank Act…that sanctions would not be imposed at that time 
and that Export-Import Bank operations in support of U.S. exports to China would return to 
normal.”499 Before making this public determination, the Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
had met Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen in The Hague in April 1996 to discuss Chinese 
nuclear technology transfer to Pakistan and other countries and Chinese obligations under the 
NPT to which it acceded to in 1992. During their discussions, the Chinese side had ‘assured’ the 
United States that there would not be any future transfer of nuclear weapons technology from 
China to any other country, that China will strengthen its nuclear export controls measures and 
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that China will not provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. It was based on this 
assurance by senior Chinese leadership that the Secretary of State determined against the 
imposition of sanctions on China in 1996.500 This determination worked in two ways for the 
administration: first, U.S.-China economic cooperation remained unaffected, second, it relieved 
the administration from the burden of invoking the Symington amendment and restraining the 
transfer of embargoed equipment to Pakistan. Ignoring Chinese missile and nuclear technology 
transfer to Pakistan also meant ignoring Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development. Despite the 
release of embargoed military equipment to Pakistan, the Clinton administration had limited 
leverage to engage Pakistan to stop its progress towards nuclear weapons or missile 
development.  
 While Pakistan’s march towards the bomb was difficult to be curtailed, the Clinton 
administration tried to pressure Pakistan into signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) in 1996 however the efforts were unsuccessful. Pakistan’s civilian and military 
leadership had decided against unilateral signing of the CTBT due to an abortive attempt to 
conduct nuclear tests by India in 1995. Feroz Hassan Khan in Eating Grass writes that in August 
1995, Pakistan’s ISI ‘reported unusual activities in Pokhran’, the 1974 Indian nuclear test site, 
and concluded that India was preparing for a nuclear test. Along with its preparations for the 
nuclear test, Indian position on the CTBT also ‘hardened’. In January 1996 General Jehangir 
Karamat, the new COAS, held a meeting with scientists and diplomats to assess the ‘potential of 
an Indian nuclear test and the larger CTBT negotiations’. Khan documents that  
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The meeting concluded that India was miffed at the passage of the Brown Amendment, 
which marginally mitigated nuclear sanctions, but was taking advantage of the KRL 
[Kahuta Research Labs] ring-magnet scandal to divert international focus to Pakistan so 
that it could conduct a test. If such an Indian test were to reoccur, attendees predicted that 
U.S. reactions would be similar to those during the 1974 nuclear test. As in the past, there 
would be an initial uproar, a mild rap on the knuckles, and possible sanctions under the 
Glenn Amendment that would be quickly lifted. Ultimately, America’s efforts would be 
directed to prevent Pakistan from following suit.501  
 
Based on these findings, Khan writes, General Karamat “ordered the immediate preparation of a 
test site…and by June 1996 the tunnel was ready and Pakistani intelligence was working round 
the clock to monitor activities at the Pokhran site.”502 Bruce Riedel in his book Avoiding 
Armageddon also provides an account of the Indian nuclear test preparations in 1995. Riedel 
writes of Secretary William Perry’s eagerness to “change American policy and undo the Pressler 
amendment after the CIA detected preparations for a nuclear test in India in December 1995.”  
According to Riedel, “the CIA’s warning was leaked to the New York Times, and Clinton’s 
ambassador in New Delhi, Frank Wisner, used the leak to persuade India not to test.”503 
When the General Assembly voted on the CTBT on 10 September 1996, India was 
against it and given that Pakistan did not block CTBT’s passage, the Clinton administration 
pressured Pakistan into signing the treaty when it opened for signature on 24 September 1996. 
Pakistan’s military, scientific and diplomatic community deliberated on the CTBT’s pros and 
cons and sent their recommendations to PM Benazir Bhutto for the ‘final decision’ on Pakistan’s 
position on CTBT. Khan writes that Bhutto announced Pakistan’s position as follows 
(1) Pakistan would not sign the CTBT unless India signed it first, (2) Pakistan reserved 
the right to conduct nuclear tests should its national security demand it, (3) Pakistan 
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would vote in favor of CTBT’s passage to the United Nations, (4) despite not signing 
the treaty, Pakistan would adhere to the letter and spirit of the treaty, and (5) Pakistan 
would willingly participate in the CTBT monitoring system and allow its seismic 
station to be part of the CTBT verification network. 
 
Khan maintains that “Benazir Bhutto’s decision reflected a rare institutional consensus within 
Pakistan. Aware that India could test and then sign the CTBT, Islamabad’s new policy would 
allow it to react in turn.”504  
Towards the end of 1996, Pakistan was preparing for another political transition. Benazir 
was ousted from office on the charges of corruption, domestic instability along with her failure to 
protect her own brother who lost his life in a police encounter when she was the sitting prime 
minister. The blame game that ensued thereafter led to finger-pointing both at the president and 
the top army leadership resulting in an all too familiar and convenient exercise, undertaken this 
time by President Farooq Leghari who used the eighth amendment to dismiss Benazir’s 
government. 
 The Sharif Government and The Harkin-Warner Amendment 1997 
New elections were held in February 1997 bringing Nawaz Sharif back in office for his second 
term. Sharif was successful in repealing the eighth amendment, making the office of the Prime 
Minister the most powerful in the country after a period of twenty years. President Bill Clinton 
had also been selected for his second term in office in January 1997. Although the embargoed 
defense equipment was released in 1996, 28 stored and unreleased F-16s were still a sore point in 
the bilateral U.S.-Pak relationship.  
According to Dennis Kux, Clinton’s new foreign policy team (Madeline Albright who 
replaced Warren Christopher as the Secretary of State, Thomas Pickering as Undersecretary of 
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State for political affairs and Karl Inderfurth who replaced Robin Raphel as Assistant Secretary 
of State for South Asia) “made an early decision to try to broaden relations with India and 
Pakistan and to place less emphasis on nonproliferation matters.”505  
In addition to non-proliferation issues, U.S.-Pakistan bilateral relations were dominated 
by U.S. concerns about South Asian regional stability in particular Pakistan’s relations with its 
eastern and western neighbors, India and Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, after eighteen years of 
infighting amongst various tribal factions, the extremist Taliban movement had taken hold in 
majority of provinces and the opium production had increased by 25 percent, which was also the 
main funding source of the Taliban regime.506 The Taliban wanted to impose strict Shariah law 
in the country and the international community was not happy about their human rights record 
especially their treatment and subjugation of women in Afghanistan.507 With respect to India, 
there were considerably lesser concerns in 1997 despite the still outstanding issue of Kashmir. 
That was so because in his second term, Nawaz Sharif did not make Kashmir the sole focus of 
his India policy despite opposition from the foreign office and the army for taking spotlight off 
Kashmir as the core issue. Both Nawaz Sharif and Indian Prime Minister Inder Kumar Gujral 
had developed a personal rapport and at the ninth South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC) conference in May 1997, both leaders agreed to establish the following: 
‘joint working groups’ to resolve all outstanding issues including Kashmir, ‘hot line’ between the 
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two leaders, ‘reciprocal release of civilian prisoners’, work towards easing the visa regime, and 
hold foreign secretary talks.508 The foreign secretaries of the two countries met in June 1997 to 
set up working groups on bilateral issues. But before substantive talks could progress between 
the two countries, Indian Prime Minister Gujral’s government was forced to resign in November 
1997 as a result of a political crisis. The new Indian elections brought the Hindu nationalist 
party, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to power in March 1998. A constitutional political crisis also 
emerged in Pakistan late November 1997, which resulted in President Farooq Leghari’s 
resignation and appointment of a new president in Pakistan, Mohammad Rafiq Tarar in January 
1998. But since the president no longer had political authority after the Eighth Amendment, he 
was merely a figurehead and Nawaz Sharif, after having survived the latest political crisis, 
remained the most powerful leader in Pakistan.  
Secretary of State Albright visited Pakistan in November 1997, which marked the first 
high-level visit since Secretary Shultz’s visit to Pakistan in 1982. During her visit, “nuclear 
weapons, Afghanistan, Kashmir, and drugs provided a full substantive agenda.”509 Pakistan-U.S. 
bilateral relations were stable throughout 1997. For FY 1998, Congress had approved a 
sponsored amendment by Senators Tom Harkin (D-IA), John Warner (R-VA), Robert Torricelli 
(D-NJ), Rick Santorum (R-PA) and Tim Johnson (D-IA) to resume ‘the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (OPIC), International Military and Education Training (IMET), Trade 
and Development Assistance (TDA) and democracy-building programs in Pakistan, such as the 
National Endowment for Democracy.’ The sponsoring senators of this amendment to the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961, OPIC-Section 239 (f) and IMET-Section-638 (b) believed that the 
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administration’s South Asia policy was hijacked by the shortsightedness of the non-proliferation 
focus and with the expanding developmental and economic opportunities in the region, the U.S. 
was at a disadvantage given its sanctions policy. The Clinton administration backed this bi-
partisan effort to resume developmental aid and military training programs with Pakistan. The 
Department of Defense was particularly interested in pursuing the IMET program with Pakistan. 
Secretary of Defense William Cohen who had replaced William Perry wrote to Senator Harkin in 
support of his amendment and stated, “We believe that the positive impact of IMET on the 
Pakistani military will serve to enhance our overall relationship with Pakistan and, by extension, 
will facilitate our engagement with Pakistan in a number of important areas including 
proliferation.”510 Secretary Cohen further argued on the importance of engaging Pakistan at a 
critical time and wrote 
Opponents of your legislation will claim that Pakistan’s performance with regard to 
proliferation should not be “rewarded” by making it eligible for these assistance 
programs. We would respond that our denying any of these programs will not cause the 
Pakistanis to forgo strategic programs which they believe are essential for their national 
security. However, by making these assistance programs available, we will not only serve 
U.S. interests directly but will improve the climate of our overall relationship thus 
encouraging Pakistan to be more receptive to our point of view in other areas.  
 
Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering also wrote in support of the Harkin-Warner 
amendment and stated 
We believe that restoring IMET programs will have an appreciable impact on our 
relationship with Pakistani military. For seven years, the United States has lacked contact 
with junior and mid-level Pakistani officers, from whose ranks will emerge the next 
generation of Pakistani military leaders. We would serve our interests well by giving 
them exposure to U.S. practices, institutions and values…We need to consider carefully 
how to pursue our non-proliferation objectives in conformity with the entire range of U.S. 
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interests in Pakistan. We believe that an initiative such as yours…will advance our 
interests without undermining our non-proliferation agenda.  
 
Nawaz Sharif had definitely made an impact with his policies of economic reform, trade 
liberalization, deregulation and privatization in his efforts to transform Pakistan’s economy into 
a market-oriented economy. And in due course his efforts would have been supplemented by the 
resumption of trade and development assistance programs with the United States, which the 
Congress approved through the adoption of the Harkin-Warner amendment for FY 1998. But 
unfortunately, given the turn of events in the first half of 1998 another amendment was in store 
for Pakistan –– the Glenn amendment –– that was bad news for the future of Pakistan’s 
economic development and a blow to the U.S. non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan.  
 Pakistan’s Nuclear Tests in 1998 and The Glenn-Symington Sanctions 
On May 11, 1998 India conducted three underground nuclear tests at the Pokhran testing site, 70 
miles from the Pakistani border –– the same location where the first Indian nuclear test was 
conducted in 1974. On May 13, 1998 two more nuclear tests were conducted at Pokhran. In their 
discussions with U.S. officials after the first series of tests, some Indian officials cited reasons for 
the rationale of nuclear testing including their border disputes with China, concern over Pakistan-
China ties, Pakistan’s support for terrorism in the disputed territory of Kashmir and the loss of 
respect for Indian military capabilities in the region –– all of which were rejected as an 
unpersuasive rationale for conducting nuclear tests by the U.S. officials.511 Strobe Talbot, Under 
Secretary of State at the time, writes in his book Engaging India that the Indian Prime Minister 
Atul Bihari Vajpayee in his letter to President Clinton after the tests also pointed to China and 
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Pakistan as the rationale for India’s nuclear tests: “China, an ‘overt nuclear weapons state’ on our 
borders, a state which committed armed aggression against India in 1962’ and Pakistan, a ‘covert 
nuclear weapons state’ that had committed aggression against India three times and that 
continued to sponsor terrorism in Kashmir.”512 Indian nuclear tests automatically triggered U.S. 
sanctions against India pursuant to Section 102 of the Arms Export Control Act - the Glenn 
amendment in addition to extensive economic sanctions as per the Nuclear Proliferation 
Prevention Act of 1994.  
Pakistan however was not surprised by the Indian tests. It had feared an aggressive 
nuclear policy by the new BJP government when it came to power given that it had publicly 
advocated for the development of nuclear weapons during its election campaign. Nawaz Sharif 
had warned President Clinton about BJP’s nuclear intentions in his 3 March 1998 letter but his 
warnings were relegated to Pakistan ‘crying wolf regarding India’ and dismissed by the 
administration, which was confident that ‘BJP would not act precipitously.’513  But when India 
caught the administration and the U.S. intelligence agencies off guard, all attention turned 
towards stopping Pakistan from responding to the Indian nuclear tests by tests of its own. Strobe 
Talbot writes that Pakistan had the opportunity to ‘cash in virtually every dollar of aid that donor 
countries like the United States and Japan’ would have withheld from India pursuant to the 
sanctions if it decided to show restraint. Many in administration believed that Pakistan had a 
golden opportunity since the ‘mood on the Capitol Hill had shifted after the Indian test’ and to 
take advantage of that shift, Secretary of State Albright “went to work enlisting support from key 
members of Congress for the release of the sanctioned F-16s” if the administration was able to 
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“get the Pakistanis not to conduct a nuclear test.”514 In order to bring him on board, Clinton 
phoned Nawaz Sharif “to whet his appetite for the planes, huge amounts of financial aid, and a 
prize certain to appeal to Sharif –– an invitation to make an official visit to Washington” but 
“Sharif was not swayed.” Talbot writes that after hanging up the phone, Clinton said, “You can 
almost hear the guy wringing his hands and sweating.”515  
A day after the Indian nuclear tests, Pakistan’s Ambassador to the U.S. Riaz H. Khokar 
told Senator John Glenn in a letter that the Indian tests did not come as a surprise to Pakistan and 
informed him that Pakistan was going to closely monitor the U.S. reaction to the Indian tests. 
Khokar wrote 
For more than two decades we have tried to draw American attention towards the Indian 
development of nuclear weapons and missile capability in their quest for regional 
hegemony. When the Hindu fundamentalist BJP led government came to power in India 
earlier this year, Pakistan alerted the U.S. to publicly stated Indian intentions to “exercise 
the option of inducting nuclear weapons.” This was conveyed in a letter from the Prime 
Minister to the Secretary of State, both dated April 3, 1998. Unfortunately, however, our 
warnings went unheeded and a certificate of “restraint” was issued by the U.S. to the 
Indian government. Recent developments have only served to underscore the fallacy of 
such an approach. Despite facing the grave danger posted to its security over the past 
twenty years by Indian conventional weapon superiority and nuclear weapons capability, 
Pakistan has demonstrated voluntary restraint by not conducting a nuclear test, 
developing nuclear weapons or transferring nuclear technology. But Pakistan has still 
been subjected to discriminatory sanctions by the U.S.- a policy that has once again 
proven to be counter-productive. The time has come for the U.S. to pursue a realistic, 
non-discriminatory and equitable non-proliferation policy in South Asia. My country 
will, therefore, closely watch American reaction to the latest provocation by India. 
Pakistan reserves the right to take all appropriate measures for its security.516 
 
Feroz Khan writes that Pakistan military’s first reaction was to assess the situation, alert the air 
defense regiments of the army to monitor the air space –– “Pakistan’s armed forces were making 
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defensive preparations as if a war were imminent…based on their long-held threat perceptions, 
they were bracing for the possibility of preventive strike.”517 When Nawaz Sharif, who was in 
Uzbekistan at the time of the Indian tests, returned to Pakistan on May 12, COAS advised him to 
call an emergency meeting of the Defense Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) “to examine the full 
spectrum of implications and bring in all stakeholders for a comprehensive discussion.” The 
DCC met on May 13, 1998 –– the day India conducted two more tests –– and deliberated on the 
pros and cons of Pakistan conducting test in a matching response to the Indian nuclear tests. The 
next day, on May 14, a full cabinet meeting was held at PM Sharif’s residence and according to 
Khan, ‘three perspectives’ were presented  
The hawks (three members) insisted on conducting the test immediately to resume parity 
and restore the strategic balance, convinced that no other opportunity would arise. The 
doves (six members) suggested that Pakistan set its own time to test rather than jump into 
a trap laid by India. Pakistan had a rare opportunity to isolate India, bolster conventional 
defense, and reap economic benefits. The third group (six members) advocated a middle 
position of simply waiting to make a more informed decision.518 
 
Meanwhile, the U.S. had not given up trying to convince Pakistan against nuclear testing. 
Undersecretary Strobe Talbot along with Commander in Chief U.S. Central Command General 
Anthony Zinni and some other State Department officials traveled to Pakistan on May 13, 1998. 
The mission was to tell Pakistan that it had a choice: “it could join the rest of the world in 
isolating India, or it could follow India down a foolish, backward-leading, and dangerous path” –
– the catch phrase to be used was “Restraint and maturity.” Talbot writes that “Restraint would 
allow us to put the Pressler amendment forever behind us and solidify a post-cold-war 
relationship with Pakistan as a moderate, democratic, and above all responsible Islamic state.”519 
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Upon meeting Pakistan’s foreign minister Gohar Ayub Khan.520  Talbot recalls that he received a 
‘history lesson’ which began with “the perfidy of India going back to 1947 (a “habitual aggressor 
and hegemon”) and the inconstancy of the United States (“a fair-weather friend”), whose cutoffs 
of military aid had deprived Pakistan of its “qualitative military edge.”’521 When Talbot 
presented ‘the carrots’ he had brought, Gohar Ayub said “offers of Pressler relief and delivery of 
“those rotting and virtually obsolete air-planes” were “shoddy rugs you’ve tried to sell us before” 
[the Pakistani people] would mock us if we accepted your offer. They will take to the streets in 
protest.”522 Talbot and General Zinni’s meeting with COAS General Jehangir Karamat was more 
cordial where they were told that Pakistan would be ‘looking out for its own defense’ however 
suggesting that what Pakistan “needed from the United States was a new, more solid relationship 
in which there was no “arm twisting” or “forcing us into corners.”’523  In their meeting with 
Nawaz Sharif, the Talbot Mission was not told anything new or different. Sharif was facing 
intense domestic pressure and he said “I am an elected official, and I cannot ignore popular 
sentiment.” Talbot informed Sharif that the United States was doing everything in its power to 
condemn the Indian nuclear tests with toughest possible sanctions and that President Clinton had 
told him that “he would use Sharif’s visit to Washington and Clinton’s own to Pakistan in the fall 
to “dramatize” the world’s gratitude if Sharif would just refrain from testing.”524 After the 
meeting ended, Sharif told Talbot in private that “if a final decision had been reached, I would be 
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in a much calmer state of mind…Please believe me when I tell you that my heart is with you. I 
appreciate –– and would even privately agree with –– what you are advising us to do.”525 
 Feroz Khan writes that after the Talbot mission left Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif called another 
meeting of the DCC on May 16, 1998 and “gave the green light to proceed with the nuclear test.” 
On May 18, Nawaz Sharif “personally summoned PAEC Chairman Dr. Ishfaq Ahmed and said 
in Urdu, “Dhamaka kar dein” (“Carry out the explosion”).”526  On May 28, 1998 Pakistan 
conducted five nuclear tests in ‘five horizontal shaft tunnels’ at the Ras Koh Hills, Chagai, 
Balochistan. Two days later on May 30, 1998 Pakistan conducted one more test –– in total six 
tests –– and settled the score with India for their 1974 Pokhran I test. Khan writes that “as 
Pakistanis congratulated themselves and Prime Minister Sharif beamed with pride and enjoyed 
popularity, the nation prepared to stomach whatever punishment followed.”527 
Pakistan’s Senator Akram Zaki, Chairman Pakistan Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
defended Pakistan’s nuclear weapons tests during his visit to the U.S. immediately after the 
nuclear tests. In addressing the international media at a meeting at the National Press Club in 
Washington DC on June 1, 1998 Zaki told the audience that Pakistan had no choice and stated, 
“what we have done was under compulsion. We had no option. The NPT provided for only five 
nuclear powers. If NPT, which had been indefinitely extended, is sacred, then in the 17 days that 
we waited, we had hoped that the five nuclear powers would persuade India to reverse their 
action. And now if NPT has no meaning and if the number has to increase from five, then it 
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cannot stop at six.”528 Pakistan met the same fate as the Indians and was sanctioned under the 
Glenn amendment but the government and the nation was prepared for it. President Clinton 
called the tests “self-defeating, wasteful and dangerous” but Talbot recalls that “he bore down 
harder on India than Pakistan, accusing the BJP government of betraying ‘the ideals of 
nonviolent democratic freedom and independence at the heart of Gandhi’s struggle to end 
colonialism on the Indian subcontinent.’”529 Pakistan was satisfied with the American 
performance since it was in the same boat as India with respect to condemnation from the 
international community and evenhanded sanctions from the United States.  
Clinton’s non-proliferation policy came under criticism in the United States after the 
Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. A New York Times article by Tim Weiner indignantly blamed 
China and the United States for helping Pakistan build its nuclear weapons. Sympathetically 
making the case for Pakistan, Weiner wrote 
The United States provided Pakistani nuclear scientists with technical training from the 
1950’s into the 1970’s. And it turned a blind eye to the nuclear weapons program in the 
1980’s, because Pakistan was providing the crucial link in the Central Intelligence 
Agency’s effort to smuggle billions of dollars of weapons to Afghan guerrillas attempting 
to drive out Soviet invaders. But when that covert operation ended, the United States cut 
off a multi-billion military aid program by imposing sanctions in the 1990’s –– leaving 
Pakistan feeling defenseless. Everything changed after the Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, when Pakistan was no longer needed as the key link in the C.I.A’s arms 
pipeline to Afghan rebels. In 1990, the United States finally acknowledged that the 
Pakistani nuclear weapons program existed –– and under the law, cut off military aid. 
This left Pakistan’s armed forces, facing an Indian Army twice their size, without a 
reliable source of conventional weapons, like tanks and jet. It is still waiting for 28 F-16s, 
                                                
528 National Press Club Afternoon Newsmaker with Pakistani Senator Muhammad Akram Zaki, Ambassador Riaz 
Khokar and Pakistani Defense Attaché Pervez Cheema, June 1, 1998, The National Press Club, Washington DC, 
RG: 57/a-284-13, Patricia Backheit- Foreign Relations, India/Pakistan, Nuclear Weapons Tests, 1998 and 
background materials, Box 284, John Glenn Archives, Ohio State University, OH 
529 Talbot, 74 
 333 
for which it paid the United States $650 million. Now, with last week’s weapons tests, 
Pakistan faces fresh sanctions from the United States.530  
 
The sanctions indeed were tough and given Pakistan’s economic condition at the time that 
Pakistan tested, there were concerns that the financial collapse of the state was imminent. 
According to Dennis Kux, “at the time Islamabad tested, the country had a foreign debt of over 
$30 billion and foreign exchange reserves of only $600 million” and without financial help from 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Pakistan would not have been able to “meet upcoming 
debt service payments.” In addition to this, the government of Pakistan “froze foreign-currency 
bank accounts immediately after the tests” which created “havoc for foreign companies working 
in Pakistan” damaging Pakistan’s credit rating. The United States however decided to “give 
Pakistan some breathing room” and after negotiations with Pakistani and IMF officials “agreed 
on an economic program –– more of a bandage to prevent Pakistan from going under than a 
comprehensive attack on the country’s fiscal ills.”531 This was made possible through two 
expedited legislations. First was the Agriculture Export Relief Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-194) to 
waive sanctions on agricultural export credits signed into law by President Clinton on July 14, 
1998. This Act amended the Arms Export Control Act by “exempting for one year, food and 
other agricultural commodity purchases from nuclear nonproliferation sanctions under Section 
102 (b) of that law.” The amendment was proposed by Senator Mitch McConnell (R-) on July 9, 
1998 to permit “U.S. wheat growers to take part in a July 15 Pakistan wheat auction.”532 The Act 
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also provided the waiver authority to the president to exempt food related items from sanctions 
whenever appropriate.  
The second legislation was Senate’s adoption of the India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998, 
proposed as an amendment to the 1999 Agricultural Appropriations Bill (H.R. 4101) by Senator 
Sam Brownback (R-KS), chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South 
Asian Affairs.533 The Relief Act of 1998 provided the President “the authority to waive for one 
year some economic sanctions” imposed on India and Pakistan. The India-Pakistan Relief Act 
became part of the ‘Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 
1999 (H.R. 4328), and enacted into law on October 21, 1998, as Public Law 105-277 (112 Stat. 
2681).534  
 Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif visited Washington on 2 December 1998. The highlight of 
his trip was the final resolution of the F-16s issue that had been pending due to the Pressler 
sanctions for the past eight years. Pakistani officials had never stopped working with the 
policymakers in Washington to settle the F-16s issue and to make a convincing argument, the 
GOP officials used the logic of ‘fairness’ and ‘law’ to make their case: that it was ‘unfair’ for the 
U.S. to not release the aircrafts had Pakistan paid for and if the issue was not settled, the U.S. law 
would settle it for Pakistan. While the logic of ‘fairness’ did not prove to be a persuasive enough 
argument, Pakistan resorted to the idea of taking the administration to the court to get what it 
deserved. In their account of How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States, Ambassadors 
Howard and Teresita Schaffer write of the successful resolution of the F-16s account as follows 
Recognizing that persuasion was not producing results, Ambassador Riaz Khokhar 
looked for a more compelling approach. He engaged a lawyer, Lanny Davis, who had 
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earlier served in the Clinton White House. At Davis’s suggestion, Khokhar floated to the 
administration the idea of taking the U.S. government to court. He made clear that he 
much preferred to work things out diplomatically, but argued that he “trusted the fairness 
of the U.S. courts.” The U.S. side pushed back. However, once the administration became 
convinced that Pakistan might win in court –– and might even win a judgment awarding 
them principal and interest on their payments –– the search for a mechanism for 
reimbursement began in earnest…. The Pakistanis used a U.S. lawyer, gained leverage 
from the U.S. legal process, and negotiated a pragmatic solution to the problem.535 
 
The Clinton administration ‘tapped a special fund used to pay judgments against the U.S. 
government’ to settle with Pakistan. According to Kux, “since the Justice Department had 
assessed the chances of losing at 70 percent, the administration could tap the special fund for this 
percentage of the $470 million that was owed to Pakistan for the F-16s.” To cover the remainder 
(of the total $658 m), Clinton accepted a “Pakistani suggestion that the U.S. government make a 
“best effort” to provide $140 million of wheat and other commodities on a grant basis over the 
coming two years.”536 While Sharif’s visit resulted in an unexpected deal, he did not stay in the 
government long enough to enjoy the fruits of his triumph. Moreover, this was not the end of the 
F-16s episode.  
 Kargil 1999 and The Military Coup 
After the South Asian nuclear tests, both India and Pakistan had realized the power of the 
weapon that they now possessed. This sobering realization brought the two governments together 
to initiate a series of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) to develop trust in the post-
nuclearized environment. Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee traveled to Lahore, Pakistan, in 
February 1999 via bus marking the ‘resumption’ of once-functional bus service between India 
and Pakistan. The peace process between India and Pakistan resulted in signing of the Lahore 
Declaration where the two countries pledged to work towards achieving peace as two responsible 
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nuclear states. This atmosphere of peace and trust lasted but briefly and was disrupted by a crisis 
in the Kargil region in the Indian-held Kashmir. There is consensus in the literature on the 
origins of the Kargil crisis by American, Indian and Pakistani scholars that  
The Kargil operation was planned by the Pakistan Army using troops of the Northern 
Light Infantry (NLI) under the Force Commander Northern Area (FCNA). The objective 
was to infiltrate the Line of Control and occupy forward posts in the Kargil region, which 
was vacated by the Indian Army during wintertime due to extreme weather conditions 
when patrolling becomes impossible.537  
 
General Musharraf who was COAS at that time published his memoir in 2006 and maintained 
that Pakistan army did not initiate the crisis and that the infiltration was purely an attempt by the 
Kashmiri mujahedeen.538 Bruce Riedel writes that  
Musharraf’s plan was to exploit a traditional stand-down in operations along the northern 
front line of divided Kashmir province to create a fait accompli that would force India to 
the bargaining table on Pakistani terms….The problem was that Musharraf did not have a 
plan B or a fallback option if India refused to give in. If the Indians decided not to talk 
and fight instead, they could try to storm the occupied heights or open a new front 
somewhere else to take pressure off their Kargil positions. In short, India could widen the 
war. If it did, then Pakistan would find itself facing a broader military campaign and 
blamed for starting a dangerous new conflict. And that is what happened.539 
 
At the initial stages of the Kargil crisis when the Indian intelligence agencies were trying to 
understand the situation, their belief was that the usual suspects –– Kashmiri militants or 
freedom fighters –– had infiltrated Kargil. Until late May 1999, Pakistan Army and its chief, 
General Musharraf (who was also Kargil operation’s chief architect), managed to deceive the 
Indians into believing that the infiltrators were the Kashmiri mujahedeen. It was only after the 
Indian intelligence was able to intercept a call between General Musharraf and his Chief of Staff 
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Mohammad Aziz Khan on 26 May 1999 that they realized “the whole operation in Kargil was no 
jihadi operation but a military aggression, planned and executed by the Pakistan Army.”540  
After intense U.S. diplomacy with both Pakistan and India and Sharif’s visit to 
Washington at the height of the crisis, tensions dissipated when Pakistani forces were ordered to 
pull back from the LOC following a cease-fire in the Kargil sector. Bruce Riedel who was 
Clinton’s senior advisor on South Asian affairs at the time provides a detailed account of the 
Clinton-Sharif meeting at the height of the crisis.541  Riedel who was the third and only person 
attending Sharif’s meeting with Clinton at the Blair House on 4 July, 1999 and according to his 
account that was later confirmed by both Clinton and Sharif, the only solution acceptable to 
Washington was Pakistan’s complete and unconditional withdrawal to the LOC. U.S. had 
intelligence about Pakistan preparing its nuclear forces for deployment and Clinton confronted 
Sharif with this information. According to Riedel, Clinton told Sharif that “he was worried that 
India and Pakistan were taking a horrible risk: getting into an escalation of the conflict similar to 
the one that the Soviet Union and the United States stumbled into during the Cuban missile crisis 
in 1962” and asked Sharif “whether he knew how far along his military was in preparing for 
nuclear conflict” but Sharif was “evasive” even though he knew that a nuclear war between the 
two countries would be “a catastrophe.”542  Riedel writes that Clinton gave Sharif “a choice” 
If he would announce the immediate withdrawal of all Pakistani forces to a position 
behind the LOC, the United States would support the resumption of the Lahore process 
between India and Pakistan and urge India to allow the withdrawal to proceed. If not, 
                                                
540 V.P. Malik, Kargil: From Surprise to Victory (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2006), 100  
541 For complete account of U.S. diplomacy during the Kargil conflict see, Bruce Riedel, “American Diplomacy and 
the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House,” Policy Paper Series, Center for the Advanced Study of India, University of 
Pennsylvania, 2002. Bruce Riedel was Special Assistant to President Clinton and Senior Director for Near East and 
South Asia Affairs in the NSC from 1997 to 2001. 
542 Riedel, Avoiding Armageddon,133-134 
 338 
America would blame Pakistan for starting a war that could end in nuclear disaster. On 
top of that, Clinton would blame Pakistan for assisting Osama bin Laden and other 
terrorists. 
 
Riedel writes that “Sharif very reluctantly agreed to withdraw, knowing that he would be 
castigated at home for giving up Pakistan’s territorial gains with nothing to show for it.” 543  
After the U.S. brokered peace in Kargil, Nawaz Sharif’s position in the country became difficult 
and public opinion soured whereby the accord and ceasefire was viewed as a ‘sell out to the 
Americans.’ A rift between the government and the army was all too visible in Pakistan where 
both parties tried to blame each other for an ‘ill-fated Kargil plan.’544 Rumors of a military coup 
in Pakistan came true when in a dramatic manner on October 12, 1999, Nawaz Sharif ordered the 
diversion of the airplane carrying General Pervez Musharraf, the COAS, and the Chairman Joint 
Chiefs, whilst returning after a visit to Sri Lanka –– and dismissed him from service. The 
military takeover was smooth and coordinated by Musharraf from his airplane which landed in 
Karachi to end the sordid episode making him the fourth military ruler of Pakistan. Like all 
previous military leaders, Musharraf also pledged reform and reelection as soon as his ‘interim’ 
rule had stabilized the political situation in the country.  
As a result of the military coup, the United States imposed sanctions on Pakistan under 
Section 508 of the FAA of 1961 that prohibited U.S. economic and military assistance to any 
country whose elected head of the government was deposed by a military coup, but according to 
Kux, “these had little immediate impact, since Pakistan was already under severe sanctions 
because of the Pressler amendment and the 1998 nuclear tests.”545 
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 Additional Relief from Sanctions: Brownback II Amendment 
Interestingly, the same month Musharraf became the ‘Chief Executive’ of Pakistan (and self-
assumed this title) after the coup in October 1999, the U.S. Congress passed Defense 
Appropriations Act FY 2000 (P.L 106-79) also known as Brownback II, which gave the 
president the authority under Title IX to waive the Glenn-Symington sanctions on India and 
Pakistan that had been imposed after the nuclear tests. Title IX also gave the president the 
authority to waive the Pressler sanctions on Pakistan in addition to Glenn-Symington if 
necessitated by the U.S. national security interests. Since the President previously did not enjoy 
any waiver authority under the Glenn sanctions therefore the rationale of the Brownback II 
amendment was to provide the President enough flexibility to engage and influence the behavior 
of India and Pakistan to make them cooperate with each other to avoid an arms race in the sub-
continent post-nuclearization. On the targeted sanctions, the sense of the Congress was that a) 
“the broad application of export controls to nearly 300 Indian and Pakistani entities” was 
“inconsistent with the specific national security interests of the United States” and b) export 
controls were only to be applied to those India and Pakistani entities “that make direct and 
material contributions to weapons of mass destruction and missile programs and only to those 
items that can contribute to such programs.”546 President Clinton exercised his authority under 
Title IX to remove the economic sanctions on India and Pakistan in 2000.  
Five months into office, Musharraf welcomed President Clinton to Pakistan who was on a 
short trip to South Asia on 25 March 2000. As if the Pressler narrative and the stifling sanctions 
were not damaging enough, Clinton’s five-hour trip to Pakistan as opposed to five days in India, 
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added more negativity to the Pakistani public opinion of the United States. With nine months left 
in the White House for Clinton and nothing new to offer, Musharraf did not expect much. After 
the nuclear tests, U.S. non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan transformed into a counter-
proliferation policy and with a new Republican administration in 2001, Pakistan hoped for the 
best.  
 Conclusion 
The Clinton administration, like its predecessors, subordinated its non-proliferation policy to 
achieve broader foreign policy objectives. The administration undermined its non-proliferation 
policy by ignoring the missile and nuclear technology transfers between Pakistan and China and 
missile and nuclear trade between Pakistan and North Korea. Furthermore, the administration’s 
decision not to impose sanctions against China and Pakistan for the sale of ring magnets 
conveyed the message that it was more interested in maintaining economic cooperation with 
China than holding it to tough non-proliferation standards. The administration also failed to bring 
Pakistan and India into the fold of the non-proliferation regime, the CTBT and the NPT despite 
exhibiting successful leadership on achieving the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. But 
while these were documented in history as Clinton’s non-proliferation policy failures, the U.S. 
administration’s actions did not fail Pakistan.  
 Pakistan was on the receiving end of American assistance after Congress passed the 
Brown amendment in 1995. This had authorized the President to release $368 million worth of 
sophisticated weapons to Pakistan that the latter had paid for and were withheld due to the 
Pressler sanctions. Not only that, the Brown amendment was passed despite considerable 
evidence of Pakistan’s engagement in nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation activities. Even 
though the Pressler sanctions remained intact after the passage of the Brown amendment, release 
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of sophisticated defense equipment was a significant triumph for Pakistan. In 1996, Pakistan 
bounced back and resisted pressure from the administration stating its refusal to sign the CTBT 
or any other non-proliferation arrangements unilaterally unless India was also on board. 
Immediately after the Indian nuclear tests in May 1998, the administration attempted to pressure 
India to sign the CTBT as an incentive to stop Pakistan from conducting nuclear tests of its own 
but the attempts were unsuccessful. The U.S. Senate refused to ratify the CTBT in 1999 and after 
George W. Bush won the elections in November 2000, CTBT was taken off the agenda on the 
basis that it was against the national security interests of the United States.  
 The Clinton administration placed unilateral sanctions on India and Pakistan after their 
nuclear tests in 1998. But only after a month of their testing, economic sanctions were removed 
from both countries to resume agricultural activity and a year after their testing, further economic 
relief was provided to both countries. The unilateral sanctions imposed on Pakistan off an on 
during Clinton’s two terms in office, failed to influence Pakistan’s nuclear behavior or policy 
and instead of reinforcing U.S. non-proliferation policy objectives, impeded the attainment of 
other U.S. foreign policy objectives.  
 One issue that remained outstanding throughout Clinton’s eight years in office was the 
continuation of the Pressler sanctions under his administration. Due to Pakistan’s lobbying 
efforts and the threat of a lawsuit, the administration decided to cut its losses and in December 
1998, returned Pakistan an IOU worth $470 million in cash and for the remainder amount 
promised to deliver $140 million worth of wheat and other commodities on grant basis over two 
years. The money was supposedly reimbursement of Pakistan’s 28 F-16 jets stored in Arizona 
desert for which Pakistan had paid $658 million in addition to the storage costs for the planes. 
The New Zealand government decided to buy ‘Pakistani’ F-16s by the U.S. on a ten-year lease-
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purchase deal. However, for Pakistan the issue of the F-16 still remains unresolved and an open 
wound. 
The new administration came with new policies. Non-proliferation was replaced with 
counter-proliferation but only temporarily. On September 11, 2001 (commonly known as 9/11) 
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York changed the Bush administration’s 
national security priorities bringing, once again, war to Pakistan’s border. Afghanistan, where the 
Taliban government was protecting the planners of 9/11, came in U.S. crosshairs. Once again, 
Pakistan became a front line state due to Afghanistan, this time offering its airspace and ground 
lines for transportation of U.S. troops and supplies into Afghanistan in America’s war on 
terrorism. In order to enlist Pakistan’s support, President Bush exercised his authority under Title 
IX (P.L. 106-79) and removed all sanctions on Pakistan (Symington, Pressler and Glenn) to 
resume economic and military assistance in 2001. Only the military coup sanctions under Section 
508 of the FAA remained intact.   
Twenty years after their anti-Soviet partnership, in 2001 Pakistan and the United States 
stood together in familiar territory to negotiate yet again the terms of reengagement for a war, 
one that lasted, this time, for fifteen years. 
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Chapter 8 - Conclusion 
 The Counter-Narrative 
This dissertation has examined U.S. non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan under five U.S. 
administrations, from Ford to Clinton, in the light of Pakistan’s abandonment narrative which 
maintains that Pakistan was used and abandoned by the United States at its convenience and was 
unfairly targeted for nuclear proliferation in South Asia. Development of Pakistan’s narrative has 
been episodic beginning in 1965 with the U.S. refusal to assist Pakistan in its war with India and 
its subsequent arms embargo suspending the much-needed economic and military assistance to 
Pakistan. Table 8.1 provides the episodic summary of Pakistan’s abandonment narrative. 
Table 8.1 Pakistan’s Abandonment Narrative 
Years Episodes 
1965 U.S. did not provide assistance against what Pakistan perceived as Indian aggression 
in the 1965 war. Unfairly sanctioned by the U.S. arms embargo  
1971 U.S. did not provide assistance against its war with India in the 1971 which 
consequently resulted in Pakistan’s dismemberment despite its selfless and unique 
assistance in opening up China for American diplomacy. 
1972-1977 Beginning of Pakistan’s nuclear program. U.S. pressure to cancel the Pak-French 
plutonium reprocessing agreement and halt ‘peaceful’ nuclear activities/unfairly 
targeted for its ‘peaceful’ nuclear program 
1978 Cancellation of plutonium reprocessing agreement by France under U.S. pressure 
1979 Invocation of the Symington amendment against Pakistan to stop its uranium 
enrichment program.  Unfairly sanctioned in comparison with India 
1990 Invocation of the Pressler amendment’s sanctions  against Pakistan immediately after  
the Soviet defeat and U.S. disengagement from Afghanistan.  Unfairly sanctioned for 
‘peaceful’ nuclear program. U.S. forsook alliance 
1991-1995 U.S. withheld Pakistan’s fully-paid 28 F-16s and other defense equipment after the 
Pressler sanctions which were not part of the U.S. ‘aid’ to Pakistan. Unfairly targeted 
1998 Sanctions on Pakistan after its response to Indian nuclear tests with nuclear tests of its 
own in May 1998. Forced to test in the absence of no security guarantees by the U.S. 
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The narrative follows a negative path and hits low notes in all such instances in their alliance 
history where the U.S. has failed to meet Pakistani expectations of its relationship with the 
United States. Central to the development of Pakistan’s narrative about the deviations in 
America’s alliance behavior is the latter’s disregard of Pakistan’s ‘India’ problem. The security 
dilemma Pakistan has faced ever since its independence from British rule and partition from 
British India in 1947 has compelled it to explore means to secure itself against the Indian threat 
or its perception of it, particularly in the absence of tangible security guarantees from the United 
States. Forced by its massive conventional arms inferiority with India and the Indian head-start 
in the nuclear weapons program, Pakistan decided to attain strategic parity with India by 
obtaining nuclear weapons of its own. Pakistan’s quest for nuclear weapons affected its 
relationship with the United States by the former’s challenging the global non-proliferation 
norms championed by the U.S. While Pakistan pushed the envelope with each passing year from 
1972 when it started the nuclear weapons program, U.S. non-proliferation laws attempted to 
constrain Pakistan’s proliferation behavior but did not achieve the desired results. Pakistan’s 
abandonment narrative picked up new themes of ‘selective targeting’ for proliferation in South 
Asia when the U.S. invoked non-proliferation sanctions against Pakistan firstly in 1979 when the 
Symington amendment was invoked and secondly in 1990 when the Pressler sanctions were 
imposed.  
This dissertation provides the first formal chronological analysis of how Pakistan’s 
narrative vis-à-vis the United States has developed over a period of years. After examining the 
U.S. non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan from 1974 to 2001 using archival records from 
presidential and congressional archives, this research determines that the U.S. provided Pakistan 
with a double deterrent: a) the U.S. economic and military assistance over several years provided 
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Pakistan with a decent conventional capability against India and b) in the periods the U.S. was 
dependent upon Pakistan to achieve its regional foreign policy goals, it ‘ignored’ Pakistan’s 
nuclear weapons development, its missile and nuclear technology transfer and trade with other 
countries which enabled Pakistan to achieve its nuclear weapons capability.  
A systematic historical examination of U.S. non-proliferation policies and nuclear 
sanctions on Pakistan from 1974 to 2001 carried out in this dissertation reveals that they did little 
to obstruct Pakistan’s path to nuclear weapons capability. It also means that something does not 
add up in Pakistan’s abandonment narrative: the ‘most sanctioned U.S. ally’ became the world’s 
seventh nuclear weapons state and that means that contrary to its popular narrative, the 
relationship delivered. The body of this dissertation provides evidence that Pak-U.S. alliance was 
not as dysfunctional as often portrayed. Table 8.2 summarizes the U.S. non-proliferation policy 
towards Pakistan under each of the five administrations (1974-2001) in a tabular form. Pakistan’s 
case study suggests that the inconsistency with which the U.S. non-proliferation laws were 
enforced by each administration examined in this dissertation, enabled Pakistan’s nuclearization. 
This research suggests that for the success of U.S. non-proliferation policy to deal with suspected 
proliferants, consistency in enforcement of non-proliferation norms is the key without which the 
United States will not possess the essential threat credibility required to deter proliferation 
behavior.   
The evidence presented in this dissertation also confirms that Pakistan being a small state 
in alliance with a major power like the United States achieved beyond its expectations because of 
how its leadership at different points in time remained persistent in the pursuit of nuclear 
weapons and used the available leverage to gain maximum benefit from the alliance. Pakistani 
public needs to shun the ‘victim’ mentality and acknowledge what its leaders have been able to 
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deliver. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development began under Z.A. Bhutto and it was he who 
managed to confound the United States to solely focus on the Franco-Pak plutonium 
reprocessing deal so that Pakistan’s covert uranium enrichment program could progress 
unhindered beyond international scrutiny –– and it worked. While Pakistan was on its path 
towards uranium enrichment and sanctioned for its unsafeguarded uranium enrichment facility in 
Kahuta under the Symington amendment, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 came as a 
blessing in disguise for Pakistan. General Zia-ul-Haq dexterously exploited U.S. dependency on 
Pakistan for achieving its Cold War objectives towards the Soviets and pressed on with nuclear 
weapons development cognizant of the costs involved. Pakistan weathered the Pressler sanctions 
with all its consequences and Benazir Bhutto and later Nawaz Sharif refused to compromise on 
the nuclear weapons program after its existence became public knowledge. One leader after the 
other Pakistani leader from 1972 to 1998 believed that Pakistan needed strategic parity with 
India and worked towards achieving that capability.  
This dissertation presents a counter-narrative to Pakistan’s abandonment narrative based 
on the evidence examined on the Pak-U.S. relationship during the Cold War and U.S. non-
proliferation policy towards Pakistan, a policy, which in its implementation, benefitted Pakistan 
more than it likes to acknowledge: 
First, Pakistan-U.S. relationship during the Cold War was a two way street. If the United 
States got its national interest served, Pakistan too, very successfully handled U.S. foreign policy 
imperatives at the height of the Cold War to realize its objective of becoming a nuclear weapons 
state and did not waver from the nuclear path.  
Second, India was not rewarded for its proliferation behavior. The Ford administration 
condemned Indian nuclear PNE in 1974 and initiated the London Suppliers Group, an 
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international export control organization, whilst the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act of 1978 
passed by the Carter administration directly aimed at controlling the spread of nuclear weapons – 
a threat that emanated from the Indian PNE. As for the sale of nuclear fuel for India’s Tarapur 
plant, the U.S. was fulfilling its commitment under the 1963 Indo-U.S. nuclear cooperation 
agreement with India since Tarapur plant was under the IAEA safeguards. However, this issue 
needs to be analyzed in the context of the Carter administration trying to bring India into the U.S. 
fold after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and after the Indian support for the Soviet position.  
Third, Pakistan was not targeted selectively by U.S. non-proliferation legislations, at least 
initially. The Symington and Glenn amendments were more general in their approach to stop the 
spread of nuclear weapons and their objective was not solely to curb ‘Pakistan’s nuclear 
activities’. Pakistan got unlucky due to intelligence reports in 1979 about Pakistan’s clandestine 
progress on uranium enrichment program and the Symington amendment triggered 
automatically. If India had been pursuing an enrichment program, the Symington amendment 
would have automatically triggered against it as well. The same was the case with the Glenn 
amendment, which was not conceived with Pakistan in mind. Had the French provided Pakistan 
the reprocessing plant and not cancelled their agreement in 1978, the Glenn amendment would 
have automatically triggered against Pakistan. The only sanctions that were Pakistan-specific 
were the Pressler and Solarz amendments. Even here, a closer examination of the archival record 
reveals that the Pressler amendment was not punitive. It was designed to provide Pakistan 
maximum relief in economic and military assistance by allowing the U.S. president to certify that 
Pakistan was not developing nuclear weapons. President Reagan provided three over-riding 
certifications to ensure that military and economic assistance reached Pakistan unhindered even 
though credible intelligence existed that could have prevented such assistance. The Solarz 
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amendment was passed by the U.S. Congress after Pakistani nationals were caught in violation of 
export control laws in 1985 and 1987 but charges were dropped against them. And despite strong 
opposition, President Reagan invoked and waived Solarz sanctions the same day and moved on 
with the relationship.  
Finally, the United States did not abandon Pakistan immediately after the Cold War 
ended. It is true that Pakistan was hit hard by the Pressler sanctions in 1990 but what is not 
commonly acknowledged is that the Bush administration made every attempt to maintain its 
bilateral commitments with Pakistan to provide Pakistan the spare parts for its military 
equipment even if it meant bypassing the Pressler law. Once the Clinton administration came to 
power, the Brown amendment was passed to modify the Pressler language and ease the effect of 
sanctions on Pakistan. As a result the defense equipment for which  Pakistan had paid $368 
million was returned to Pakistan and the F-16s issue was also settled even if not entirely to 
Pakistan’s satisfaction.  
The Pakistan-U.S. relationship continues to suffer even today due to this narrative that 
has taken deep roots in the Pakistani psyche. Since 2001, more episodes have reinforced this 
narrative and yet the relationship remains. There is so much potential for growth as the two 
countries continue to mature in their foreign relations. The only thing stopping them from fully 
enjoying their relationship is the way the United States is seen in Pakistan and vice versa.  
This dissertation has modestly attempted to settle some uneven arguments in Pakistan’s 
narrative using historical records to develop an insight into the workings of the Pak-U.S. 
relationship to suggest that all is not lost. The counter-narrative presented here is not anti-
Pakistan or pro-U.S. It is based on historical evidence of how the policies were developed, what  
their objectives were and what they achieved. It tells but only one story –– Pakistan was not a 
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victim of U.S. non-proliferation policy. It was able to successfully maneuver in restricted spaces 
and managed to become  a silent beneficiary.  
Table 8.2 U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy Towards Pakistan From Ford to Clinton (1974-
2001) 
 
Administrations Compromises/Tradeoffs Pakistan’s Nuclear Development 
Ford 1974-1977 Resumption of U.S. arms sales to Pakistan 
linked to Pakistan’s assurances for 
peaceful nuclear program 
• Pak provided assurances on not developing 
nuclear weapons 
• Efforts to start plutonium reprocessing  
• Efforts to start uranium enrichment program  
• Started nuclear weapons development 
Carter 1977-1981 • Symington amendment enacted 
• Glenn amendment enacted 
• Invoked Symington sanctions 
• Sought assurances for peaceful 
nuclear program 
• Pressured France to cancel plutonium 
reprocessing agreement with Pak 
• Lifted Symington sanctions after 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
• Pak initially provided assurances on not 
developing nuclear weapons  
• Started uranium enrichment program  
• Condemned Symington sanctions and planted 
PNE gossip 
• Condemned French cancellation of processing 
plant deal and continued its plutonium 
reprocessing program  
• Rejected Carter’s aid offer after Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan and refused to 
provide assurances on Pakistan’s nuclear 
intentions 
• Continued nuclear weapons development 
Reagan 1981-1989 • Renewed aid offer without explicit 
non-proliferation conditions 
• Pressler amendment enacted 
• Solarz amendment enacted 
• Certified before Congress that 
Pakistan was not possess nuclear 
weapons 
• Directed Pakistan not to enrich 
uranium above 5% 
• Invoked and simultaneously waived 
Solarz amendment to continue 
providing economic and military 
assistance to Pakistan 
• Assured not to enrich uranium above 5% 
• Continued to enrich uranium above 5% 
• Received nuclear weapons designs from 
China 
• Conducted its first cold test 
• Clandestinely continued procurement 
activities for its nuclear weapons program 
from the U.S. and Europe 
• Denied involvement in illegal procurement 
activities inside the U.S. after Pakistani 
nationals were caught 
• Continued to provide assurances on not 
developing nuclear weapons 
• Continued nuclear weapons development 
H.W. Bush 1989-1993 • Suspicions about Pakistan’s 
enrichment activities 
• Refused to certify that Pakistan did 
not possess nuclear weapons 
• Invoked Pressler amendment 
• Condemned the Pressler sanctions 
• Continued nuclear weapons development 
• Engaged in missile technology transfer with 
China 
• Condemned the withheld shipment of F-16s 
and defense equipment post-Pressler sanctions 
Clinton 1993-2001 • Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act 
1994 (NPPA) 
• Brown Amendment passed to modify 
the Pressler amendment- no non-
• Continued nuclear weapons development 
• Continued to engage in missile and nuclear 
technology transfer with China 
• Engaged in missile trade with North Korea 
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proliferation conditions attached 
• Ignored Pak-China missiles 
cooperation 
• Ignored Pak-China nuclear 
cooperation 
• Ignored Pak-North Korea missile trade 
• Ignored intelligence about Pakistan’s 
nuclear technology procurement 
• Released the held-up defense 
equipment for Pakistan 
• Agreed to return Pakistan’s money for 
the stored F-16s/settled the F-16s 
issue 
• Harkin-Warner amendment passed to 
resume economic assistance 
• Sanctions after 1998 nuclear tests 
under NPPA 
• Brownback I and II amendment to lift 
the NPPA sanctions – resumed 
economic assistance 
• Refused to unilaterally sign the CTBT  
• Lobbied to get the F-16s and defense 
equipment back 
• Nuclear technology procurement continued 
through international black-market 
• Conducted nuclear tests in response to Indian 
nuclear tests on May 28 and 30, 1998 
• Became the seventh nuclear weapons state 
• Refused to unilaterally sign the CTBT or 
negotiate a FMCT  
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